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Abstract 
Since 1997, public services improvement has been at the centre of the national policy 
agenda in the UK. The greater visibility of poor quality and performance has led to an 
increasing interest among policy makers, health care managers and clinicians in 
understanding the processes by which underperforming organisations can 
`turnaround' their situation. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to a wider 
understanding of organisational failure and turnaround processes in the public sector, 
particularly health care organisations. 
A conceptualisation was carried out concerning organisational failure and the 
turnaround process in the for-profit sector in relation to a range of theoretical 
frameworks and models. As a result, the `stages' theory was selected as a conceptual 
framework with which to organise and interpret the findings of the empirical part of 
the study. 
A comprehensive review was conducted to examine the findings of empirical studies 
regarding the processes of organisational failure and turnaround across a range of 
public services. The review showed insufficient empirical studies in this field in the 
health sector. The review concluded that a range of both external and internal factors 
contributed to organisational failure and various triggers were identified, which 
initiated the process of change. A range of turnaround interventions were identified 
including reorganisation, retrenchment and repositioning strategies. 
A qualitative case study of a purposefully sampled hospital Trust, involving semi- 
structured interviews (57 interviewees from different organisations) and a review of 
background documents were carried out to explore the symptoms and causes of 
organisational failure, factors that triggered the process of change, and the perceived 
effectiveness of a variety of turnaround interventions. Symptoms of organisational 
performance failure were identified, including financial deficit, lack of good external 
relationships, inability to meet core targets, lack of clear management systems and 
low staff morale. These markers had not been taken seriously by the previous senior 
management team. Symptoms of failure reflected the presence of secondary and 
primary causes of failure. Poor managerial leadership, poor financial control and 
performance management, lack of an open culture, distraction by two large projects 
and the lack of clinician engagement were perceived as internal causes of failure and 
the high level of policy changes within the NHS as the key external cause. The level of 
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deprivation in the area was also thought to have had a negative impact on 
performance. The replacement of the Chief Executive Officer and executive members 
of the Board and the public reporting of poor performance and external investigation 
reports were perceived as the main triggers for change. The Trust's managers were 
able to develop and implement their action plan and turnaround performance without 
receiving direct intervention from external organisations. The interventions deployed 
within the Trust may be classified under three key categories: i) Reorganisation 
(replacement of the Chief Executive Officer and executive members of the board, 
internal restructuring and increased involvement of clinical staff in the management 
of the organisation, and an increased focus on performance management); ii) 
Retrenchment which aimed to stabilise the crisis situation using tight financial 
control and focus on main performance targets); iii) Repositioning strategies which 
aimed to sustain performance improvement by attempting to change organisational 
culture, better stakeholder management and external relationship and developing 
new vision. Several unintended consequences of turnaround interventions (e. g. 
distortions of clinical priorities and presence of stress and anxiety among staff) were 
identified. 
The findings of this study make a significant contribution to our understanding of 
organisational failure and the turnaround processes and reinforce and expand those 
of recent studies in the public sector, particularly in health care. 
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Chapter i: Introduction 
The principal aim of this thesis is to identify and explore the key factors associated 
with organisational failure and turnaround in NHS hospital trusts. This chapter 
presents an introduction and brief background to the research, outlines the objectives 
of the study and details the structure and organisation of the thesis. 
1. i Introduction 
Over the last two decades, increasing attention has been given to reforming the 
financing, organisation and delivery of public services, with a wide range of strategies 
deployed by national and local governments to this end (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). 
These strategies can be divided into two broad approaches: those that focus on the 
external environment within which public sector organisations operate; and those 
that target changes internal to these organisations (Jas and Skelcher, 2005; Boyne, 
2oo3a; Martin et al., 2001). Public sector reform has generated increasing interest in 
organisational performance measurement and management in the public sector, not 
least in the US and the UK (Propper and Wilson, 2003; Turner et al., 2005). For 
example, according to the American National Government, as cited in the 
Performance Results Act of 1993, all federal departments and agencies were given a 
mandate to develop a five year strategic performance plan for measuring the 
performance of each programmed activity against allocated agency budgets, using a 
range of quantifiable performance indicators and measures (Kravchuk and Shack, 
1996). These performance measures differentiated between organisations on the basis 
of their performance, and considerable variations between US public organisations 
were identified following an appraisal process of federal, state and local government 
services (Ingraham et al., 2003). In the UK, although a range of performance 
indicators has been incorporated into the management of the public sector since 1979 
(Propper and Wilson, 2003), the new Labour Government has placed a much greater 
emphasis than its predecessors on measuring and managing the performance of 
public services (Boyne, 2003a). This government, elected in 1997, has sought not only 
to improve the efficiency and quality of services delivered but also to reduce 
inequalities in service provision, across population sub groups and between 
geographical areas (Jas and Skelcher, 2003; Boyne, 2006). 
In consequence, the performance of UK public sector organisations has increasingly 
been subject to external systems of checking, verification and audit, and a range of 
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performance metrics of varying obtrusiveness has developed (Walsh et al., 2004; 
Goddard et al., 1999; Propper and Wilson, 2003; Micheli and Kennerley, 2005). A 
variety of reasons motivates the use of performance measurement and assessment 
(Harris, 1998). Mannion and Goddard (2002) identify four: 
 " ensuring the accountability of health organisations and professionals to a range 
of external stakeholders; 
  facilitating efficient market mechanisms by providing consumers with information 
on the relative performance of health care providers, and thereby creating 
incentives for providers to improve quality and performance; 
  securing central government control of semi-autonomous agencies within 
devolved health systems; 
  promoting continuous performance improvement within provider organisations 
by identifying opportunities for improvement through comparison both within the 
organisation overtime and between similar organisations. " 
To date, a range of comparative performance rating and scoring systems have been 
applied to UK public organisations in service areas such as education, health, and 
transport, ranking their performance from poor to high (Boyne, 2003a). 
Organisations unable to achieve a minimum level of acceptable performance, are 
`named and shamed' and labelled as `poor' or `failing'. One example is the national 
performance `star rating' system in the National Health Service (NHS), operating 
between 2001 to 2005 to rank the performance of NHS organisations ranging from 
zero star (poor performance) to three stars (good performance). The ratings were 
based on organisational performance against a range of key national targets and 
information provided by the Commission for Health Improvement and other 
regulatory agencies. The comprehensive performance assessment (CPA) is another 
example of a performance measurement system in the UK public sector that classifies 
the local governments into five categories (poor, weak, fair, good and excellent). Such 
schemes bring poor performance into the public domain and contribute to political 
pressure to improve or `turnaround' poor performers (Joyce, 2004; Andrews et al., 
2006). As a result of the public release of comparative performance data, poorly 
performing organisations are identified and exposed. The greater visibility given to 
problems associated with poor performance has led to an increased interest in 
understanding how organisations can shift from low to high performance. This 
performance improvement process is commonly termed `turnaround' (Mordaunt and 
Cornforth, 2004; Joyce, 2004). 
2 
In order to improve the performance of failing organisations, it is crucial to 
understand the causes of organisational failure and the factors that lead to successful 
turnaround. There is extensive literature on the nature of organisational failure and 
turnaround in the for-profit sector, but in the public sector and particularly in health 
care settings, such evidence is sparse (Edwards et al., 2003; Boyne, 2006; Jas and 
Skelcher, 2003). Meire and Bohte (2003) maintain that the causes of organisational 
failure in the public sector have been subject to insufficient academic attention, and 
policy makers and managers lack robust evidence to guide the implementation of 
successful strategies (Boyne, 2006). Against this background, the purpose of the 
present study is to contribute a deeper understanding of the process of organisational 
turnaround in NHS Trusts. 
1.2 Aim and Objectives of the study 
The aim of this study is to contribute to a wider understanding of organisational 
failure and turnaround processes in health care organisations through an 
investigation of the organisational process that led to a significant improvement in the 
performance of a zero starred acute hospital Trust. 
The specific objectives of the study are to: 
" explore the symptoms of failure and factors that have contributed to poor 
performance in the Trust; 
" explore the factors (triggers) that have stimulated performance improvement in 
the Trust; 
9 identify the turnaround strategies used by the organisation in the processes of 
performance improvement in the Trust; 
" identify any unintended and dysfunctional consequences of turnaround strategies 
in the Trust; 
" identify factors that facilitated (or impeded) turnaround strategies and 
interventions in the Trust; 
9 explore the applicability of stage models, developed in the for-profit-sector, for 
understanding and predicting performance improvement in health services; 
" draw out general lessons regarding the most appropriate strategies to prevent, 
diagnose and turnaround `organisational failure' in NHS. 
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1.3 Outline of thesis 
The thesis is organised around nine chapters, which closely align with the `stage' 
theoretical framework set out by McKiernan (2002). The stage framework is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2. The outline of the rest of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 2 Organisational failure and turnaround process: 
definitions, concepts and models 
Chapter 2 discusses organisational failure and turnaround processes, from the 
perspective of a range of theoretical frameworks and conceptual models. The burden 
of the emphasis here is on the for-profit sector, from which most of the theories and 
empirical evidence are derived. Different definitions, symptoms, causes and the 
diagnosis of organisational failure are discussed using a range of theoretical 
perspectives. The concept of turnaround, turnaround `stage' framework, turnaround 
interventions and their consequences are also discussed. In addition, where relevant, 
these concepts are examined within the context of public service delivery. The 
rationale for selecting McKiernan's stage model for conducting this empirical research 
is also set out. The concepts, models and theories, discussed in Chapter 2, are used 
later in the thesis in both Chapter 3, which provides conceptual background for 
conducting a comprehensive review of the public sector literature in this area, and in 
the chapters reporting and discussing the findings of the empirical phase of this study 
(Chapters 5,6,7 and 8) by providing a basis to interpret the empirical evidence. 
  Chapter 3 Organisational failure and turnaround in the public 
sector: a review of the evidence 
Chapter 3 presents the results of a comprehensive review of the literature on 
organisational failure and turnaround across a range of public services, with a 
particular focus on health care provision. The conceptual background detailed in 
Chapter 2 is used to organise, report and interpret the findings of the studies included 
in the review. A summary of the findings, key theoretical frameworks and key 
research methods related to the selected studies, and gaps in the existing empirical 
evidence, are reported. In particular, the symptoms and causes of organisational 
failure are presented, together with triggers for change, turnaround interventions and 
their consequences. The differences between the public and for-profit sectors in this 
regard are also examined. 
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Chapter 4 Research methodology 
Chapter 4 details the methods used in the empirical study: study design; sampling; 
data gathering; and analysis. A detailed explanation of the case study approach (the 
research strategy used in the study) and the `Framework analysis' (used to analyze the 
qualitative data) are presented. The NHS `star' performance rating system is outlined 
and star rating is used as a key indicator of organisational performance in the study. 
Validity, reliability and ethical issues (e. g. confidentiality and consent) are also 
outlined. The findings of this empirical study are presented in three sequential 
chapters which reflect the progressive nature of organisational failure and the 
turnaround processes within the `stage' framework. 
  Chapter 5 Findings: organisational failure- symptoms and causes 
of failure 
Chapter 5 presents the findings regarding the symptoms of failure in the case study 
organisation and explores the factors that contributed to the failure of the Trust (both 
secondary and primary factors are addressed). In addition, the responses of staff to 
the announcement of the Trust's zero star rating are presented. 
  Chapter 6 Findings: triggers for change 
Chapter 6 presents the case study findings regarding the diagnosis of poor 
performance and the triggers for change in the Trust. The reactions of newly 
appointed managers to organisational failure are presented and the role of internal 
and external factors in initiating the process of change is explored at length. 
Chapter 7 Findings: turnaround process- turnaround 
interventions and their consequences 
Evidence relating to the turnaround process in the Trust is presented in Chapter 7. 
The range of interventions and strategies deployed to improve the Trust's 
performance are explored and interpreted using the `3R' model (Boyne, 2004a). The 
impact of interventions and factors that facilitated or impeded the implementation of 
turnaround strategies are also discussed at length. The unintended and dysfunctional 
consequences of these interventions and their impact on staff, patients and delivery of 
services are also outlined. 
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Chapter 8 Discussion 
Chapter 8 draws together an overall summary of the evidence presented in previous 
chapters. These finding are compared and contrasted with the extant literature in the 
field and key similarities and differences are presented. It also examines the 
applicability of the `stage theory', in the health sector and discusses whether the 
theory is well suited to understanding the process of change in the health sector. 
Chapter 9 Conclusion, policy and research implications 
The final chapter sets out the overall conclusions of the study and discusses the policy 
and research implication of this research. 
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Chapter 2: Organisational failure and turnaround 
process: definitions, concepts and models 
2.1 Introduction 
There are major debates concerning the theoretical basis for understanding 
organisational failure. As most of the literature in this area is derived from the for- 
profit sector, particularly in the USA, the majority of definitions and theoretical 
models relate to this sector. The aim of this chapter is to define organisational failure 
and turnaround within the context of various theoretical frameworks and conceptual 
models. Although there is far less academic literature on public service organisations, 
the definition of these terms and their applicability to the public sector are also 
considered. 
This chapter comprises the following sections. Section one outlines the concept of 
organisational failure and as this is closely related to performance, conceptualisation 
of performance and performance measurement are also discussed. Section two 
focuses on symptoms and causes of organisational failure and triggers for addressing 
failure. Section three discusses theoretical models, interventions and outcomes 
related to the turnaround process. 
2.2 Definition of organisational failure 
In the literature, there is no clear, consistent and objective definition of what 
represents `organisational failure' and as a consequence, it is a subjective and 
contested term. Researchers and practitioners have described it variously as: decline; 
organisational mortality; organisational death; organisational exit; crisis; fiasco; and 
bankruptcy (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). 
Pandit (2000) defines failure as an `existence-threatening decline' in the 
performance of a firm. Hambrick's (1985) definition is `one in which business 
performance is persistently below some minimally acceptable level'. This definition 
shows that `failure' is shaped by three elements: performance; the minimum 
acceptable level of performance; and performance which is `persistently' below this 
acceptable level. These are now discussed in turn. 
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2.2.1 Organisational performance and performance measurement 
Defining and measuring organisational performance is problematic, not least 
because for any organisation a wide range of performance criteria may apply (Palfery 
et al., 2004). Steer (1975) indicates that early empirical work in this area used a 
narrow measure of organisational success. However, organisational performance 
was later recognised as a multidimensional construct, and to capture its complexity a 
wide range of measures should be considered (Cameron, 1986; Boyne and Dahya, 
2002). 
Turnaround studies in the business sector have tended to define and measure 
performance in terms of financial criteria (e. g. profitability and rate of return on 
investment) (Hoffman, 1989; Boyne, 2004b). Decline and improvement in 
performance is usually judged against these criteria, although this approach may 
disregard important non-financial performance criteria that apply to the for-profit 
sector, such as corporate social responsibility, the welfare of staff and impact on the 
environment (Palfery et al., 2004) and stakeholders' opinions (Lohrke et al., 2004). 
The performance of public organisations is even more complex and difficult to 
measure, (Jas and Skelcher, 2005; Boyne, 2004b) especially in a multi-agency and 
multi-layered organisation such as the NHS (Mannion et al., 2003). Rainey (1997) 
states that the multiple goals of public sector organisations are politically motivated 
and contested. Stakeholders continually judge the performance of an organisation 
from their own perspectives (Kimberley et al., 1983; Cameron, 1986). In any public 
organisation, there are a range of different internal and external stakeholders, such 
as consumers, providers, national government, regulators, and tax payers, each with 
a legitimate interest in organisational performance and each with a different 
viewpoint on what constitutes `good' (or poor) performance (Appleby et al., 2002; 
Mannion et al., 2003; Boyne and Dahya, 2002). Even when stakeholders have the 
same criteria, they may weight them differently in importance (Boyne, 2004b), 
resulting in a variety of evaluations of the performance of an organisation (Mannion 
and Goddard, 2002). Conflict of interests and views among stakeholders is inevitable 
and, in many public sector services, it is difficult to establish a clearly agreed 
definition of performance (Shaw, 2003). Connolly et al. (1980) indicate that an 
organisation is likely to be viewed as a good performer if it can satisfy the demands of 
its key stakeholders. 
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The `Competing Values Framework' (CVF) of organisational effectiveness developed 
by Quinn and Rohrbaug (1981,1983) can be used to describe a political perspective 
on the performance of organisations. As illustrated in figure 2.1, two major 
dimensions (axes) generate four quadrants when they are intersected. The first 
dimension relates to the focus of the organisation, ranging from an internal emphasis 
on the well being and development of its staff to an external emphasis on 
organisational survival. It indicates where the location of power to define 
organisational performance: inside or outside the organisation (Boyne and Dahya 
2001). The second dimension (axis) indicates the preference of the key stakeholders 
for structure, ranging from flexibility to control. Each of the four quadrants 
characterises a concept of organisational performance: open systems, rational goals, 
human relations, and internal processes. 
The `open system' model places prominence on flexibility and has an external focus, 
using performance criteria such as growth and resource acquisition and political 
support. The emphasis of the `rational goal' is on control and the external position of 
power, using planning, goal setting and achievement and with productivity and 
efficiency as performance criteria. The `human relations' model stresses the internal 
locus of power and flexibility, with an emphasis on cohesion, morale and 
development of human resources. It encourages participation and involvement of 
staff. The `internal process' model accentuates control and the internal position of 
power, relating performance to stability and control, with information management 
and communication carrying most weight. 
Human Relations 
Model 















Figure 2.1 The Competing Values Framework of organisational 
effectiveness 
adapted from Quinn and Rohrbaug (1983) 
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Although each of these dimensions is likely to be present in any organisation, certain 
political groups, with their preferred performance criteria, may predominate. For 
example, the current performance regime of the UK public sector reflects the 
`rational goal model'. Public organisations in the UK (e. g. schools and hospitals) are 
currently under tight external regulation (a focus on control) from government 
agencies (powerful external stakeholders), in order to achieve explicit and 
quantifiable targets. The power to define performance measurement is clearly 
externally rather than internally located (Boyne and Dahya, 2001). 
Mannion et al. (2003) discuss the particular difficulties and challenges in the 
measurement of organisational performance in the NHS, outlining the wide range of 
measures that can be used to assess health care performance depending on the 
purpose and particular audience in question (e. g. clinical outcomes, patient 
satisfaction, staff variables, productivity, equity etc). Assessing comparative 
performance across health care organisations is a difficult task, given the range of 
technical problems involved. For example, the data may be incomplete or inaccurate 
and the quality of available data may be poor (having a low level of validity and 
reliability). There are also difficulties in the risk adjustment of data. Smith (2005) 
stresses that mode of presentation, precision and timeliness of performance data can 
affect the value of the data for different end users. Discrepancies may also arise from 
`hard' information contained in league tables (quantitative data) and `soft' 
intelligence information (qualitative data) disseminated via informal professional 
networks (Goddard et al., 1999). These difficulties have led to serious problems in 
providing objective measures of health care performance and similar issues arise in 
the definition and measurement of performance in other public sector organisations, 
such as schools and local government services. 
The inference from the above research is that a single measure of performance is 
unlikely to satisfy the needs of all end users. In the UK, the government applies 
composite indicators, which integrate a range of criteria, into a single measure in 
order to compare the performance of the organisations (e. g. star ratings in the NHS 
and Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) for Local Government). Star 
ratings are discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
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2.2.2 Minimal acceptable level of performance 
The acceptable level of performance is a key issue in Hambrick's definition of failure, 
though Harvey (2005a) argues that setting a point at which a poor performance 
situation becomes organisational decline is problematic, particularly when the 
organisation or external assessors use different sets of indicators to assess their 
performance. The business literature demonstrates that some managers achieve an 
acceptable level by setting lower performance thresholds in order to maintain or 
advance their personal reputation. In any objective analysis, it is important to 
consider who defines the level of acceptable performance in an organisation (Boyne, 
2004b), this being even more problematic where the indicators and their underlying 
objectivity under criticism and public debate. 
2.2.3 Definition of persistent poor performance 
Nash (2002) argues that setting a specific period of time to identify persistently poor 
performance is a contested issue. Poor performance over a time period of between 2- 
4 years is commonly regarded in empirical research in the for-profit sector as 
`persistently' poor performance (Lohrke and Bedeian, 1998). However, 
organisational decline may occur within a much shorter timescale as a result of 
unexpected or extraordinary events (Balgobin and Pandit, 2002). Most of the 
turnaround studies in the private sector use an annual performance assessment to 
evaluate an organisation performance. Boyne (2004b) maintains that the 
`periodicity' of failure in the private sector is related to the nature of the services 
provided and the frequency of collecting, monitoring and publishing these data. He 
argues that, in the public sector, the time period over which persistent decline should 
be measured needs to be more flexible than in the private sector. For example, an 
annual performance assessment might be appropriate for a school, but in a hospital 
setting, a consistently high death rate over a short period of time (e. g. a month) 
requires more immediate consideration. 
It is important to distinguish between a temporary decline in performance and a 
long-term failure. Miller (1994) states that even high performance firms can 
experience a short-term decline in attainment. Some commentators argue that such 
situations may be used as a learning opportunity to inform long-term success 
(Donaldson, 1999; McKiernan, 2002). However, organisations may see further 
decline if they do not respond to the performance problems through appropriate 
remedial and corrective action (Boyne, 2004b). A short-term decrease in the success 
of an organisation is not normally considered to be decline, but if the organisation 
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does not instigate strategic change, but continues to pursue its current strategy, 
`organisational death' may occur, either through bankruptcy or takeover by other 
firms (Slatter, 1984). 
2.2.4 Concept of failure in the public sector 
As noted previously, studies conducted in the private sector tend to use financial 
criteria to measure performance and to track the decline of an organisation. In the 
public sector, difficulties with the definition and measurement of performance make 
defining failure more problematic (Walshe, 2004; Mordaunt and Otto, 2004). In the 
UK public sector, a combination of formulae and discretionary judgements are 
currently in use to define failure (Boyne, 2004b). Although different performance 
indicators are considered in the assessment of some public organisations (e. g. 
hospital star ratings), significant discretion from external assessors also plays an 
important role in the final judgement (Bache, 2003). Boyne (2004b) argues that on 
balance, it is judgment that carries more weight than standard formulae in the 
labelling of failing organisations in the UK public sector. 
Pandit (2000) defined failure as an `existence-threatening decline' in the 
performance of a firm. In the public sector, Pandit's definition is more difficult to 
apply, because `existence -threatening' is not usually an issue for poor performers in 
the same way as in the private sector (Walshe, 2004). A public organisation such as a 
hospital or a school is unlikely to be dissolved completely (Kaufman, 1976), as it has 
a commitment to provide a range of services for the population and it is often 
politically insensitive to `exit' the market (Jas and Skelcher, 2005). Consequently, the 
risk of closure or takeover is far less of an incentive to act than in the private sector 
(Boyne, 2004b). Meyer and Zucker (1989) in their typology classify poorly 
performing public organisations as "high persistence, low performance" 
organisations. They argue that in the public sector "social constraints impede the 
operation of economic or economic-like forces that would sustain high performing 
organisations and shut low performers. " (Meyer and Zucker, 1989: 115), so these 
organisations continue to operate until positive changes are taken to address the 
poor performance (Jas and Skelcher, 2005). Nevertheless, public agencies do not 
always survive and poor performing public sector organisations may be merged with 
similar public organisations, be subject to privatisation or `outsourcing', or split into 
smaller units (Boyne, 2004b). 
According to the political perspective, public services failure arises when "key 
stakeholders are so dissatisfied that the continued existence of an organisation as a 
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separate entity is threatened" (Boyne, 2004a). When the performance of an 
organisation is not able to satisfy the expectations of its key stakeholders, legitimacy 
and support is likely to decline (Jas and Skelcher, 2005). Edwards et al. (2003) state 
`in the NHS failure is possible through simply not moving forward sufficiently 
quickly'. However, there is obvious ambiguity in this definition and different 
stakeholders may have contrasting perspectives on failure and the speed of change. 
Jas and Skelcher (2005) argue that it is rare to see the total failure of a multi- 
functional organisation. Indeed, they cite examples of good performance within UK 
local authorities rated as poor performers. They also emphasise that in public 
organisations, the performance curve appears to be cyclical rather than linear, 
meaning that performance needs to be assessed in terms of the stage in the cycle an 
organisation finds itself. In brief, any assessment of organisational failure and 
turnaround needs to take into account a range of dimensions of the performance (e. g. 
efficiency, effectiveness, and equity) and the perception of their relative importance 
in order to judge whether or not a public organisation is in decline and in a 
turnaround situation (Boyne, 2004b). 
2.3 Routes to failure 
D'Aveni (1989) states that decline can occur suddenly or gradually. Although decline 
could be occasioned by a single event, some researchers consider the process as the 
product of a series of causal events. A range of models have been developed to 
explain decline. Weitzel and Jonsson's (1989) model separates decline into five 
sequential stages: blinded, inaction, faulty action, crisis, and dissolution. Table 2.1 
details these stages and the corresponding organisational action that leads to them. 
Except for the dissolution stage, all are reversible if the organisation addresses the 
problem appropriately and within an acceptable time period. 
Table2.1 Stages of organisational decline and corresponding 
organisational action 
Stages Organisational action 
i. Blinded Failure to anticipate or detect pressure toward entropy; decline 
begins 
2. Inaction Failure to decide on corrective action; decline becomes noticeable 
3. Faulty Action Faulty decisions; ineffective implementation of decisions 
4. Crisis Given faulty-action stage and unforgiving environment, last 
chance of reversal. Given forgiving environment, slow erosion 
5. Dissolution Given crisis stage and unforgiving environment, rapid demise. 
Given forgiving environment, slow erosion 
Source: Weitzel, W. and E. Jonsonn (1989) `Decline in Organisations: A Literature Integration and 
Extension'Administrative Science Quarterly 34, pp 97 
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McKiernan (2002) outlines a number of behavioural characteristics which commonly 
accompany organisational failure in the business sector. At first, the existence of a 
major problem may be rejected or concealed by managers (ignorance phase). When 
the problem continues and becomes evident to external and internal stakeholders, 
the senior managers try to relate the decline to other parties or external factors 
beyond their control in an attempt to transfer the blame (blaming others). Managers 
may even manipulate some of the information to give the impression of a better 
performance (information disguise) than is actually the case. Evidence shows that 
good managers become disillusioned and tend to leave when they perceive that there 
is no future for the organisation with the current weak managerial team, thereby 
worsening the situation for that particular organisation (managers tend to exit). 
Finally, the top management team, especially the CEO, may be replaced due to a loss 
of faith by external stakeholders in the present style of management. 
Slatter (1984) delineates a model to understand crisis development. This is 
comprised of four stages: crisis denial; hidden crisis; organisational disintegration; 
and organisational collapse. He concludes that the consequence of the final stage is 
either failure or successful recovery depending on the action of the organisation, the 
latter usually being achieved by a new manager(s). It is important to find the main 
reason(s) behind the first stages of decline (occurring symptoms of decline) and this 
cannot be accomplished unless subtle scrutiny of organisational development takes 
place early enough in the process. 
2.4 Definition of turnaround 
Pandit (2000) defines organisational turnaround as "the actions taken to bring about 
recovery in performance in a failing organisation". He argues that the results of 
successful turnaround strategies vary. On a sliding scale, the lowest acceptable 
baseline for the organisation's stakeholders is `survival' - the highest reflects 
`sustainable' performance improvement. 
In this process, organisations are often engaged in a range of short, medium and 
longer-term activities to develop their managerial and leadership capacity and 
capability, deal with operational problems immediately, reshape their structure and 
consider new strategies to assure their long term success (Harvey, 2005a). The 
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results of a successful recovery range from what the organisation's different 
stakeholders would consider merely acceptable economic performance to achieving 
sustainable, more highly competitive situations in the market (Balgobin and pandit, 
2001). Temporary performance improvement in a poorly performing organisation is 
not referred to as `turnaround' and an organisation is required to show continuous 
performance improvement. 
The business literature reveals that the frequency of performance turnaround 
situation among firms is rising and surprisingly, the turnaround activities for 
organisations suffering considerable and/or chronic decline in performance result 
more in failure than recovery (Pandit, 2000). Poorly performing organisations in the 
UK public sector, which need turnaround activities, have also become more evident 
with the rise in external systems of checking, verification and audit. 
2.5 Symptoms of organisational failure 
Various symptoms and causes of organisational failure are identified in the 
literature (Mone et al., 1998; Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1988; D'Aveni, 1989; 
McKiernan, 2002). In McKiernan's framework (2002), he differentiates symptoms 
from causes of decline, whilst other researchers conflate these terms (Harvey et al., 
2005a). Three separate, although inter-related, levels of organisational failure are 
categorised in McKiernan's model: i) symptoms; 2) secondary causes; and 3) 
primary causes of failure. These are illustrated in figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 McKiernan's model of failure 
Diagnostic direction 
Symptoms Secondary causes Primary causes 
Causal direction 
McKierna. n, (2002), developed from Neumatr (1998) 
McKiernan proposes that symptoms are the initial observable indicators of the 
presence of a problem in an organisation, and classifies these in to four categories: 
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  Physical (e. g. supply difficulties, lack of investment in new technologies, product 
failure) 
  Managerial (e. g. managerial paralysis, lack of leadership, board conflict) 
  Behavioural (e. g. ignoring problems, culture of cynicism and fatalism, lack of 
strategy, attitude) 
  Financial symptoms (e. g. decreasing profit, increasing debts, declining in 
demand, high level of financial competition). 
Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) also identify a range of symptoms of failure in the for- 
profit sector through their broad literature review including: shrinking financial 
resources; negative profitability; shrinking market; exit from international markets; 
and severe market share erosion. 
McKiernan (2002) argues that financial symptoms are more easily distinguished and 
measured than symptoms relating to `human' and `organisational' capital. Public 
domain and external stakeholders may have easier access to the former than the 
latter, which are likely to be found in internal reporting systems and may be 
disseminated by top managers with some discretion. However, financial problems 
and their severity can be consciously obscured through vague financial reporting 
(McKiernan, 2002). Slatter and Lovett (1999) refer to the difference between 
reported performance and actual performance of an organisation as the `reality gap'. 
Early detection of the symptoms of failure may help organisations to recover. 
Adequate management consideration of these markers may result in identification of 
the causes of the problem and appropriate corrective action being taken during the 
early stages. 
2.6 Causes of organisational failure 
A running debate in the business literature has concerned the exact causes of 
organisational failure (Mellahi et al., 2002). McKiernan (2002) classifies the sources 
of the failure in the business sector into two broad groups: secondary and primary. 
Secondary causes are a combination of internal and external factors and decline can 
be related to multiple secondary causes. McKiernan (2002) suggests three further 
categories within the secondary causes, including financial (largely internal such as 
absence or inadequacy of cash flow forecast, costing systems, and budgetary control), 
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demand (largely but not entirely external), and managerial (internal such as poor 
management, especially at CEO level). 
McKiernan (2002) relates all symptoms and secondary causes of failure to primary 
causes, pointing out dysfunction in terms of failure in organisational learning 
processes, as the primary cause of failure. He argues that the inability of the 
organisation to make proper use of available information to learn about themselves 
and their environment causes performance decline and failure. He cites a variety of 
reasons for problems with the learning process, including lack of experience 
(especially in young organisations), over confidence, complacency, and rigid thinking 
within the organisation. For example, in the case of `rigid thinking', organisational 
members behave and act on the basis of a prevailing belief system (paradigm) and 
follow routines which have become embedded and entrenched over time. These 
comprise the central element of the culture of an organisation, so any changes or 
learning processes not compatible with the paradigm, may be disregarded. In 
consequence, organisations that are unwilling to challenge their dominant belief 
systems may not be able to adapt to environmental changes and these can ultimately 
cause the organisation to fail (Protopsaltis et al., 2003). Some organisations may 
diagnose problems but do not take corrective action sufficiently early perhaps , 
because of the presence of powerful routines that channel managerial responses. 
Typically, such organisations use existing rules and routines as comfort zones and 
resist change (McKiernan, 2002). 
A review of the literature by Balgobin and Pandit (2001) reveals a clear agreement in 
the findings of cross-sectional studies for the causes of decline in the business sector. 
He highlights several inter-connected causes, of which three internal and three 
external are identified in all the studies. The three external causes are: decline in 
demand; increase in competition; and increase in input costs (e. g. salaries, raw 
materials, and number of personnel exceeding the organisation's resources). 
The first internal cause of failure is poor management (e. g. an inadequate CEO; 
inadequate balance of skills and knowledge at the top level; management problems; 
poor quality of management; lack of participative boards; insufficient depth in 
middle management). A study conducted by Grinyer et al., (1990), identified poor 
management as the cause of failure in 45% of their sample of UK companies of 
different sizes, experiencing different levels of industrial decline but which, 
subsequently, presented a process of sharp and sustained recovery. The second cause 
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is inadequate financial control (e. g. a very conservative financial plan; high 
debt/equity ratio and improperly financed resources) (Slatter, 1984). The third 
cause is high cost structure (e. g. operating insufficiency, high overheads, and scale 
effects as three elements of high cost structure in 35%, 30% and 28% of Slatter's 
(1984) sample, respectively). 
Bibeault (1982) found that 67 % of failure in his samples from the private sector was 
related to internal factors, 9% to external factors alone, and 33% to a combination of 
external and internal causes. 
Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) identified different perspectives through a 
comprehensive literature review on the causes of organisational failure: a 
Deterministic view including Industrial Organisation (IO) and Organisational 
Ecology (OE) on one hand and a Voluntaristic view comprising Organisational 
Studies (OS) and Organisational Psychology (OP) on the other. 
Industrial Organisation refers to the economic theory of market competition and 
strategies used by firms. Organisational Ecology refers to a sociological tradition that 
studies the evolution of organisational populations. Both these perspectives 
emphasise the external environment as the cause of organisational failure (Mellahi 
and Wilkinson, 2004) and ignore internal factors, such as the threat of the rigidity 
effect and structural inertia (Witteloostuijn, 1998). Although these perspectives differ 
in some areas, both presume a deterministic role for the environment and argue that 
exogenous industrial and environmental restrictions constrain managers in their 
strategic choices. They argue that in many circumstances managers have little or no 
control over external factors that cause organisational failure (Mellahi and 
Wilkinson, 2004). `On the other hand the Voluntaristic perspective sees internal 
factors as the main causes of failure (Cameron et al., 1988). Figure 2.3 maps four 
perspectives and their related concepts to organisational failure. Each discussed in 
detail below. 
2.6.1 Industrial Organisation perspective (10) 
The Industrial Organisation perspective (IO) supposes that organisational failure is 
caused primarily by changes in the external environment, which are the result of a 
range of technological, economic, regulatory and demographic factors (Scott, 1992). 
A range of studies has highlighted the effect of the environmental factors on firms' 
performance (Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Melin, 1985; Zammuto and Cameron, 
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1985). Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) illustrate some of the main causes of 
organisational decline according to the Industrial Organization (10) literature, 
including `turbulent demand structure' owing to `brand shifting' by the main clients, 
changes in customer taste, declining demand. 
Three different dimensions, which describe the industrial environment, are used to 
explain the relationship between an organisation and its environment: dynamism; 
munificence; and complexity. `Dynamism' refers to an uncertain environment 
resulting from the extent of change and difficulty in predicting change. The term 
`Munificence' refers to the extent of available resources. `Complexity' illustrates the 
extent of heterogeneity and range of an organisation's functions, which reveal the 
extent of linkage, both internal and external (Dess and Beard, 1984). Mellahi and 
Wilkinson (2004) argue that dynamism and complexity have a positive correlation 
with the `organisational death rate' and suggest that there is an adverse relationship 
between munificence and the `organisational mortality' rate. However, Anderson and 
Tushman (2001)indicate that uncertainty (dynamism) is a considerably more 
serious problem than the other two. 
2.6.2 Organisational Ecology theory (OE) 
Organisational Ecology theory (OE) applies a natural selection model to 
organisational dynamics. It is based on a biological analogy, in which organisations 
scan the environment and compete and recognise situations, mechanisms and 
processes underlying emergence, growth, regulation and demise (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989). OE emphasises the understanding of reciprocal relationships 
between populations and communities containing organisational ecosystems (Baum, 
1996). It presumes that other institutions can affect the rate of success or failure of 
an organisation (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). According to the OE perspective, 
organisational failure is related to four main factors: population density; industry life 
cycle (ILC); the organisation's age; and its size (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). A 
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2.6.2.1 Population density 
The total number of organisations within the relevant population in the market 
(population density) can indicate the expected failure rate. In the private sector, the 
relationship between population density and the probability of failure has been found 
to be U-shaped (Hannan and Freeman, 1988a). There are two key mechanisms with 
two opposing effects- legitimation (the recognition of the group of organisations) and 
competition (justification of the effect of population density on the failure rate). 
Organisational death begins at a high level and drops when legitimacy rises, then 
rises when the competition rate increases. An escalation in the number of 
organisations within a population results in raising the legitimacy of the population 
and consequently causes greater absorption of resources by those organisations. This 
decreases the failure rate. Before reaching legitimacy, the number of organisations is 
fairly small. They cannot attract resources, so a high rate of failure may result. But, 
when the number of organisations increases in a way that boosts competition for 
resources, the failure rate will rise because of the increasingly competitive 
environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1989 - cited in Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). 
Dobrev et al. (2001) state that the location of an organisation in the market can affect 
the failure rate once the population density rises. In this situation, organisations in 
the centre of the niche market are more likely to fail than those on the periphery. 
2.6.2.2 Industry Life Cycle (ILC) theory 
ILC theory explains that businesses move through a predictable sequence of 
developmental phases (Klepper, 1997). Several variants on the number and 
definition of the life cycle stages can be found in the literature. Figure 2.3 depicts one 
of the examples shown in the curve of the Industry Life Cycle (ILC) stages. Industry 
Life Cycle (ILC) theory presumes that all organisations move irreversibly towards the 
equilibrium of death through different stages (Boulding, 1950). In consequence, 
organisational failure is considered a natural and objective event, the outcome of 
factors such as saturation of demand, running out of supplies, and introduction of 
new technology (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). 
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2.6.2.3 The effect of organisation's age 
Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) show that the expected probability of failure among 
young organisations is higher than among similar, but more established and more 
mature organisations. They apply `liability of newness' theory and `adolescence' 
theory to explain this phenomenon. Henderson (1999) states that rates of decline 
ultimately decrease as the age of an organisation increases. The high rate of failure in 
younger organisations is caused mainly by inadequate or lack of formal 
organisational structure, unstable relationships with customers and a lack of 
attention to the necessary costs involved in learning new tasks and processes. Also, 
insufficient investment in creating new roles, the conflict such roles present and the 
lack of organisational stability contribute to a higher risk of failure in younger 
organisations (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). Aldrich and Auster (1986) outline 
some key constraints that affect new organisations, such as government regulations, 
tax laws, increasing capital, and competition for labour. 
2.6.2.4 Effect of organisation's size 
Empirical findings support the view that mortality rates decrease with increased size 
(Ranger-Moore, 1997). According to the liability of smallness theory, small firms are 
more susceptible to failure than larger ones because of inadequate resources, 
problems in competition for premium labour supplies, and higher administration 
costs (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). Furthermore, Baum (1996) illustrates that small 
firms do not have adequate legitimacy with external stakeholders. In contrast, larger 
organisations have access to more resources, are able to recruit more highly skilled 
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staff (Aldrich and Auster, 1986) and possess greater political authority (Ranger- 
Moore, 1997). However, some researchers argue that larger size may increase 
organisational inertia, including inadequate responses to environmental changes, 
resulting in a higher risk of failure (Ranger-Moore, 1997). 
2.6.3 Criticism of the deterministic view 
In general, OE perspectives place more emphasis on the role of industry/population 
than on the firm's internal strategies and relate the performance of organisations to 
the environments within which they exist. Environmental factors are viewed as the 
main cause of both the birth and demise of organisations. However, this perspective 
cannot explain why, in the same environment, some organisations fail while others 
succeed. In addition, some studies have found that organisational strategies have a 
more significant role than environment as the main determinants of performance 
(e. g. Harrigan, 1980; Meyer, 1982). They maintain that IO/OE perspectives alone 
cannot justify the failure of an organisation, except in cases affected by very extreme 
external factors. Therefore, internal factors should be taken into account when 
attempting to explain the failure process (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). 
2.6.4 Organisation Studies and Organisational Psychology 
The Organisation Studies (OS) and Organisational Psychology (OP) perspectives 
view failure and success as a result of internal rather than external and 
environmental factors (Cameron et al., 1988). They focus on the role of managers as 
the key decision makers in a firm and assess their ability to react to external factors 
(Mellahi et al., 2002), rejecting the IO/OE perspective that assumes managers are 
powerless in determining organisational performance. 
Mone et al. (1998) emphasise that managers' perceptions of the external 
environment influence the way in which organisations are managed. Mellahi and 
Wilkinson (2004) conclude that managers' personal characteristics and erroneous 
perceptions may cause organisational failure. However, they argue that 
organisational decline cannot be explained by any grand theory in the OS/OP 
literature and outline middle range theories including: Groupthink theory; Upper 
echelon theory; Curse of success; and Threat rigidity effect. Each of these internal 
causes of failure is discussed in turn below. 
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2.6.4,1 Group think theory 
Janis (1972, P. 286) developed the `Groupthink' theory, defining it as "a mode of 
thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, 
when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically 
appraise alternative courses of action". He states that such consensus- seeking in a 
group may result in sub-optimal decision-making. Groupthink practice is likely to be 
exhibited under the following conditions: the presence of a highly cohesive group 
(members with similar backgrounds); existence of an isolated external group with 
contrary views; presence of a directive leader who discloses his or her desires; and 
absence of a clear decision making process in the group (Janis, 1972). Janis (1972) 
reports that, according to group thinking, people in the group assume that they 
comprise a harmonic group and that the decisions they make are moral and ethical. 
They view themselves as invulnerable and are overconfident regarding the success of 
the decisions they have made. Information is not processed accurately and external 
information is disregarded by such teams, where self-censorship is practiced. 
Performance decline and the consequent organisational decline are likely results of 
this kind of thinking and decision making process (Peterson et al., 1998). 
2.6.4.2 Upper Echelon Theory 
`Upper Echelon' theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) relates organisational 
outcomes - strategic choice and organisational performance - to the characteristics of 
their managers. The composition of the top management team and managerial 
succession are considered to be two important factors contributing to organisational 
failure (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). 
The response of the senior management teams to their firms' decline is influenced by 
different factors: homogeneity of the senior management team (Pitcher and Smith, 
2001; Ferrier et al., 2002; Ferrier and Lyon, 2004); tenure (Mone et al., 1998; Miller, 
1991); and the functional background of senior managers, especially the CEO 
(Zimmerman, 1989). In terms of tenure, the literature highlights the difference in 
reaction to the causes of failure in a crisis situation (e. g. external threat) on the part 
of new management and long-tenured managers. New managers tend to relate 
failure to internal factors (Mone et al., 1998), while long-serving managers typically 
blame external factors, deeming them transitory and beyond their control. Managers 
with longer tenure tend to ignore internal factors and are highly committed to the 
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existing routines. They are also apt to rely only on a limited source of information, 
fail to investigate warnings and challenges facing them, and do not respond to 
environmental changes (Wiersma and Bantel, 1993; Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). 
In Miller's (1991) view, such senior managers may become `stale in the saddle', 
leaving their organisation to face severe problems which result in failure. The 
evidence shows that heterogeneous groups (members with different backgrounds) 
react better than homogenous groups in uncertain and turbulent environments. 
However, some researchers argue that in a crisis situation, where timely decisions 
are important, a homogenous group can make decisions more quickly (Mellahi and 
Wilkinson, 2004). Ferrier and Lyon (2004) notes that less homogeneity among 
senior management teams results in the reduction of the range of strategic actions 
carried out by failing organisations. 
Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) state that different effects of succession on 
organisational failure are identified in the literature. When the composition of the 
firm's top management is changed, it is referred to as the executive succession. The 
appointment of new executive can affect strategic decision-making processes 
(Wiersma, 1992). Some studies show a higher probability of failure through the 
succession process, especially when it occurs in small organisations (Alexander and 
Lee, 1996) or in their early stages (Carrol, 1984). Insufficient experience in working 
with succession is the cause of this failure (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). However, 
the positive effect of succession on the performance and survival of organisations has 
been addressed, especially in turbulent environments (Virany et al., 1992). In 
addition, Helmich (1974) argues that outsider successors are more successful than 
those internal to the firm. 
2.6.4.3 Curse of success (fallacy of success) 
Starbuck and Hedberg (1977) have coined the phrase `success breeds failure' to 
explain a specific type of organisational failure among successful firms. Miller (1994) 
argues that a firm's history in terms of its previous success may breed overconfidence 
and arrogance among its managers. A dominant idea might be established among the 
leaders of an organisation as a result of its previous success (Jas and Skelcher, 2004), 
which indicates how the organisation should be run and what is important to the 
organisation (Weiss, 1995). At some level this dominant idea and way of working 
may prove successful, but it may also result in neglecting 
further search into 
performance improvement, with the organisation maintaining the operating 
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functions related to the dominant idea associated with success in the past (Jas and 
Skelcher, 2004). As a consequence, the firm may reduce its focus on quality and 
product development, fail to deal with negative customer feedback, reduce its 
attention to any short-term falls in sales, and fail to monitor product innovation, 
persisting with previous successful routines (Whetten, 1987). Such organisations are 
more likely to show resistance to change (Miller, 1994) and may become vulnerable 
(Whetten, 1988). The failure of Marks and Spencer over the past decade is an 
example of the `curse of successes', with no focus on the changes taking place in the 
external environment (e. g. new technology, higher level of competition, and new 
ways of retailing). Management of Marks and Spencer disregarded information 
which was in conflict with their dominant paradigmatic beliefs (Mellahi et al., 2002). 
2.6.4.4 Threat rigidity effect 
Some types of organisational failure have been explained by the threat-rigidity effect 
model developed by Staw et al. (1981). This model assumes that in the face of a threat 
or crisis, individuals, groups and organisations tend to act rigidly by avoiding 
changes and trying to maintain the status quo. Organisations and managers restrict 
information flow and persist in applying previous internally-established assumptions 
and expectations. These may not result in the strategic actions and adaptations 
required to solve the problem (Staw et al., 1981; Millikien and Lant, 1991). 
Furthermore, managers centralise authority, exercise stricter control over the 
organisation and restrict new actions. D'Aunno and Sutton (1992) report less 
participative decision-making, and more commitment to existing procedures, as 
consequences of the threat rigidity effect among senior managers faced with a decline 
in funding sources. In addition, poor information systems may not allow sufficient 
consideration of information on the part of management, which is likely to result in 
poor performance (Wilson et al., 1999). Peterson and Behfar (2003) argue that some 
managers blame others for failure as a reaction to performance problems. They add 
that reduction of group consistency (reaction at intergroup level) and task conflict 
and relationship conflict (reaction at intragroup level) are exhibited in a crisis. 
As managers do not always make an adequate response to external threats 
(environmental changes) and crises, or even ignore problems altogether (McKiernan, 
2002), the situation can worsen and result in failure. Organisational psychology 
perspectives argue that the response of managers in such situations could be related 
to factors that are beyond their awareness. Indeed, they believe that organisational 
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failure is often linked to hidden, sub-conscious feelings on the part of management 
(Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). 
2.6.5 Criticism of the Voluntaristic view 
Some researchers criticise the voluntaristic view on organisational failure. The main 
weakness of the OS/OP perspectives is the lack of a'grand theory' to explain 
organisational failure. Literature shows a high level of confidence in a series of 
middle range theories (Groupthink, Upper echelon, Curse of success, Threat rigidity 
effect). In addition, the outcome of middle range theories has shown fragmented and 
unconnected results, as discussed previously. Furthermore, this perspective relies 
highly on internal factors and overlooks the context within which organisations work. 
Most of the studies that have investigated the effect of internal factors on failure have 
been conducted in the USA, so their findings may be heavily context-dependent, and 
caution should be used when generalising to other countries (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 
2004). 
In conclusion, it is important to note that only in some extreme conditions, 
organisational failure can be caused by external or internal factors independently. 
For example, environmental or economic catastrophes as external causes, or severe 
managerial misconduct as an internal cause can result in organisational failure. In 
other cases, both internal and external factors contribute jointly to the process of 
decline (Pajunen, 2005). For instance, the result of the succession process in failure 
is dependent on both the nature of the succession (e. g. internal successor vs. external 
successor) and the context within which succession occurs, as well as ecological 
specifications such as the age, size, density and life cycle stage of the organisation 
(Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). 
According to the literature, Jas and Skelcher (2004) have developed a typology by 
combining two factors: source of failure (internal and external) and the capability 
level of the organisation to deal with the decline and initiate turnaround (high or 
low). This is illustrated in table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 Typology of performance decline 
Ability of organisation to initiate turnaround 
High Low 
Source of decline External e. g. changing user e. g. authoritative 
preferences, failure by reallocation of 
service supplier where resource base, 
alternatives available disasters 
Internal e. g. ineffective e. g. political 
management systems, poor instability, 
consumer information corruption 
Source: Jas and Skelcher (2004) 
Jas and Skelcher (2004) divide external sources of failure in two types. The first 
consists of factors that undermine the organisation's functioning and the 
organisation is unlikely to avoid failure and initiate turnaround when confronted 
with such issues. Disasters (natural or man-made) or reallocation of resources by a 
party with a higher level of authority, are examples of the first type. In contrast, when 
organisations face the second type of external factors (e. g. shifts in customer 
preferences, redesign of service delivery mechanism, development of new technology 
by competitors or failure by service suppliers where options exist) they are more 
likely to manage or even prevent failure. 
In this model, internal causes are categorised into two groups. They can affect the 
capability of the organisation to deal with them effectively. Some causes are mainly 
technical in nature (e. g. poor management systems or poor consumer information) 
and organisations probably address them through relevant interventions. However, 
some factors are more complex and difficult to resolve. Political insecurity, 
corruption and problems related to managerial culture are examples of this second 
group. The existence of complex internal political or managerial problems, make it 
more difficult to initiate turnaround strategies (Jas and Skelcher, 2004). 
McKiernan (2002) argues that symptoms, primary and secondary causes of decline 
cannot be isolated and are inter-related and interactive in such a away that they can 
potentially combine to exacerbate the situation. Except in very extreme situations, 
such as disasters, failure is usually caused by a combination of different factors. 
However, in the literature, top management teams are commonly identified as the 
main cause of failure and as a result the most common form of intervention to 
turnaround poor performers is their replacement, especially CEOs. It is assumed 
that management is unlikely to be the sole cause of decline and managers may be 
symptoms of failure as much as causes (Walshe et al., 2004). 
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2.7 Prediction and diagnosis of failure 
The failure of an organisation may be prevented if a detection system is set up to 
identify early signs and symptoms of performance decline. McKiernan (2002) 
suggests that early detection is likely to be the result of the presence of a good 
scanning system for alerting the organisation to changes in the environment, an 
effective management information system and a recognised management control 
framework, such as a balanced scorecard. It is difficult to predict decline when 
relying too heavily on quantitative measurement of performance because other 
sources of data, such as soft data (non-quantitative measurement), that may 
highlight gaps in the organisation's performance are not given sufficient and/or 
timely consideration. Walshe et al. (2004) indicate that in some studies failure has 
been predicted by using a wide variety of sources of data, particularly in the short or 
medium term (up to two years). They suggest that the benefit of using a wide source 
of data (both hard and soft data), is to identify `at risk' organisations in an attempt to 
avert future failure and decline. 
McKiernan (2002) emphasises that in order to recognise the main secondary causes 
of failure, an excellent diagnostic procedure is requested. He suggests a diagnostic 
policy should: avoid hurried decisions; adopt multiple perspectives; search for broad 
initial information; consider ambiguous symptoms; create multiple hypotheses; 
generate diagnostic algorithms for reduction; and consider the type I error (rejection 
of a hypothesis when it is true) and type II error (acceptance of a hypothesis when it 
is false). This diagnostic procedure needs to be adapted to the particular situation of 
each organisation (e. g. organisational culture) and recognize prevailing externalities 
if it is to work effectively. This system is likely to provide direction and guidance for 
the organisation to recognise secondary causes of decline appropriately and at the 
right time. McKiernan (2002) adds that even overconfidence in professional 
consultants is likely to be moderated by such a diagnostic framework. 
When performance levels are far below the acceptable level, a triggering process is 
required. Triggers act as activators for both a diagnosis process and a call for action 
(McKiernan, 2002). Inertia and active resistance to change are exhibited by the 
majority of organisations (Crow and Hartman, 2003). As a consequence, a significant 
jolt or trigger to act must take place, otherwise the organisation faces a high risk of 
failure (McKiernan, 2002). 
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Both internal and external stakeholders can delay the diagnosis of failure. Indeed, 
they may fail to recognise, disregard or conceal problem until incidents or a crisis 
trigger interventions (Walsh et al., 2004). Meyer and Zucker (1989) argue that before 
failure is identified some organisations may experience intermittent cycles of decline 
and partial improvement or slow escalating decline. 
Triggers can be internal (e. g. recognition of the problem by senior managers) or 
external (e. g. high pressure for change from external stakeholders) (McKiernan, 
2002). Walshe et al. (2004) argue that formal diagnosis of organisational failure is 
often not totally unexpected for most stakeholders, especially internal ones. They 
argue that for these stakeholders, only public acknowledgement of problems that 
were already evident, gave impetus for changes to be made. 
Some commentators argue that performance decline has to be severe to trigger 
radical change. In this situation, the problem is rarely ignored or disguised by those 
within the organisation (Balgobin and Pandit , 2001; Weitzel and Jonnson, 1989). In 
their case studies, Grinyer et al. (1990) found different types of triggers. They 
revealed that introducing a new chief executive (in 55% cases) and recognition of 
major problems by managers (in 35% of cases) were the most important triggers in 
the for-profit sector. The other sources of triggering were intervention from external 
bodies, a change of ownership or the threat of such a change, and perception by 
management of new opportunities. In most cases, multiple rather than single triggers 
have been recognised, especially in the case of severe problems or crises. Some 
researchers, including Schendel et al. (1976) and Bibeault (1982) find management 
change to be the most important trigger for action. Walshe et al. (2004) identify 
extreme events or accidents which result in performance failure, as playing a role as a 
trigger for action because they are so obvious and may expose wider organisational 
failure. 
Grinyer et al. (1990) emphasise that the mere presence of triggers may not 
necessarily induce remedial responses. Jas and Skelcher (2004) outline the changes 
which are necessary to recover an organisation, particularly a permanently failing 
organisation, on the basis of the `stress-inertia' theory of strategic renewal. Inertia in 
the organisational context is defined by Huff et al. (1992, P 56) as `the level of 
commitment to current strategy, reflecting individual support for a given way of 
operating, institutional mechanism used to implement strategy, monetary 
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investments and social expectations'. They note that inertia is characterised by a 
predilection to maintain the status quo and resist strategic renewal, especially when 
the current strategies have worked successfully in the past (fallacy of success). Katz 
and Kahn (1978) in Crow and Hartman (2003) highlight sources of resistances to 
change, including structural inertia, limited focus of change, group inertia, threat to 
expertise, threat to established power relationships, threat to established resource 
allocation, economic factors (e. g. reduction in an individual's income), and the fear of 
uncertainty which emerges after change. On the other hand, organisational stress 
uncovers ways in which the current strategy is not satisfactory. The lack of fit 
between demands and opportunities confronted by an organisation and the capacity 
of current strategies to react to those situations, can build up organisational stress 
(Huff et al., 1992). 
According to the stress-inertia theory, organisations are conceived essentially as 
inertial and a significant strategic change happens only when the level of stress 
becomes greater than the inertia and its resulting resistance (Barker et al., 2001). 
Therefore, strategic changes might happen through decreasing resistance stemming 
from inertia or increasing stress levels deriving from dissatisfaction with the status 
quo. Stress can increase as a result of different factors, such as dynamism of the 
environment (environmental changes), performance decline, executive replacement, 
and changes in rules and policies (Huff et al., 1992). 
Accumulation of stress in the organisation necessitates the strategic renewal process. 
However, Barker et al. (2001) theorise that performance decline is not sufficiently 
stressful to initiate change, and other factors such as external intervention or internal 
power repositioning (e. g. change in senior management) are also required. This 
assumption can potentially justify the necessity of external interventions to initiate 
change in poorly performing organisations which are unable to develop turnaround 
processes internally. 
2.8 Stages theories of failure and turnaround 
Despite an increasing interest in the academic and practitioner literature, to date, no 
coherent theory of organisational turnaround has been developed (Lohrke et al., 
2004; Pajnuen, 2005). The focus of studies has typically been on the examination of 
the turnaround strategies (e. g. Hall, 1980; Goodman, 1982; Altman, 1983; Hoffman, 
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1989; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; Barker and Duhaime, 1997), causes of failure 
(e. g. D'Aveni, 1989; Mone et al., 1998; Hambrick and D'aveni, 1988), and the 
composition of boards and turnaround managers' characteristics (e. g. Barker et al., 
2001; Daily and Dalton, 1994). Most empirical evaluations overlook the investigation 
of turnaround as a whole process (Pajunen, 2005: Shook, 1998). Chowdhurry (20o2) 
highlights the fact that separation between empirical findings (mostly on the basis of 
correlational studies in the private sector) and research explaining the causal 
structure of events, from the beginning of the organisation's decline to its eventual 
recovery or death, has resulted in a lack of coherent theory in organisational 
turnaround. However, the `stage' approach is exceptional because it purports to 
explain the process of decline and/or turnaround as occurring in sequential stages 
(Pajunen, 2005) that may result in the survival and performance improvement or 
failure of an organisation (Chowdhurry, 2002). It structures the process in terms of 
sequential phases. 
A variety of stage theories or conceptual models can be found in the literature, each 
of which applies slightly different definitions and distinctions. The focus of some 
stage theories is on the turnaround process itself and these divide the process into 
different stages (e. g. Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Bibeault, 1982). According to the 
former, two different stages of response to decline can be by the organisation, 
including a'decline-stemming stage' which aims to overturn dysfunctional 
consequences of decline (erosion of external stakeholders, loss of efficiency and 
deterioration of internal climate and decision process) and stabilise the situation, 
and the `recovery stage', which comprises activities that result in the growth of the 
organisation in terms of competition in the market and achieve long-term success. 
The decline stemming stage goes beyond the activities that only emphasise reduction 
in cost and assets, considering garnering stakeholder support and stabilising the 
internal climate and decision processes of the firm. These two stages are comparable 
to `operational' and `strategic' activities (Hofer, 1980) or `efficiency' and 
`entrepreneurial' functions (Hambrick and Schecter (1983), which are discussed in 
the next section (turnaround interventions). Bibeault (1982) characterises the 
turnaround process comprising five stages including: management change; 
evaluation; emergency (stop the progress of the firm's financial haemorrhaging); 
stabilisation (improve core operation); and return to normal growth. A combination 
of the emergency and stabilisation phases forms the firm's retrenchment stage. The 
return-to-growth phase is identical to the recovery stage. 
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In another class of stage models (e. g. Balgobin and Pandit, 2001; McKiernan, 2002; 
Chowdhurry, 2002), the turnaround phase forms only one part of the process and 
the decline and crisis phase, as well as triggers for change that precede the 
turnaround phase, are also included (Pajunen, 2005). In fact, these stage approaches 
link the process of failure and turnaround and pursues the level of improvement in 
the organisation. These models place emphasis on the incidents that explain how 
conditions change over time. Balgobin and Pandit (2001) develop a model 
explaining the failure and turnaround process in five overlapping but distinct stages 
consisting of decline and crisis, triggers for change ( stimulation of the activity 
required for change to happen), recovery strategy formulation, retrenchment and 
stabilisation (cost cutting and asset reduction), and return to growth (profitable 
growth). 
In a similar model developed by McKiernan (2002), the process is divided into six 
stages: failure phase (poor performance due to the internal and external factors); 
triggering actions (the very stimulation of the activity required for change to happen 
in terms of both problem diagnostic process and call for actions); diagnosing 
activities (identification of the main secondary causal factors); retrenchment 
(stabilising the situation and providing positive cash flow through cost cutting and 
asset reduction, tighter control, autocratic management and rationalisation); 
recovery (activities to achieve further performance improvement after stabilisation 
through efficiency and/or entrepreneurial strategies); and renewal (return to a level 
of performance similar or even better than that prior to decline). The interventions 
are discussed in detail in the next section. 
Chowdhury (2002) defines a model consisting of four different stages: decline 
(including role of internal and external factors in occurring decline and also shows 
the source of interventions that trigger actions in this stage such as replacement of 
the incumbent CEO); response initiation (starting corrective operational and/or 
strategic actions); transition (the time period needed before the results of the 
turnaround strategies shows and includes implementation of strategies and complex 
interaction of strategy, culture, structure, technology and human variables); and 
outcome (failure or success). Ghowdhurry (2002) states that "the stages are not 
disparate, rather, they are sequentially linked and mutually reinforcing. " In this 
model, four core concepts including performance, strategy, implementation and 
performance are allocated to these four stages (decline, response initiation, 
transition, and outcome) respectively (Chowdhurry, 2002). 
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The `decline phase' in Chowdhury's model is similar to the first two stages of 
McKiernan's model (`failure phase' and `triggering actions') and Balgobin and 
Pandit's model ('decline and crisis' and `triggering for change'). Response initiation is 
comparable with the `recovery strategy formulation' in the model of Balgobin and 
Pandit and is also analogous with `diagnostic activities' in McKiernan's model. 
Transition is analogous with `retrenchment' in Balgobin and Pandit's model and with 
the two last stages of McKiernan's model (retrenchment and recovery). The last stage 
of Chowdhury's model (outcome- success) is in accordance with the `return to 
growth' and `renewal' stages of Balgobin and Pandit's model and McKiernan's model 
respectively. 
Boyne (2004b) has developed, through an extensive review of the business literature, 
a model containing seven separate stages: the onset of decline; corrective action to 
avert a turnaround situation; the turnaround situation; the search for new strategies; 
selection of a new strategy; implementation of the new strategy; and outcomes of 
turnaround strategy. No model of the turnaround process has yet been developed in 
the public sector (Boyne, 20o4b). 
Although the stage models assume all turnaround processes will be successful, in the 
real world that may not be the outcome of turnaround strategies (ineffective 
turnaround), as they may end in bankruptcy and organisational failure (McKiernan, 
2002). Pandit (2000) points out that the number of organisations in the private 
sector subject to ineffective turnaround is increasing. 
These stage theories provide a useful framework to investigate the whole process but 
it should be recognised that in real world contexts they do perform interdependently 
rather than in a sequential, logical and linear fashion (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). 
This means organisations may experience movement between stages, miss out a 
stage, become trapped in a stage for a long period or apply several stages 
concurrently (McKiernan, 2002). 
The McKiernan stage model (2002), consist of six stages, has been selected as the 
theoretical framework to organise, report and interpret the findings of this empirical 
case study. The framework provides the opportunity to link organisational decline 
and turnaround processes as together as occurring in sequential and differentiates 
between symptoms and causes of failure (secondary and primary), allowing the 
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researcher to discover diagnostic and causal relationship relationships between these 
(see section 2.5). Triggers of change, turnaround interventions used by the 
organisation, and the outcome of the turnaround strategies are also considered using 
this framework. As this framework has been in limited use in the health sector (two 
studies, one of which remains unpublished), the findings of this case study can be 
compared with those studies. The applicability of the model is also investigated 
within the health sector. 
2.9 Turnaround interventions 
According to the stage approach, when the decline is diagnosed a series of strategies 
(interventions) should be selected and implemented to turnaround the performance 
of the organisation. Turnaround strategies have been examined by different 
researchers (e. g. Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Hoffman, 1989; Hambrick and Schecter, 
1983; Barker and Duhaime, 1997; Pearce and Robins, 1993). For example, Hofer 
(1980) dichotomizes the response of the organisation to the strategic response (e. g. 
by changing marketing processes or entrance to the new business) or operational 
responses (e. g. using cost reduction). In the former approach, organisations reverse 
the problem through implementing strategic changes but in the latter by increasing 
efficiency and exerting more control. Hambrick and Schecter (1983) have referred to 
these as `entrepreneurial' strategies and `efficiency' strategies respectively. 
There is no single, generally accepted description for turnaround strategies within 
the private sector literature (Boyne, 2004a). Some experts classify intervention into 
major generic strategies. For example, Walshe et al. (2004) distinguish between 
three: Replacement, Retrenchment, and Renewal and similarly Boyne (2oo4a) 
categorises these as the `3Rs', including Reorganisation, Retrenchment and 
Repositioning. In spite of the different titles, similar areas of activity are addressed 
by each, including: 
i) Reorganisation (Replacement) refers to change in the management of the 
organisation. Boyne (2004a) refers to reorganisation as any change in the 
internal management of an organisation (e. g. changes in planning, styles of 
human resources management, performance management, and the extent of 
decentralisation) but he emphasises that the most prevalent type of the 
reorganisation is the replacement of the chief executive and/or the entire or part 
of the senior management team. 
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2) Retrenchment refers to employing short-term actions to stabilise the 
organisation and controlling short-term problems (e. g. cost cutting and asset 
reduction). 
3) Repositioning or renewal refers to initiating new strategies to assure long-term 
success. 
All three strategies may be adopted by an organisation simultaneously rather than 
sequentially (Harvey et al., 2005a). To choose appropriate and timely turnaround 
strategies, organisations need to consider the causes of the decline (external vs 
internal) (Pearce and Robins, 1993; Arogyswamy et al., 1995; James, 2002; Slatter 
and Lovett, 1999; Schendel and Paton, 1976; Hofer, 1980) and the severity of the 
decline (e. g. severe vs not severe) (Hofer, 1980; Pearce and Robins, 1993). 
Turnaround strategies that do not focus on the causes and severity of the turnaround 
situation may not achieve appropriate results or may accomplish only short-term 
successes rather than long-term growth. For example, if the failure is related to the 
poor quality of leadership or ineffective operational management, replacing this 
management may result in improving performance but it may not be effective in the 
case of long term unresolved strategic issues (Edward et al., 2003). Initiating new 
strategies (repositioning) has frequently been applied when the problems are related 
to external factors (Pearce and Robins, 1993). Hofer (1980) suggests that in less 
severe crises, small changes such as cost cutting may be enough to engender recovery 
but when the organisation faces severe crisis, other dramatic interventions, such as 
market reorientation, should be used. There is no rigorous evidence on the 
effectiveness of turnaround strategies in the public sector which reveals the necessity 
of further research in this area. Boyne (2004b) and Fox (2003) highlight the need for 
the speedy and timely development and implementation of strategies in the 
turnaround situation for public organisations. Boyne (2004b) suggests that highly 
visible and politically prominent public organisations may experience huge pressure 
to provide a recovery plan quickly. In contrast, less prominent organisations are less 
visible and probably under less pressure, which means that they are likely to have 
more time to analyse the situation and benefit from more consultation when 
implementing a recovery plan and implementing turnaround strategies. 
2.9.1 Replacement (Reorganisation) 
One of the most common types of turnaround strategies discussed in the literature, is 
the replacement of key members of the management team with either internal or 
external people (Walshe et al., 2004; Jas and Skelcher, 2005). Top management 
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team replacement is considered an essential prerequisite for a successful turnaround 
by some commentators (Barker et al., 2oo1; Mueller and Barker, 1997). In most 
cases, only the chief executive officer is at high risk of removal. However, it can often 
entail one or two other senior managers or, in special cases, all members of the top 
management team (Walshe et al., 2004). The new CEO or senior managers may also 
act in the process of diagnosis of failure and act as a trigger factor (an agent for 
initiating change) (McKiernan, 2002). Some researchers state that the most 
significant trigger for change is to effect change in the top management team 
(Schendel and Paton, 1976; Bibeault, 1982; Slatter, 1984). Boyne (2006) also 
categorise changes in the planning system, the extent of decentralisation and style of 
human resources management as reorganisation strategies. 
The upper echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), discussed earlier, is 
employed by some researchers to justify the significant impact of senior managers 
(especially CEO) on the development of strategic plans and consequently 
organisational performance. In addition, according to stress-inertia theory, 
management replacement may increase the level of stress to such an extent that 
organisational change is essential (Huff et al., 1992). 
In a turnaround situation, long-serving managers may be highly committed to the 
existing strategies that resulted in the decline, and reject any change of these in 
response to the identification of problems (Barker and Patterson, 1996). In the crisis 
situation they may demonstrate the threat rigidity effect, mentioned earlier, which 
limits them in dealing with the crisis properly (Barker et al., 2001). Slatter (1984) 
also argues "the existing management is rarely capable of taking the drastic action 
needed to effect a turnaround". Hoffman (1989) highlights substantive reasons for 
changing the top managers, including managers' incapability to identify or deal with 
the decline, the need for different expertise and information to tackle the crisis, and 
removal of untrustworthy staff. In this situation, the presence of new leaders seems 
necessary to unfreeze current attitudes and provide new insights into the situation. 
New leaders may also collect information on the cause of the failure using different 
analytical methods, consult with internal and external people, change the power 
structure within the organisation, and provide new strategic direction (Hoffman, 
1989; Barker and Mone, 1998; Barker et al., 2001). 
Removal of long-serving managers and replacing them with new staff also has a 
symbolic function. It can relay a clear message about the gravity the organisation is 
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placing on the recovery programme and strategic changes that, in turn, may prompt 
the staff, and particularly external stakeholders, to allocate the required time and 
resources to reverse decline (Boyne and Meier, 2005). 
Boyne (2oo4b) has reviewed the impact of reorganisation or replacement strategies 
on turnaround processes in nine studies that compared successful and unsuccessful 
turnarounds in the for-profit sector. He found that in six, replacement intervention 
resulted in performance improvement (O'Neil, 1986a; Muller and Barker, 1997; 
Pearce and Robbins, 1994; Thietart, 1988; Stopford and Baden Fuller, 1990; Harker 
and Sharma, 1999). There was no difference in the outcome in two of the studies 
(Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001; Bruton et al., 2003) and there was a negative effect on 
the turnaround in one study conducted by Barr et al., (1992). As the number of cases 
investigated in the latter study was too small (only two cases), its result needs to be 
interpreted with caution. 
There are debates over the effectiveness of a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
either from inside the organisation (insider) or outside (outsider) due to a lack of 
robust research evidence (Boyne and Meier, 2005). The probability of replacing 
incumbent managers by outsiders is much higher when the causes of decline are 
believed to be internal, and in the case of failure caused by external factors, internal 
people are likely to replace top managers (Bibeault, 1982). O'Neil (1986a) found that 
in successful turnarounds, new top managers are more likely to come from outside 
rather than inside the organisation. In contrast, in other studies, internal senior 
managers were found to be leading the turnaround process (e. g. Zimmerman, 1989). 
As shown above, appropriate and speedy action is crucial in a turnaround situation 
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Although outsiders can apply radical changes, especially 
in non-failing organisations (Wiersma, 1992), they may be unable to formulate and 
implement new strategies quickly and effectively because of a lack of detailed 
knowledge of the organisation. On the other hand, insiders may have more in depth 
knowledge about organisational problems and about the capability and political 
context of the organisation, making them better able to develop rapid responses to 
the problems and achieve recovery. However, some commentators argue that 
insiders may have closer working relationships, which may have a deleterious impact 




Retrenchment denotes a series of largely short-term activities applied by 
management to stabilise an organisation in order to secure its survival (Bibeault, 
1982; Finkin, 1985; Dumaine, 1990; Grinyer and McKiernan, 1990) and tackles the 
immediate problems responsible for initiating the crisis (Robins ad Pearce, 1992). 
Some commentators suggest that retrenchment strategies are the first options in the 
turnaround process (Bibleaut, 1982; Sloma, 1985; Pearce et al., 1987; McKiernan, 
2002), which consider financial losses, and provide positive cash flow and can be 
viewed as `efficiency' interventions (Hambrick and Schecter, 1983). The resources 
released from a retrenchment strategy can also be employed for investment in more 
productive areas (Boyne, 2004b). 
Retrenchment comprises cost cutting (e. g. changing prices, exit from markets, 
elimination of unprofitable products and reducing the scale of the operation, staff 
numbers and overheads) and assets reduction (e. g. selling land and equipments) 
(Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; Bibeault, 1982). For example, Mellahi et al. (2002) 
highlight the retrenchment strategies used by Marks and Spencer following a rapid 
drop in profits, in order to stabilise the organisation including the exit from overseas 
markets, closing retail outlets, and selling assets. 
Furthermore, retrenchment may involve the focus of senior managers on the internal 
operation of an organisation (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995) to improve operational 
management (e. g. reshaping work process, waiting time reduction or increasing 
throughput) (Robins ad Pearce, 1992). McKiernan (2002) also emphasises closer 
control, autocratic management and rationalisation as retrenchment strategy. 
Retrenchment is likely to lead the organisation towards recovery, in the event that 
performance problems are related to high cost and low efficiency. However, it is 
unlikely to produce better results when the organisation faces other problems (Boyne 
and Meiere, 2005). Robins and Pearce (1992) argue that organisations are likely to 
choose retrenchment strategies when failure originates from internal factors. Some 
commentators suggest that cost reduction should be the initial retrenchment 
response, particularly in cases of less severe decline and, if that does not solve the 
problem, then aggressive asset reduction should supplement it (Hofer, 1980; Robins 
and Pearce, 1992). As discussed above, retrenchment can result in the revival of 
organisations in less severe crises (Hofer, 1980), but more entrepreneurial and 
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strategic reorientations (repositioning) should be adopted when organisations face 
severe problems (Robins and Pearce, 1992; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983). 
In a review, Boyne (2004b) explored the impact of retrenchment strategies on the 
reversal of performance in the for-profit sector, including studies that compared 
successful and unsuccessful turnaround processes among firms. Of 18 studies 
reviewed, 12 showed a strong association between retrenchment strategies (asset 
reduction and/or cost cutting) and performance improvement. (Hambrick and 
Schecter, 1983; Chowdhury and Lang, 1996; Barr et al., 1992; Bruton and Wan, 1994; 
Bruton et al., 2003; Dawley et al., 2002; Pearce and Robbins, 1994; Robbins and 
Pearce, 1992; Stopford and Baden-Fuller, 1990; and Thietart, 1988). 
In six studies, no significant association was found (Barker and Mone, 1994; 
Chowdhury and Lang, 1994; Evans and Green, 2000; Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001; 
Pant, 1991). Interestingly, no significant negative relationship was noted in the 
studies. Boyne identifies discrepancies between the results of studies on the basis of 
the views of Arogyrawasmy et al. (1995), who argue that some researchers consider 
retrenchment an isolated and sufficient strategy, but others treat it as the first and 
necessary stage of a turnaround intervention. 
In general, the burden of the empirical evidence supports retrenchment as an 
effective turnaround strategy (Pajunen, 2005; Boyne, 2004a). Some researchers, 
however, have questioned the effectiveness of retrenchment in the turnaround 
process (e. g. Barker and Mone, 1994). These commentators question whether an 
organisation needs to go through retrenchment as this may not have a significant 
effect. Some commentators support retrenchment as a crucial and established stage, 
but argue that too much focus on cost and asset reduction may lower staff morale or 
may even encourage resistance by increasing organisational inertia and increase 
turnover of the most talented employees (McKiernan, 2002; Greenhalgh, 1983; 
Hardy, 1987; Sutton et al., 1986). A successful retrenchment strategy should be 
followed by a long-term strategy to assure future growth of the organisation (Grinyer 
et al., 1988; McKiernan, 2002). 
2.9.3 Renewal (Repositioning) 
Repositioning (renewal) strategies are activities, utilised to reorient the direction of 
an organisation and its vision, with the aim of assuring long-term successful survival 
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(Walshe et al., 2004; Boyne, 2004a). Hofer (1980) refers to such interventions as 
strategic responses and Hambrick and Schecter (1983) term them `entrepreneurial' 
strategy. `Repositioning' includes a range of long-term activities, such as changing 
the mission and direction of an organisation, entrance to a new market, introducing 
new products, and searching for new sources of profit. Slatter and Lovett (1999) 
argue that change in the leadership style and culture of an organisation can be 
classified as repositioning or renewal. Unlike the retrenchment phase, in which an 
autocratic leadership style is more likely to be applicable, in the repositioning stage it 
may be better to have a more democratic form of leadership (McKiernan, 200). 
McKiernan (2002) argues that established operating patterns, beliefs, and rules 
(OBR) are unlikely to promote entrepreneurial strategies because old OBRs tend to 
be rigid and maintain the status quo. If organisations are not able (as a key part of 
the organisational culture) to challenge the belief systems that inform their work, 
even temporary interventions such as cost cutting and reorganisation, are unlikely to 
guarantee long-term success. Thus McKiernan highlights the important role of new 
OBRs in developing and implementing entrepreneurial intervention. In addition he 
suggests that in severe cases, organisations are not likely to be able to develop 
entrepreneurial changes because of lack of financial resources. 
Boyne (2004b) has reviewed the impact of repositioning strategies on performance 
improvement among private sector organisations. Seven out of eleven studies in the 
review demonstrated a positive effect of repositioning on firm performance (Pearce 
and Robbins, 1994; Barker et al., 1998; Thietart, 1988; Stopford and Baden Fuller, 
1990; Barr et al., 1992; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; Harker and Sharma, 1999; 
Evans and Green, 2000). Two of the studies found no difference (Sudarsanam and 
Lai, 2001; Pant, 1991) and two revealed a negative impact (O'Neil, 1986a; Schendell 
and Paton, 1976). The latter had either a small sample size (O'Neil, 1986a) or used a 
narrow measurement of repositioning (new capital investment) (Schendell and 
Paton, 1976). The overall evidence seems to be in favour of the positive effects of 
repositioning strategies. 
2.10 Outcome of turnaround strategies 
In general, the burden of the evidence in private sector organisations suggests that 
three different strategies (retrenchment, repositioning and reorganisation) have a 
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positive impact on the turnaround of financial decline (Boyne et al., 2004). However, 
the extent of their positive impact on performance varies according to both the 
external and internal circumstances of an organisation (McKiernan, 2002). As each 
organisation has special characteristics and exists in a unique context, a generic 
turnaround solution is likely to be ineffective. Therefore, tailor-made interventions 
are suggested in order to consider those special organisational characteristics 
(Pandit, 2000). 
Turnaround strategies can result in both successful and unsuccessful turnarounds. 
Some organisations that are able to initiate the turnaround process and improve 
their performance are termed `self regulating' organisations. Unsuccessful 
turnarounds produce two different outcomes, one is organisational `death' and the 
other is the persistence of poor performance (a `permanently failing' situation) 
[Meyer and Zucker, 1989]. Organisational death may have resulted from the 
formulation of inappropriate strategies or improper implementation of a good 
strategy. As discussed earlier, organisations in the public sector may not be allowed 
to disappear completely. Persistence of poor performance is the second possible 
outcome of an unsuccessful turnaround and here error correction processes may 
have little effect as the organisation becomes locked in a cycle of poor performance. 
2.11 Permanently failing organisation and turnaround process 
Jas and Skelcher (2005a; 2005b) argue that a typical performance trajectory in the 
public services organisations is cyclical rather than linear over the medium to long- 
term (figure 2.5). The figure shows that the performance of an organisation may be 
higher or lower than an acceptable level of performance (Dichotomous variable) over 
time. If the organisational performance is persistently below the minimal acceptable 
level of performance organisational failure is deemed to have occurred. 
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Source: Jas and Skelcher (2005b) 
As shown in figure 2.5, organisations can actually improve after a period of poor 
performance. However, other organisations, which do not react to low performance 
and which are not able to recover themselves, continue to act consciously or 
unconsciously at the poor performance level and are termed as `permanent failure' 
organisations (Meyer and Zucker, 1989). Figure 2.6 illustrates two situations 
including `permanent failure' and `turnaround'. 
Figure 2.6 Permanent failure and turnaround 
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Source: Jas and Skelcher (2005b) 
Meyer and Zucker (1989) use the rational actor theory to explain situations where 
there is permanent organisational failure. They suggest that the presence of diverse 
motivations, interests and power among three groups of organisational stakeholders 
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including owners, managers and dependant actors (non managers staff, consumers, 
and community who receive the organisation's services) can explain permanent 
failure situations especially in the for-profit sector. 
Furthermore, they argue that when organisations perform at a high level, a 
congruent interest among the three main stakeholder groups is seen. However, once 
performance declines, these groups display divergent interests as the owners seek 
turnaround changes in order to return to profitability status. The managers have dual 
interests, seeking turnaround changes to make profit for the organisation, on the 
other hand, and they disagree with changes due to their concern about their 
employment situation as a consequence of the change process. As the changes may 
affect employment prospects and the situation of employers and community 
(dependant actors), they demonstrate resistance to change. The value of the 
existence of the organisation for dependant actors is greater than their valuation of 
its performance. Consequently, organisations may experience sustained poor 
performance because the possibility of change is blocked. Inability of an organisation 
to align diverse interests presents a collective action problem that may contribute to 
a permanent failure situation. For example, the leaders of an organisation may 
accept the risk of selecting and implementing new strategies to improve 
performance, however, the workforce may be less willing to take such risks and 
prefer to keep the status quo, which means that they prefer organisational 
persistence rather than organisational performance (Jas and Skelcher, 2005a). 
Meyer and Zucker (1989) argue that the low performance level for such organisations 
becomes accepted as an unavoidable norm. However, it is assumed that a rescue 
action is still possible if the collective action problems originated from diverse 
interest, mentioned before, are considered. A combination of external and internal 
factors may act as triggers for actions in self-regulating organisations (Jas and 
Skelcher, 2005b). Whereas, in permanently failing organisations only external 
triggers can initiate changes (Turner and Whiteman, 2005). Figure 2.7 illustrates the 
performance profiles for self-regulating and failing organisations. 
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Jas and Skelcher (2004) indicate that although failure in the alignment of diverse 
interests within an organisation is likely to result in an unsuccessful turnaround 
process, diverse interests cannot always explain failure in self-initiated turnaround in 
poor performing organisations. Other factors, they state, seem to inhibit self- 
initiating turnaround and lead to organisations continuing to act under conditions of 
poor performance. These factors include a lack of cognizance of problems, 
incapability of leadership (political and managerial) in initiating change and 
establishing turnaround-oriented programmes, and a lack of capacity within the 
organisations to implement changes. 
Jas and Skelcher (2004) compare the characteristics of permanently failing 
organisations with other failing organisations, that are able to initiate their own 
turnaround process (self-regulating organisations), as illustrated in table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 Characteristics of self-regulating and permanently failing 
organisations 
Class of organisation Self-regulating Permanently failing 
Key feature 
Fallacy of success 
Motivational investment in the 
status quo 
Internal source of sufficient 
authority to initiate change 
Threat rigidity effect 
1. Restriction of information 
Threat rigidity effect 
2. Constriction of information 






aims to maintain unity 
through process of 
change 






aims to protect existing 
leadership by resisting 
Source: Jas and Skelcher (2004) 
In addition, Jas and Skelcher (2004) indicate that to act as a self-regulating 
organisation, political stability and internal political and managerial leadership are 
very important factors which emphasise the necessity for change and motivate 
people within the organisations to take steps in that direction. However, they argue 
that the `fallacy of success' and motivational investments in the 'status quo' are two 
factors that impede leadership capacity and capability to turnaround the 
organisation. They also assume that organisations that do not experience 
performance decline have low levels of `fallacy of success' and motivational 
investment in the `status quo' which shows their high potential for adaptation. 
However, self-regulating and permanently failing organisations have moderate and 
high levels of these factors respectively. Self-regulating organisations also display 
high levels of internal sources of sufficient authority to initiate change vs low levels 
for permanently failing organisations. As noted by Meyer and Zucker (1989), 
decision makers in permanently failing organisations tend to rely on familiar and 
routine behaviour during organisational failure, which may not be effective when 
crises occur. 
As a consequence, permanently failing organisations require an authoritative 
external mediator(s) to intervene and initiate the turnaround process (Turner and 
Whiteman, 2005). Jas and Skelcher (2004) use principal-agent analysis to show the 
effect of different types of interventions, depending on the relationship between the 
principal (intervening body) and the agent (organisation which requires 
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intervention). Principal-agent theory, defines the relationship between two parties 
(principal and agent), which exists when an individual or organisation (the principal) 
delegates a task, provides services or generates output to an individual, group or 
organisation (the agent) and in return the agent receives reward. Such delegation 
may be problematic in two situations: first, when the interests and objectives of 
principal and agent are different, which causes that agent to behave in ways that are 
not aligned with the principal's wishes and second, when the agent has an 
informational advantage over the principal (information asymmetry), which means 
the principal has insufficient information about the performance of the agent. The 
latter can provide an opportunity for the agent to mislead the principal about his or 
her performance and/or shirk his or her agreed duties (Mannion et al., 2004). To 
mitigate these problems, Smith et al. (2003) (cited in Mannion et al., 2004) 
recommend three broad strategies: first, development of a better information system 
which enhance the control of the principal over the agent; second, the 
implementation of cultural change strategies to better align the interests of the agent 
to the interests of the principal; and third, the use of appropriate incentive structures 
to encourage the agent to perform as the principal desires. Briefly, the main concern 
of principal-agent theory is how to get an agent to perform in the best interests of the 
principal. 
Jas and Skelcher (2004) present three alternative types of interventions: episodic, 
relational/mutual, and mandated. The characteristics of these interventions are 
presented in table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 Approaches to external turnaround of permanently failing 
organisations (a principal-agent analysis) 





Episodic Hands-off Discretion to Low Agent 
(intermittent Focused on react 
inspections) outcome 
Relational/mutual Agreement Obligation Moderate Shared 
(self-managed between all to comply 
turnaround) parties with 
Monitoring agreement 
Mandated Power Duty to High Principal 
(take-over) differential comply 
Information 
svmmetrv 
Source: Jas and Skelcher (2004) 
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In the episodic approach, the principal allows the agent to develop and implement 
required strategies to improve performance. However, the principal carries out 
intermittent inspections which lead to a series of suggestions for change. After the 
inspection, organisations may produce a new action plan or correct their current 
action plan. In the period between the audit programmes, there is a low level of 
interaction between principal and agent. The principal's main focus is the outcome, 
rather than process of performance improvement through a hands-off approach. On 
the other hand, the agent reacts to the principal's assessment with a high level of 
discretion (Jas and Skelcher, 2004). 
In the mandated approach, the principal deals with the problems and takes action 
directly to improve performance. Very little alternative is left for the agent, and only 
his complicity is required. In this approach, the principal faces problems in 
performance monitoring, because of information asymmetry, which provides the 
opportunity for the agent to share the existence of selected information in order to 
present a more positive picture of the organisation and its performance. This 
approach causes a high level of incidence of political risk to the principal and has the 
highest level of financial cost of all three approaches. 
The relational/mutual approach rests on the basis of agreement between two parties 
to deal with problems and improve performance, so an action plan is developed and 
implemented by the agent under the supervision of the principal. The agent has 
enough authority to choose strategies to turnaround the situation. In addition, a 
monitoring process is agreed between parties. This approach is in accordance with 
the current UK government policy to turnaround failing local authority 
organisations. The incidence of political risks is shared between the two parties and 
the financial cost is moderate (Jas and Skelcher, 2004). 
In terms of financial cost, the episodic approach has the lowest level of cost 
compared with the mandated approach, which has the highest, because in the 
former, organisations use their staff to implement changes. In the mandated 
approach, a number of external consultancy and staff resources are needed to 
implement the action plan, which is costly. The cost of the relational approach is 
moderate. The risks are political, and the highest level of political risks to the 
principal is in the mandated approach because the principal plays a direct role in 
order to turnaround the organisation, the turnaround process may not be successful 
and, then, the principal will be questioned. However, the highest level of risk to the 
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agent is seen in the episodic approach and the principal may experience the lowest 
level of risk in this approach. Jas and Skelcher (2004) argue that in the hands-off 
approach (episodic), governments may also experience political risks in another way, 
as they might be accused of having done nothing to solve the problem. 
Harvey et al., (2005a) note that all three types of intervention have been used in the 
NHS. For example, intermittent inspections by the Health Care Commission and 
Monitor (for Foundation Trusts), accompanied by their suggestions for action, are 
examples of the episodic approach. In the case of serious problems, according to 
their inspection reports, the Department of Health may apply closer investigation 
and stricter monitoring (using special measures). A good example of the relational 
approach is the function of the Performance Development Team (PDT) [as a part of 
the Modernisation Agency] in the turning around of failing organisations in the NHS. 
The Performance Development Team helps the organisation to develop and 
implement an action plan. One of the examples of the mandated approach is the 
`Franchising' process in the NHS. Through franchising, the Government brings in 
new management with a positive record of success to take over the poor-performance 
organisation in order to affect improvement. Willmott (1999) and Turner et al., 
(2004) also address the mandated approach in the education field and local 
government, respectively, in the UK. However, it seems that UK government prefers 
to encourage a voluntary relationship between poor-performance organisations and a 
relevant external agency, rather than applying a mandated approach in the first 
instance. Harvey et al. (2005a) indicate that the relational approach could be the 
most favourable approach to the NHS with a reasonable level of risk and cost. 
2.12 Summary 
This chapter has defined organisational failure and turnaround processes in poorly 
performing organisations, particularly in the for-profit sector in which most of the 
literature is rooted, and explains related models from different theoretical and 
conceptual perspectives. It demonstrates that the concepts of performance and 
failure are contested and complex, particularly in the public sector, not least because 
of the political nature and difficulties in measuring the performance of public 
organisations. It has also shown the importance of turnaround processes in reversing 
decline and improving organisational performance. 
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The Chapter presented a range of symptoms (markers) of organisational failure 
which are visible at an early stage. If organisations are able to identify these markers 
and carry out proper and timely action, then decline may be avoided. The secondary 
and primary causes of organisational failure were also explored, using a range of 
theoretical frameworks and models. Both internal and external causes of failure were 
outlined. Failure to learn throughout an organisation was identified as the primary 
cause of decline. 
Diagnosis and factors that are able to initiate the process of change (triggers) were 
reviewed. It was revealed that the triggers for `self regulating' and `permanently 
failing' organisations are often different. The latter tend to be subject to external 
triggers to initiate remedial action. 
This chapter has shown that a lack of coherent theory currently exists to define 
organisational turnaround. The `stage' model was considered as a framework in 
which the process of organisational failure and/or turnaround is structured in terms 
of sequential phases. A range of `stage' models developed in the for-profit sector were 
compared and contrasted. Three generic turnaround interventions - replacement 
(reorganisation), retrenchment and return to growth (repositioning) were discussed. 
The role of external agents and their interactions with poorly performing 
organisations, as the trigger for change and facilitator or promoter of turnaround 
interventions, was explained in detail using the lens of principal-agent theory. The 
outcomes of turnaround strategies were considered and it was shown that 
turnaround strategies may not always deliver the desired organisational outcomes 
and `organisational death' (exit of the organisation from the market) or `permanent 
failing' organisations (organisations which continue working at a poor level of 
performance over a long period of time) result following an unsuccessful turnaround. 
The next chapter (Chapter 3) presents a comprehensive review of the literature on 
organisational failure and turnaround processes in the public sector, with an 
emphasis on the heath care services. 
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Chapter 3: Organisational failure and turnaround in 
public services: a review of the evidence 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, the theories of organisational failure and turnaround were discussed in 
relation to a range of conceptual frameworks and models. The aim of this chapter is to 
review the findings of empirical studies concerning the processes of organisational 
failure and turnaround across a range of public services, with particular focus on health 
care provision. In the first part of the chapter, the methods used in the review are 
explained in detail. Then the findings of the studies included are presented using the 
`stages' framework as an organising framework for discussion. In alignment with 
McKiernan's model (2002), the symptoms, secondary (internal and external) and 
primary causes of failure are presented as separate sections and then triggers for 
change, (both internal and external) are demonstrated. Turnaround strategies used in 
the included studies are explained using the `3Rs' model (Reorganisation, 
Retrenchment, Repositioning) (Boyne, 2004a) [see section 2.9]. Because of the 
important role of CEOs and the wider senior management team during turnaround, the 
leadership styles of managers enacting turnaround strategies are also considered. 
External organisations commonly play a central role in all stages of turnaround and 
these are presented in detail in a separate section. The impact of intended and 
unintended consequences of turnaround strategies on organisational performance is 
also discussed. Finally, the key similarities and differences between public and private 
sectors in organisational failure and the turnaround process are also presented. 
3.2 Background 
As outlined in the previous chapter, existing theoretical frameworks and empirical 
evidence of organisational failure and turnaround are, in the main, derived from studies 
in the private sector, particularly in the USA (Ketchen, 1998). The first studies were 
conducted in the mid-1970s (Cameron et al., 1988) and have grown in number to date 
(Barker et al., 2001; Bruton et al., 2003, Ketchen, 1998). Borins (1998) argues that early 
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interest in the subject was on the part of practitioners rather than researchers, and 
focused on practical rather than theoretical concerns. 
Several commentators have highlighted the paucity of robust empirical evidence and 
theoretical frameworks to explore turnaround in public sector organisations (Walshe et 
al., 2004; Boyne, 2003a; Jas and Skelcher, 2004). However, interest in this subject has 
grown a pace over recent years. Boyne (2003a) argues that strategies deployed by 
managers to turnaround poorly performing public organisations have not been chosen 
on the basis of robust evidence and well constructed theory, adding that the quality and 
quantity of research on organisational performance in the public sector, are limited and 
in need of development. Borins (2001) suggests that efforts should be made to explore 
the determinants of organisational success and failure in the public sector to facilitate 
practitioners' and managers' strategies to turnaround their organisation's performance. 
There is no comprehensive review (especially in the health sector) of the empirical 
evidence in this area. The aim of the present review is to provide a summary of the 
research conducted on organisational failure and turnaround process across the public 
sector, and to identify the key themes, findings and areas of debate. 
3.3 Objectives of the review 
The specific focus of the review is as follows: 
" to produce a summary of the key theoretical frameworks and models used in the 
studies; 
" to identify the signs and symptoms of organisational failure; 
" to identify the likely causes of organisational failure; 
" to determine the factors that are likely to `trigger' turnaround processes; 
" to identify the range and effectiveness of interventions and strategies employed 
during the turnaround processes; 
" to identify interventions and strategies employed to sustain continual 
improvements in organisational performance. 
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3.4 Methods of the review 
The scope of the review is to identify studies relating to organisational failure or 
turnaround process in public services. 
3.4.1 Inclusion criteria 
The following selection criteria were used to select the `included' studies: 
  Setting: only studies undertaken in the public sector were included; 
  Publication type: only empirical studies were included and abstracted; 
  Language: only studies in English were considered, because of translation 
difficulties and costs; 
  Study period: Only papers published since 1970; 
  Study design: All types of study design and research methods were included. 
3.4.2 Search strategy 
A broad search strategy was used to ensure that the maximum number of eligible 
studies were captured. One of the initial strategies used was a search of the library 
catalogues and internet using internet search engines, for example Google Scholar. This 
method has been termed `systematic browsing' by Greenhalgh et al. (2004), as it 
provides an opportunity to locate rich sources of information at very early stage of the 
review process. It also helped when identifying the key index terms used to structure the 
search strategy. The broad approach included electronic databases, reference scanning, 
hand searching of key journals, and contacting academic experts and practitioners. 
3.4.2.1 Electronic databases 
Several key databases were searched including HMIC (Health Management Information 
Consortium via Ovid -a combination of the Department of Health, King's Fund and 
HELMIS); Medline (Via Ovid); SSCI (Social Sciences Citation Index); ASSIA (Applied 
Social Science Index and Abstracts); Business Source Premier (one of the main 
bibliographic sources used for identifying organisational science; public administration; 
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and management literature). The SIEGLE (System for Information on Grey Literature 
in Europe) and the ASLIB Index to theses (http: //www. theses. com) were searched for 
theses and dissertations produced in the UK and Ireland. 
Searches were undertaken using a range of failure' and `turnaround' synonyms which 
were linked to `organisation' synonyms. The keywords used were: failure', 'decline', 
`mortality', `crisis', 'death'. `exit', `turnaround', `recovery', `success', `retrenchment', 
`rejuvenation' and `renewal'. For each database an appropriate search strategy was used 
and two librarians from the NHS Centre for Reviews and Dissemination (CRD) were 
consulted in order to focus the search strategy. A key difficulty with the medical/health 
databases used was the use of similar phrases in clinical papers such as failure', 
`mortality', and `death'. 
As organisational failure and turnaround processes are diverse and multifaceted topics, 
it is difficult to strike an optimal balance between sensitivity (avoiding the non-retrieval 
of relevant items) and specificity (precision in retrieving only what is relevant) when a 
search strategy is devised. Hence, a substantial amount of time was required for 
searching for all relevant studies. Although both MESH terms and free text terms were 
used to enhance the sensitivity of the search, dispersed subjects are unlikely to be well 
represented in bibliographic databases in terms of the indexing system, so it was 
necessary to increase the free text searching. Sheaf et al. (2003) state that the loss of 
specificity in retrieval could be a result of this strategy. Some additional methods of 
exploration employed when electronic databases were searched in order to capture 
additional sources, such as using the authors' names of relevant papers as a search 
term. The first search was conducted during November 2004 and refined and updated 
in August 20o6. The search strategy is detailed fully in Appendix 3.1. 
To eliminate duplication, results from the different databases were placed into a 
reference manager package and reference lists from the systematic reviews were 
crosschecked. To avoid duplication, studies included in both were not abstracted. 
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3.4.2.2 Reference scanning 
Reference lists of all relevant articles were scanned. This most commonly took the form 
of following up references in papers that were candidates for inclusion. Some 
publications unavailable in electronic form were also included. Though costly in terms 
of time, this method has the advantage that other articles in a specific issue, for 
example, may have some bearing on the search, especially where the journal has 
produced a special issue covering a particular topic. 
3.4.2.3 Hand searching of key journals 
Following consultation with experts (Boyne, G; Skelcher, C; Gray, J; Walshe, K), 
relevant journals from 1990 selected from a range of disciplinary areas including public 
administration (Public Management Review; Public Money and Management), health 
policy (Journal of Health Services Research & Policy; Health Policy; Health Affairs) and 
management ( Health Care Management Review; Strategic Management Journal) were 
hand searched. 
3.4.2.4 Contacting experts and relevant organisations 
Experts and relevant health care research and funding organisations (e. g. NHS Service 
Delivery and Organisation Research & Development Programme NHS SDO) in this field 
were identified worldwide, either through their published work, or identified by other 
researchers, and were contacted via e-mail to obtain their empirical and theoretical 
papers (including unpublished and research in progress). 
3.4.3 Quality assessment 
There is no objective method of appraising the quality of non-experimental studies 
(CRD, 2001). Following consultation with an expert in this area, an a priori decision 
was taken not to specify a minimum cut off point to assess the quality of studies, owing 
to the presence of heterogeneity and the variability in the quality of research. Egger and 
Smith (1998- cited in McDonald, 2003) argue that considerable debate has arisen about 
what kinds of studies form `good enough' evidence. Where necessary, the quality of 
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studies are discussed in the presentation of study findings. Most of the included studies 
were qualitative and various checklists for quality assessment was considered (Blaxter, 
1996; Popay et al., 1998; Mays and Pope, 2000; Mays et al., 2001). There are many 
similarities among these and Mays and Pope's checklist (2000) was adopted, as it 
covers several important criteria (See Appendix 3.3). To assess the quality of the 
quantitative studies, a checklist developed by Boynton and Greenhalgh (2004) was used 
(See Appendix 3.4) 
3.4.4 Data extraction 
A data extraction form was designed (Appendix 3.2) to distil details concerning the aims 
of the study, setting, study design, participants, method of data collection and analysis, 
reported findings, and implications for research and policy. 
3.4.5 Method of analysis 
It was felt inappropriate to use the meta-analysis technique (CRD, 2001) to aggregate 
the data, owing to the absence of homogenous quantitative evidence and the wide 
variety of study design. The literature on organisational failure and turnaround 
processes is mainly discursive and the studies rarely include objective measurable 
outcomes commonly used in quantitative research. In such cases, a narrative approach 
is used to synthesise the results of the studies (Pawson, 2oooa; Mays et al., 2005). The 
stage theoretical framework was used to summarise and interpret the study findings. 
3.4.6 Results 
Once duplicates were removed, the search identified 9156 papers. During the initial 
stage, 8671 papers were excluded on examination of the title and abstract. In the next 
stage, the complete texts of the remaining papers (485) were assessed against the 
inclusion criteria and a further 470 studies were excluded. Finally, 15 studies (13 
primary studies and 2 reviews) were included. One of the included studies (Turner and 
Whiteman, 2005) reports the results of a three year longitudinal multiple case study. A 
range of policy reports (Skelcher et al., 2004; Hughes et al., 2004; Jas, 2004; 
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Whiteman, 2004) and articles (Turner et al., 2004; Jas and Skelcher, 2005a) were 
published about this study. However, as the last article (Turner and Whiteman, 2005) 
covered all the results of the study, it was the only one included and abstracted but key 
issues covered in the policy reports and articles were used for further discussion. Table 
3.1 presents a brief summary of the included studies. A more detailed summary is 
presented in Appendix 3.5. It is important to note that many papers about 
organisational failure and turnaround were largely anecdotal and published in non- 
academic journals. Some of the material studied was either deemed theoretically and/or 
practically weak or, more commonly, covered areas irrelevant to the study. These 
categories include editorial pieces, or articles by consultants that appear designed to 
capture the interest - or even custom - of readers. Two included reviews were not 
related to the health sector, so their primary studies were not abstracted and only the 
findings were used to inform the results of this review. The first (Boyne, 2006) covered 
the turnaround strategies used in the US public services and included seven separate 
studies (Contino and Lorusso, 1982; Rainey and Rainey, 1986; Holzer, 1988; Decker 
and Paulson, 1988; Stephens, 1988; Poister, 1988; Moore, 1995). The second (Gray, 
2000) reviewed organisational failure and turnaround strategies in UK state schools. 
3.5 Overview of the included studies 
3.5.1 Setting of the studies 
Studies have been conducted across a wide range of organisational settings including: 
health services (Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Fulop et al., 2004; Harvey et al., 2005a); local 
government (Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Andrews et al., 2006; Eitel, 2004; Joyce, 
2004); schools (Harris et al., 2003; Harris and Chapman, 2002; Wilmott, 1999; Meier 
and Bohte, 2003; Boyne and Meier, 2005; Gray, 2000); and a combination of public 
services (Paton and Mordaunt, 2004; Boyne, 20o6) (See table 3.1). 
3.5.2 Aims of the included studies 
The aims of the studies were multiple and diverse. Two focused only on the symptoms, 
causes and patterns of failure, and the impact of contextual factors in contributing to 
failure (Andrews et al., 2006, Meier and Bohte, 2003). Andrews et al. (2006) examined 
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the impact of both misfortune (adverse circumstances faced by some organisations 
beyond their control) and the mismanagement of organisations. Meier and Bohte 
(2003) examined under-performance in some school districts. They explored the 
contribution of four independent variables (task diversity, available resources, 
bureaucracy and incentives) to failure, defined as micro failure (pattern of suboptimal 
performance for a period of time) measured by three indicators (absenteeism, class 
failure and dropout). 
Five studies focused only on the turnaround strategies and factors that affected their 
impact (Harvey et al., 2005a; Joyce, 2004; Harris et al., 2003; Boyne and Meier, 2005; 
and Boyne, 20o6). Specifically, Harvey et al. (2005a) focused on the role of an external 
intervention agent (the Performance Development Team) in promoting and facilitating 
turnaround of poorly performing (zero star rated) organisations. Joyce (2004) placed 
exclusive emphasis on the role of the new CEO in the turnaround process of a poorly 
performing English council. Harris et al. (2003) explored the strategies used for raising 
and sustaining attainment in English schools, in a former coalfield area, over 5 years. 
Boyne and Meier (2005) tested a new model of turnaround that evaluated the impact of 
both a range of `turnaround strategies' (reorganisation, retrenchment and 
repositioning) selected by managers and `good luck' - the change in external 
circumstances (beyond managerial control) on the success of turnaround processes in 
15o Texas school districts. Boyne (20o6) reviewed seven studies in order to assess the 
impact of turnaround strategies (reorganisation, retrenchment, and repositioning) on 
the reversal of performance of poorly performing public service organisations. 
The remaining eight studies explored both organisational failure and turnaround 
processes (Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Fulop et al., 2004; Turner and Whiteman, 2005; 
Eitel, 2004; Harris and Chapman, 2002; Wilmott, 1999). Both Protopsaltis et al. (2002) 
and Fulop et al. (2004) sought to explore the symptoms, causes of failure, triggers for 
change and turnaround strategies used in their case studies (nine low performing NHS 
acute Trusts) and to investigate the impact of turnaround strategies on the performance 
of organisations and key stakeholders. Turner and Whiteman (2005) examined the 
causes of failure and turnaround process in 15 English local authorities that were 
categorised as poor performers over a three year period. One study explored the reasons 
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why improvement strategies failed to turnaround a US regional government office, 
which had been assessed as underperforming for the previous 25 years (Eitel, 2004). 
Harris and Chapman (2002) looked at leadership processes and approaches in ten 
schools facing challenging circumstances, that demonstrated gradual performance 
improvement. Wilmott (1999) investigated the ways in which a Local Education 
Authority (LEA) advisory team (as the external turnaround agent) had responded to the 
needs of a `failing' school, identified by the OFSTED auditors, and how the school 
mediated LEA interventions. 
3.5.3 Time of publication 
There has been a growing interest in this topic since the late 199os. Eight studies were 
published before 1999 and seven of these (from the USA) were included in the review 
conducted by Boyne (2006). Twelve studies were published after 2002 (see table 3.1) 
and a number of high quality studies were published after 2005. All quantitative studies 
were published after 2005, so that at the time of starting this research, the size and 
quality of the available literature was far less than at present. In addition, one of the key 
studies, conducted in the health sector (Fulop et al., 2004) is still unpublished. 
3.5.4 Terminology used in the included studies 
Most of the studies used the terms `failure' and `decline' to identify serious performance 
problems. None used similar terms to those that have been used in the for-profit sector 
(e. g. organisational mortality, organisational death, and organisational exit) to 
represent failing situations. All three studies conducted in the health sector used the 
star rating system to define failure and improvement in the star rating classification. 
Similarly, the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) was used to define 
performance attainment in the local government sector (Turner and Whiteman, 2005; 
Andrews et al., 2006; Boyne and Meier, 2005). Turnaround, recovery, success and 
retrenchment were used interchangeably to present performance improvement 
following a period of poor performance. The terms rejuvenation and renewal were 
sometimes used in the included studies. 
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3.5.5 Research methods used in the included studies 
The most commonly used research method was the qualitative case study (employing 
interviews, document analysis and observations to gather data). Three studies used a 
single case study, and multiple case studies were used in seven studies. In two, the data 
was collected by interviewing a senior manager only in order to explore the objectives of 
the study. Three studies used quantitative survey methods. All the studies, conducted in 
the health sector used qualitative multiple case studies; (these studies are detailed in 
table 3.1). 
3.5.6 Theoretical frameworks used in the included studies 
Several studies had no explicit theoretical framework to explain organisational failure 
and/or turnaround (Andrews et al., 20o6; Eitel, 2004; Joyce, 2004; Harris et al., 2003; 
Harris and Chapman, 2002; Meier and Bohte, 2003). However, some studies did use 
different stage theoretical framework, including Argyowasmy's two stage model (Paton 
and Mordaunt, 2004) and McKiernan's six stage model (Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Fulop 
et al., 2004). A'realistic' evaluation methodology (Pawson and Tilley, 1998) was 
adopted, by Turner and Whiteman (2005), which sought to identify the Context for 
poor performance (causes), Mechanisms for recovery, and Outcome of the recovery 
interventions on local authority performance (CMOs model). Two studies used the 
"3Rs" strategy (Retrenchment, Repositioning and Restructuring) [see section 2.9] to 
explain the impact of interventions in turning around poor performance (Boyne and 
Meier, 2005; Boyne, 20o6). 
The remainder of the chapter considers the symptoms of organisational failure, its 
primary and secondary causes, triggers for change, and strategies used to turnaround 
poor performance. In addition, the impact of these interventions on organisational 
performance and on staff, the role of external organisations in triggering change and the 
turnaround process are also explored. 
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3.6 Symptoms of failure 
As noted in section 2.5, the symptoms or markers of failure are the initial observable 
indicators of the presence of a problem in an organisation. If organisations are able to 
detect these, decline may be prevented. In accordance with McKiernan's (2002) 
classification, different categories of symptoms of failure are identified in some of the 
studies included in this review: financial (financial deficit, poor financial control); 
physical (inability to hit core targets, management turnover, a high level of staff 
turnover, recruitment problems, poor public and press image, poor working relations 
with external stakeholders, and major incidents - such as avoidable deaths in hospitals); 
behavioural (ignoring problems, placing the blame for problems on others, low staff 
morale, loss of reputation, absence of pride in the organisation, low levels of 
expectation, and poor behaviour in school classes); managerial (stagnating 
management, mistrust on the part of employees, internal conflict, lack of teamwork, 
centralised decision making behind close doors). Table 3.2 summarises the symptoms 
of failure reported in each included study. 
Inability to meet key performance targets is a common symptom in all studies, 
regardless of sector. Examples are the failure to achieve waiting list targets in the health 
sector and the inability to provide an acceptable level of education as set by OFSTED in 
schools. Poor working relationships with external stakeholders, a high level of staff 
turnover, recruitment problems, and a poor public image were the symptoms that 
presented in all three settings (health, school and local government sectors). Paton and 
Mordaunt (2004) reported a physical sign of failure during the period of the NHS 
`internal market'. They found a poor performing health care trust suffered from 
significant clinical weakness and inadequate competition reflected in a substantial net 
export of patients to surrounding hospitals, which put the Trust in an uncertain 
situation, with the possibility that its management might be taken over by external 
organisation. 
Financial symptoms were addressed in two studies in the health sector, (Protopsaltis et 
al., 2002; Fulop et al., 2004) as obvious indicators of failure, though in the school 
setting it was not reported as an evident symptom. Only Paton and Mordaunt (2004) 
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and Gray(20oo) reported lack of financial balance in poorly performing schools in 
deprived areas. Among managerial symptoms, employee mistrust, internal conflict and 
lack of teamwork were the most prevalent markers across three settings (health, school 
and local government sectors). Low staff morale was a common symptom (behavioural) 
reported in all three contexts. Unsatisfactory teaching quality, poor behaviour in classes 
and low levels of expectation were the specific symptoms identified in the school setting. 
Fulop et al. (2004), in a study covering nine poorly performing English NHS acute 
trusts, classified indicators of decline, as perceived by stakeholders, into multiple 
`clusters' rather than `singular' events. Two main `clusters' were identified. Cluster type 1 
represented "the organisation as an insular `fortress' exhibiting poor media image, poor 
external relationships, low staff morale, high turnover and recruitment problems". This 
cluster was common to zero star rated trusts, and in particular was perceived by 
incoming managers as a key symptom of failure. Cluster type 2 represented "the 
organisation that is unable to implement core targets (breaches of core access and 
waiting list targets, poor A&E performance) and exhibits financial problems (breaches 
of core financial, external financial pressures and inability to adjust to new funding 
systems". It was reported that all samples of trusts were represented in this cluster, 
though `at risk' samples that had not been rated as zero star (reduced performance, but 
not absolute failure) exhibited it more commonly. 
Included studies showed good managers leaving organisations, which is a classic 
marker of failure, and a high level of management turnover ensued (Fulop et al., 2004; 
Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Eitel, 2004; Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Gray, 2000). The 
posts tended not to be (or could not be) filled, or inexperienced managers were brought 
in. Consequently, the organisation lost its managerial capacity and capability (valued at 
a premium during the crisis phase) exacerbating the situation and likely to be the cause 
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Turner and Whiteman (2005) report that in six of their cases, the need for turnaround 
interventions had been denied by managers over a long period (behavioural marker). 
Fulop et al. (2004) and Eitel (2004) found that managers tended to blame others for 
performance problems and did not consider themselves as a cause or contributor to the 
failure (behavioural marker). 
Some studies defined certain causes of failure as symptoms. Fulop et al. (2004) viewed 
distraction by a major development plan (e. g. a merger or implementation of a Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) scheme) as symptoms of failure rather than secondary causes. 
Certain researchers do not differentiate between symptoms and secondary causes of 
failure, despite McKiernan's view to the contrary (Harvey et al., 2005a). 
3.7 Secondary causes of failure 
As outlined in section 2.6, a range of internal and/or external factors combine to cause 
organisational failure in the for-profit sector. The current review similarly found that 
both internal and external factors contribute to organisational failure in public services. 
For example Andrews et al. (2006) reported that both mismanagement (an internal 
factor) and misfortune (an external factor in which untoward circumstances are faced 
by some public organisations and are beyond the control of the organisation) had an 
impact on the performance of public organisations. They reported that around 55% of 
the variation in the relative success and failure of 120 UK local authorities was 
collectively explained by misfortune and mismanagement variables. 
McKiernan (2002) classifies secondary causes of failure in the for-profit sector in terms 
of following: (1) financial (largely internal); (2) demand (external environment); and (3) 
managerial (internal) causes. This current review identified five different internal 
secondary causes of failure within public sector, including: (1) managerial; (2) financial; 
(3) organisational; (4) cultural; and (5) political. Table 3.3 summarises the internal and 
external secondary causes of failure reported by each of the studies. The following 
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3.7.1 Internal secondary causes 
Included studies identified five different categories of internal secondary causes of 
failure: managerial; financial; political; organisational; and cultural factors. 
3.7.1.1 Managerial factors 
A range of managerial related factors were identified, including poor managerial 
leadership, poor operational performance, lack of performance management 
arrangements, a lack of managerial skills and capacity, lack of data management 
systems, `silo' management, lack of corporate vision and strategies, insufficient staff 
engagement (lack of clinical staff involvement in the health sector), lack of relationship 
with external stakeholders, inattention to external warning signals, distraction by a 
major development plan (e. g. merging of organisations or development of a new 
organisational site), mismanaged priorities, lack of system process and policies, lack of 
managerial capability to turnaround, loss of credibility on the part of management 
among staff and remote managers (where the management team were located off the 
main site) [see Table 3.3]. 
Lack of managerial leadership was one of the most common factors reported in all three 
sectors. Protopsaltis et al. (2002) found that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of poorly 
performing NHS acute trusts were a key contributor to the problem. Lack of leadership, 
unwillingness to make decisions, reluctance to distribute power (delegation), working in 
isolation from managers in other organisations, and the inability to challenge internal 
vested interests were found to be key managerial problems. Lack of leadership by the 
Trust board was also a factor in some cases. For example, non-executive members of the 
board were unable to raise problems and effectively challenge executive members. In 
one case the board of the Trust had focused entirely on financial problems; attaining 
access targets, such as waiting lists was not viewed as a key priority. 
Andrews et al. (20o6) examined the impact of mismanagement and misfortune on the 
success or failure of 120 UK upper tier local authorities measured by the Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment (CPA) scores using a questionnaire based survey. They used 
seven criteria to measure mismanagement including: (1) performance management 
74 
(management information system at corporate and service level); (2) having clear 
priorities; (3) internal partnership (joint working and cross cutting working); (4) links 
with users (the importance of understanding users' needs, the importance of users' 
demands and the involvement of external stakeholders in strategy making); (5) external 
partnerships; (6) managerial leadership; and (7) political leadership. There were 
significant associations between three out of seven mismanagement variables 
(performance management (T= 2.602, p<0.05), managerial leadership (T= 3.527, 
p<o. oi) and political leadership (T= 2.88 1, p<o. ol)) and the performance of local 
authorities. It was shown that English local authorities were more likely to fail if they 
had poor performance management systems and poor political and managerial 
leadership as their internal characteristics. This suggests that a lack of leadership rather 
than weak organisational structure and process is more likely to lead to organisational 
failure. The clarity of priorities, internal relationships, links with users and external 
relationships did not show a statistically significant impact on the performance of local 
authorities. However, only the development of a relationship with the private sector was 
considered as the external relationship in this study and relationships with other public 
and governmental organisations were not included. This suggests that the impact of the 
working relationship with other external stakeholders should be the focus of future 
research regarding organisational failure. It was noted that the study measured joint 
working and cross cutting working in order to evaluate internal relationships, though 
these two factors are only one form of internal relationship and did not present 
significant correlation with failure. The other elements of internal relationship, which 
may show a relationship to failure, were not included in this study. Turner and 
Whiteman (2005) also highlighted poor political and managerial leadership as causes of 
failure in some of the local authorities in their study. 
Different kinds of poor operational management in under-performing NHS acute trusts 
were identified as causes of failure, such as lack of financial understanding and 
management, inadequate and unclear plans for managing clinical (e. g. waiting list, A& E 
and patient discharge) and non-clinical tasks, and inability or unwillingness to address 
key targets. Furthermore, some CEOs and/or senior managers were reluctant to invest 
in improving their management structure (Protopsaltis et al., 2002). 
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In studies conducted in all three sectors, poor working relationships between managers 
and other stakeholders at local and/or central level were reported as an important cause 
of failure. Senior managers of such organisations were distracted by major development 
plans, resulting in them taking their `eyes off the ball'. Fulop et al. (2004) and 
Protopsaltis et al. (2002) reported that a major development plan (e. g. a merger or PFI 
scheme) caused senior mangers' attention to become distracted in several poorly 
performing NHS trusts. 
3.7.1.2 Financial factors 
A series of financial problems were reported in included studies, particularly in the 
health sector (Fulop et al., 2004; Protopsaltis et al., 2002), as internal causes of failure. 
Fulop et al. (2004) identified poor financial control and financial instability, a high cost 
structure (drugs and agency staff), overspends in key clinical directorates and the 
duplicating of services across two or more hospital sites of a trust as examples of 
financial problems in their sample (nine poorly performing NHS acute trusts). 
Protopsaltis et al. (2002) reported that in certain cases, previous managers had hidden 
the existence of financial problems and that they were revealed when investigated by 
new managers. 
3.7.1.3 Political factors 
Political factors were reported as an important internal cause of failure in some studies 
conducted within the local government setting (Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Andrews 
et al., 2006). Turner and Whiteman (2005) reported several relatively common political 
factors among their cases, including poor political leadership characterised by a lack of 
vision, stagnant political environment or volatile political environment (frequent 
changes in control, such as different parties in power following two elections, poor 
inter-party relations and internal political dispute). Parochial politicians, lacking 
strategic vision and the ability to make complex decisions, were also perceived as 
political factors in two cases. Andrews et al. (2006) also found a statistically significant 
(T=2.881, P< o. oi) relationship between political leadership and the performance of 
120 selected UK local authorities. It was argued that poor leadership or unsteady 
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('volatile') leadership, is unlikely to be able to respond to performance problems 
appropriately and the ability to improve may not be fully embedded within the 
organisation owing to constant change (Turner and Whiteman, 2005). 
Joyce (2004) also placed emphasis on the importance of both managerial and political 
leadership as important factors in preventing continuing failure. The importance of 
political leadership was rated more highly than managerial leadership because of the 
power of politicians, who can approve or reject decisions made by managers (Andrews 
et al., 2006). They also argued that good political and managerial leaders were unlikely 
to be attracted by poorly performing organisations, creating a vicious circle, where poor 
leadership resulted in poor performance. 
3.7.1.4 Organisational factors 
A number of organisational factors contributing to the failure of organisations were 
reported in some included studies. These factors were: poor corporate structure 
(departmentalism) [Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Eitel, 
2004]; tense employee relationships and internal conflicts (Fulop et al., 2004; Turner 
and Whiteman, 2005; Wilmott, 1999; Eitel, 2004; Harris and Chapman, 2002); 
insufficient professional confidence and capability (Harris and Chapman, 2002; Harris 
et al., 2003); loss of a CEO following a major disaster such as a significant patient safety 
accident (Fulop et al., 2004); poor relationships and/or conflict between political and 
managerial leadership (fear amongst managers driven by political intimidation); and 
complex relationships between members, managers, union and community 
organisations (Turner and Whiteman, 2005). 
As an example of the role of organisational factors, Eitel (2004) reported that a US 
regional office, which had performed poorly for years, worked as a `siloed' organisation 
with a poor corporate structure, within which each department functioned separately 
and had its own decision making pathways, with counterparts in the national office. It 
was a highly bureaucratic organisation and significant mistrust between managers and 
staff was evident, encouraging staff resistance to some key decisions made by senior 
managers. 
77 
3.7.1.5 Cultural factors 
As culture is a contested term, it is necessary to discuss organisational culture and 
explain its impact on organisational processes and outcomes before stating the role of 
cultural factors as a secondary cause of poor performance identified in the included 
studies. 
Culture as a concept comes originally from the academic study of social anthropology in 
the early twentieth century. Organisational culture is a multidimensional concept that 
developed independently in several disciplines ranging from social anthropology to 
organisational psychology. There are many approaches to culture and even more 
definitions. Various definitions portray different ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological assumptions (Smircich, 1983; Ashkanasy et al., 2000). Definitions of 
organisational culture range from a very short description given by Bower (1966): "It's 
the way we do things around here" to more complex definitions. Atkinson (i99o) 
defines organisational culture as: "reflecting the underlying assumptions about the way 
work is performed; what is acceptable and not acceptable; and what behaviour and 
actions are encouraged and discouraged". Schein (1985, pig) defines organisational 
culture as: "A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough 
to be considered valid and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems". According the Schein, 
organisational culture is the learned result of group experiences, and it is to a large 
extent unconscious. Schein (1992) contends that underlying assumptions grow out of 
values, until they become taken for granted and drop out of awareness. Schein (1992) 
views organisational culture as a three mutually reinforcing layers, which are artifacts 
(tangible signs), espoused values and basic assumption from surface to core. 
During the past two decades, research in organisational culture has shown two 
competing perspectives, each based on very different ontological assumptions: culture 
as a critical variable (e. g. the functionalist view) vs. culture as a root metaphor 
(interpretivist view) (Smirich, 1983). In the former, culture is defines as a variable that 
an organisation has and aaccording to this approach leaders develop the culture and an 
organisation's value system Here the managers are viewed as manipulators and cultural 
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change agents to achieve corporate objectives (Peters and Waterman, 1982). In a strong 
and corporate culture all workers must, according to this approach, adopt the manager's 
values as their own underlying assumptions and act according to them. Here, Unitary 
(strong) culture is pursued as the theory of cultural cohesion and conflicts or differing 
opinions are considered harmful and every effort is made to eradicate them (Alvesson & 
Berg 1992; Parker, 2000). This view is seen in those models, which try to distinguish 
different `types' of organisational culture. The latter perspective views culture as a 
metaphor. Here culture defines the whole character and experience of organisational 
life or what an organization is. Here organisations are viewed as a culture existing in 
and generated through the social interactions of their participants. The emphasis in this 
approach is to understand how organizations are socially accomplished and reproduced 
rather than what organization can achieve (Mannion et al, 2005). Therefore, this 
approach considers cultural cohesion in terms of co-existing sub cultures rather than a 
unitary culture. Interpretivists explore the active creation of meaning and the ways in 
which meanings are associated in organization (Schultz and Hatch, 1996). 
Johnson and Scholes (2002), state that culture can act as a filter through which 
members of the organisation relate to their world both internally and externally. This 
can be helpful in two ways: first as a shorthand way to understand complex situations 
and second as a basis for organisational success and competitive advantage because the 
culture itself is difficult to imitate. Kotter (1995) cites the inability to anchor change 
initiatives in the organisation's culture as one of the primary reasons that change efforts 
are not sustained. Regardless of the size, industry, or age of the organisation, culture 
affects many aspects of organisational performance (Fisher & Alford, 2000). Therefore, 
it is important to take into account the concept of organisational culture when 
attempting to develop and manage organisation-wide change initiatives. Cultural 
transformation is a central component of the NHS plan (DoH, 2000,2002) in the UK 
alongside structural change to deliver desired improvement in quality and performance. 
In the healthcare context, organisational culture has been associated with several 
organisational factors that contribute to quality, such as quality of nursing care, job 
satisfaction, and patient safety. 
Several cultural issues were identified as secondary causes of poor performance in the 
studies. These included: the lack of a performance culture (Turner and Whiteman, 
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2005); low levels of expectation, especially in the education sector (Harris et al., 2003; 
Harris and Chapman, 2002; Gray, 2000); the presence of a blame culture (Fulop et al., 
2004; Eitel, 2004); a risk averse culture (Eitel, 20o6); resistance to changing the 
inappropriate behaviour of some doctors within trusts (Protopsaltis et al., 2002) and 
resistance to turnaround owing to the lack of management/political will (Turner and 
Whiteman, 2005). Protopsaltis et al. (2004) reported that some of their cases (poorly 
performing NHS trusts) had a reputation for a `poor culture' and their values, beliefs 
and rules were inappropriate or even toxic. 
3.7.2 External secondary causes of failure 
Changes in the external environment were a contributing factor to organisational failure 
reported in several studies. Policy change was reported as an important external 
secondary cause in several studies [Protopsaltis et al. (2002), Fulop et al. (2004) in the 
health sector, Turner and Whiteman (2005) in local government. Fulop et al. (2004) 
reported a series of structural changes and reforms that were experienced by the trusts 
during 1999-2001, such as the introduction of the Performance Assessment Framework. 
The changes resulted in a re-definition of roles and responsibilities that caused major 
unintended and dysfunctional consequences in an increasing number of hospital trusts. 
This was an indication that the speed of change required by the government was too 
rapid, with management teams finding it difficult to both transform their roles and 
satisfy the new expectations of partner organisations. Fulop et al. (2004) also 
maintained that increased competition, following imposed structural changes and 
reforms, played an important role in the drift into failure. Some of the services 
provided by trusts were transferred to Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and Mental Health 
Trusts, which resulted in more competition between these organisations. 
Some studies identified the impact of contextual factors on organisational failure in 
school settings (Wilmott, 1999; Harris et al., 2003; Gray, 2000; Meier and Bohte, 2003) 
and local government (Andrews et al., 2006; Turner and Whiteman, 2005). No studies 
in the health sector made an exclusive investigation of the impact of contextual factors 
on the failure or turnaround of organisations. Andrews et al. (2006) examined the 
impact of misfortune (untoward circumstances faced by some public organisations, 
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beyond the control of organisations) on the success or failure of 120 UK upper tier local 
authorities measured by CPA scores. They used five criteria to measure misfortune, 
including the size of the local authorities measured by the population of the areas which 
were served, two dimensions of diversity of service needs including ethnic diversity 
(using a calculated index) and social class, the prosperity of local residents by using two 
proxies for the capacity of local citizens to co-produce services including the percentage 
of single parent households and the percentage change in the population between 1991 
to 2001. The results showed that among misfortune variables the diverse service needs 
(supported by higher ethnic diversity (T= -3.779, p<o. oi)), poverty (supported by the 
higher number of lone-parents household (T= - 3.267, p<o. ol) and population change 
(T= 6.522, p<o. oi)) contributed to the organisational failure. This meant that 
organisations with ethnically diverse populations or higher levels of poverty (more lone- 
parent households or a declining population) were more likely to be classified as 
performing poorly. The size of the local authority and financial resources, directly 
available to the local authority, had no statistically significant relationship with 
performance. 
Turner and Whiteman (2005) also showed that the local population's need for various 
services was a factor that increased the possibility of failure. It concluded that a high 
level of poverty and deprivation had a negative effect on the performance of local 
government. Gray (2000) also indicated that most of the schools on `Special Measures' 
were located in areas with high levels of social deprivation. This was viewed as their 
most obvious contextual characteristic, as measured by the percentage of pupils entitled 
to receive free school meals. Gray (2000) added that poorly performing schools had 
historical difficulties, such as `changes in the composition of their catchments areas, 
problems with their local communities, difficulties in managing falling pupil numbers, 
budget restraints and the threat of closure'. Harris et al. (2003) reported that all 
selected schools in former coalfield areas perceived that environmental disadvantage 
(deprivation and poverty), faced by the pupils, inevitably had a deleterious effect on 
their performance. Although social class diversity was reported as a factor that 
increased the possibility of failure in both schools and local government (Paton and 
Mordaunt, 2004; Gray, 1999), Andrews et al. (20o6) did not find a significant statistical 
effect between social class and failure in UK local government. 
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Wilmott (1999) examined the ways in which a Local Education Authority (LEA) 
advisory team (as external turnaround agent) had responded to the needs of a 'failing' 
school (as identified by OFSTED auditors). The catchments area of the case study (a 
poorly performing school) had mainly local authority housing and high levels of 
economic and social deprivation. In Wilmot's study (1999), the evaluation of school 
effectiveness by the OFSTED advisors was based only on measurable outcomes. 
However, the author discussed the fact that the socioeconomic background of the pupils 
(level of deprivation) could affect their achievements but that it was not considered by 
the advisors. 
Meier and Bohte (2005) examined the impact of four independent variables (task 
diversity and goal conflicts, adequate resources, the level of bureaucracy, and the level 
of incentives) upon the likelihood of micro-failure (the pattern of suboptimal 
performance over a period of time) measured by three key indicators (absenteeism, 
classes failure, and dropout) in iooo public school districts in Texas. The emphasis of 
the study was not on macro-failure (the total collapse and demise of the organisation) as 
micro-failure is likely to occur more frequently than macro-failure in public services. 
The authors suggested that the public organisation's micro-failure, in the long run, 
might be associated with the macro-failure of governance. It was hypothesised that 
greater task diversity and goal conflict, inadequate resources, increased bureaucracy, 
and the failure of incentives in the public sector would all result in more micro-failures. 
Detailed information about the measurements of these four criteria is presented in the 
data extraction form (See Appendix 3.4). 
The regression analysis showed that of the four hypotheses, only task diversity/goal 
conflicts was correlated positively with micro-failure measurements (absenteeism, 
retention and dropout) [ii out of 15 measures]. The measurement of resources gave rise 
to mixed findings. Class size, as a measure of resources, is always significant in the 
direction that was hypothesised, which means that larger social classes are likely to be 
at risk of micro-failure. Resources committed to classroom instruction, however, do not 
show correlation with absenteeism and retentions and positively is correlated with 
dropout rate. The relationship between instructional expenditure per pupil and micro- 
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failure was weak, showed variations in the cost of educational input and did not offer 
reliable evidence of the relationship between resources and failure. The incentive 
measures also presented a mixed relationship. In two cases, surplus funds are 
correlated with fewer organisational failures. Teacher turnover as a measure of 
incentive (adequate salaries) did not have an impact on micro-failure. There was no 
general association between increased bureaucracy and greater organisational failures. 
3.8 Primary causes of failure 
As outlined in section 2.6, according to the for-profit literature, both symptoms and 
secondary causes of decline were related to the primary causes of failure. McKiernan 
(2002) argued that dysfunction of organisations in terms of their organisational 
learning processes was a main cause of organisational failure (McKiernan, 2002). 
Several studies explored the primary causes of failure (Fulop et al., 2004; Eitel, 2004; 
Turner and Whiteman, 2005). Fulop et al. (2004) explicitly reported organisational 
introspection or `eyes off the ball', organisational myopia, organisational trauma, and 
organisational arrogance were four important factors that had a negative impact on 
organisational learning processes, causing performance decline and failure among their 
nine case study NHS acute trusts. Table 3.4 presents definitions of factors that 
contributed to organisational learning problems. 
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Table 3.4 Primary causes of failure 
Defects in the organisational learning process identified among the nine case study trusts 
Organisational introspection: 
Learning from the past is used for future behaviour. Management becomes a closed 
system unable to deal with external challenges. 
Organisational arrogance: 
Arrogance is embedded in the core of the organisation. Changes in external environment 
are ignored. The organisation continues on set course oblivious to need for adaptation to 
remain successful. The seeds of failure are built into the organisations belief in its own 
success. 
Organisational trauma: 
High profile negative media coverage, clinical investigations, lead to removal of CEO 
followed by period of interim leadership leaves the organisation traumatized and 
spiralling towards failure. 
Organisational myopia: 
The decline into failure happens because of myopia among management who have poor 
ability to scan the environment. Long service executives are shut into past successful 
recipes. The organisation is conservative and risk/change averse. This behaviour is 
exacerbated when the organisation is spiralling down into failure. 
Source: Fulop et al. (2004) 
Organisational introspection occurred as a consequence of senior management being 
distracted by a range of factors, such that they were unable to deal with external 
challenges. These factors were: (i) the redevelopment of hospital sites; (2) clinical 
investigations; or (3) negative media interests. 
Organisational arrogance arose in those trusts that enjoyed a high profile because 
of a reputation for clinical excellence or a well-regarded clinical specialty. This 
necessitated a struggle by the management when dealing with the clinical reforms as set 
out in the NHS plan, and as a consequence, the management team neglected the overall 
performance of the organisation, while they focused on achieving clinical service 
change. 
Organisational trauma describes a situation in which a traumatic event (e. g. 
replacement of a CEO following a serious problem at a 
hospital and covered by the 
national media) happens when senior managers are already 
faced with problematic 
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internal relationships. The difficult situation of such a traumatised trust is exacerbated 
when the trust has no CEO in post for a period of time, or has an interim manger. The 
resulting leadership hiatus makes the trust highly vulnerable to failure. 
Organisational myopia depicts circumstances in which senior management teams 
are unable or unwilling to modernise and develop a new system of working. For 
example, a'bunker mentality' is often exhibited by a myopic corporate team in a trust 
and development of the essential corporate learning strategies required to avoid failure 
is prevented (Fulop et al., 2004). Turner and Whiteman (2005) also indicated that 
resistance to external pressure (e. g. failure to implement modernisation and change) 
was an important issue in declining performance in local government. 
Turner and Whiteman (2005) reported that inertia related to previous success 
(organisational arrogance) and lack of appropriate response to a changing external 
environment (organisational introspection) were causes of failure among their cases 
(poorly performing local government authorities). 
Some studies highlighted lack of organisational learning in poorly performing 
organisations as a main cause of failure (Eitel, 2004). Eitel argued that a regional 
governmental office was categorised as a permanently failing organisation. According to 
the cognition approach to failure (Anheire and Moulton, 1999), the organisation did not 
learn from its mistakes and used only `single loop' learning (Stead and Smallman, 1999). 
Single loop learning refers to the process of detection and correction of errors in 
relation to the difference between expected and obtained outcomes within an 
organisation, without questioning the current organisational policies, goals, values and 
assumptions (Argyris and Schon, 1987). Eitel (2004) reported that both the 
organisation and its staff suffered from a lack of `double loop' learning when 
confronting organisational failure. Double loop learning occurs when an organisation 
detects and corrects its errors and also questions and amends its strategic goals, policies 
and values to avoid the recurrence of such errors (Argyris and Schon, 1987). 
Findings of the above studies support evidence from the for-profit sector literature, 
which shows that the lack of an organisational learning capacity, is a key primary cause 
of organisational failure. 
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The foregoing sections considered all symptoms, internal and external secondary and 
primary causes of failure explored in the included studies. In the following sections, 
factors initiating the processes of change (triggers), and strategies used by organisations 
to turnaround poor performance are discussed. 
3.9 Triggers for change 
As outlined in section 2.7, literature in the for-profit sector shows that when the actual 
or perceived performance of an organisation falls far below an acceptable level, a 
significant internal and/or external jolt or trigger for action is required, otherwise the 
organisation faces a high risk of failure. According to stress-inertia theory (discussed in 
detail in section 2.7), strategic changes occur within an organisation when the level of 
stress becomes greater than the level of inertia. This can occur by decreasing the inertia 
level or increasing the stress level. Triggering factors can increase the level of stress and 
stimulate change processes. 
Some of the studies in the current review explored triggers for change in various public 
services, including health care (Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Fulop et al., 2004), local 
government (Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Eitel, 2004), schools (Gray, 2000; Wilmott, 
1999) and mixed settings (Paton and Mordaunt, 2004). Table 3.5 details the triggers 
reported by each study. 
As with the for-profit sector, both internal and external factors were recognised as 
triggers for change. Replacement of senior manager(s), change of politician(s), contact 
of internal managers with central government agencies concerning the poor 
performance of the organisation, opposition at different levels of the hierarchy, conflict 
among different groups within the organisation striving to maintain their autonomy, 
and reaction to the announcement of poor performance were internal triggers. New 
policies and programmes originated by central government that aimed to improve the 
performance of the organisation, external inspection or intervention and the concern of 
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Replacement of senior manager(s) was the most common trigger found in all the above 
studies. This aligns closely with the findings from the for-profit sector. For example, 
Turner and Whiteman (2005) and Paton and Mordaunt (2004) showed that the 
departure, or the replacement of the CEO or council leader in selected poorly 
performing UK local government services, was an important trigger. Turner and 
Whiteman (2005) also reported that a change in politicians at the local level triggered 
change in some of their cases. 
Fulop et al. (2004) showed that, in some poorly performing NHS trusts, internal 
managers contacted central government agencies and raised serious concerns about the 
poor performance of their organisation. For example, chairmen sometimes contacted 
the Department of Health (DoH) or Regional Office (RO) to voice their concerns about 
the functioning of the existing management team and its lack of attention to the wider 
changes in the local health economy. This resulted in a change of management team. In 
two other cases, the newly appointed CEO and senior mangers called in the Commission 
for Health Improvement (CHI) to conduct a diagnostic investigation. The subsequent 
CHI report acted as a significant stimulus for the first trust by enabling the newly 
appointed CEO to gain support for remedial interventions. The existing CEO of the 
second trust was replaced by an interim management team imposed by the Regional 
Office following publication of the CHI report (Fulop et al., 2004). 
External inspection or intervention was an external trigger that played an important 
role in initiating change. Fulop et al. (2004) reported that for some of the poor 
performing NHS trusts, the call for action arose from external stakeholders, such as the 
Regional Office, Strategic Health Authority and user groups. Jas (2004) similarly noted 
that the need for change and specific action was perceived when the external inspectors' 
reports in UK local government setting emerged. Likewise, Eitel (2004) indicated that 
in his case study (a regional government agency), the national office's report had a role 
in seeking change, although the outcome of the changes deployed by the organisation 
was not positive. Wilmott (1999) identified the role of the Office for Standards in 
Education (OFSTED) audit report in the initiation and development of an action plan in 
a poorly performing school. In the UK, those schools ranked by OFSTED auditors as 
poorly performing or `failing' are subject to help from Local Education Authorities 
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(LEA) and the OFSTED report was regarded as an impetus for change (Office for 
Standards in Education Report, 1996). Paton and Mordaunt (2004) showed the role of 
the Local Education Authorities (LEA) in triggering change by appointing an 
experienced mentor (the head teacher of another school) to aid a poorly performing 
school to provide a suitable action plan for improvement. 
Revealing performance decline within the organisation and the announcement of poor 
performance ('naming and shaming') were also important triggers for organisations to 
initiate a series of strategies to address their performance problems. For instance, the 
public reporting of Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) scores -a system 
that ranks the performance of UK local governments - was a trigger for change. Seven 
out of lo authorities stated that the CPA process had influenced turnaround. However, 
two authorities believed that the CPA had no effect on turnaround (these organisations 
lacked an `achievement' culture) and one case defined the role of the CPA as a delaying 
factor for turnaround (Turner and Whiteman, 2005). The latter's claims were 
consistent with Barker et al's (2001) study findings, who argued that performance 
decline was an insufficient factor to initiate change and that other factors, such as 
external intervention or internal power repositioning (e. g. change of senior 
management) were also required for change to occur. 
The concerns of different external stakeholders were also an important trigger. Fulop et 
al., (2004) reported that the external community of user groups raised concerns about 
the performance of organisations using local and/or national media. This action 
triggered change in some organisations. Strong lobbying by local and national media 
highlighted the poor performance of four NHS trusts. Jas and Skelcher (2004; 2005b) 
indicated that `naming and shaming' may have also resulted in enforcing pressure from 
citizens or service-users on poorly performing UK local governments. Gray (2000) 
highlights the concern of parents of pupils in schools with poor standards of teaching 
and the low level of pupils' achievement was considered to be a trigger. In some studies 
(e. g. Paton and Mordaunt, 2004) the need for change was accepted by senior staff but 
there was insufficient agreement on the precise nature of the change. 
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3.10 Turnaround strategies used in included studies 
As outlined in section 2.9, a range of turnaround strategies used in the for-profit sector 
are assessed in the literature. Although there is no dominant classification of 
turnaround strategies in the for-profit literature (Boyne, 2004a), three generic 
strategies, including Reorganisation (Replacement), Retrenchment, and Repositioning 
(Renewal), can be distinguished in the for-profit sector literature (Boyne, 2004a; 
Walshe, 2004) [see section 2-9 for a detailed description of these concepts]. Different 
studies have used these conceptual categories (or similar labels) in order to examine the 
impact of different approaches to reversing organisational decline. However, it should 
be borne in mind that some variables and labels do not fit neatly into any of these three 
conceptual categories. Therefore, some slightly different patterns of evidence might 
arise because of different subjective judgments (Boyne, 20o6). Table 3.6 details all the 
turnaround interventions used in each included study and Table 3.7 presents the same 
strategies, categorised by the '3 Rs' framework (Boyne, 2004b). 
3. io. 1 Reorganisation (replacement) strategies 
As outlined in section 2.9, reorganisation strategies include changes in the internal 
management of an organisation, and the most common reorganisation strategy in the 
for-profit sector literature is the replacement of the CEO and/or senior management 
(Boyne, 2006). This current review also shows that the most common intervention used 
in the public services to stimulate turnaround is the replacement of senior manager(s). 
Protopsaltis et al. (2002) reported that the replacement of senior managers occurred in 
all five turnaround cases (NHS acute trusts). In all, the CEO was replaced, and in two, 
the chair of the trust was also replaced. In three cases, most or all of the trust board had 
been replaced. 
Turner and Whiteman (2005) argued that the replacement of management was a 
common intervention used by the local authorities, reflecting the perception that poor 
leadership influenced failure. Although success is not guaranteed by the replacement of 
senior managers, an increase in managerial commitment may be facilitated by the 
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such changes, and the qualities of new manager(s) can influence the effectiveness of the 
new senior manager(s). In some cases, interim managers were appointed to provide 
temporary leadership capacity. Turner and Whiteman (2005) found several local 
authorities did not change their CEO or senior management team within the first year 
following a low CPA score. In the later CPA score, these organisation were seen to have 
the slowest progress in turning around poor performance. 
Fulop et al. (2004) found that although the CEO and/or senior manager(s) in their case 
studies had been replaced, four were unable to turnaround their performance. The 
implication was that the replacement of a CEO was a necessary but not sufficient factor 
in turning around poor performance. Fulop et al. (2004) explored several factors to 
explain differences between their cases, which are discussed in another section. 
In Boyne and Meier's (2005) study in a school setting, internal reorganisation had a 
significant positive effect on performance improvement. The reorganisation was 
assessed using the following measures: new superintendent from inside the 
organisation (insider); new superintendent from outside of the organisation (outsider); 
changes in staff allocated to teaching (core staff); and change in teacher experience as 
the marker of quality of core staff. Recovery from failure situation was more likely to 
occur when schools districts replaced their superintendents with insiders, but the 
appointment of an outsider did not result in a significantly different outcome from 
persevering with the superintendent who had led the district to failure. It was shown 
that increases in the proportion of core staff (teachers) and the recruitment of more 
experienced teachers resulted in a significantly better prospect of turnaround of a 
failing situation. Thus, Boyne and Meier (2005) showed that turnaround was associated 
not only with top management change but also with an effective human resource 
strategy that focused on core staff. 
Eitel (2004) reported that the replacement of managers was used to turnaround the 
situation of a poorly performing regional government organisation. However, this did 
not result in performance improvement because inappropriate leaders (poor leadership) 
had been appointed. The appointed managers were often close to retirement 
(insufficient motivation). Their focus was on local politics rather than national 
97 
directives and their decisions were reached independently from those of the national 
office (representing poor corporate citizenship), which resulted in weak support from 
the national office. These managers suffered from a lack of corporate vision, poor 
external relationships, insufficient communication and staff involvement in the decision 
making process, and lack of involvement with the national office. These factors caused 
long-term failure, and as a consequence, the regional office was targeted for closure by 
the national office. 
In a school setting, Gray (2000) reported that in a study conducted by Stark (1998) 
during the period 1993-96, over half the case study schools had changed their head 
teachers within a term or two prior to (25%) or following (75%) the school's failure. 
Other reorganisation strategies were used in the included studies, such as focusing on: 
performance management; human resources strategies; internal reorganisation; and 
strategic planning. For example, most of the studies emphasised the important role of 
robust performance management to aid recovery of the organisation. Both Harris and 
Chapman (2002) and Harris et al. (2002) reported that all schools applied a 
performance tracking system using a better data management system to monitor pupils' 
performance and progress. 
Fulop et al. (2004) reported that different turnaround strategies were planned to be run 
over a period of three years in three different time periods (first six months, between 7 
to 12 months, and 12 to 36 months). Managers used various turnaround strategies to 
influence a range of organisational issues, including management structure, finance, 
human resources, organisational culture, external relationships, systems and protocol, 
strategic vision and operational performance. The reorganisation strategies used within 
the first six months were: strategic issues (focus on consultation on strategy); 
managerial issues (reorganisation of management structure to improve clinical 
engagement, a reduction in the number of clinical directorates, creation and 
appointment of new posts for key directorates; Human Resources Management issues 
(communication strategies to gain staff commitment to national targets); systems 
process and policies issues (data management); operational performance (prioritising of 
operational performance targets). 
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In the second time frame (between 7 to 12 months), the focus of reorganisation 
strategies changed and included: Management issues (re-organisation of middle 
management and leadership programme); Human Resources Management issues 
(developing staff training and staff reward system); systems process and policies issues 
(modernise procedures). Table 3.6 and 3.7 detail the range of reorganisation strategies 
used in each study. 
3.10.1.1 Leadership styles 
Different leadership behaviour was reported in studies during the turnaround process. 
In health care, Fulop et al. (2004) reported that a range of different leadership styles 
from participative, facilitative and risk-taking to more mechanistic approaches based on 
hierarchical principles had been deployed by new managers to turnaround poor 
performance. 
In the school setting, head teachers showed a broad range of leadership styles from 
directive leadership to participative, people oriented, and dispersed leadership during 
the turnaround process related circumstances. However, greater emphasis was placed 
on the people-oriented leadership approach (setting a clear vision in terms of personal 
and professional values, morale, honesty, fairness and equality, promoting respect for 
individuals, and the overall development of staff) and transformation and empowering 
staff (Harris et al., 2003; Harris and Chapman, 2002; Gray, 2000). Harris and 
Chapman (2002) argued that whilst directive leadership was likely to be required 
during the initial phase of turnaround, more democratic and delegated forms of 
leadership (staff engagement and ownership, staff empowerment, promoting 
collaboration and investing in quality of relationship and raising commitment within 
the school) was required as a school responded positively to change. It was reported 
that a more autocratic leadership style (e. g. focus on policy implementation and 
consistent standards of teaching) was used by head teachers during the pre-inspection 
phase (e. g. OFSTED inspection) but they displayed more supportive styles of leadership 
during the inspection phase (Harris and Chapman, 2002). 
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Joyce (2004) examined the behaviour of a new chief executive during the successful 
turnaround of a poorly performing English council. The council moved from 31st to 
third out of 33 London boroughs over a three year period (1996 - 1999), as assessed by 
a composite set of performance indicators used by the Audit Commission. Joyce (2004) 
reported that an effective turnaround leader should also be a good manager. The CEO 
presented both leadership characteristics (e. g. work through a strategic vision, 
communication and empowerment) and management capability (e. g. paying attention 
to operational details, having the ability to take staff into uncomfortable areas, investing 
time in planning and control). The CEO was more visible than the previous incumbent 
and learnt how the organisation was performing by visiting and listening to staff and on 
the basis of soft intelligence, a new vision was formulated. Support from local politicians 
and external stakeholders were viewed as an important factor to support senior 
management team decisions. Strategy development, performance management and 
focusing on human resources and organisational development were the three major 
tactics employed by the CEO. In addition, through reasoned argument, the CEO actively 
challenged resistance on the part of certain managers to the new vision. The CEO 
presented a significant level of energy and resilience in the development of performance 
management. Considerable emotional energy was seen to be necessary when dealing 
with resistance to change. Therefore, a clear contrast between management and 
leadership was defined in the literature and the ideal CEO was viewed as a mixture of 
Kotter's manager and leader. [Kotter (1990) differentiates between leadership and 
management and suggests that leaders set a direction and develop a vision for the 
future, while managers are more concerned with planning and implementing strategies. 
Kotter maintains that managers typically promote stability while leaders encourage 
change]. So Joyce (2004) concluded that effective turnaround leaders need to know 
detailed information with regard to its performance. Leaders should deal with 
resistance and conflict resulting from the presence of disagreement amongst 
stakeholders. It should be borne in mind that the data was collected only via 
interviewing a new CEO, so does not necessary present a rounded view of what 
happened within the organisation. 
Included studies indicated that a varied range of leadership styles were exercised by 
senior managers during the process of turnaround, relevant to each stage of the 
100 
turnaround cycle. None of the studies prescribed a single leadership style as being 
appropriate during the whole course of the turnaround processes. 
3.10.2 Retrenchment strategies 
As outlined in section 9.2.2, retrenchment strategies included a range of short-term 
activities used by organisations to secure their survival and were aimed at tackling the 
immediate problems responsible for initiating the crisis. The most common 
interventions used in the for-profit sector were cost cutting and asset reduction to 
increase cash flow. In addition, core performance targets were commonly homed in 
upon. Some of the included studies in the current review also reported retrenchment 
interventions in the public sector. Table 3.6 and 3.7 detail the range of retrenchment 
strategies identified in the included studies. 
A focus on core performance targets and tasks was a retrenchment strategy used in 
various public sector services including health care (Fulop et al., 2004; Protopsaltis et 
al., 2002), local government (Turner and Whiteman, 2005) and schools (Wilmott, 1999; 
Boyne and Meier, 2005). Both studies, conducted in the health sector, placed emphasis 
on achieving the main performance targets measured by the NHS star rating system. 
Cost reduction was a `classic' retrenchment strategy through financial control (e. g. 
reduction in staffing levels, cuts in expenditure, reduction in stock) [Fulop et al., 2004; 
Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Eitel, 2004; Paton and Mordaunt; 2004; Boyne, 2006; Boyne 
and Meier, 2005]. In Boyne and Meier's (2005) study, retrenchment was assessed using 
a questionnaire completed by school superintendents who were the most powerful 
stakeholders in planning and implementing strategies through: the level of priority 
given to reducing costs/increasing efficiency by superintendents, the extent of focus on 
exam results (TAAS) as a core business, and calculating the percentage of 
superintendents' time on internal management. There was no statistically significant 
relationship between two of the three retrenchment variables (focus on core business 
and time spent on internal management) and performance change. More emphasis on 
reducing costs and increasing efficiency was extremely unlikely to produce improved 
results. This finding contrasts with the effect of retrenchment on performance 
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improvement in the for-profit sector and seems likely to result in further failure, rather 
than to initiate recovery. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, some factors such as the degree of performance problems 
and the extent of environmental munificence (availability of resources), may affect the 
selection and impact of managerial strategies in the for-profit sector. It was found that 
cost cutting may improve performance where the level of decline is moderate and the 
organisation is in an environment of low munificence. In contrast, in a serious decline 
situation, or in an environment of high munificence, a radical repositioning strategy is 
required. Compared with results in the private sector, Boyne and Meyer's findings 
(2005) did not show a significant relationship between the effects of managerial 
strategies, performance problems and environmental munificence. 
Eitel (2004) noted that downsizing (reduction in staffing) was used as a turnaround 
strategy (retrenchment) in a poorly performing US governmental regional office. It was 
not successful in the first two rounds of turnaround because of local political pressure 
and the resistance of unions, which sought to retain staff and preserve their working 
terms and conditions. The reduction of staffing levels suffered from the lack of a clear 
plan and it was not apparent which staff were to leave the organisation. Some key staff 
soon left and were not replaced, and management treated this attrition as its 
downsizing strategy. However, this resulted in the loss of several high quality staff, with 
the consequence that the remaining staffs were required to work harder and take on 
new duties, and these factors led to even more staff leaving. In 1994, when the 
government proposed closing two regional offices because of financial problems, this 
organisation was one of the candidates for closure. Finally, duties of the local 
organisation were given to other offices and a merger was eventually forced. 
In the school setting, the included studies did not place exclusive emphasis on the role 
of cost cutting as the main retrenchment strategy. It would appear that compared with 
the for-profit sector, the use of retrenchment strategies, particularly cost reduction, is 
less frequent in the public sector - at least for organisations in a school setting. Neither 
was asset reduction identified as a way to balance financial problems. 
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3.10.3 Repositioning strategies 
As discussed in section 2.9.3, repositioning (renewal) strategies refer to activities that 
attempt to reorient the corporate vision and strategy of an organisation in order to 
assure its long-term survival. Interventions such as changes in the strategic mission of 
an organisation, entry into new markets, changes to the organisational culture, 
pioneering new products, improving stakeholder management, development of new 
external relationships, and searching for additional sources of profits, are the types of 
long-term repositioning strategies commonly found in the for-profit sector literature. 
The current review also found a range of repositioning strategies in public services. 
The following repositioning strategies were used in the included studies: attempts to 
change organisational culture; refocusing of the organisation's activities; better 
stakeholder management and improvement of external relationships; implementing a 
constructive organisational learning environment; creating clinical networks with other 
hospitals; developing a new vision and change in mission; seeking private funding, 
focusing on external marketing (only one example); and a shift towards in-sourcing of 
manufacturing of replacement parts. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 detail the repositioning 
strategies used in each included study. 
Repositioning strategies were assessed in Boyne and Meier's (2005) study. Here 
repositioning was assessed using a survey completed by school superintendents using 
measurement of a range of variables: the extent to which the superintendent resolves to 
implement change; seeking private funding, and contact and interaction with external 
stakeholders. Two of the three repositioning variables were positively related to the 
extent of turnaround; the superintendents who sought change and initiated interactions 
with a wide range of stakeholders were more likely to lead their school districts towards 
performance improvements. The third element of repositioning, the emphasis on 
acquiring private funding, had no significant impact on recovery and performance 
improvement. Taken together, the results for retrenchment and repositioning suggest 
that `financial' turnaround strategies (cost cutting and seeking revenue) were not 
effective in school districts. 
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Protopsaltis et al. (2002) reported that several hospital trusts had attempted to change 
their organisational culture by creating a'can do' philosophy through a range of 
organisational changes including promoting transparency in decision making, clearer 
goal setting and setting intended performance targets. The trusts had also tried to 
develop better relations with external stakeholders. 
Fulop et al. (2004) reported that different turnaround strategies were planned to be run 
over a period of three years in three different time periods (first six months, between 7 
to 12 months, and 12 to 36 months). They presented a range of repositioning strategies 
including the development of external relationships (better relationships with the media 
and better working relationships with external stakeholders, engagement of service 
users and the development of clinical networks); attempts to change the culture 
(increasing the visibility of the top team and use of `quick wins' over the first six 
months) and more focus on completion of a new building/PFI scheme to demonstrate 
management ability and commitment to a time scale between 7 to 12 months. The 
implementation of organisational learning processes, improving clinical networks and 
encouraging ownership of a strategic vision throughout the organisation were the focus 
of repositioning strategies during the third phase of turnaround (being carried out in a 
period between 12 and 36 months). 
Both Harris et al. (2003) and Harris and Chapman (2002) highlighted the positive 
impact of some repositioning strategies in successful turnaround in a school setting. 
They showed that a `high expectation' culture was nurtured by the management team 
through using a range of activities, including award ceremonies and celebratory events. 
They also found that attempts to nurture and improve external relationships (e. g. better 
engagement with the community and increasing involvement of parents in school life) 
were strategies deployed by the schools. 
In one study (Paton and Mordaunt, 2004), the managers of a poorly performing 
healthcare trust focused on external marketing and reputation building as repositioning 
strategies. They emphasised a series of activities which expanded their clinical 
partnership with the hospitals that had proposed taking over the Trust when it was 
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performing poorly. They used this strategy when the `internal market' policy existed 
within the NHS context and were successful in providing a larger clinical network and 
broadening their area of service provision. However, because of the nature of the public 
sector, entrance to new markets or introduction of a new product is less likely to occur 
than in the for-profit sector. 
3.11 Role of external organisations in turning around poor 
performance 
Some included studies considered the role of external agents in turning around poorly 
performing public service organisations. These strategies can be divided into those 
forced upon them by the government and those initiated by the organisations 
themselves. In the health sector, Harvey et al. (2005a) explored the role of the 
Performance Development Team (PDT) (previously a part of the Modernisation 
Agency) as an external agent in promoting and facilitating turnaround in zero star rated 
NHS organisations. During their one year contract, the PDT was responsible for 
engaging with the Trust through PDT client managers to develop an agreed work plan 
with each trust and help staff to implement the plan. 
Harvey et al. (2005a) present their findings under four broad themes: 
a) Nature and content of PDT interventions: 
The main aim of the PDT was to help trusts to obtain sustained improvement in 
performance through changes to their organisational culture and the development of 
whole-system working. The PDT's role was consistent with the `relational approach' 
rather than `episodic' or `mandated' approaches (Jas and Skelcher, 2004) [see section 
2.11], and it focused on the main causes of failure (secondary and primary) rather than 
merely concentrating on its symptoms. However, this aim contrasted with the aims of 
some trusts and their external stakeholders, particularly the SHA, who sought quick 
performance improvements (through hitting essential targets) and achieving one or 
more stars in the next round of ratings. There were questions as to whether the one year 
contract between the PDT and the failing organisation could ensure sustained 
performance improvement in the long term. 
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b) Impact of PDT intervention: 
The focus of PDT activity was on retrenchment and renewal, as the PDT did not have 
the authority to replace key managers (replacement). Although the initial purpose of the 
PDT was to apply flexible and responsive interventions, depending on the needs and 
contingencies of each organisation (tailor-made approach), the strategies they used 
were not in necessarily in accordance with the organisational needs, and as a result 
some organisations declared that this approach limited the range and breadth of 
available interventions. In general, organisations studied were positive about the impact 
of the PDT, stating that the PDT provided the required skills and experiences to assist 
change, as well as confirmation for initiating change within the trusts from an external 
agent. Furthermore, the trusts indicated that the PDT assisted them in developing 
networks with other external organisations and also gave constructive criticism, helping 
the trusts to concentrate their efforts across the organisation. Most of the PDTs (86%) 
delivered their agreed plan on time and there was an improvement in star rating in 
most of (8o%) of the zero star organisations studied. However, attribution of such 
improvements to the activity of the PDT, which is only one among several factors, is 
problematic. Some organisations reported that they (especially new managers) could 
improve performance without help from the PDT and, in some cases, it was argued that 
the PDT impeded positive change within the organisation and was seen as an interfering 
factor in processes of change. 
c) Facilitating factors in achieving successful turnaround supported by an 
external agent (the PDT): 
Harvey et al. (2005a) explored specific factors that enhanced the effectiveness of PDT 
interventions, such as the role of the client manager of the PDT. This effectiveness was 
influenced by individual's level of maturity, background and experience; the 
organisation's willingness to accept the PDT's help, the clarity of the role and the quality 
of the relationship between the PDT, the trust and other related organisations such as 
the Strategic Health Authority (SHA), the type of approach adopted by the PDT and its 
flexibility, and the establishment and management of realistic expectations. 
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d) Impeding factors in progressing the turnaround process: 
The progress of turnaround strategies was hindered by insufficient resources (especially 
financial resources), inadequacy of PDT skills and experience in certain areas (e. g. 
financial expertise), a poor relationship between trusts and external organisations such 
as the SHA, a shortage of time for the PDT to work with the trusts. It was also the trusts' 
perception that the huge amount of pressure and stress on a zero-star organisation to 
improve its performance served to inhibit positive change. 
Harvey et al., (2005a) argued that PDT resources were used by poor performers that 
were both willing and able to achieve recovery (self initiating organisations), limiting 
the amount of PDT help for organisations that were unable and/or unwilling to initiate 
turnaround themselves (permanently failing organisations). Therefore, they 
emphasized the importance of discriminating between these in advance of planning 
external support, noting that, as PDT interventions included both retrenchment and 
renewal (repositioning) strategies, the members of the PDT should have relevant 
expertise in these areas. They argued that a one year period is not long enough, 
especially in terms of renewal (repositioning) interventions, for those organisations that 
have more serious problems and are less prepared for change. They felt that additional 
time should be spent on negotiation and initial engagement before implementing 
specific turnaround interventions. 
Similarly to Harvey et al. (2005a), Turner and Whiteman (2005) reported that the 
government preferred to use a'relational' approach or engagement (motivation and 
support of the organisations to turnaround with the main responsibility for the process 
of change owned by the individual authority) as a first choice, rather than direct 
intervention using its legal power (mandated approach) to turnaround poorly 
performing local authorities. The `relational approach' might bolster co-operation and 
coalition building between government supporting agencies and poorly performing 
organisations, reducing the level of resistance by authorities to the involvement of the 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). There were three particularly important 
mechanisms used by the government to help poorly performing local authorities, 
including the use of Lead Officials, Government Monitoring Board and Political 
Mentors. It should be borne in mind that almost all of the selected organisations 
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received government funding as a source of extra support during the turnaround 
process (Turner and Whiteman, 2005). 
The Lead Officials worked with both local authorities on the one hand, and officials in 
central government and other national agencies on the other. Their role was to assist 
local government to understand the nature of performance problems, develop their 
action plan and help the organisation to recognize the external sources of support. 
Another important role was to make a preliminary judgment about whether the local 
authority was capable of implementing its action plan and to give advice to central 
government as to which kind of approach ['engagement' ('relational') or `intervention' 
('mandated')] should be used. Co-ordination with the Monitoring Board, which was 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the plan, was another responsibility 
of the Lead Officials. Five out of fifteen local authorities showed good progress. The 
ODPM reduced engagement or even disengaged, with the five successful organisations, 
but continued engagement with other local authorities according to their CPA scores or 
suggestions by Lead Officials or the Monitoring Board. Three organisations that did not 
improve their CPA scores were categorised as `permanently failing organisations' and 
direct intervention was used in one case by a government minister because the local 
authority was reluctant to cooperate with the engagement process. 
The responsibility of this board was `to provide the government with a means of 
assessing, guiding, and challenging a council in relation to its turnaround of poor 
performance, and in agreeing recommendations to ministers, the Audit Commission, 
individual inspectorates and others. ' 
An important strategy used to change political views and behaviours within local 
government was the introduction of political mentoring where there was perceived weak 
political management and poor member-officer relations (Whiteman, 2004). Political 
mentors are experienced councillors, from outside authorities, who assist their 
equivalents in implementing turnaround processes. They support group leaders, council 
executives and councillors by providing an overview and scrutiny of the turnaround 
process. According to the context, mentoring varied from organisation to organisation. 
For example, the role of mentors was to provide advice on how political capital could be 
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best gained from service improvement. In another example, council leaders reluctant to 
change were advised by their mentors to adhere to the turnaround agenda. A direct 
cause and effect relationship between the function of the mentors and actual outcome in 
terms of service improvement cannot be demonstrated, but it was indicated that a new 
commitment amongst members towards improving their councils was achieved as a 
result of the role of political mentors (Turner and Whiteman, 2005). The level of 
experience and skills of Lead Officials and political mentors was perceived to be an 
important factor in assisting organisations to address resistance to change and to 
develop a commitment to recovery. Nevertheless, resistance to the function of the 
external political mentors was reported owing to the mentees' own political culture. The 
mentors also played a crucial role in identifying and accessing both internal and 
external capacity. Sometimes political mentors entered areas that the Lead Officials 
regarded as being within their own remit. Thus, the issue of delimiting the boundaries 
for the work of political mentors and Lead Officials was important (Whiteman, 2004). 
Eitel (2004) highlighted the important role of a US national office in seeking to 
transform (trigger of changes) a poorly performing regional office by the appointment 
of a new management team. 
Harris et al. (2003) reported that additional resources and support, through external 
interventions or projects, were received by poorly performing schools. The schools 
received support for professional development through mentoring, coaching, and peer 
review (half of the schools set up a new peer review system). Harris and Chapman 
(2002) also emphasised that these schools received external support from OFSTED or 
LEA advisors, which helped them develop external networks to facilitate the generation 
of ideas, professional development and dissemination of good practice. 
Wilmott (1999) investigated the role of the Local Education Authority advisory team in 
dealing with a school identified as a poor performer following an OFSTED visit in 1996. 
It was reported that the school managers developed an action plan under the 
supervision of the LEA advisory team and that the implementation of the action plan, 
which was evaluated by three LEA advisors, was found to be unsatisfactory. Lack of 
communication, constructive discussion and feedback between advisors and staff 
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caused disbelief and anger among staff, who reported that the assessment lacked depth. 
It was also stated that the advisors had focused only on measurable outcomes and 
lesson planning and paid little attention to the reality of the socioeconomic background 
of the pupils which affected their achievements. One of the limitations of the study was 
the lack of interviews with the three LEA advisors. Neither did the study present the 
relationship between school managers and LEA advisors during the implementation of 
the action plan. Wilmott (1999) concluded that environmental constraints, such as the 
level of local deprivation, should be taken into account when the outcome of a 
turnaround process is considered. After the LEA advisors' inspection, the head teacher 
decided to take early retirement and one of the senior members of staff was appointed 
as temporary head. The new head teacher used the following strategies: (i) 
reorganisation of staff meetings to reduce the high level of confrontation between the 
staff, (however, this did not produce a positive outcome); and (2) focusing on SATs 
(Standard Attainment Tests) as most the important target. 
3.12 Impact of turnaround strategies 
The impact of turnaround strategies on the organisational performance (outcome of 
turnaround interventions) and on the staff are considered in the included studies, which 
are presented below: 
3.12.1 Organisational performance 
The included studies demonstrate that some organisations experienced successful 
turnaround and improvement in their performance, at least in the short term, but that 
the performance of many organisations remained as poor, if not worse than before the 
implementation of turnaround strategies. For example, Fulop et al. (2004) found that 
five trusts out of nine showed consistent improvement in their performance assessed by 
the `star rating' system over the study period, which meant that the new managers of 
these organisation were able to transform their `failing' organisations into `self 
regulating' organisations. However, the performance of four remained the same or 
declined. Two out the four cases could be classified as `permanently failing' 
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organisations. Similarly, Turner and Whiteman (2005) reported that six organisations 
showed good progress, as measured by the CPA scores, but three did not improve their 
scores. Turner and Whiteman (2005) reported several common characteristic among 
those local authorities that successfully turned around their performance in a short 
time. All possessed cognition, capability and capacity. Cognition is the term used to 
define to the level of awareness and understanding of the organisation's key players 
regarding the performance trajectory. Capability refers to the politico-managerial 
leadership coalition which is able to construct and institutionalise a change-oriented 
narrative. The extent to which political and managerial technologies (e. g. performance 
management arrangements, human resources systems, consultation with the public and 
consumers of services) exist in the organisation, and are in line with the goals set by the 
political and managerial leadership, are referred to as capacity. These organisations 
presented a forward-looking, turnaround-oriented plan initiated by a (new) dynamic 
leadership at both managerial and political levels. 
The presence of certain problems, caused by the lack of one or more of these 
characteristics, had been identified amongst those local authorities that were unable to 
turnaround their performance. Also, different local authority backgrounds, political 
histories and socio-economic contexts had an impact on the level of effectiveness of 
similar strategies. These local contingencies and problems reveal that a flexible and 
tailor-made approach is required to deal with the problems of each organisation 
because of the differences in the level of cognizance, capacity, capability and the 
contextual background of the organisation. 
Similarly, Fulop et al. (2004) found that although the CEO and/or senior manager(s) in 
their case studies had changed, four were unable to improve their performance. This 
implies that the replacement of the CEO is a necessary, but not sufficient step its own. 
Various constraints on turnaround and the level of access to required resources for the 
turnaround, can explain differences between successful and unsuccessful organisations. 
Some factors constrained the turnaround interventions, including cultural diversity 
(competing sub-cultures among different clinical professionals and also between clinical 
and non-clinical staff), complexity (the multi- layered nature of hospitals), lack of 
leadership, and external influences (impact of government policy and pressure from 
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public image). Resentment and resistance from the clinical body and middle 
management were the result of cultural diversity and complexity. The success of the 
managers in turnaround was also contingent upon their having certain core skills 
(establishing a clear agenda for change, developing a strategic vision and the ability to 
communicate this, the ability to grasp the detail required to deliver core targets) and 
access to financial, temporal (time and stability), and external (support from SHA/ 
PCT/ MA) resources. The impeding factors that were very found by Harvey et al. 
(2005a) were similar to those explored by Fulop et al. (2004). 
Gray (2000) placed emphasis on the notion that an adequate period of time should be 
given to managers to turnaround poor performance and stressed that evaluating 
performance over a short time period may not capture their improvement properly. He 
argued that the average time reported for the primary and secondary schools to improve 
performance was 20-22 months and 27 months respectively. Protopsaltis et al. (2002) 
and Fulop et al. (2004) also emphasized that sufficient time be given to organisations to 
improve their performance. 
Eitel (2004) reported an unsuccessful turnaround process based around downsizing 
(reduction of staffing level) in a US governmental regional office owing to local political 
pressure and the resistance of unions, which sought to protect staff positions and 
working conditions. The policy of staff reduction suffered from the lack of a clear plan, 
and it was not apparent which people should leave the organisation. In addition, staff 
resisted change (internal factors) over a long period of time and because of sustained 
poor performance a culture of failure developed, with the organisation finally being 
taken over by another. 
3.12.2 Staff 
Some of the included studies showed that concerns were expressed, by staff and 
managers, about working under the high level of pressure placed upon them by the 
turnaround interventions introduced by senior managers. As a consequence, low staff 
morale and a variety of change resistance strategies were reported relating to the 
replacement of some staff and greater expectations of the workforce. Furthermore, 
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changes in job descriptions and increased stress among staff were further factors 
contributing to low staff morale and resistance to change (Protopsaltis et al., 2002; 
Fulop et al., 2002, Eitel, 2004; Turner and Whiteman, 2005). High workloads were 
perceived by staff, particularly when the reduction in staffing was used as a strategy to 
lower costs (Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Fulop et al., 2002, Eitel, 2004). 
Some studies reported that several staff referred to work overload as `recovery fatigue', 
as it impacted on their energy and morale. Senior managers reported that they had to 
manage the turnaround process over and above their day to day responsibilities and 
that they were also required to invest a large proportion of their time, energy and effort 
in responding to the demands of inspectors and external agencies. So once the 
engagement process eased, as a result of improvements in performance, many 
managers felt a high degree of relief (Turner and Whiteman, 2005). Both Protopsaltis et 
al. (2002) and Fulop et al. (2004) reported conflicts between new incoming managers 
and clinicians because of the type and level of changes introduced by managers in 
reorganising clinical practice and procedures. Middle managers felt frustration, as they 
were continuously being asked to meet targets without the time to stand back and plan 
to improve the processes. 
3.12.3 Role of contextual factors in turning around performance 
Some of the included studies, especially those in school settings, found that contextual 
issues may be important factors in the success of turnaround strategies (Boyne and 
Meier, 2005; Wilmott, 1999; Gray, Zoo; Harris et al., 2003). 
Boyne and Meier (2005) hypothesized that both good luck (favoured changes in the 
external circumstances beyond managerial control) as well as good management 
influenced the possibility of successful turnaround in the public sector. The indicators 
for evaluating the organisational environment were munificence (change in financial 
resources) and environmental hostility (the socio-economic characteristics of school 
children, which make it easier or more difficult to teach them). The latter was measured 
by the proportion of minority (black and Hispanic) and low income students in selected 
cases. Here, good luck is perceived as the availability of financial resources and a lower 
113 
proportion of minority and low income students. Several variables were used as controls 
comprising the size of the schools measured by the number of pupils enrolled in 1995, 
tenure measured by the number of years that superintendents have spent in the current 
school district, and finally the extent of the severity of failure. The statistical evidence 
showed turnaround to be associated with good luck as well as good management. The 
greatest level of the performance improvement was found in districts with worst 
baseline and non-linear relationship between superintendents' experiences and 
performance improvement was shown. It was concluded that the size of school had a 
negative correlation but was only significant at. ol level and an increase in munificence 
and decrease in hostility were likely to lead to better performance. 
In Boyne and Meier's study (2005) although luck (changes in the external environment) 
was included in the analysis of turnaround in Texas school districts, the data only 
covered munificence and hostility as aspects of luck, but data on change in the 
complexity of the conditions, confronted by school superintendents, was not 
considered. Secondly, the focus of the analysis was on the technical but not the 
institutional environment of turnaround (e. g. changes in external stakeholders' support 
and shifts in judgments regarding the legitimacy of different response to failure). The 
authors emphasised that future studies of turnaround should seek to extend the analysis 
of good luck by including these variables. 
Also, Boyne and Meier (2005) tested whether or not the impact of managerial strategies 
was contingent on the severity of performance problems and the extent of 
environmental munificence. Earlier work shows that when the organisation is facing 
only moderate performance decline, the cost cutting may be beneficial, however, in a 
severe decline situation, a radical repositioning strategy is necessary (Hambrick and 
Schechter, 1983; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). Likewise, retrenchment is required in an 
environment of low munificence, whereas in a situation when munificence is high a 
strategy of repositioning is more feasible (Thietart, 1988). The validity of these 
arguments was tested through interaction terms that captured the combined effects of 
managerial strategies, performance problems and environmental munificence. No 
additional variables produced a significant effect on the explanatory power of the 
turnaround model developed by Boyne and Meier (2005). 
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Furthermore, the measures of all three generic turnaround strategies were included in 
the same statistical model, but previous research has typically tested only one or two 
strategies in relation to performance decline. For example, some researchers only 
examined retrenchment (Chowdhury and Lang, 1994; Morrow et al., 2004; O'Neill, 
1986), and in a number of studies the reorganisation was not taken into account in the 
turnaround models (Bruton and Wan, 1994; Evans and Green, 2000, Hambrick and 
Schechter, 1983; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). 
Moreover, Gray (2000) stated that schools in areas with an absence of extreme social 
deprivation, were more likely to recover by themselves and also to have a relatively 
short history of poor performance, which is another positive contributor in performance 
improvement. Harris et al. (2003) found that additional resources and support through 
external interventions or projects, and changes in the social mix of the pupil population 
were positive external factors influencing the outcome of turnaround interventions. 
In Wilmot's study (1999), it was concluded that environmental constraints, such as the 
level of deprivation, should be taken into account when the outcome of the turnaround 
process was considered. Turner and Whiteman (2005) also reported that different local 
authority backgrounds, political histories and socio-economic contexts had a significant 
impact on the level of effectiveness of turnaround strategies. 
3.12.4 Unintended and dysfunctional consequences of turnaround 
interventions 
Several of the included studies noted that turnaround interventions might induce a 
range of unintended and dysfunctional consequences for organisations and their staff 
(Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Fulop et al., 2004). 
Turner and Whiteman (2005) argued that achieving a better CPA score became the 
most important priority for some local authorities. Two negative consequences were 
identified: first, the local authorities were unwilling to criticise the government 
(Compliance); and second, local authorities focused on meeting centrally set targets 
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(heavily oriented to the CPA score possibly incompatible with the requirements of their 
local communities). In addition, organisations might be distracted from the focus on 
sustainable performance improvement. The tension between external criteria-based 
assessment and internal culture, and the process of performance management, were 
highlighted here. It was shown that some organisations were willing to perform 
activities that were likely to result in positive responses from inspectors or auditors. 
Some leading participants attributed quick improvement to dealing with the inspection 
and audit processes rather than turnaround strategies. They indicated an improvement 
in the level of cognition, capability and capacity in dealing with audit processes. Further 
investigation is needed to explore whether the improvement is attributable to the 
turnaround strategies or to gaining more capabilities and capacities to deal with central 
targets and audit processes (Turner and Whiteman, 2005). They also reported that the 
organisations needed to consider financial costs due to changes in both management 
and organisational restructuring and that two local authorities reported changes in their 
current budget priorities during turnaround. 
3.13 Discussion 
This is the first comprehensive review to consider both organisational failure and the 
turnaround processes in the public sector. It has distilled the available evidence, within 
the public sector, and compared it with the existing literature derived from the for- 
profit sector. Using the findings of this review, several propositions are developed, 
which informed the design of the empirical fieldwork in this thesis. The review has 
highlighted key issues with regard to the theoretical framework and methods used in 
the studies and has summarised the results of the included studies on the symptoms 
and causes of failure, triggers for change, and turnaround interventions. These are each 
discussed in turn below. 
3.13.1 Symptoms of failure 
As in the for-profit sector, four different types of markers of failure (financial, physical, 
behavioural and managerial) were also found in the public sector. The most common 
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markers of failure in the public sector were an inability to hit core targets, poor working 
relationships with external stakeholders, high management turnover, employee 
distrust/internal conflict and low staff morale. In the health sector, poor financial 
balance, the high level of staff turnover and/or recruitment problems and poor 
public/media image were evident markers of failure. Financial issues were not a crucial 
marker in the school sector, although there were some examples indicating the inability 
of schools to achieve a financial balance. Only two studies (Fulop et al., 2004; Eitel, 
2004) identified a link between markers, secondary causes of failure and primary 
causes of failure (dysfunction in organisational learning). 
3.13.2 Secondary and primary causes of failure 
Findings of this review show that internal and/or external secondary factors, similar to 
those in the for-profit sector, contribute to the organisational failure process in the 
public sector. Five different secondary internal causes were found, including 
managerial, financial, organisational, cultural and political factors. It should be borne in 
mind that, except in very special circumstances (e. g. the occurrence of a disaster) that a 
single factor can lead to a failure, whereas in other situations, several different factors 
contribute to a decline in performance. 
The most common internal secondary causes of failure were poor managerial 
leadership; poor operational management; poor performance management (not evident 
in school settings); cultural problems; insularity (poor relationships with other 
stakeholders), poor internal relationships, lack of staff engagement and inattention to 
external warnings. Poor political leadership was an important cause of failure found in 
local government settings. As a result of the political context of the public sector, 
particularly in local government, political issues (e. g. poor political leadership and poor 
political-managerial relationships) were key contributing factors to organisational 
failure, although this was not a cause of failure in the for-profit sector. 
There are some differences between the symptoms and causes of failure between the 
two sectors, owing to the nature of the services provided and the context of provision. 
For example, decline in demand was not found to be a contributory issue that in 
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performance decline in the public sector, though it was an important cause of failure in 
the for-profit sector (see section 2.6 for more details). On the other hand, Walshe et al. 
(2004) argued that the inabilities of a public sector organisation to meet customer 
demand and create satisfaction for its stakeholders were indeed issues that can 
contribute to failure. 
Policy change, diverse service needs and a poor socioeconomic situation (high level of 
poverty and deprivation) were the most important external factors contributing to 
performance decline and failure within public services. In the health sector, policy 
change was perceived as the most evident external contributor to organisational failure, 
but the impact of contextual factors (e. g. socioeconomic factors) has not been 
considered in the health sector. 
3.13.3 Triggers for change 
This review identified that both internal and external factors have made a contribution 
in initiating processes of change (triggers) within the public sector. Replacement of 
senior management was the most common internal trigger in all the included studies, 
and reports provided by external agents and concerns expressed by external 
stakeholders were the most common external triggers. Reaction of organisations to the 
announcement of poor performance was also an important trigger. The findings of this 
review were comparable with literature from the for-profit sector, though the role of 
external agents in diagnosing and triggering change was more common and of greater 
importance in the public sector than the for-profit sector. Harvey et al. (2005a) 
identified the valuable role of the PDT as an external agent in diagnosing problems of 
NHS organisations and serving as agents of change. It is vital to note that, in all 
included studies, multiple factors rather than a single factor played a crucial role in the 
initiation of the process of change. 
3.13.4 Turnaround interventions 
To organise and report the interventions used in the included studies in this review, the 
`3Rs' strategy (Boyne, 2004a), derived from the literature in the for-profit sector was 
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used. This review showed that three generic turnaround strategies (Reorganisation, 
Retrenchment and Repositioning) used in the for-profit sector, have been also used in 
the public sector, though the feasibility, frequency and extent of use of these strategies 
have not been similar across the two sectors. Reorganisation strategies were the most 
common form of intervention used in the public sector. Although retrenchment 
strategies have been used in the public sector, particularly in health care trusts facing 
financial difficulties, their effectiveness is not proven. In the school setting, it was the 
least used strategy. The use of repositioning strategies to change the activities of the 
organisation or to expand its services by entering into new markets is often impossible 
for public service organisations, as the objective providing services is mandatory due to 
the statutory obligations. Although, in some of the cases, this review showed that the 
responsibility for service provision of an organisation was transferred to other 
organisations (e. g. Eitel, 2004). The evidence in this area within the public sector is still 
limited and existing studies are not comprehensive, so it is difficult to reach a firm 
conclusion on the effectiveness of these strategies. 
However, the limited evidence base may provide important information for policy 
makers and managers charged with turning around poorly performing organisations. 
3.13.5 Limitations of this review 
As outlined in section 3.4.2.1, a broad search strategy, following consultation with two 
librarians from the NHS Centre for Reviews and Dissemination (CRD), was used to 
ensure that the maximum number of eligible studies was included. However, owing to 
the diversity of the topic (organisational failure and turnaround processes) and the 
presence of under-developed search strategies for non-experimental studies, it is 
possible that some studies were missed. To minimise this problem, some additional 
exploratory pathways were employed, e. g. searching using the authors' names of 
relevant papers as a search term. 
Because of the nature of student research, all the processes of this review (inclusion of 
studies, data extraction and data synthesis) were carried out by one reviewer, which will 
not necessarily ensure an unbiased approach. To reduce the probability of bias, the 485 
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papers examined against the inclusion criteria were double checked. In addition, the 
doctoral supervisor checked the data extraction for the included studies. 
3.13.6 Limitations of included studies 
As mentioned in section 3.5.5, the principal research method used to study 
organisational failure and turnaround was the qualitative case study design, although 
the number of quantitative studies has increased since 2005. In some case studies 
(Joyce, 2004; Paton and Mordaunt, 2004), data were collected by interviewing only one 
informant, and so may not provide a rounded view of the issue under question, and the 
potential for bias should be considered. In addition, some studies used a retrospective 
approach (e. g. Paton and Mordaunt, 2004; Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Joyce, 2004), 
making recall bias (selective recall) a cause for concern. It should, however, be noted 
that Paton and Mordaunt (2004) tried to use document analysis to support interviews 
in two out of four of their cases. 
3.13.7 Gaps in the literature 
This review highlights difficulties regarding the methodology of review of non- 
experimental studies: searching (particularly electronic databases); quality assessment; 
and data synthesis. With all of these issues, it seems that more methodological 
development is required. 
The gap in linkage between symptoms, secondary and primary causes of failure in the 
public sector is also apparent from this review. So far it is not clear how the 
identification of the symptoms of failure can result in the diagnosis of secondary and 
ultimately primary causes of failure. Similarly it is unclear how diagnosis of symptoms 
and causes of failure can result in the selection and implementation of appropriate 
turnaround strategies. 
This review also shows that the existing relevant literature lacks robust longitudinal 
studies, which track over time how organisations sustain their hard won improvements 
in performance. 
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In relation to the effectiveness of the turnaround strategies, there remain gaps in the 
literature. There is currently insufficient evidence about which turnaround strategy of 
the three broad generic types (Reorganisation, retrenchment and repositioning) is the 
most appropriate to use, and in what contexts and circumstances the different strategies 
would achieve the best outcomes. Moreover, how these turnaround interventions can be 
combined in different contexts is an important issue that is not explored fully in the 
public sector literature. 
This review also revealed a gap in the literature with regard to the role of external 
organisations in dealing with poorly performing organisations, as relates to the 
initiation of the turnaround process, and support both during the process and while the 
organisation improves and attempts to sustain its improvement. The type of strategies 
used by external organisations and the duration of these interventions with regard to 
the type of poorly performing organisation (self initiating and permanently poor 
performing) are insufficiently covered by empirical studies, although three different 
kinds of relationship between external supporting organisations and poorly performing 
organisations have been defined by Jas and Skelcher using principal-agent theory (see 
section 2.11 and table 2.4). There is not sufficient empirical evidence to differentiate 
between `permanently failing' and `self initiating' organisations, which may help policy 
makers to focus their support more on `permanently failing' organisations. 
It is clear from the review, that several research studies in this area are not underpinned 
by sound theoretical frameworks. For example, most of the studies conducted in a 
school setting had not used or reported a theoretical framework or conceptual model. 
Moreover, the gap in the literature about the impact of contextual factors on 
organisational failure and the probability of success or failure of turnaround 
interventions within the public sector was highlighted. 
3.13.8 The relevance of this review to the empirical part of the thesis 
The findings of the review revealed a serious gap in the existing literature concerning 
organisational failure and the turnaround process within health care organisations. 
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Particularly during the first search (November 2004), only one published report was 
found relating to the health sector (Protopsaltis et al., 2002). As this study only 
investigated change performance, in terms of star ratings, over one year, it was not 
possible to measure sustainable performance improvement as an outcome of the 
turnaround process over a longer period of time. As a consequence, the findings of the 
review confirm the need for further research in this area in health care. A unique case 
study (an acute hospitals NHS Trust) was selected (this is explained in detail in chapter 
4) that allowed the researcher to investigate how the poorly performing Trust was able 
to make significant improvement in its performance during a very limited period of time 
(one year) and to sustain this improvement in performance for two successive years. 
The results of the review were also used to develop a number of propositions which 
guided the empirical phase of the study. These are outlined below, and the findings of 
this empirical study are linked specifically to addressing these propositions. Yin (1994) 
maintains that the data collected in any study should relate to the initial propositions (if 
there are any). He states that "data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, 
tabulating, or otherwise recombining the evidence to address the initial propositions of 
a study" (Yin, 1994). 
3.13.9 Proposition for the study 
The following propositions are derived from the overall study objectives and the 
findings of the literature review. These were used to inform research design, data 
gathering, analysis and interpretation. 
1) A range of markers and symptoms of failure of the Trust, under study, will be shown 
to be similar to those identified in the literature review. 
2) A range of secondary external and internal factors contribute to organisational 
failure. 
3) The primary causes of failure are the main source of organisational decline. 
4) A range of internal and external factors trigger the process of change. 
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5) Organisations, able to `self turnaround, do not necessarily require a large degree of 
external support (particularly in terms of the presence of an in-house performance 
support team). 
6) Although a range of turnaround interventions are used within the Trust, 
reorganisation strategies will be the most important ones deployed. 
7) In the process of replacement strategy, the appointment of an appropriate 
managerial team, with sufficient skills and capabilities, is an important factor in 
initiating turnaround interventions. 
8) A range of unintended consequences and barriers related to implementing 
turnaround interventions, within the Trust, will be apparent. 
9) The `stage' model theory, developed in the for-profit sector, is applicable in the 
public sector, particularly the health sector. 
io) The Trust's managers will use more mechanistic (directive) style of 
leadership during the first phase of the turnaround process 
In the Chapter 4, the research method used in this empirical study will be presented and 
issues regarding study design, sampling methods used, the process of data collection 
and data analysis will be explained. All ethical issues are also discussed. 
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Chapter 4: Research methodology 
4,1 Introduction 
As outlined previously, the aims of this study are threefold: i) to better understand 
organisational failure and turnaround processes in health care settings, ii) to place the 
findings of the empirical study in the context of the wider literature on organisational 
failure and turnaround, and iii) to draw lessons from both the literature review and 
empirical phase of study for the development of health policy and the focus of future 
research. The choice of research design and methods has been informed by the 
literature review. 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline and justify the methods used in the empirical 
phase of the study. The focus is on exploring the overall study design, sampling 
strategies used, and methods of data gathering, analysis and interpretation. 
4.2 Methodology 
Methodology refers to the ways in which knowledge is attained about the social world 
(Bowling, 2002). Silverman (2004: pig) defines `methodology' as `a general approach 
to studying research topics'. Two main methodological traditions are discussed in the 
theoretical literature: Nomothetic and Ideographic approaches. Those holding 
objective ontological assumptions and positivist epistemological assumptions seek 
knowledge through nomothetic methodologies. Nomothetic approaches rely on 
scientific methodology, and a -priori hypothesis testing. They use quantitative tests 
including surveys, personality tests, and standardised research tools to investigate the 
empirical world. Nomothetic analysis attempts to formulate general laws that explain 
regularities and patterning in social phenomena. Alternatively, researchers with 
subjective ontological assumptions and interpretive (anti-positivist) epistemological 
assumptions adopt ideographic approaches to investigate and understand the social 
world. Ideographic approaches place greater emphasis on "getting inside" a subject 
and exploring their detailed background and life history, using a range of qualitative 
methods including interviews, observation and the use of diaries. Ideographic analysis 
focuses on what is unique about a person, a time period, or a locale (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). 
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In nomothetic methodological approach, the researcher begins by identifying a set of 
variables for analysis and subjects these to quantitative and statistical analysis 
(Silverman, 2004). Qualitative approaches incorporate a different set of research 
methods. Holloway (2005) outlines the key characteristics of qualitative enquiry as 
follows: 
  An emphasis on obtaining and analysing textual data; 
 A focus on extensive interaction with the people being studied, which provides an 
opportunity for the research to be open and unstructured; 
  Based on field work (e. g. participant observation, and unstructured and semi- 
structured interview); 
  An emphasis on a flexible plan of inquiry. Qualitative researchers do not rely 
heavily on a pre-defined protocols or hold a rigid approach to sampling, data 
collection and analysis. 
Qualitative research using case study methods provides the opportunity for 
researchers to observe complex phenomena and understand the dynamics of 
behaviour in organisations (Lee, 1999). Organisational failure and turnaround are 
complex and dynamic phenomena to study and to gain an in-depth understanding of 
the processes at work it was decided that a qualitative case-study design would be the 
best approach as it would allow a rich description of the organisational processes and 
mechanisms leading to performance decline and renewal. The following sections 
detail the research design, the selection of the study case and the methods of data 
gathering and analysis. 
4.3 Research design 
Yin (2003) argues that the selection of an appropriate research strategy in the social 
sciences depends on three key factors: i) the type of research question; ii) the extent 
of researcher control over events; and iii) the level of focus on contemporary rather 
than historical events. He classifies research strategies into five broad categories: 
experiments; surveys; case studies; history; and archival analysis. Following Yin's 
framework, Table 4.1 shows the most appropriate fit for a research strategy depending 
on these factors. 
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Table 4.1 Selection of search strategy 
Strategy Form of research Control over Focus on 
question behavioural contemporary events 
events 
Experiment how, why, who, what, Yes yes 
where 
Survey how many, how much No yes 
Case study how, why No yes/no 
History how, why No no 
Archival Who, what, where, No yes 
analysis how many, how much 
Source: Yin (2003) 
In Table 4.1 a range of basic categorisation schemes for the types of research 
questions are identified including: "who"; "what"; "where"; "how"; and "why". There 
are two types of `what' questions: the first is exploratory, and is used to justify a 
rationale for conducting an exploratory study aimed at generating hypotheses and 
propositions for further research. All five research strategies for this type of question 
can be used. The second type of "what" question actually means "how many" or "how 
much". This type is used mostly in survey or archival type work. "Who" and "where" 
questions are the same as the second type of "what" question, indicating that they are 
likely to be used in survey and archival research. Such questions are used by those 
wanting to present incidence or prevalence of an occurrence or when the aim is to 
predict a specific outcome. 
In contrast, "how" and "why" questions are used in studies with explanatory 
objectives. Case study, history and experiment are three strategies that are more likely 
to use these types of research questions. 
When a "how" and/or "why" question is key, the degree of researcher's control over 
behavioural events may differentiate among history, case study and experiment. In 
experimental research, the researcher is able to manipulate behavioural events. 
However, when there is no control over events, both histories and case studies are the 
preferred strategies. The focus on contemporary events makes a distinction between 
case studies and history strategies, as history is not able to examine contemporary 
events. 
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4.3.1 Case study design 
The aims of the research considered alongside the methodological issues discussed 
above, make it clear that the case study method is the most appropriate strategy for 
use here. Yin (2003) defines the case study as `an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and which 
relies on multiple sources of evidence'. Stake (1988: 258) defines a case study as `the 
study of a bounded system, emphasizing the unity and wholeness of that system, but 
confining the attention to those aspects that are relevant to the research problem at 
the time'. In case study research, the researcher attempts to comprehend the case in 
depth in a natural setting and take account of its complexity and context. In addition, 
understanding the wholeness and unity of the case (through a holistic focus) is a key 
characteristic (Punch, 2005). Miles and Hubermann (1994) maintain that a case may 
be an individual, a role, a small group, an organisation, a community, or even a 
nation. 
Yin (2003) notes the applicability of case study methods in the following situations: 
  to explain complex causal links in real-life interventions; 
  to demonstrate the real-life context in which the intervention has happened; 
  to describe the intervention itself; 
  to explore the conditions within which the intervention is scrutinised has no 
evident set of outcomes. 
4.3.1.1 Types of case study design 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that case study methods can be used to develop a theory, 
test a theory, or provide a rich description. According to Yin (2003), case studies can 
be explanatory, descriptive, or exploratory. In explanatory studies the aim is to 
explore causal relationships, whereas the aim of an exploratory case study is to guide 
the development of relevant research questions and hypotheses. A descriptive case 
study begins with a descriptive theory (Tellis, 1997c). Stake (1995) classifies case 
studies into three categories: i) Intrinsic (the researcher has an interest in the case); ii 
) Instrumental (the aim is to give insight into an event or to refine a theory); and iii) 
Collective (an instrumental study is extended to cover several cases/groups of cases to 
gain more insight into the phenomenon and condition). Tellis (1997c) notes that 
intrinsic case studies are single case studies, in which the focus is within the case. In 
collective case studies, the focus is both within and across cases. 
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Case studies can be either single or multiple-case in design (Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) 
holds that they can be holistic (single unit of analysis) or embedded (multiple unit of 
analysis in the same case, where subunit(s) are examined in a single case ). Yin 
identifies four different types of case studies as detailed in Table 4.2: 
Table 4.2 Types of case studies 
Single case design Multiple case design 
Holistic Type l Type III 
(single unit of analysis) 
Embedded Type II Type IV 
(multiple unit of analysis) 
Source: Yin (200 
Type I: A single case study approach, which has only one unit of analysis and the 
overall nature of an organisation or a programme is examined in a single case study. 
Type II: A single case study where multiple units of analysis are incorporated. 
Although only a single case is selected, the analysis includes different subunit(s). 
Type III: A multiple case study approach, involving only one unit of analysis in each 
case. 
Type IV: A multiple case study approach in which more than one unit of analysis is 
incorporated in each case. 
Yin (2003) argues that researchers may use a single case study to confirm or dispute a 
theory, or scrutinise a unique or extreme case. He also suggests that a single case 
study is used when the possibility exists for the researcher to investigate a case which 
has not previously been accessible. Flyvbjerg (2004) notes that when a researcher is 
seeking the maximum amount of information on a phenomenon, the selection of an 
atypical or extreme (unusual) case often uncovers more valuable information than an 
average or typical case. He argues that studying such cases provides an opportunity to 
understand and achieve deeper insights into organisational processes and 
mechanisms, and maintains that studying a critical case is valuable owing to its 
strategic importance in relation to the general problem. If researchers study cases 
with maximum variations, they may obtain insights into the various significant 
circumstances of case process and outcome. A case with specific characteristics in 
relation to a single dimension (e. g. in terms of size, budget, form of organisation) 
could be an example of such a situation. 
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4.3.1.2 Advantages of the case study approach 
The comparative advantages of case studies have been discussed in the literature. A 
case study allows the researcher to obtain a holistic overview which takes into account 
the local context and any contingent factors (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). Tellis (1997a, 
1997b) argues that case study approaches provide the opportunity to use both 
qualitative and quantitative methods to collect data on organisational processes and 
outcomes. Three principles of qualitative research, relating to `description', 
`understanding' and `explaining', are included as part of case study analysis (Tellis, 
1997a; Pettigrew 1990). Exploratory case studies may result in the development of 
new hypotheses, which need to be tested, and may also help in establishing more 
specific research questions (Stake, 1995; MacNealy, 1997; Yin, 2003). 
4.3.1.3 Limitation of the case study approach 
The above notwithstanding, case study research has a number of limitations and it has 
been subject to a wide ranging critique, particularly by positivist social scientists. 
One area of concern is the issue of generalisation (Yin, 2003). It can be argued that 
the results of a case study cannot be generalised, as the sample does not necessarily 
represent the total population in a statistical sense. In answer to the question "How 
can you generalise from a single case? ", Yin (2003, lo) states: 
`The short answer is that case studies, like experiments, are 
generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or 
universe. In this sense, the case study like the experiment does not 
represent a "sample" and the investigator's goal is to expand and 
generalise theories (analytical generalisation) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalisation)'. 
Indeed Yin (2003) argues that the generalisation of case study results, (either single 
or multiple designs), is made with regard to theory development rather than statistical 
generalisation. Tellis (1997a) contends that this interpretation, in which sample cases 
are taken from a larger universe of cases, is inappropriate. He maintains that 
terminology such as a "small sample" is incorrect, as though a single case study was a 
single respondent. Punch (2005) maintains that in two types of situations, 
generalisation is not an issue. The first is when the case is very important, interesting, 
or unique in some respects that in itself makes it worthy of study. This situation is 
similar to Stake's (1995) intrinsic case study. This type of case study does not propose 
to generalise but rather to comprehend the case in its complexity and wholeness. The 
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second situation concerns `negative cases'. Study of such atypical cases provides the 
opportunity to learn why they are different and may contribute toward a better 
understanding of typical cases. This is similar to Stake's (1995) second type of case 
study (instrumental case study). 
Another potential problem in case study research is researcher bias, where the 
researcher may influence the process of data collection (e. g. biased data collection, 
which seeks to collect only evidence that strengthens the initial assumptions and 
hypotheses), data analysis and interpretation of results (Yin, 2003). 
In response to those questioning whether a single case is as robust as a multiple case 
design, Ragin (1992: 225) states that even single case studies `are multiple in most 
research efforts because ideas and evidence may be linked in many different ways'. 
To conduct case studies, researchers should consider the time and resources required 
for the research because a case study is expensive, time consuming and presentation 
of results may require preparation of a lengthy document (Yin, 2003; MacNealy, 
1997). 
4.3.1.4 Why was a case study design selected for this study? 
A case study design was selected for the following reasons: 
The case study is appropriate when an empirical study proposes to investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context (Yin, 2003; Tellis, 1997a). 
Indeed, Yin (2003) differentiates a'case study' from a 'history', as the focus of a case 
study is on contemporary events. However, some academics (e. g. Bryman, 1984; 
Stake, 1995) do not specify a focus on contemporary events as being a necessary 
characteristic of a case study. Similar methods, such as reviewing archival data, are 
used by both historical and case study researchers, but case studies may also use 
direct observations and systematic interviews. Hence, in the present study research 
participants were asked to recall their attitudes and perceptions regarding both 
preceding and current events relating to their explanation of decline and turnaround 
in the organisation. It is evident that in the present study the events being examined 
are contemporary, although retrospective information is used where appropriate. 
Consequently, the case study method seems to be an appropriate design for this study. 
130 
Table (4.2) shows that when a research question takes the form of a `how' or `why' 
question, the case study is an appropriate method. As the aim of this empirical study 
is to understand `how' and `why' a large acute NHS trust failed and then successfully 
turned around its performance, it would appear that the case study method is suitable 
(Yin, 2003) 
When the boundaries between a phenomenon and its context are not clearly defined, 
the case study is a suitable research method (Yin, 2003). As the processes of 
organisational failure and turnaround are context-related and no evident boundary 
exists between the processes and context, again the case study is an appropriate 
method. 
When the researcher is unable to manipulate behaviours and has no control over the 
events (in contrast with experimental studies), the strength and suitability of the case 
study make it a substantial and an appropriate method, resulting in the provision of 
`thick description' and a deep level of understanding of the phenomenon under 
examination (Merriam, 1988; Yin, 2003; Burns, 1990). In the current study, the 
researcher was not able to have control over events and the case study approach 
seems suitable for forming a deeper understanding of the factors leading to 
organisational failure and turnaround in the organisation. 
Using the categories defined by Yin (2003), a holistic single case study design (Type I) 
was selected for this study in order to elicit deeper insights into organisational failure 
and turnaround processes in English acute trusts. The study uses a single case study 
organisation as the unit of analysis. It is necessary to mention several practical issues 
considered when the researcher proposed tackling the case (acute Trust): accessibility 
of the case; costs of the project; time required for data collection; management of 
large and complex data sets; and the number of participants within the case. More 
justification on the selection of the case is provided in the next section. 
4.4 Sampling strategies 
In the present study, a two stage sampling strategy was used. The first stage 
concerned the selection of the organisation using a purposive sampling method. In 
the second stage, internal and external participants were selected in order to provide 
relevant information from different professional and managerial groups and at 
different levels of the organisational hierarchy. 
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4.4.1 Selection of the case 
One of the most important issues in the case study method is the selection of the 
case(s) to be examined (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the case study approach, cases are often 
selected on the basis of theoretical sampling (Glaser and Straus, 1967) or purposive 
sampling (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), rather than conventional or statistical sampling. 
Statistical sampling is applied for experiment hypothesis-testing studies within which 
samples are randomly selected from the population. The goal of statistical sampling is 
to provide accurate statistical proof on the distributions of sample variables within the 
population (Eisenhardt, 1989). Lincoln and Guba (1985: P. 202) state when referring 
to the differences between purposive sampling and statistical sampling: `It [Purposive 
sampling] is based on informational, not statistical considerations. Its purpose is to 
maximise information, not to facilitate generalisation. Its procedures are strikingly 
different, too, and depend on particular ebb and flow of information as the study is 
carried out rather than a priori consideration. Finally, the criterion used to determine 
when to cease sampling is informational redundancy, not a statistical confidence 
level'. Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that the purpose of the selection of case(s) is to 
replicate previous cases or to expand or test evolving theory. He maintains that 
although random selection of cases is possible, it is neither necessary nor even 
preferable. 
Purposive selection of cases with extreme situations among a limited number of cases 
that could be investigated is recommended by Pettigrew (1988) and Flyvbjerg (2004). 
Purposive sampling results in increasing of the scope and range of data and a higher 
probability of revealing multiple realities (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Tellis (1997c) 
emphasises that, in the process of purposive selection of cases, concentrating on one 
or two issues which are crucial in understanding the system being scrutinised is 
necessary. 
Purposive sampling has been used for this study, and the importance and relevance of 
the selected case study organisation to the research questions can be used to justify its 
selection. For ethical considerations, the organisation and staff remain anonymous. In 
selecting the case, first the change in the performance of all English NHS acute trusts 
according to the `star rating system' was considered between 200 and 2004. As the 
case under study was selected on the basis of performance assessment by the star 
rating system, this system (as a composite measure of performance) is outlined below. 
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4.4.1.1 The Star Rating system 
Since the introduction of the NHS Plan in 2000 (Department of Health, 2000), NHS 
organisations have been subject to increased external performance measurement and 
management. A system for measuring the performance of NHS organisations was 
introduced by the Department of Health in 2001. This management system was a 
composite measure of performance (Davies et al., 2003), which categorised NHS 
organisations from zero to three stars according to their performance level (star rating 
system) (Department of Health, 2002). The star rating system is the first attempt at 
publicising the quality of the provider's performance in the English NHS (Shekelle, 
2005). This policy is predicated on the premise that the publication of these 
comparative data can encourage organisations to respond and improve their 
performance, especially those dimensions of performance that are measured 
(Mannion et al., 2005; Davies and Lampell, 1998). The following table details the 
four-point scale (zero to three stars) used in the star rating system (Department of 
Health, 2001). 
Table 4.3 Star rating system 
3 star Trusts with the highest levels of performance 
2 star Trusts that are performing well overall, but have not quite reached 
the same consistently high standards 
1 star Trusts where there is some cause for concern regarding particular key 
targets or extremely poor performance on the balanced scorecard 
zero star Trusts that have shown the poorest levels of performance against key 
targets or in CHI clinical governance reviews 
Source : www. healthcarecommission. org. uk 
In September 2001, the first star ratings for acute hospital trusts were published. In 
2002, the second assessment covered all acute hospitals, specialist hospitals and 
ambulance services. In July 2003, an independent organisation - the Commission for 
Health Improvement (CHI) - took on the responsibility for publishing a table of the 
annual performance star rating and more recently a new organisation - the 
Healthcare Commission - took on the role in 2004 when CHI was abolished 
(www. healthcare commission. org. uk; Mannion et al., 2005). Over time, additional 
and more sophisticated indicators were included in the star rating system. The focus 
of the ratings in 2000/1 was `not primarily a commentary on the quality of clinical 
care ', but an evaluation of the overall `experience of NHS patients' (Department of 
Health, 2001). Other approaches have been used to assess the performance of NHS 
organisations, along with the star rating system, including national and local audits, 
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clinical governance reviews and performance monitoring by strategic health 
authorities (Mannion et al., 2005). 
One of the aims of the star rating system is to incentivise improvement in 
performance in a way which enables good performers to be rewarded and poor 
performers to receive external support. The Trust can then take any necessary action 
with regard to their overall assessment as well as the scores placed on their individual 
performance indicators (Department of Health, 2002). The Department of Heath has 
awarded three stars to trusts by allocating additional capital payment of up to £1 
million, along with different managerial freedoms, in order to support further service 
development and improvement (Department of Health, 2002). Each of the three star 
trusts also became eligible to apply for `Foundation Trust' status and taken out of the 
NHS performance management hierarchy, with new powers to borrow from private 
markets for capital investment. 
The Department of Health stated that zero star trusts will `have to develop immediate 
plans to improve performance. If this does not happen, the management of the 
hospital will be put out to franchise' (Department of Health, 2002, P. 9). Franchising 
refers to the replacement of the Chief Executive and perhaps other members of the 
senior management team (Snelling, 2003). Such organisations are required to submit 
their plans to the relevant Strategic Health Authority (SHA), which applies a 
performance management system to the organisation's performance. In turn, the 
performance management and improvement responsibilities of the SHA are overseen 
by the Recovery and Support Unit at the Department of Health. The star rating system 
has focused the attention of NHS managers on meeting strategic priorities and key 
national targets (Mannion et al., 2005). 
Five key areas (Table 4.4) have been used to assess the performance of NHS acute 
trusts. The trust star rating is produced by combining the scores derived from each 
key area through a complex six-step algorithm process (Mannion et al., 2005). Ten 
`key indicators', which mostly relate to waiting times, are the key determinants of an 
organisation's rating. In addition to these key indicators, the performance of the 
organisation is viewed through a composite measure of performance on the basis of a 
series of subsidiary indicators, merged in the form of a `balance scorecard'. Only a 
small component of the calculation is comprised by measures of clinical quality 
(Health Care Commission, 2004). These five key areas and their scoring systems are 
summarised in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 Key areas, criteria and scoring for the star rating system 





indicators with a 
clinical focus 
Performance 




with a capacity and 
capability focus 
CHI reviews 
Mostly relate to access and 
waiting list targets 
included indicators relating to 
mortality rates, re-admission 
rates and rates of successful 
discharge to home following hip 
fracture and stroke 
Included indicators relating to 
waiting times for inpatient 
treatment, outpatient 
appointments, casualty and 
cancer treatment, delayed 
discharge, cancelled operations 
and patient experience of care 
(from survey) 
Each targets scored as 
`achieved', `under 
achieved', or `significantly 
underachieved' 
Judges as `significantly 
above average', `above 
average', `average', `below 
average', significantly 
below average'. 
Five points awarded to 
highest level and one to 
lowest. Indicator scores 
combined (unweighted) to 
produce overall score for 
clinical care. Scores 
presented with confidence 
intervals 
Includes indicators relating to As above. Scores banded 
data quality, staff opinion (from in percentiles 
survey), junior doctor hours and 
sickness absence rates 
Largely qualitative assessment 
of clinical Governance systems 
across seven components: risk 
management; clinical audit; 
research and education; patient 
involvement; information 
management; staff involvement; 
education training and 
development 
Judged as zero star if 
significant weakness found 
by CHI review in five or 
more of the seven areas. 
Judged as three star if 
significant strength in all 
areas and no significant 
weakness in any area 
CHI, Commission for health improvement 
Source: Mannion et al. (200 
It is important to note that few differences existed in the set of indicators used 
between 2001 and 2005. However, in 2004 acute trusts were not assessed in relation 
to their clinical governance reviews. 
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4.4.1.2 Justification for using star rating system in the sampling process 
Numerous commentators have questioned the validity and accuracy of star ratings as 
a measurement of health care performance (Snelling, 2003; Gulland, 2002). Jas and 
Skelcher (2005, p 197) acknowledge that, from a methodological perspective, the 
development of a composite indicator to measure overall performance, through 
combining multiple measures of organisational performance, is a complex 
undertaking and not beyond criticism. However, they argue that there is clear 
evidence that some public organisations display lower levels of performance than 
others. The Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) is given as an example by 
them and relates it to the English local government. Although CPA has been criticised 
by some councils, academics and policy commentators, local councils have generally 
accepted its scores (Jas and Skelcher, 2005b). 
Davies et al. (2003) suggest that despite the fact that the star rating system has been 
criticised, it has important political, managerial, financial and reputational 
implications which trusts cannot ignore. In health care this means that zero-star rated 
organisations are required to take very seriously challenges that they face to improve 
their performance. Whilst the accuracy of star rating is questioned, the public, trusts 
and the wider NHS community perceive a zero star rating as a general indication of 
`failure' (Harvey et al., 2005a). On the other hand, a three-star rated organisation is 
viewed as `successful' and a high achiever. Smith (2005) argues that the real impact of 
performance data has occurred for the first time in England through the introduction 
of the star rating system and highlights improvements in the waiting lists in the 
English NHS. Similarly, Hauck and Street (2007) identify major improvements in the 
performance of the English NHS when compared with the service in Wales, where the 
star rating has not been implemented. Nonetheless, Smith (2005) adds that intense 
debate is required as to whether the overall impact has been positive or negative. In 
addition to beneficial changes, a number of unintended and adverse-side effects of the 
star rating system have also been identified (Mannion et al., 2005; Smith, 2005). 
4.4.1.3 Why was this Trust selected for this study? 
The Trust was selected as a case of successful turnaround, as it fulfilled the criteria 
below. 
The performance of the Trust declined in terms of star rating for two successive 
years. 
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  The Trust subsequently obtained three stars in the following year. It was a unique 
case among acute Trusts because the organisation had improved its performance 
dramatically moving directly from zero or one to three stars. 
There was acknowledgment by the Trust's senior managers and external 
stakeholders (e. g. Strategic Health Authorities) that the Trust had faced serious 
problems, especially in terms of access indicators, and an evident turnaround in 
performance had occurred. 
The Trust allowed access to the researcher for the collection of primary and 
secondary data. 
To gain access to the organisation, a letter of invitation was sent to the Chief Executive 
of the Trust and the Research and Development unit (R & D) of the Trust for the final 
decision. All the required documents were submitted to the R&D unit (proposal and 
University of York support letter). Permission was granted for the researcher to access 
the Trust following local ethics approval (LREC). 
4.4.2 How were the participants selected for this study? 
A decision was made to select different participants using a purposive sample of staff 
from different organisations (external and internal to the Trust), departments 
(clinical and non clinical), organisational positions (senior, middle and junior levels), 
and professional groups (clinical consultants, matrons, nurses) in order to provide a 
rounded view of the performance decline and turnaround processes. Different factors, 
such as the complexity of the phenomenon under study, the size of the Trust and the 
plan to interview people from diverse groups and organisations, played an important 
role in deciding how many staff to interview. It was envisaged that about 50 people 
needed to be interviewed to obtain a rounded view of organisational dynamics and 
events. However, the plan was to keep sampling until no new ideas emerged. The 
sampling was flexible and the interviewees were selected according to both their 
degree of knowledge and understanding of the context and phenomenon under study 
and appearance of new ideas from ongoing data collection and analysis. 
Therefore, it was proposed to select participants who had prior knowledge of the 
failure and/or were involved in the turnaround process. When selecting participants 
within the Trust, an attempt was made to select staff who had continued to work in 
the organisation since the early stages of the failure and people who had started to 
work there since the failure occurred, although, new managers were included even 
when they were not in post at the initial stages of performance decline. It should be 
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noted that most of the views and information were obtained from staff, in particular 
at senior manager level, who were not in post at the time of the failure, so there is a 
greater possibility of interviewing those individuals who may have been more inclined 
to criticise previous managers. To avoid such an imbalance in information, those 
individuals that were working at the time of failure were also contacted. Inevitably, 
the views of the managers in the Trust are likely to be partial and one-sided (Patton 
and Mordaunt, 2004). In order to corroborate information provided by internal staff 
and minimise the potential for bias, it was suggested that data should be also gathered 
from outsiders (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004) and cross-checked with relevant 
documents. 
The internal participants were identified using the organisational chart for the Trust. 
The external participants were selected on the basis of their organisational position 
and the extent of their involvement with the Trust during the time of the failure and 
turnaround process. Participants from the following external organisations were 
interviewed: local Strategic Health Authority (SHA); local Primary Care Trusts (PCT); 
the Performance Development Team of the Modernisation Agency; and patient 
representatives. 
To invite staff to participate in the study, an invitation letter and a participant 
information sheet (See Appendix 4.2) were sent by email or mail. The participant 
information sheet comprised of. an introduction of the research project and the 
researcher; the possible benefits of the research; the amount of time that participants 
would be required to spend on the project; confidentiality and ethical procedures; 
emphasis on voluntary participation; the right to withdraw at any stage of the study; 
and the audio-taping process. Staff were given three weeks to respond. A total of 57 
people agreed to be interviewed. During interviews some interviewees introduced 
potential participants who would shed new light on rich information to incorporate 
into the data being collected. 
Eleven out of fifty seven people were external to the organisation. The participants 
from the trust were from both clinical and non-clinical groups. The Trust's 
interviewees were from the following groups: executive and non executive members of 
the board; senior non-clinical managers; clinicians with managerial position; middle 
clinical and non-clinical managers; clinical directors; junior managers; consultants 
without managerial responsibility; matrons; and nurses (senior and junior). Eight 
people did not agree to participate in the study because of high workloads or that they 
had no interest in the study. This group mostly comprised clinical consultants (both 
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clinical directors and consultants without managerial positions) but also included 
several junior nurses. Table 4.5 shows the number and organisational positions of the 
interviewees who participated in this study and also details of staff who refused to 
participate or did not reply to the invitation letter. Table 4.6 provides further details 
of each interviewee, listing their background characteristics (gender, job position, 
duration of working in the NHS and in the Trust). 
Table 4.5 Interview sample of the case study 





did not reply 
Trust Senior Directors 6 2 
managers Non-directors 9 
Non executive members 2 3 
Middle managers 8 1 
Clinicians with managerial 4 10 
position 
........ .....;................... Clinicians and nurse consultants 3 i 
Matrons (nursing background) 5 
Nursing Ward manager 22 
staff Staff nurse 4 5 
Others (junior manager, clerical 3 1 
staff, and staff representative) ':. 
*SIIA [Senior managers 2 1 
Clinical staff with managerial post 
Primar Care S i 
2 
y en or managers 2 
Trust 






_... ..................... ............ _....... 
representative 
Total 
*Strategic Health Authority 
**Performance Development Team - Modernisation Agency 
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57 26 







ý. ý. _ý. 
Role or position Work in Work in Trust 
the NHS or relevant 
(years) organisation 
(years) 
1F Senior manager- director 18 
2 M Clinician with managerial 27 
position 
3 M Middle manager 
. 
9 
4 F Senior manager- Director 20 
5 M Senior manager (Non 17 
director) 
6 M Non executive 
; - 7 M ......... _. Senior manager (Non 
director) 
8 F PCT- Senior manager - 
9 F Senior manager (Non 20 
director) 
10 M Senior manager (Non 24 
director) 
11 M Senior manager- director 18 
12 F Non executive 
13 F SHA- Clinical staff wit 
managerial post 
14 F Senior manager (Non 
director) 
15 F Middle manager 
i6 F Senior manager- director 
17 F Middle manager 
18 M Senior manager (Non 
director) 
19 M Senior manager (Non 
director) 
20 F Junior manager 
21 M SHA- Senior manager 
22 M SHA- Senior manager 
23 F Middle manager 
24- 
, 
---t M Middle manager 
25 F Senior manager (Non 
director) 


















21 (2 years in 
sr. position) 
































Role or position Work in 
the NHS 
(years) 




27 F Senior manager (Non 21 2 
director) { 
28 F Middle manager 12 2 
29 M Matron (nursing) 23 8 
30 F Ward manager (nursing) 21 21 (6 years as 
ward mgr) 
31 F Matron (nursing) 22 2 
32 M Clinician 35 t6 
33 F Nurse consultant 
............ 
14 7 
34 F Matron (nursing) 16 3 
35 F 
........ o ... 
Staff nurse 5 5 
36 F Staff nurse 33 32 (12 years as 
sister) 
37 M MA- member of the PDT 15 3 
team 
38 M Clinician with managerial - 4 
position 
39 M Middle manager i6 7 
40 M Staff representative 33 23 (15 years 
staff rep. ) 
41 F 
_L 
Patient rep. 2 
42 M Clinician with managerial 21 12 (4 years 
ý position aI mgr position) 
43 .... F , Matron (nursing) ._ 39 28 
44 F Matron (nursing) 22 22 (3 years as 
matron) 
45 M PCT- Senior manager 5 
46 M Senior manager- director 13 2 
47 M SHA- Clinical staff with 38 2 
managerial post 
48 M Senior manager- director 8 2 
49 M Middle manager - 2 
50 M Patient representative - i 
51 F Patient representative 
..... - ..... _. ...... 
i 
52 F Staff nurse 9 4 









55 F Staff nurse 8 3 
56 F Clerical staff 10 4 
57 F Ward manager (nursing) 18 10 (3 years 
ward mgr 
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The researcher was aware that clinicians (particularly clinicians with managerial 
positions) working in the NHS are very busy due to their high workload and that they 
may not be willing or interested in taking part in the study. For these reasons, all the 
divisional and clinical directors were sent an invitation letter via e-mail or internal 
mail. Six out of fourteen (42%), agreed to be interviewed in their offices. However, on 
the day of the scheduled interview, two were not able to take part due to unexpected 
circumstances (clinical matters) having arisen at short notice. There were eight 
clinical directors, who chose not to participate in the study: four of whom did not 
reply and four refused to participate. However, four consultants interviewed in the 
study gave both supportive and critical perspectives with regards to organisational 
failure processes and turnaround strategies selected by the new managers. Therefore, 
it does not seem that they only gave a one-sided opinion on the processes under study. 
In addition, one of the interviewees from outside of the Trust was a consultant who 
had worked as a divisional director for a few years in the Trust, having had experience 
of working with both the previous and the current management team. 
4.5 Data collection 
Yin (2003) considers data collection in the case study approach as a design issue, 
which can determine the reliability and validity of the study. Tellis (1997c) argues that 
data collection in case studies should not be isolated from other aspects of the 
research process and refers to the case study as a triangulated research strategy. Yin 
(2003) also states that the accumulation of converging evidence and triangulation of 
data over a given issue, is the aim of data collection. 
4.5.1 Triangulation strategies 
Triangulation is a strategy which can be used to corroborate the validity of research 
findings. Different types of triangulation have been identified by Denzin (1984) 
including: 
i) Data sources triangulation: This refers to the collection of data from various 
relevant groups and stakeholders who have a vested interest in the 
phenomenon under study. Therefore, convergent results from all or most of 
the groups/stakeholders are more likely to offer a better understanding of the 
situation. 
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ii) Investigator triangulation: This includes using several researchers (usually a 
research team with same discipline) to study the same phenomenon using the 
same method (e. g. observation or interviews). 
iii) Theory triangulation: This refers to the strategy used when different 
investigators with different perspectives (multidisciplinary research team) 
interpret the same data/results. 
iv) Methodological triangulation: This involves utilisation of various 
methodologies (multiple qualitative and/or quantitative methods) to examine 
a particular phenomenon. Yin (2003) emphasizes that utilisation of many 
sources of information will result in more robust evidence. In terms of 
methodological triangulation, Yin (2003) suggests using different sources of 
evidence and classifies these sources into six groups: documentation; archival 
records; interviews; direct observation, participative observation; and physical 
artefacts. Not all sources of evidence are relevant or essential for every case 
study. The strengths and weaknesses of these sources are detailed in Table 4.7. 
There are two different groups of data, primary and secondary. Whether 
primary or secondary, the data can be internal or external. Primary data refers 
to the data that are mainly gathered for the ongoing research. Secondary data 
are gathered not for the purpose of ongoing research because they are already 
documented. When the data are derived from within the organisation, under 
scrutiny or external to the organisation, they are referred to as internal and 
external data respectively in the study. 
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" stable - repeated review 
" unobtrusive - exist prior to case 
study 
" exact - names etc. 
" broad coverage - extended time 
span 
" same as above 
" precise and quantitative 
" targeted - focuses on case study 
topic 
" insightful - provides perceived 
causal inferences 
Weaknesses 
" retrievability - difficult 
" biased selectivity 
" reporting bias - reflects author 
bias 
" access - may be blocked 
" same as above 
" privacy might inhibit access 
" bias due to poor questions 
" response bias 
" incomplete recollection 
" reflexivity - interviewee 
expresses what interviewer 
wants to hear 
" time-consuming 
" selectivity - might miss facts 
" reflexivity - observer's presence 
might cause change 
" cost - observers need time 
" same as above 
" bias due to investigator's actions 
" reality - covers events in real 
time 
" contextual - covers event 
context 
Participant same as above 
Observation . insightful into interpersonal 
behaviour 
Physical . insightful into cultural features 
Artefacts . insightful into technical 
operations 
Source: Yin (2003), Page 8o 
" selectivity 
" availability 
4.5.2 'Which kinds of triangulation strategies and sources of data were 
used in this study? 
In this study, both data source triangulation and methodological triangulation were 
used. Because the research was conducted by one PhD student, investigator 
triangulation and theoretical triangulation were not possible. As explained above, the 
study proposed to gather data from all relevant internal and external people in the 
Trust in order to produce a rounded view on the processes being studied (data sources 
triangulation). Any controversy about data derived from different sources should be 
addressed and should undergo further analysis, scrutiny and investigation (Lacey and 
Luff, 2001). In this research, a number of follow up interviews and a review of 
additional data was undertaken to clarify ambiguities and mismatches between 
official documents and interview responses. Therefore, the principal data collection 
for the study was semi-structured interviews and a review of relevant documents and 
reports (internal and external). Table 4.8 details the data sources used in the study. 
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Table 4.8 Sources of data 
Primary sources Secondary sources 
Internal   interviews with managers at   documents (e. g. annual reports, 
sources different levels (senior, middle, trust board minutes, 
and junior) performance outcomes) 
External   interviews with managers of 
sources other organisations (PCT, SHA, 
MA, consultants and patient 
representatives) 
  interviews with researchers 
with an interest in the public 
health sector 
i) Interviewing: 
documents (e. g. inspection 
reports, government reports, 
press release, journal articles, 
and websites 
Tellis (1997c) notes that one of the most important sources of information in a case 
study is the interview. In the present study, face to face interviews were undertaken by 
the researcher with the individuals in the sample population. An interview topic guide 
was developed on the basis of the theoretical framework forming the basis of the of 
the study (stage theory) and findings from the literature review and the views of 
experts in the field. The interview topic guide was tested in a pilot interview with three 
participants (one senior manager and two middle managers). The results of the pilot 
were then used to construct additional sub-questions that allowed the researcher to 
obtain more focused information (See Appendix 4.3 for the interview topic guide). 
Semi-structured interviews were then conducted with the remaining participants, who 
were recruited and interviewed between May and November 2005. Most interviews 
took between 45 to 6o minutes to complete and were conducted at the workplace of 
the interviewees, in a quiet area. Once a participant agreed to take part in the project, 
an informed consent form was signed by both participant and researcher (see 
Appendix 4.4). At the start of the interview, the researcher introduced himself and 
gave a brief explanation of the research project and its objectives. The first questions 
related to background characteristics of the respondents including their qualifications 
and employment history. The questions focused on the history of the Trust's 
performance and presence of performance problems, factors that were likely to have 
contributed to the performance decline, factors initiating the process of change, the 
process of development and implementation of an action plan to turnaround the 
situation, the intended and unintended consequences of turnaround interventions, 
and finally, factors that had facilitated or impeded the turnaround process. The 
researcher tried to ask fairly general question and provide ample opportunity for the 
interviewees to articulate fully their views, perceptions and ideas. The interviewer also 
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tried to avoid the use of `leading' questions. Once all the questions were asked, each 
respondent was given the opportunity to add anything that he or she thought would 
be of value to the study. 
An interview summary sheet was completed shortly after each interview. Within 24 
hours, each tape was listened to twice by the researcher and important information 
was noted briefly in the `interview summary sheet' prior to the completed 
transcription. Miles and Hubermann (1994) emphasize the importance of such a 
sheet, as it helps the researcher to retain the initial impressions and compare them 
later with the transcript. The summary sheet also played a valuable role in the data 
collection process, as it highlighted key information and resulted in the posing of 
more pertinent questions. Subsequently, interviews were audio-taped, transcribed 
verbatim, and converted into text. A total of several-hundred pages constituted the 
interview text and taken together comprised the raw `data' for the study. Some follow- 
up interviews with respondents (face to face, telephone interviews or by e-mail) were 
undertaken with the aim of clarifying any ambiguities or issues requiring fuller 
explanation and confirmation about key events or issues raised in previous interviews. 
ii) Review of documents: 
The role of reviewing documents is to corroborate the information gathered at the 
interview stage (Yin, 2003; Tellis, 1997c). Mellahi et al. (2002) note that, as the 
interviews generally reveal people's insights rather than presenting deeper realities 
relating to the incident, the stress is on the confirmatory role of the reviewing 
documentation. In this empirical study, both internal documents (e. g. Trust annual 
report, annual clinical governance reports; internal audit reports; documents related 
to patient complaints; minutes of board meetings) and external documents (e. g. CHAI 
reports, audit reports, Clinical Governance reports, SHA reports; media text) were 
reviewed in order to examine the awareness of the crisis, reactions and interventions 
in response to identified problems. All information collected from different sources 
was cross-checked to increase the validity of the study. 
4.5.3 Search for disconfirmatory evidence: 
Popper (1959 in Easterby-Smith et al., 1991) suggests that researchers should always 
take into account both confirmatory evidence as well as disconfirmatory evidence and 
to resist the temptation to consider only data that confirms to whatever position or 
stance they take. Other scholars recommend that deviant cases (evidence), those 
which may not fit with the findings should also be looked for and examined in 
146 
qualitative research ((Dey, 1999; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Mays & Pope, 
1995; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) claim that if researchers 
search carefully for disconfirmatory evidence, they may develop more useful theory 
and findings. 
In this study, the researcher tried to avoid the `confirmation trap' by not neglecting to 
search for disconfirmatory evidence. For example, a significant number of 
interviewees criticised the previous management team as a key contributor to the 
Trust's failure. The researcher was aware that most of the views and information were 
obtained from staff, in particular at senior manager level, who were not in post at the 
time of the failure, so there is a greater possibility of interviewing those individuals 
who may have been more inclined to criticise previous managers. To avoid such an 
imbalance in information, those individuals that were working at the time of the 
failure were also contacted and interviewed (particularly staff who were working 
closely with the previous senior management team). In addition other sources of data 
(e. g. SHA report) were used to make clearer the role of the previous management 
team with regards to organisational decline. During the data collection process, the 
researcher tried to explore any disconfirmatory evidence and explore the reasons for 
such discrepancies and identify any alternative explanations. Any significant 
differences in perceptions of senior, middle and junior managers and between 
managers and clinicians were investigated and the researcher attempted to clarify any 
differences. Inevitably, the views of the managers in the Trust are likely to be partial 
and one-sided (Patton and Mordaunt, 2004). In order to corroborate information 
provided by internal staff and minimise the potential for bias, it was decided that data 
should be also gathered from outsiders (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004) and cross- 
checked with relevant documents. Participants from the following external 
organisations were interviewed: local Strategic Health Authority (SHA); local Primary 
Care Trusts (PCT); the Performance Development Team of the Modernisation Agency; 
and patient representatives. 
4.6 Data Analysis 
Data analysis consists of "examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise 
recombining the evidence to address the initial propositions of a study" (Yin, 2003). 
The qualitative data were analysed using the `framework analysis' approach with the 
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assistance of the Atlas-Ti (version 5) as a computerised qualitative data analysis 
package. 
4.6.1 Framework analysis 
The interview transcripts were analysed using the `framework' analysis approach 
(Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). Pope and Mays (2000) state that thematic framework 
analysis provides the opportunity to include both a priori theoretical (deductive 
approach) and empirical (inductive approach) issues into the analysis process. In 
addition, the framework allows for structuring the process of data analysis, rendering 
it more objective. Lacey and Luff (2001: p 9) state that: 
"The framework approach was explicitly developed in the context of applied 
policy research. Applied research aims to meet specific information needs 
and provide outcomes or recommendations, often within a short timescale. 
Framework analysis shares many of the common features of much 
qualitative analysis, and of what is often called `thematic analysis'. The 
benefit of framework' analysis is that it provides systematic and visible 
stages to the analysis process, so that fenders and others can be clear about 
the stages by which the results have been obtained from the data. Also, 
although the general approach in framework' analysis is inductive, this form 
of analysis allows for the inclusion of a priori as well as emergent concepts, 
for example in coding". 
In the `framework' approach, when themes emerging from the data are similar to the 
issues in which the researcher is interested, the data have confirmed the importance 
of these issues identified by the researcher and can be investigated further (Lacey and 
Luff, 2001). Framework analysis has been used successfully by health services 
researchers (e. g. Todd, 2003; Griffiths et al., 2001). 
Framework analysis consists of five complementary stages (Ritchie and Spencer, 
1994). Although there is essentially a sequential process, researchers can move 
between stages during the process of analysis in order to apply his or her conceptual 
ability for clarification of meanings and links between data. In addition, data analysis 
can be carried out while data collection is ongoing. Box 4.1 displays the different 
stages of the Framework Analysis (Lacey and Luff, 2001). 
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Key stages of Framework Approach 
  Familiarisation 
  Identifying a thematic framework 
  Indexing 
  Charting 
  Mapping and Interpretation 
Adapted from Lacey and Luff (2ooi) 
Data analysis process in this study: 
i) Familiarisation: 
At this stage, I read and re-read the transcripts three times and where 
necessary listened again to the tapes to obtain an overall view. During the 
process, memos were made and important issues and repeated themes were 
noted before starting the formal analysis using Atlas-Ti. The participants were 
contacted via e-mail or telephone whenever it was necessary to ask for further 
clarification of points raised in the interview. 
ii) Identifying the thematic framework: 
In this stage, the preliminary coding framework (categories) was developed 
both from a priori issues based on the earlier literature review (deductive 
approach; see Pope et al. (2000) and categories during the familiarisation 
stage (inductive approach; see Pope et al., 2000). The `stage' theory 
(Mckiernan's model) was used to develop the thematic framework and 
different parts of the `stage' theory in the framework were deliberately 
included. Discussions regarding the preliminary framework were conducted 
over several meetings between the researcher and supervisor. 
iii) Indexing: 
During this stage (usually referred to as coding in other qualitative analysis) 
the developed thematic framework was applied to the whole data set using 
both numerical and textual codes to identify relevant pieces of data with the 
different themes. Some pieces of data corresponded to more than one theme 
and were indexed by multiple themes. In addition, if the developed thematic 
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framework was not able to index a piece of data, new categories were 
developed, thus expanding the thematic framework. The first step for indexing 
was to export transcriptions in Rich Text Format (RTF) into Atlas-Ti version 5. 
During the process of indexing (assigning codes to the data) within Atlas-Ti, 
memoing was adopted as a strategy to capture deeper and more coherent 
thoughts on the case. Memos are defined by Strauss and Corbin (1990: 198) as 
`the written forms of our abstract thinking about the data'. The importance of 
memos is described by Charmz (1999) as a 'pivotal intermediate step between 
coding and writing' which provides an opportunity for researchers to stop and 
think about the data and move beyond its descriptive codes to considering how 
codes can become categories for analysis, and alerting the researcher to gaps 
in the data and points where comparison can be made. Memos include 
operational notes about data collection, but also theoretical memos, which are 
an essential step in the development of analytical ideas. Theoretical memos 
include initial ideas about data, emerging hypotheses about relationships 
between codes and the properties of codes, and detailed notes later in the 
analysis on how the axial and selective coding is developing. Crucially, memos 
keep the researcher writing, which is an essential element in the analysis itself 
(Green and Thorogood, 2004). Lacey and Luff (2001) suggest that researchers 
need to keep a record of their thoughts and theories as they carry out analysis, 
often called journal or memo keeping. They add that researchers need to keep 
any flow charts, diagrams, tables and other visual sources in the journal to 
support the analysis. 
iv) Charting: 
During this stage, headings from the thematic framework were used to develop 
a chart form so the whole data set could be read more easily. Two different 
types of charts (thematic and case charts) can be used, either thematic for each 
themes across all participants (cases) or by case for each participant across all 
themes. These are illustrated below: 
Table 4. o Charting 
Case chart 




Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Theme 
In the study, the researcher used the case chart and words or quotations were 
included in each chart from the transcripts that had already been transferred 
into Atlas-ti. The paragraph reference (developed in the Atlas-Ti software) for 
each part of the passage was placed in the chart by the researcher to facilitate 
retrieval of the data relevant to the theme. Table 4.9 presents an example of a 
case chart developed and compiled for this study. When the chart was 
completed for all participants, it provided the opportunity to compare the 
views of one interviewee about different themes (by looking across the rows in 
the thematic chart), and to contrast the views of different interviewees about 
one theme (by looking across columns in the thematic chart). 
V) Mapping and interpretation: 
Once all the data was charted according theme, the researcher searched to find 
the main characteristic of the data. The chart was used to compare and 
contrast data extracted between interviewees at different managerial levels, 
with different professional backgrounds, and between individuals from inside 
and outside the Trust. The relationship between themes was searched. Ritchie 
and Spence (1994: 186) argue that during this stage the aim of the researcher 
should be to define concepts, map the range and nature of phenomena, 
develop typologies, find associations, provide explanations and develop 
strategies. The original research objectives and also emerging themes were the 
main guides and influential factors for the researcher at this stage of the 
analysis (Pope and Mays, 2000). Ritchie and Spencer (1994) state that: `this 
part of the analytical process is the most difficult to describe'. 
Each interviewee was allocated a number, which could subsequently be 
quoted. In addition, Atlas-Ti generated the paragraph numbers of the 
transcriptions. When reporting the results, at the end of each quotation 
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(written in italics) a bracket is entered with two numbers separated by a colon. 
The first number represents the interviewee code and the second is the 
number of the paragraph (generated by Atlas-Ti) from which the quotation 
comes, for example, (1: 12) shows that the quotation has been stated by 
interviewee number 1 and the quotation is in paragraph 12. 
Yin (2003) emphasizes that a general analytical strategy should be presented 
for each investigation, to clarify the data used and for what reason they will be 
analysed. Three analytic techniques are recommended by Yin: pattern- 
matching, explanation-building, and time-series analysis. Tellis (1997c) 
argues that in general the analysis will rely on either theoretical propositions 
or the development of a descriptive framework around which the case study is 
organized (in the absence of theoretical propositions). In addition, the original 
objective of the case study may help to identify some causal links that could be 
analyzed. 
Pattern-matching is an important analytical strategy and compares the pattern 
of results derived from an empirical study with a predicted one (Trochim, 
1989). Congruence between actual patterns with those predicted, which are 
often derived from previous qualitative and quantitative studies, can enhance 
the internal reliability of the study (Yin, 2003). In this study, pattern-matching 
was used. However, as Tellis (1997c) notes, the discretion of the researcher is 
necessary when interpreting the data. 
Explanation-building as a form of pattern-matching is a method of analysing 
the data on the basis of building an explanation of the case. It is very useful in 
explanatory case studies, though it has been used for exploratory studies as 
well as part of a hypothesis-generating process. Explanation-building is an 
iterative process that begins with a theoretical statement, refines it, revises the 
proposition, and repeats this process from the beginning (Tellis, 1997c). 
Time-series analysis refers to a technique that analyzes changes and trends in 
a variable over time. The results of this technique are used to support the 
findings derived from other methods (Tellis, 1997c). 
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4.6.2 Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) 
Different dedicated software packages are available to facilitate the management, 
processing and analysis of qualitative data (Green and Thorogood, 2004). 
ETHNOGRAPH, ATLAS-Ti, NUDIST, QSR and NVivo are some examples of 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). Silverman (2005) 
notes that using CAQDAS results in managing and retrieving a large volume of data 
more quickly, thus providing an opportunity for the researcher to explore several 
analytic questions. It also facilitates a more consistent and transparent coding scheme 
for members of a research team, particularly in large or multi-centre studies, and it 
improves the rigor of analysis. However, it must be stressed that none of the software 
packages is able to do the analysis and the researcher is still responsible for 
developing a coding scheme, interpreting all data and formulating conclusions. 
The researcher had access to Atlas-ti via the University of York's computer system. 
Atlas-Ti is a conceptual network builder which allows researchers to perform 
qualitative analysis of large bodies of textual, graphical, audio and video data. It is a 
flexible software package that facilitates management, extraction, comparison, 
exploration and reconstruction of meaningful pieces of data in a creative, adaptable, 
yet systematic, way (http: //www. atlasti. de). It provides the opportunity for coding, 
developing memos, search and retrieval, data linking, and creating conceptual 
diagrams that illustrate linkage between emerging ideas. The researcher participated 
in two different Atlas-Ti training workshops to achieve the required skills prior to 
working with Atlas-Ti in the project. 
4.7 Validity and reliability of methods 
The reliability and validity of qualitative studies have long been of concern in the 
social science literature (Merriam, 1988; Yin, 2003). Studies should be well 
constructed to maximise validity (construct validity, internal validity, and external 
validity) and reliability. However, some commentators (e. g. Lincoln and Guba, 1985) 
use a different terminology to define reliability and validity issues in qualitative 
studies. Lincoln and Guba (1985) present four criteria of `trustworthiness' to verify the 
accuracy and appropriateness of the data interpretation. These include i) credibility 
(the `truth value' or the level of credibility of the results for the participants), ii) 
transferability (the extent to which the results can be transferred and applied to other 
populations and interviews), iii) dependability (the extent to which the results would 
be repeated if the study was to be replicated) and iv) conformability (the extent to 
which the results are derived from the participants and not due to bias or 
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misinterpretation by the researcher). Instead of using the terms construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity and reliability, Lincoln and Guba (1985) use 
confirmability, credibility, transferability and dependability respectively, as 
definitions of the same concepts. In this study, criteria suggested by Yin (2003) are 
used to address validity (construct validity, internal validity, external validity) and 
reliability issues. 
Construct validity is `corroboration that the instrument is measuring the underlying 
concept it purports to measure" (Bowling, 2002). Internal validity ( particularly 
important in explanatory or causal studies) is `the approximate truth about inferences 
regarding cause-effect or causal relationships' (Tellis, 1997c). External validity refers 
to generalisability of study results beyond the immediate case or cases (Tellis, 1997c). 
Reliability demonstrates issues of stability, precision, accuracy of measurement and 
results. To address reliability, researchers need to determine whether or not the 
research is consistent, traceable and reproducible. For a study to be reliable, other 
researchers must be able to obtain the same conclusions when they apply the same 
methods and data. 
Yin (2003) addresses these quality issues in the case study approach and recommends 
specific strategies in order to enhance the validity and reliability of case studies. These 
are outlined in table 4.10. 
Table 4.10 Validity and reliability issues in case study approach 
Techniques used to 
meet the criteria 
Phase of study 
Construct Data triangulation Data Collection 
Validity Maintaining a chain of evidence Data collection/ ordering 
Have key informants review Composition 
draft case study report 
Seminar presentation Analysis/Composition 
Internal Explanation building Design/Analysis 
Validity Peer Debriefing Analysis/debriefing 
Pre publishing Composition 
Pattern matching Data analysis 
External Relate to extant literature Design/Analysis 
Validity 
Reliability Case study protocol Data collection 
Establish a case study database All phases 
Keep a research diary All phases 
Source: Yin (2003) 
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Tellis (1997a) outlines serious concerns about construct validity in case study 
research. Following Yin (2003), three strategies for enhancement of construct validity 
have been used in this study, which consist of applying multiple sources of evidence 
(triangulation), developing a chain of evidence, and reviewing the findings of the 
study by key participants. The emergent themes were sent via e-mail to the key 
participants, both within and outside the trust, when seeking verification and 
providing additional comments. Tellis (1997a) and Lacey and Luff (2001) emphasize 
that feedback to respondents, and taking account of their comments, increases the 
accuracy of both data recording (by giving respondents' quotations) and analytical 
interpretation. In addition, they stress that it may reduce the concerns that the 
researcher has sole power over interpretation. Lacey and Luff (2001) note that new 
data are also generated from respondents' feedback. It is necessary to note that, in the 
process of applying for ethics approval, seeking feedback from participants was 
explicitly acknowledged. 
In order to maximise internal validity and following the work of Yin (2003), pattern- 
matching was used in the analysis. The pattern-matching technique links pieces of 
information from the same case to the propositions developed earlier. The 
propositions for the study were presented in Chapter 3. 
As discussed above, in the case study approach the aim of data analysis is analytical 
generalisation rather than statistical generalisation. Following Yin's method (2003), 
to perform analytical generalisation, the results of this study have been compared 
with existing theories (stage theories), which served as a template, in order to 
generate possible theoretical relationships. Detailed information about how the 
comparison was made is provided in Chapter 8. 
Different techniques can be used to assure the reliability of the case study. As with 
Yin's example (2003), a study protocol was developed prior to the data collection 
process. This was approved by the research advisory group and obtained ethics and 
Research Governance approval. Yin (2003) places emphasis on the important role of 
protocols in safeguarding the reliability of case study research. To increase reliability, 
efforts were made to ensure the process was transparent and auditable. In addition, a 
research diary was used. 
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4.8 Reflexivity in research process 
Conducting qualitative research exposes the personal influence of the researcher far 
more than quantitative methods, as the researcher is central to data collection, 
analysis and interpretation. Within the qualitative research paradigm, a high degree 
of `reflexivity' on the part of the researcher is required throughout the research 
process. Researchers need to take in to account the way that their own background 
and social position, a priori knowledge and assumptions affect all aspects of research: 
development and design, data collection, analysis and interpretation (Jaye, 2002). 
Mays and Pope (2000) relate the concept of `reflexivity' to sensitivity to the way in 
which the researcher and research process have both formed the data. Through 
personal accounting, the researchers become aware of how their own position (e. g. 
gender, race, class, and power within the research process) and how these factors 
necessarily shape all stages of data collection and analysis (Hertz, 1997). 
Academically and professionally, I have a medical background (clinical pathology). I 
worked as head of a clinical laboratory for eight years with 22 staff members who 
were under my supervision. This provided a good opportunity to deal directly with 
staff and also to develop my managerial and leadership skills (e. g. how to outline a 
clear vision, strategic planning, and communication). Following this, I was appointed 
as a hospital manager where I had to deal with a range of staff ranging from high 
ranking consultant specialists to junior doctors and nurses. This provided an 
opportunity to become familiar with a hospital environment, the interaction between 
different groups of staff especially doctor- managers relations and issues related to 
patients and the delivery of a high quality services. I was also a member of an audit 
group that was responsible for assessing and evaluating other provincial hospitals 
across the country. This experience, as well, gave me a broader perspective with 
regards to the audit process and how to assess hospital procedures and practices. 
During my time in audit I became interested in organisational performance and how 
it could be improved within a hospital setting. 
So, I entered this research with a broad background in hospital management, having 
studied relevant evidence about the NHS in Britain. During the participant 
recruitment and data collection period, my clinical background also helped me to be 
accepted more readily by the clinical staff and I felt that they disclosed issues related 
to the performance of the Trust and the Trust's management team more willingly and 
openly because I could understand the technical issues involved and I could 
empathise with their situation. 
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I attended two qualitative research method workshops and gained relevant 
knowledge in the conduct of qualitative research before to starting my fieldwork in 
2004. During my PhD study, I gained a post graduate diploma relating to "leading 
change and innovation". I used a qualitative approach, using semi-structured 
interviews and document analysis when writing empirical reports for the diploma. 
This provided an insight into the benefits of using a qualitative approach and I gained 
valuable experiences, which equipped me with the necessary skills to conduct my field 
work during the course of my study. A change, that I have identified since carrying out 
my PhD research, is that I have developed a stronger interest in qualitative methods 
and I have found that I now prefer to carry out research that "gives voice" to 
participants. 
During the earlier stages of this project, I first reviewed all available literature on 
organisational performance, organisational failure and the turnaround process. I also 
became aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the performance star-rating within 
the NHS which facilitated better understanding of the pitfalls of attempting to 
measure performance in such a complex organisation as the NHS. 
Being an overseas student, I have no allegiance to any group of managers or service 
providers in the UK. Therefore, I had and still do not have any personal vested 
interest in the findings. A researcher's journal was kept to reflect thoughts, feelings or 
ideas arising from interaction with the research participants. This was used when 
interpreting the data and writing up the findings. In addition, questions and problems 
regarding the conduct of the research project were recorded and discussed with my 
supervisor, academic advisors and experts in the field. 
4.9 Ethical considerations 
According to national regulations, all research within the NHS must obtain Ethics and 
Research Governance approval before the research can be conducted. As this study 
was a doctoral research project, the ethics committee of the Department of Health 
Sciences of the University of York also approved the study before submitting 
documentation to the relevant Local Research Ethics Committee (LREC). 
The main identified ethical issues that might arise within this study were as follows: 
risks to the confidentiality and privacy of the participants or persons they refer to; 
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risks of any possible prejudice to the participants (interviewees), their employing 
organisations, or persons or other local organisations mentioned by interviewees, 
as a result of inadvertent release of information that could be identified with, or 
might be prejudicial to, those people or organisations; 
risks to data security. 
In order to avoid ethical problems during the course of the study, the following steps 
were taken: 
  Confidentiality issues: The name of each organisation was kept anonymous. In all 
output from the project, interviewees, persons they reported in the course of the 
interviews, their employing organisations and other local organisations, are 
anonymised; 
  Prejudice issue: The protection of confidentiality effectively prevented any risk of 
prejudice to individuals or organisations; 
  Security: All digital data were kept on password protected computers during the 
course of the project. Thereafter, it was stored on CD ROM and made subject to 
access controls by the Department of Health Sciences, University of York. All 
paper data were in locked filing cabinets in the researcher's personal office. Only 
the researcher and his supervisor had access to these cabinets. After completion of 
the analysis the physical data was packed and sealed in cardboard boxes and 
transferred to the storeroom of the Department of Health Sciences of the 
University of York. Access to these data is possible only with the permission of the 
researcher. 
The research proposal and relevant documents (e. g. completed ethics forms, 
participant information sheet and consent form) were considered by LREC (in order 
to keep the name of Trust anonymous, the LREC has not been identified) and LREC 
approved the study after a minor amendment in the participant information sheet 
(REC reference number: o5/Q14o1/11). Following Ethics Committee approval, the 
required documents were sent to the Trust to obtain Research Governance approval. 
Finally, after Research Governance approval was granted, the Trust's Research & 
Development (R & D) Directorate, gave permission to conduct the study. An honorary 
contract was issued to the researcher for a period of six months by the Human 
Resources office that provided access to the site of research. The Ethics and Research 
Governance approval letters are shown in the Appendices 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. 
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4.10 Limitations of the study 
As outlined in section 4.3.1.3, case study research is subject to a number of limitations 
and the following should be borne in mind. The nature of research conducted by a 
single student, in which all the processes of data collection and analysis have been 
carried out by a single researcher, the likelihood of subjectivity in the findings is 
increased (Mays and Pope, 1995). With regard to issues of validity and reliability 
(Section 4.7), different strategies were used to minimise the likelihood of bias. The 
findings of this study were presented at two seminars and advisory meetings and the 
feedback received was used in reconsidering the analysis process. The verbatim 
quotations from interviewees were also presented in order to support the validity of 
the findings and show the link between interpretation and original data. However, the 
possibility of bias cannot be ruled out. The other limitations of the case study 
approach, mentioned in this chapter in section 4.3.1.3 should also be borne in mind 
in regard to this study. 
4.11 Summary 
This Chapter has presented methods employed in the empirical phase of the study. A 
qualitative single case study design was used to examine the process of organisational 
failure and turnaround in an acute NHS hospital Trust. A purposive sampling strategy 
was chosen as the means of selecting the case and participants for the study. In 
selecting the case for the study, the NHS `star' rating system as a composite measure 
of performance, was used to define organisational failure and performance 
improvement (notwithstanding serious criticism of the `star' rating's accuracy in 
assessment of organisational performance). On this basis, a single acute NHS hospital 
Trust was selected as a unique case in the English NHS, as once the senior 
management team was replaced, it had demonstrated a significant performance 
improvement following two successive years of poor performance. 
The main methods of data collection for the study were interviews and a review of 
relevant internal documents (e. g. the Trust annual reports, board meeting minutes, 
internal reports) and external reports (e. g. the CHI report, the SHA report, the Audit 
Commission report). Fifty-seven participants (both internal and external to the Trust) 
at different organisational positions (senior, middle and junior levels) and from 
different professional and managerial groups were interviewed to provide a rounded 
view of the processes under study. To select participants from within the Trust, the 
Trust's organisational chart was used in the first instance, and interviewees were 
159 
asked to introduce staff who had relevant information about the Trust' performance 
decline and/or the turnaround process. Eleven out of the fifty-seven interviewees 
were external to the Trust (from the SHA, the PCT, the MA and patient 
representatives). Eight people refused to participate in the study. Interviews were 
audio-taped, after obtaining interviewees' consent, transcribed verbatim, and 
converted into text. All ethical and governance reservations were considered in 
conducting this study. Both the ethical and research governance committees' approval 
were obtained before starting the study. 
The `framework analysis' approach was used to analyse the data obtained from 
interviews, which provided an opportunity to use both inductive and deductive 
approaches in the qualitative data analysis process. The `framework' analysis 
approach has been designed for use in the analysis of data for policy-focused projects. 
Atlas-ti, computer software created for qualitative data analysis, was used. To 
maximise the validity and reliability of the findings, different strategies, as suggested 
by Yin (2003), were employed. Data triangulation, key informants' reviews, the 
developing chain of evidence, and seminar presentations were all used to enhance 
construct validity. To increase the level of internal validity, the pattern matching 
technique was used. A research protocol and development of a case study database 
were strategies used to improve the reliability of the findings. 
The next three chapters (Chapters 5,6 and 7) present the findings of the empirical 
study, in the same sequential order as set out in the in the `stage' theoretical 
framework. Chapter 5 focuses on the Trust's decline and identifies the symptoms, 
causes and related issues reported by the interviewees. 'The focus of Chapter 6 is on 
the factors that initiated change process (triggers) within the organisation. Chapter 7 
discusses the development and implementation of the performance action plan 
implemented by the Trust. 
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Chapter 5: Findings - organisational failure - 
symptoms and causes of failure 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the findings of the empirical study in relation to 
the causes and symptoms of organisational failure in the case study. The stages 
theory, discussed in section 2.9, is used as a conceptual framework to organise and 
report the findings. Symptoms, secondary and primary causes of failure, and the 
response of managers and staff when the organisation was zero star rated are also 
explored. Themes related to the diagnosis of performance problems and the triggers 
of change and turnaround processes, are presented in Chapter 6 and 7. 
5.2 Study context 
5.2.1 History of the organisation 
The organisation under study is located in a large metropolitan city. It incorporates a 
teaching hospital and a community ambulatory care centre, which was previously an 
acute hospital. The Trust's annual budget is around £200 million. It employs about 
4,200 staff and services around 1, ooo beds. Over the past decade, the organisation 
has undergone a substantial restructuring and reconfiguration of its services. 
Until 1994, the local Health Authority was responsible for running three hospitals. 
When the Conservative government introduced NHS Trusts as part of the 1991 
internal market reforms, the Health Authority was split into two Trusts. The first (the 
organisation under study) comprises two hospitals under the auspices of one 
management team, hereafter referred to as hospitals A and B. Hospital A was a 
district general hospital providing several tertiary specialities and hospital B was as a 
teaching hospital with a good clinical reputation. Another Trust ran the third hospital. 
Our focus here is on the first Trust which is now one of the largest NHS Trusts in the 
English NHS. 
In 1994, an expert review of the services was conducted by members of the Local 
Health Authority and staff from a local university. In 1995, the local Health 
Commission [the joint management organisation of local Health Authority and 
Family Health Services Authority (FHSA)] published a consultation document on the 
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rationalisation and reconfiguration of services. Various options were put forward for 
discussion and a vigorous debate ensued about the best way to organise local 
secondary care. Public consultation resulted in the following decisions: 
i) a merger of both hospitals with all acute in-patient services moving to hospital A; 
2) the provision of primary care facilities for minor injuries; 
3) development of an Education & Research Centre in the acute hospital; 
4) provision of outpatient/day care services in hospital B (Vening, 2002). 
The Board of the Trust aimed to make the new hospital one of the top 10 most 
efficient Trusts in the country. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was used as a 
source of funding for the reconfiguration of services in the region. This was a fairly 
new strategy in England at the time, and the Trust was one of the first to use the PFI 
to fund large scale service changes. 
Until 1991, the main source of funding for major capital investment in the NHS was 
through tax or government borrowing. However, in 1992 another option, the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI), was introduced by the Conservative Government to pay for 
capital works in the public sector, particularly in the health and education sectors. 
Edwards et al. (2004) state: 
`The introduction of partnership working, known as the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI), was heralded with much enthusiasm by the then 
Conservative Government in the early 199os and was later adopted with 
similar enthusiasm as a cornerstone of the incoming Labour Government's 
policy for improving infrastructure and public services. The Labour 
Government re-branded the policy Public Private Partnerships (PPP), 
widened it to include several different forms of which the PFI is but one, and 
has, confusingly, used the terms PPP and PFI interchangeably. Under the 
PFI, the public sector procures a capital asset and non-core services from the 
private sector on a long-term contract, typically at least 30 years, in return 
for an annual payment. ' 
In the case of hospitals, private sector consortiums are responsible for designing, 
building, financing and running the organisation. According to the terms of the 
contract, over a pre-determined period (generally 25 to 35 years), an annual fee to 
cover both the capital cost, including the cost of borrowing, and maintenance of the 
hospital and any non-clinical services is paid by the NHS (Pollock et al., 2002). 
For the organisation under study, initially it was planned that the project would create 
debts of less than £40 million and if this was exceeded, it would need the approval of 
Ministers. Originally, the cost was estimated at £391/2 million but had risen to Elio 
million by the time it had been built. In 1995, it was decided that all services should 
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move from hospital B to hospital A and that a new acute block should be built with 
PFI finance. At the time, there were debates about which hospital should be the main 
site for the PFI project. There was more space in hospital A's area and although there 
were problems with the state of its concrete, the building itself was satisfactory, so it 
was decided that hospital A would be used as the main site. 
Hospital B, a teaching hospital, and hospital A had about goo and 6oo beds, 
respectively. Hospital A was approved and an additional beds (40o beds) were 
provided on the site, reducing the total number of beds across the two hospitals by 
500. Those planning the reconfiguration of services believed that money could be 
saved and the Trust was keen to assure the local Health Authority that the merger 
would result in a substantial reduction in overhead costs. In addition, the Local 
Health Authority and previous Trust's senior management team considered the shift 
away from closing hospital B would inevitably mean that many patients would prefer 
not to travel to hospital A but choose a different hospital, located closer to the centre 
of town. They estimated that the total workload of the merged hospital (on the new 
site) would be 20% less than the total workload of the hospitals prior to the merger. 
However, neither of these suppositions was well founded. No savings were made and 
the hospital was left with a substantial deficit. This caused severe difficulties in 
relation to the PFI scheme, because the Trust had contracted with the PFI partner for 
activity which was 20% less than the total workload, but found that clinical activity 
remained the same or greater in some area, as patients continued to use hospital A. 
Indeed, the PFI scheme was sanctioned before a national bed review took place. A 
national bed review for subsequent PFIs was carried out later, preventing the 
reduction of beds for subsequent PFIs by as much as the Trust did. 
There was a gradual transferral of services from hospital B to hospital A. The process 
began in January 2000 and in 2ooi, a major rationalisation was implemented and all 
the beds were closed on hospital B's site. As there were still ongoing debate about the 
transfer of services from hospital B to hospital A, it was decided in September 2001, 
that hospital B should become a new community ambulatory care centre. The SHA 
gave a sector of hospital B's services to the newly created local PCT, without any prior 
notice to the Trust. This caused a lot of a dissatisfaction in the Trust and managers 
wanted to know why the SHA had not consulted them before making this important 
decision. There did not appear to be a close working relationship between the Trust 
and the SHA at that time. 
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5.2.2 Characteristics of the population served by the Trust 
It is important to consider the social, economic and clinical characteristics of the 
population served by the Trust, in order to understand its activity and performance. 
According to the revised English indices of deprivation (Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, 2004), the local area was rated as one of the 50 most deprived districts in 
the UK. A large population of very poor people lived in the area who presented a high 
level of healthcare need. 
As stated by one of the interviewees: 
"Patients who are coming in here are much sicker than we've ever seen 
before and there aren't that group of patients who are self caring and 
really could be at home. " (1: 35) 
Some interviewees stressed that patient characteristics should be taken into account 
when the performance of local services was considered. 
5.2.3 Performance of the Trust: star rating 
The Trust was rated as `two star' in the 2000/2001 National Perforamnce Rating and 
was subsequently rated as performing poorly for two successive years (2001/2002 
and 2002/2003). The Trust lost its stars because of the difficulties in reaching the 
desired financial targets, A&E targets and the presence of irregularities in the 
presentation of its waiting list data. Following the replacement of the senior 
management team, the Trust was rated as a high performing Trust, over two 
successive years (2003/2004 and 2004/2005). Several members of the previous 
senior management team had left the Trust, as a result of promotion, and some had 
been replaced with the arrival of the incoming CEO. 
5.3 Findings 
The following section presents the key themes derived from the analysis of the 
transcripts and a review of internal and external documentation. Quotations are 
provided to support the discussion, where they help with interpretation. 
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5.3.1 Markers and symptoms of failure 
As outlined in Chapter 2 (section 2.5), McKiernan (2002) provides a framework which 
differentiates symptoms from causes (secondary and primary causes) of failure, 
although these concepts have a close correlation. He argues that there are several 
initial observable markers and symptoms that indicate the presence of problems in an 
organisation. Nevertheless, in real world contexts, it may be difficult to separate 
symptoms from secondary causes of failure. 
McKiernan (2002) identifies four different types of symptom in the for-profit sector 
literature: financial; physical; managerial; and behavioural. The symptoms of failure 
identified in the case study are detailed below, on the basis of the McKiernan's 
classification. 
i) Financial symptoms: 
One of the most prominent markers of failure cited by different interviewees and 
referred to in internal and external documents was the existence of a large financial 
deficit within the organisation. The Trust had not met its financial targets set by 
central government (a key determinant of the star rating system). Most of the 
interviewees suggested that there was a long-standing historical deficit and that staff 
had been aware of this for some time. In addition, (see also section 5.2.1), the 
predicted efficiencies and cost savings following the reconfiguration of services from 
hospital B to hospital A, did not come to fruition. Financial difficulties were 
exacerbated, causing additional financial pressure on the Trust to the extent of 
approximately £7 million. 
"We had massive financial problems, we were at the time in the order of 
seven million so that was quite a cynic that we were faced with so the 
whole lot sort of came crashing in. " (1: 4) 
ii) Physical symptoms: 
Inability to hit core targets: 
The Trust was not able to achieve its main operational targets (access targets were key 
in the star rating), in particular A&E targets. The long waiting time for emergency 
patients and for surgery, were some of the examples, perceived by the interviewees, 
which demonstrated the poor performance of the Trust. 
Poor public and press image: 
The Trust received adverse publicity and had a poor reputation locally owing to the 
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waiting list irregularities and the low star rating score. This was a symptom referred 
to by several interviewees. This issue of reputation, which had attracted national 
media attention, created a lot of adverse publicity for the organisation. 
"There was a massive enquiry at that time, which was very widely 
published in the press and as those things do, they caused some damage 
within the organisation. " (4: 19) 
Poor working relations with external stakeholders: 
Another symptom of organisational failure, highlighted by some interviewees and 
which could also be seen as a cause of the failure, was the poor relationship between 
the Trust and relevant external organisations, in particular the Strategic Heath 
Authority (SHA). One of interviewees, a senior manager from an external 
organisation, believed that it should be considered a serious weakness if an 
organisation is not willing to develop relationships with its external stakeholders. This 
characteristic was clearly evident in the Trust. Another senior manager from an 
external organisation, stressed that it was difficult to get information from the Trust. 
In addition, several external reports (e. g. documents produced by the SHA) also 
demonstrated poor performance in this regard. 
"So when the new Chief Executive and team arrived, the culture of the 
organisation changed markedly. It became much more positive, much 
more friendly externally; before it was never particularly a friendly 
organisation and the new Chief Executive, particularly, adopted a 
position of establishing partnerships that never play as external, which 
he saw as necessary for the organisation's strategic future, which the 
previous Chief Executive did not. " (21: 104) 
Managers leaving their posts: 
Several managers at different levels in the organisational hierarchy (both clinical and 
non-clinical) had left the Trust and this was perceived as another symptom of failure. 
In some cases, it was attributed to the autocratic leadership style of the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO). More detail is presented relating to the leadership style of 
the CEO in the following sections. 
iii) Managerial symptoms: 
Employee distrust and internal conflict: 
Some interviewees reported internal conflicts between departments and problems 
with unions as indicators of low performance and for this reason, several doctors were 
seen to be unwilling to bring their patients to the hospital. 
166 
"We had a lot of internal conflicts, there was no staff development, there 
were a lot of problems with the unions. So we had to resolve all of that 
and again it doesn't take much of a genius to look back and think but if 
that kind of thing is happening, then actually utilisation and efficiency has 
got to be bad and if you look back on it historically, it was terrible. " 
(25: 156) 
Another marker of failure, highlighted by internal staff, was the sense of fear among 
the managers and in particular middle managers, when they needed to meet and 
report to senior management - especially the CEO. 
Centralised decision making behind close doors: 
Middle managers highlighted the fact that most important decisions were made by a 
few members of the senior management team and the middle managers themselves 
were not involved in this process. 
"Whereas, in the past decisions were made behind closed doors and you 
had to work with the consequences". (40: 53) 
iv) Behavioural symptoms: 
Ignoring and hiding problems: 
Waiting list irregularities reflected failure, and were perceived by the interviewees to 
be the result of poor leadership. Indeed, it was reported that the actual waiting list 
had been hidden by the previous management team, in an attempt to report that 
patient waiting lists were shorter than they actually were. 
Blame for problems placed on others: 
It was reported that the senior managers tried to blame other staff when something 
went wrong instead of accepting responsibility themselves. In the case of data 
misrepresentation one interviewee stated: 
"So, there was the investigation and as a result [name of a director] came 
back from leave [... ] and basically tried to accuse me of doing everything 
[data misrepresentation] that he had done basically. " (5: 35) 
Low staff morale: 
Another marker of failure, perceived by most of the interviewees, was the low level of 
morale among staff. They reported that, although the quality of clinical services was 
generally perceived as good, the hospital was rated as performing poorly causing low 
staff morale throughout the Trust. 
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"I think people felt very demoralised because they knew how hard they'd 
worked and how they'd tried and they were very conscious of the good 
things that we did here. " (20: 31) 
Other reasons were given for low staff morale. Some respondents perceived that the 
actions of the senior management team, especially in asking for data to be 
misrepresented, exacerbated low morale, particularly among junior staff who were 
involved against their will in the process of providing incorrect waiting list data. Staff 
reported that, although they disagreed, there was little they could do in the 
circumstances. 
"We felt helpless, you can't turn to your manager and your manager can't 
turn to people at the top or they get dismissed, in terms of the shouting that 
was going on. What can you do? There was no sort of f... ], people 
mentioned whistle blowing policies but there really was not one at the 
time. " (10: 17) 
"So, it was, you know, very low morale but, as I said, I'd say it had come from 
the top really and that was where the problem was. " (5: 56) 
Some interviewees pointed out that the introduction of a new, inadequate IT system 
(new computer-based Patient Administration System - PAS), which was not as 
effective as the previous one, demoralised staff working in administration. The 
merging of the hospitals lowered morale, because some staff, especially on the nursing 
side, were not appropriately graded in their new roles. These factors had caused some 
tension between staff and their managers. 
"It's not easy when morale has been quite poor and at some point it's 
caused quite a lot friction not just with the Boards but with the different 
departments. " (29: 37) 
In addition, the CHI review highlighted low staff morale. It found that staff felt 
unsupported because of the many changes in the senior management team and also 
the scale and pace of change in the organisation. The review also reported that staff 
felt certain professional groups (e. g. nurses) were more likely to be blamed than 
others (e. g. doctors) following adverse events, demoralising staff in those groups that 
were blamed unfairly. 
Although most interviewees reported that staff morale was low, some had a positive 
view of the working environment in the hospital. In their view, the hospital was still a 
place where the staff were happy to work, and that generally clinicians and staff liked 
their jobs. Records on staff retention supports this. Although the consultants were 
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frustrated by the star rating targets, one interviewee felt that the consultants' morale 
was good as they moved from an old hospital to a new one with better facilities. 
"From my point of view, the hospital has always been a very pleasant 
hospital to work in and as somebody who works in the organisation, I 
must say I have not seen a great deal of difference between what we 
were doing before to what we're doing now. " (38: 15) 
5.3.2 Concerns relating to performance 
The concerns relating to the clinical and non-clinical performance of the Trust are 
given in order to reveal the opinions of staff, both internal and external to the 
organisation. The level of awareness of the Trust's declining performance of staff, both 
internal and external to the Trust, is also presented. 
5.3.2.1 Quality of care and clinical services 
There was a general consensus among interviewees (both clinical and non-clinical) 
and those external to the Trust that the organisation was performing well in terms of 
delivering high quality clinical services. According to the Dr Foster data (a dataset 
provided by an independent commercial provider and comparing services and 
standards in NHS and private hospitals throughout the UK), the hospital was rated as 
a high performing Trust with a range of good clinical outcomes. To produce this 
dataset, both Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) and Nationwide Clearing Service Data 
(NWCS) are used. It is important to appreciate that the Dr Foster data places more 
weight on clinical indicators than the star rating system. An interviewee reported that 
clinical staff never viewed the Trust as a failing organisation in relation to the clinical 
services it delivered, but that the failure was due to poor management. Some 
interviewees, in particular nursing staff, emphasized that nursing care had not 
changed, although the Trust had gone from zero to 3 stars. The patient 
representatives also supported the view that the quality of care was high. 
"The Trust has always had a very strong clinical reputation, 
particularly in terms of outcomes and if you look at Dr Foster and 
things like that, we'd always been a very strong clinical Trust. " (23: 7) 
"I say, from om a ward perception it was not seen as a big failure because 
the things that we were failing on were not the clinical side of it and as I 
said, the feedback we get from patients is always so positive. " (44: 19) 
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5.3.2.2 Internal awareness of poor performance 
Some interviewees did not have a clear understanding of the Trust's performance as a 
whole, but only had information about the relative performance of their divisions or 
departments. It is an interesting to note that at the time, very little attempt was made 
by senior managers to inform staff about the importance of meeting targets and the 
global performance of the Trust. Generally, junior staff were unaware of what was 
actually going on in their Trust, in terms of global performance, and some of them 
reported that it did not really interest them. 
"I don't have any global vision of the Trust's performance. I really only 
know the vision of the division's performance. That might be a 
management weakness of our organisation. " (2: 26) 
"I think as a ward manager, I probably was not very aware of it 
[Trust's performance] at all. As Matron, as I've become more open with 
the management team, I'm very much aware of it but I think if you're 
working on the wards you're quite insular really and you're just in your 
own ward and you're not interested in the Trust's performance. " (57: 7) 
There was some internal awareness of performance issues: 
i) Awareness of waiting list irregularities: 
The Trust had lost a star in the rating assessment because of the manipulation of 
waiting list data. There was serious concern over waiting list irregularities among the 
staff charged with producing this data. Three interviewees highlighted the fact that 
senior level managers were aware of the waiting list irregularities. According to an 
external document (the SHA investigation report), several key managers had stated 
that although the adjustment of the data had been introduced before the previous 
CEO was in post, the CEO became aware of it and then asked for the adjustments to 
be continued. Sometimes the staff had even been asked to make further adjustments 
to the data in order to show the Trust in a better light and senior managers had tried 
to keep such matters undisclosed. 
" We often got a situation where top management would see the data 
and maybe it was unacceptable to them and it was a case of come back 
when it's such and such a figure or when it's more acceptable for them. 
So we would always declare the truth or the official set of figures but it 
was not acceptable to them. So we got into a situation where everyone 
was taking numbers off the list until it reached an acceptable level for 
them to sign off, by as I say, keeping two sets of figures. " (10: 17) 
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"I explained to what was going on [about data misrepresentation], 
believing that he didn't know what was going on. As I said, eventually I 
found out he did know [... ] and he said well let's see this planned activity 
out to the end of the financial year where hopefully everything will then 
be sorted out. " (5: 17) 
In the SHA report, one of the senior managers who had left the Trust argued that he 
informed the CEO and Deputy CEO about the waiting list irregularities immediately 
he became aware of them, but he was not able to give the information to external 
organisations. He added that: 
`He (a senior manager) had no further avenue and the pervading 
management culture was not conducive to an ethos of raising concerns 
externally. ' 
In the report provided by the local SHA, the previous CEO said that she was not aware 
of the adjustments made to waiting lists until the year 2000. She then accepted that, 
under pressure, she had made a serious error for which she should be accountable. 
She also admitted that the Board of the Trust should have been told about the long- 
standing adjustments to waiting list numbers as soon as she was made aware of them. 
She concurred that sometimes loopholes in interpretation were exploited and the 
Trust did not always follow best practice. However, she emphatically denied that the 
Trust had made a deliberate attempt to mislead. 
It was evident that misrepresentation of data had become embedded in the 
management culture of the Trust. Staff who provided waiting lists, reported that when 
they were asked for information by senior managers they often had to think which 
figures were being requested, it was whether the manipulated data for external use or 
actual data for internal use. Staff reported real concerns for patients who were 
removed from the "active waiting" list and transferred to the "planned admissions" 
list. [The active waiting list comprised people who were available for treatment if 
hospital capacity allowed and these patients were included in the waiting list report. 
However, the planned admissions list included patients who had a scheduled 
treatment plan (e. g. periodical treatment plan), and therefore were not waiting for 
treatment. The waiting list data did not include the latter group of patients. ] Staff had 
reported the problem to their line managers by writing formal letters on at least two 
occasions. It was the staffs perception that this misreporting could not have 
continued indefinitely as it would have eventually been revealed through external 
investigation and scrutiny. 
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ii) Awareness of financial difficulties: 
With regard to the Trust's financial status, staff were generally more aware of 
financial difficulties, although one interviewee argued that the level of awareness was 
likely to be insufficient to focus the attention of staff trying to work within the budget 
allocated to them by the Trust. The Trust's financial deficit was considered to be of 
major concern given the huge financial burden in relation to the PFI building and 
rationalisation process. 
"So, I think it's probably fair to say that we all had to take a gulp and 
think, my god, how do we actually deal with these issues and actually I 
think the issues almost came one after the other, so you were still reeling 
from the we've got a massive financial problem to this misreporting of 
the waiting list data. " (4: 17) 
iii) Awareness of insufficient capacity: 
There were real concerns raised by the senior and middle managers, about the lack of 
capacity (beds), as the Trust lost about 50o beds after the rationalisation process. In 
addition, an inappropriate flow of patients throughout the hospital caused further 
problems and impacted deleteriously directly on A&E, waiting list targets and 
operation cancellation rates. 
Some of the interviewees (both internal and external to the Trust) stressed that the 
Trust had not dealt with all the problems, or still had issues to address at that time. A 
source of concern for the Trust was the inability to hit key access targets, particularly 
A&E targets set by the government. The previous management team was said to 
aware of the problems in A&E and difficulties with the discharge process, but did 
not or could not resolve these issues. A clinical consultant stated that the hospital was 
a `busy clinical area' but was seen as probably one of the `less dynamic' and `go- 
getting' hospitals in the region. 
On the other hand, some interviewees (e. g. a staff representative) argued that the 
hospital had never under-performed, and that it had always performing reasonably 
well. With regard to the resources available to the hospital, they did not report 
significant major performance problems, and said that receiving a zero star rating 
came as a shock to them. One interviewee believed that the Trust was the same as 
other Trusts that were struggling to reach targets but that the management team had 
caused the waiting list problems. 
"I think that on the whole, like the rest of the hospitals, we're performing as 
well as anyone else but we put a spoke in our wheel. " (15: 7) 
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5.3.2.3 External awareness of poor performance 
To some extent, a number of external organisations were aware of deficiencies in the 
performance of the Trust, both before and after the organisation received a zero star 
rating. The concerns of different external organisations were pointed out by some of 
the interviewees at different levels of the managerial hierarchy. Several external 
stakeholders claimed that their view of the organisation's performance was not 
particularly positive, as the Trust had not tried to nurture a constructive relationship 
with them and they considered the Trust to be insular. One of the external 
interviewees reported that `the mentality of the Trust' was to state that everything was 
fine because they did not want the external organisation to come into the Trust and 
investigate their procedures'. He believed that organisations with larger problems 
were less likely to ask for help in their areas of weakness. The interviewees added that 
the financial deficit was a source of concern for the external organisations, in 
particular the SHA, which was responsible for managing the performance of the local 
health economy. 
"There was a huge external concern particularly from the Strategic 
Health Authority. Yes, we had auditors in we had the modernization 
here, we had from the Prime Minister's office, so yes there were huge 
concerns about our performance. " (1: 6) 
The CHI report revealed several areas of under performance and made comments on 
the Trust's performance. Different interviewees supported the use of the CHI report 
as a lead for the Trust improvement plan. It was evident that the CHI was aware of 
problems in the performance of the Trust. 
Although the Trust had been audited by the National Audit Office for 2000/01, 
through the mandatory "light touch" review of data quality, the waiting list 
irregularities and the manipulation of the data had not been detected. Three 
interviewees reported that it seemed that the National Audit Office had not examined 
and investigated the accuracy of waiting list data in enough detail in the course of its 
`light touch' review. The Audit Office gave no satisfactory response as to why they had 
not unearthed this problem, a question asked by some new members of the Board of 
the Trust. The new management team was also concerned about the accuracy of the 
data, but felt that they could ascertain the truth quite quickly. This demonstrates the 
importance of the quality of external inspection and the need for in-depth auditing. 
However, the Audit Office did stipulate a number of recommendations that the Trust 
needed to carry out including: 
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`Strengthen the formal documentation and procedures; ensure correct 
outpatient referral dates are used in all cases; ensure accuracy and 
timeliness of suspensions is improved in some cases; and demonstrate 
accountability to the Trust Board. ' (Report for Strategic Health 
Authority, 2003). 
In the Audit Commission's opinion, there was no problem with the performance of the 
Trust in terms of waiting lists in the 2000/01 report. Regarding the inappropriate 
adjustments to waiting lists of nine NHS Trusts, forty seven Trusts were randomly 
selected for a `spot check' review of in-patient and out-patient waiting lists and the 
Trustunder study was one of those selected. The external auditors revealed the 
waiting list irregularities following a report given by internal staff. There were two sets 
of reports, internal and external. External reports showed fewer patients waiting than 
had been reported internally. It was surprising that at the time, only external reports 
were given to the Board of the Trust and its operational management team. The 
briefing report produced by the District Audit revealed that the misreporting of 
waiting list information had started before the year 2000, although the Auditors had 
not investigated figures prior to that year. 
Following the new CEO's report to the SHA on waiting list irregularities (discovered 
by the National Audit Commission), an independent external investigation was 
launched by the SHA. This investigation indicated that the adjustment process began 
during the period 1996/97. At that time, the Regional Office and the Trust agreed a 
waiting list profile, which was monitored on a monthly basis. If there was an excess of 
5% in the figures, the Trust would be required to provide an exception report, but still 
the waiting list irregularities did not become evident to the Regional office. The SHA 
report showed that the Trust aimed to adjust the figures within the range of a 5% 
profile, and claimed that recording waiting list irregularities had become entrenched 
as a standard practice within the Trust. Some e-mails presented in the SHA report 
clearly showed that senior managers had intentionally manipulated data. 
One of the interviewees argued that the PCT must take some responsibility for what 
went on in the Trust, as it had not performed its monitoring and commissioning role 
properly. It was concluded that the failure was in the local health economy rather 
than an individual organisation. 
5.3.3 Secondary causes of failure 
A range of internal and external factors, perceived by the interviewees, that had 
contributed to the Trust's performance decline and failure were identified in this 
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study. The internal causes of failure can be classified into four key categories 
including: i) managerial; ii) financial; iii) organisational; and iv) cultural. 
5.3.3.1 Managerial factors 
i) Leadership issues 
Leadership style: 
In order to understand the contribution that the Trust's managers made to the failure 
of the Trust, it is important to have an appreciation of the situation at the time the 
previous CEO took up her post. She was appointed following a period of about seven 
months when the Trust had been run by an acting CEO. Also, the CEO who was in 
post prior to this was given another position in the region as a consequence of a report 
written by the Chair and non-executives showing his inability to achieve a financial 
balance. 
At that time, the chair of the Trust was a rather strong character who was frequently 
in contention with the CEO. When the CEO left the Trust, for a six month period the 
organisation was run by an acting CEO with only two executive members of the 
Board. Two executive positions remained unoccupied. These were the circumstances 
in which the post was advertised and the CEO was appointed. At that time, the Trust 
suffered a financial imbalance and was making plans to merge two hospitals and build 
a new one under the PFI scheme. The CEO was assigned to balance the books and to 
prioritise the processes involved despite having little experience of healthcare 
management and coming from the private sector. 
Most of the interviewees attributed the Trust's performance problems to the actions of 
the CEO and other senior managers, and to their leadership styles. The previous 
management team and particularly the CEO were perceived as autocratic. It seems 
that the hierarchical culture of the organisation established by the CEO and executive 
team meant that whatever the senior management team decided (even in the case of 
manipulation of data), others had to follow. Participants pointed out that the previous 
senior management team lacked effective leadership and that no attempt was made to 
encourage participative leadership or to empower middle managers. The CHI report 
confirmed this, demonstrating that the staff felt that the support from the top was 
inadequate. 
175 
"The other thing that seems to have been true at that time was that the old 
management ethos was top heavy, a bit dictatorial, emphasis on discipline 
and people having to do what they were told. " (7: 18) 
With regard to the personality of the previous CEO (as explained below), one 
interviewee maintained that she was the right person to carry out the necessary 
changes during the period of rationalisation. In addition, the CEO in post before her 
had a very facilitative style, but he was always undermined by the Chair. Poor 
financial management and inability to balance the books was evident at the time, so 
removing the Chair and appointing a stronger leader (the previous CEO) helped in 
running the organisation more effectively. Nevertheless, the previous CEO was not 
perceived as an appropriate person for the job. The interviewee felt that a leader who 
paid more attention to staff development and empowerment and showed concern for 
people ('people' leadership style) was needed for next stage following rationalisation. 
Two junior nursing staff did not perceive any significant differences between the 
leadership style of the previous and current senior management team, or at least that 
would affect them at ward level. 
"To be perfectly honest no difference to how it [leadership style] is now. I 
can't see any difference at a ward level [... ] how any changes within that 
structure or the management team, [... ], for the management style and 
structure, it doesn't impact on me. "(30: 23) 
The following characteristics and behaviour, as reported by the interviewees, were 
evident in the leadership style of the CEO and previous senior management team. 
Centralised decision making: 
The view was expressed that the process of decision making was very centralised in 
the Trust and power was limited to a few senior managers. No input was sought from 
the rest of managerial team and middle management could only implement the 
decisions that had been made at the top, often without knowing the reasoning behind 
them. 
"In the past you only learnt about the decision making, you did not get 
involved in the decision making process, you were given a fait accompli, 
this is that somebody else has decided and we had to sort out the problems 
that that generated. " (40: 47) 
Bullying behaviour: 
Although the executive team was a fairly close knit group, the interviewees perceived 
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that the CEO, with her strong personality, dominated the senior management team. 
There was almost complete agreement among the respondents, both internal and 
external, that a bullying culture was being promoted by the CEO, with divisional 
managers under enormous pressure and feeling uncomfortable because of the way 
that they had been treated by the CEO and senior management team. As a 
consequence of her leadership style, several managers left the organisation, although 
some reported that they were not directly involved with the CEO, but had heard 
rumours and gossip about her. The perception was that the senior managers tended to 
bully others (e. g. in the case of waiting list irregularities) and would not brook 
disagreement concerning decisions made at the top, especially any challenges to the 
CEO. Her behaviour made it clear that staff were not at liberty to challenge her 
decisions. Those who did were disciplined (e. g. using secondment of staff). In certain 
examples given in interviews, it was stated that the CEO banged on the table, 
demanding that certain things be done. 
"Our previous CEO that left was a bully and everybody lived and walked in 
fear of her and that was the atmosphere in the Trust really. " (25: 15) 
"Whereas against how things are now, it was just a case of being shouted 
at from the top saying `go and deliver this'. " (5: 218) 
"I think during the reign of the previous CEO [name], it was an odd time. I 
think people would say there was bullying going on, [... ]people were 
fearful, frightened of the CEO, she was quite an aggressive individual. " 
(10: 45) 
"I think previously the culture was very much command control and a lot 
of people were quite scared of saying actually, you know, we're not doing 
things, you say we're doing one thing and we're actually doing the 
opposite. There's still quite a lot of that that we need to overcome. " (23: 35) 
On the other hand, three respondents perceived the CEO as a very bright and talented 
person and one noted that she was focused on enhancing the quality of care in the 
organisation. Two of the interviewees did not view the CEO and her deputy 
deliberately dishonest. The CEO was not described as a sensitive person, but was 
perceived by middle management and certain Board members as an individual who 
did not like debate, preferring short and focused reporting to any form of discussion. 
Some interviewees believed that the previous management team had concentrated 
only on their own advancement in the NHS, rather than seeking appropriate response 
to the external performance management system. They held that the CEO was 
pursuing a better position and indeed, that she was focusing her efforts on a possible 
merger and to opening a PFI project to promote herself when applying for her next 
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job. The Deputy CEO appeared to be exhibiting similar behaviour before obtaining a 
position as the CEO in another trust. 
"They [senior management team] seemed to be denying us [staff] that 
access for the sake of rewards for the individuals concerned that we knew 
they were on performance related pay and if the PFI went ahead they 
would get rewarded and they would get promoted and we would see it at 
the expense of our members who'd transferred over to the private finance. " 
(40: 33) 
Lack of flow of information within the organisation: 
The senior managers were viewed as secretive and unwilling to share information 
with staff. Some middle managers said that, at the time, they did not know why they 
were asked to perform certain tasks. 
"The shroud of secrecy that the Trust used to run under has disappeared 
because it was like running the secret service, you never, ever, ever got to 
find out why you were doing something. " (25: 79) 
A staff representative stated that it was management's prerogative to withhold 
certain information, such as that relating to PFI, or irregularities in waiting list 
figures (seen as the worst example). 
"So, some of the contributing factors might be that the messages were not 
relayed down, you know, management obviously knew what was going on 
but I don't think it actually got to ward level and by the time it did get to 
ward level it was done in a very abrupt way [... ]. Yeah, so perhaps 
leadership because certainly the leadership we've got now has definitely 
changed. " (42: 55) 
The SHA report noted that the practices at the Trust did not fit with the Code of 
Conduct and Code of Accountability, published in April 1994. There were three key 
elements, including `Accountability, Probity, and Openness'. A member of the Board 
also stressed that the CEO did not demonstrate the transparency expected as one of 
the main responsibilities of her position. 
I don't think there is any way in which it was acceptable what they did. 
you know this is at the heart of some responsibilities. As public servants 
you know the probity issue, transparency, you know, you do not circulate 
and generate misinformation. " (12: 33) 
Insufficient delegation of power: 
There was little delegation of power and responsibility to encourage leadership and 
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empowerment at lower level. A complaint of some middle managers was that they did 
not feel that they had sufficient authority to challenge both clinicians (divisional 
managers in clinical divisions) and their superior managers and to questions their 
decisions. 
"When I came into the post I inherited two divisions that previously had 
been managed separately whose managers had left, most of whom had not 
survived 9 months, so there was not a culture because there was not any 
leadership and I think that's management leadership. There was clinical 
leadership and clinical management leadership within those settings, so 
clinicians were very used to people coming up to them and saying, hello, 
I'm your new manager and then not seeing them again. " (23: 126) 
It was reported that the CEO had not developed a constructive and good working 
relationship with key internal staff, principally doctors, and with external 
stakeholders who would be the likely sources of help for the organisation. The senior 
management team, and particularly the CEO, did not provide adequate leadership 
owing to her unwillingness to give sufficient time to establishing good relationships 
with key staff. These irregularities were considered to be symptoms of poor 
leadership: 
"The key stakeholders internally were not properly engaged, principally 
the doctors and to a less extent external stakeholders like this organisation 
and the PCT, were not properly engaged by the Trust. I think the waiting 
list irregularities were symptomatic of poor leadership in the 
organisation. " (21: 1o4) 
Invisibility of senior management team: 
Most interviewees emphasised that the executive team was practically `invisible' and 
often unapproachable. Some complained that the CEO and executive team did not 
visit front line staff on clinical wards. Two interviewees reported that, although staff 
had been given the opportunity to meet the CEO in her office to discuss their issues, 
as one hour per week viewed as very formal and did not see them as a substitute for 
CEO visiting staff in their places of work. 
"You know you did not see the Board out on the wards. " (15: 19) 
Lack of ownership of the performance problems for senior managers: 
The Senior Management Team's (SMT) lack of ownership of problems was reported 
by both internal and external staff. A member of the Performance Development Team 
stated that this matter was evident with regard to meeting the four hour A&E target 
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because some senior managers and clinical directors did not recognize this as their 
problem, with no clear line of accountability apparent. 
"In the early diagnostic work, I thought that there was not strong 
ownership of some aspects of what needed to be done by some of the 
senior members of the executive team, I think they wanted it to happen 
but I did not think there was strong ownership of getting the job done. " 
(26: 15) 
Role of Non-executive: 
Two members of the Board argued that the non-executive members of the Board 
failed to challenge the executive members effectively. Although they said that they had 
supported the executives during the rationalisation process, they still felt that the non 
executives had not asked them sufficiently challenging questions to clarify matters. 
The relationship between the non-executives and executive teams was perceived as 
poor by one interviewee, and it was even thought that the CEO was not interested in 
the engagement of non-executives. In addition, the CEO and certain other executives 
failed to provide appropriate and accurate information for the Board. The most 
prominent example was inaccurate information on waiting list data, which caused the 
Board of the Trust, particularly the non-executives, difficulties in carrying out their 
senior leadership roles. 
"We were not getting the right information and I find this quite difficult 
I suppose and uncomfortable. I [Non-exec] always felt that we were told 
what they believed. The minimum, sort of, they could get away with 
divulging, if you will. And I suppose my part in that you know, I take 
responsibility for saying, well maybe I did not know the right questions 
to ask at that stage in my development. " (12: 61) 
"There was a Trust Board, not the Trust Board but a sort of exec 
directors team which would meet. So it was a fairly small group of 
people who would meet on a regular basis to go through all the issues 
about service. " (47: 11) 
Lack of managerial capacity and capability: 
Some interviewees believed that the scale of the changes (the rationalisation process 
and the PFI scheme) managed by the previous executive team did not leave enough 
time for the executive team to focus on performance difficulties in the organisation 
(insufficient time to focus on performance targets). In their view, the previous team 
could have managed to meet targets and overcome performance issues if they had had 
sufficient time. 
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"To be fair to the previous team, there was so much change being 
managed, this might sound like an excuse but my perception was that 
there was so much change to be managed, that had the previous team 
having made the change had the opportunity to think, okay what are we 
missing now, what do we need to develop? And so on, that if they'd had 
a bit more time it would have gotten into those things as well. But some 
of our problems were happening just after the change and the waiting 
list problem was discovered shortly after the rationalisation. "(ii: 103) 
According to the SHA report, the previous CEO gave high workload as her main 
defence against waiting list irregularities. The SHA report quotes the following 
reasons given by the previous CEO for this high workload: 
`introduction of new PFI facilities management scheme, involving 
transferring a major teaching hospital, shutting an accident and 
emergency department, re-routing patient f ows, the need to save £3om 
recurrently per annum, the problems associated with transferring large 
numbers of staff to private sector provider of non-clinical services at the 
new hospital, the workload involved in totally redesigning operational 
policies, staffing patterns and work practices. ' (The SHA report, 2003). 
Considering the extent of the changes she was dealing with, some interviewees (in 
particular those external to the organisation), argued that the CEO lacked insight and 
self awareness, qualities essential for effective leadership when dealing with a failing 
situation. It was stressed that the CEO paid no attention to the management capacity 
and capability necessary to effect such changes. At the time, two executive members of 
the Board left the organisation and for a lengthy period it was managed by the CEO 
and two members of the executive. Both internal and external senior managers, 
maintained that there was not enough management capacity at the senior level to run 
the organisation, co-ordinate the changes and manage their impact on the 
organisation. The perception was that the management lacked basic managerial skills. 
"If you're a CEO of an organisation and you are struggling because of 
the size of the agenda, then you need to recognise that and you need to 
do something about it. CEOs with insight and self awareness will do 
that, CEO who don't do that will struggle and fail and you can't be a 
leader without insight and self awareness [... ] I think it was leadership 
and basic general management that was the problem. " (21: 108) 
"I think there was an issue about capacity and capability with the 
previous executive team. [... ] there were a number of the issues it was 
trying to deal with and manage at the same time and perhaps it was not 
as clear then about what it was seeking to do or how it was going to go 
about it. " (45: 13) 
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In terms of inadequate leadership capability, one interviewee gave an example which 
indicated the lack of leadership over the Information Technology (IT) used in the 
organisation: 
"Previously informatics (IT) was managed under the Director of Finance 
and it seemed okay as a management structure but the Directors of 
Finance have often got IT underneath them and are not IT experts and 
therefore struggled to provide leadership. " (11: 115) 
Lack of ability to provide bed capacity: 
There was a perceived weakness in developing sufficient capacity in the organisation, 
which related in part to the underestimation of the required beds for the Trust. 
Indeed, the number of beds required by the organisation had never been accurately 
calculated. An interviewee reported that the whole health capacity planning process 
had been under question `from the first day'. One interviewee argued that the 
particular problems of the Trust in terms of capacity related to medical long stay 
patients and shortage of surgical beds and that this could be a result of poor 
leadership and lack of vision regarding future needs. Even when the problem was 
revealed, the management team did not know how it should be resolved. 
"Everybody was acutely aware that we did not have the bed configuration 
right, so it was things like, we know we're failing but why are we failing, 
we can't get our patients in. " (25: 57) 
"Part of the problems that the Trust face are to do with the sheer number of 
people that have wanted to come here and the lack of beds. " (5: 82) 
Two interviewees reported on the Trust's inability to provide the level of capacity that 
was needed, particularly in some clinical areas, owing to the high flow of patients 
through medical beds. They felt this to be related to the difficulties encountered in 
the process of patient discharge. Poor bed utilisation and management was another 
factor that they indicated was a contributing factor to the reduction of capacity. One 
interviewee explained that inconsistency on the part of clinicians on ward rounds and 
in the discharge of patients, on only one or two days per week, had a negative impact 
on the flow of patients. An external consultant saw the medical assessment unit in the 
A&E as dysfunctional. These issues had a direct effect on the performance of the A& 
E department, which was another reason that the hospital lost one of its stars. Some 
interviewees related a lack of appropriate flow of patients and discharge to inadequate 
coordination and collaboration with other organisations, such as social support 
services, which were not able to facilitate the process of discharging patients. 
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"In truth the vast majority of individuals occupying acute medical beds 
have straightforward medical problems and the reasons why there are not 
discharged in a timely fashion is not owing to their illness, it's owing to the 
processes and system inefficiencies. " (26: 78) 
"Getting focused on the discharge rate per day from the ward was actually 
quite helpful and it certainly produced a sort of step change in their 
medical bed utilisation and certainly helped flows around their A&E access 
because that was one where they were most vulnerable. " (26: 57) 
Insufficient attention to performance targets: 
An important issue highlighted in the interviews, was that the CEO did not focus on 
national performance targets. It was reported that staff often had no idea what the 
targets were or why they were important. Also, response to the targets was very slow 
on the part of the senior management team. 
"They [Trust's executive team] literally did not care what was happening 
outside of [Name of the Trust], I think their whole focus was just about 
maintaining the hospital and as I say, I don't think they paid any attention 
to national standards. " (8: 17) 
"I think the current exec team are more focused on the targets and the 
achievement of the targets where some of the last exec team perhaps were 
not as focused on that" (9: 17) 
"I didn't get any feeling at all of anxieties about performance or finance. 
There was a lot of stress about moves [merging two hospitals] but no 
anxieties about performance or finance. " (18: 365) 
It was reported that the CEO was not interested in knowing the details of the Trust's 
performance and the `truth' about what was happening. This led the Trust to 
experience the problems outlined above. Respondents did not consider the monthly 
performance report as an adequate vehicle for assessing detail and thus being able to 
manage the Trust. One interviewee (a non executive member) said that despite the 
fact that they were focused on the targets, clearly they were not meeting them. 
However, two interviewees maintained that the CEO did not deliberately ignore 
targets. One noted that the CEO was very sensitive to the need for timely and honest 
responses to complaints and if something was not right, the CEO investigated it 
thoroughly. 
Finally, two interviewees raised the issue that misrepresentation of waiting list data 
might be a reflection of what was going on higher up the chain of command, which 
had been questioned on occasion but not taken as a part of the terms of reference. 
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"My understanding is that the execs here were so driven by the people 
above them that they believed that because they could not square this 
circle, because they could not deliver, they basically resorted to 
manipulating the information. " (12: 31) 
ii) Distraction 
There was general agreement amongst respondents that a huge amount of the 
previous senior management team's time was absorbed in the completion of large 
projects. The top senior managers needed to merge into one site, two hospitals that 
had already been under a single management structure but were physically separate. 
An extensive PFI project, building an Education & Research Centre and developing a 
big central clinical laboratory, was also to be completed at that time. It was perceived 
that these projects and the relocation of services distracted the top management team 
from the day-to-day management of organisation. Indeed, the senior management 
team had taken their `eyes off the ball' concerning certain key access targets. However, 
as outlined previously, some interviewees highlighted a lack of leadership as an excuse 
for the previous management regime's considerable contribution to Trust's failings. It 
is important to note that some interviewees thought that the merging of two hospitals 
was a major distraction, but others looked more favourably upon the PFI project than 
the merger. 
"I think that the previous CEO and other exec members would say well 
at the time yes they were disproportionately distracted by what was 
happening around the PFI. Virtually new ground really and a huge 
project, huge initiative and fraught with a lot of difficulties not least you 
know, the closure of inpatient services at [name of hospital] what that 
meant for the local community. How that was managed. " (12: 27) 
"That was a huge project to bring the two organisations together and 
moving to a new building, I just think it's a distraction from the things that 
were nationally being measured. I think it's difficult to run an 
organisation from two very distinct sites but I don't think that's the reason 
why things went wrong, I think the reason why it probably went wrong or 
one of the things is that the time when we were no stars we were 
concentrating on making the PFI come together. " (28: 175) 
PFI project: 
The Trust's PFI project was one of the first PFI builds in the UK. At that time, the PFI 
was quite new to the health services, so insufficient expertise and experience was 
brought to bear on writing the contract between the Trust and private sector. Neither 
was guidance from the centre as good as it was later. It was unclear how the 
partnership would work, nor and it what PFI meant. An interviewee termed it "the 
morass of complexity of the PFI". 
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"I think the PFI area is a problem because we can't control it, managers 
can't manage it, you have a third party doing your work and they're in it 
for profit, they're looking at what the agreement says, they're experts in 
handling contracts and agreements. Whereas the people on the NHS side 
don't necessarily have these skills and the staff who implemented PFI, a lot 
of people who were involved at a high level have all gone, they've been 
replaced by other staff who are not familiar with what the content of the 
contract was, so we're not quite sure what services we can expect from the 
PFI partners and if you want anything else which is out with that contract, 
the Trust has to pay early and sometimes you can't even get it done. But 
there are restrictions that you can't bring outside contractors in for certain 
things because the PFI won the rights to provide that service. " (40: 135) 
Merging the two hospitals: 
The merging of the two hospitals was not completed in a single action but was a 
sequential process, between 2000 and 2ooi. The process influenced the working 
practices in the Trust. In addition, star rating as an external performance 
measurement had been introduced and the management team was required to meet 
its targets. It was likely that these factors would have an impact on the performance of 
the Trust. It was reported that it was difficult to manage two hospitals on two sites, 
particularly in clinical terms where provision of services on two sites had created 
problems in meeting targets and providing quality services. 
Although respondents were in general agreement that the process of merging the two 
hospitals went well in terms of clinical issues, some serious problems were reported in 
other areas. A level of resistance was noted, with some staff not wanting to relocate. 
Neither were they entirely happy with some of the decisions such as restructuring and 
re-staffing the departments and units, made by the Board of the Trust at the time. 
Many staff who had worked in hospital B for years were required to move to the new 
location, engendering problems in terms of operational, cultural and interrelationship 
issues. As the number of beds was reduced following the merger, one of the main 
problems was insufficient capacity and how the Trust could accommodate the burden 
of high workload on the staff. Some lost high status positions and took on lower 
organisational roles, especially on the nursing side, and for this reason and the 
stressful nature of new levels of workload, certain E grade nurses in the medical wards 
left the Trust within a year. However, the D grade nurses were accepted easily new 
situation and remained at the new hospital. Hospital A was not as academic and did 
not have as good an external reputation as hospital B, where the staff had an intense 
pride in their hospital. Those who moved to the new organisation, felt that a better 
atmosphere existed in the old hospital. Because of the presence of two completely 
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different cultures within the new organisation, a high level of anxiety and extensive 
conflict between staff members was reported, requiring a large percentage of 
management time to affect new working arrangements. One interviewee reported that 
although the relationship between staff did improve, during the first year the staff 
from the two different hospitals were aware of detachment between the two different 
staff teams. 
High levels of stress were perceived by the management team and in particular 
middle managers were trying to deliver changes and also consider the performance 
targets introduced at that time. 
"Well people have been through a very traumatic time, moving from a very 
small close knit hospital to a big site which is much more, so they were 
apathetic and anxious and there were a lot of unsettling times. " (43: 31) 
Some interviewees described the successful transfer of services and the carrying out of 
the PFI scheme as the result of the intense concentration placed on them. Indeed, 
they argued that completion of these huge projects needed such aggressive 
management, it could not have been reached without such a high level of focus. 
Some felt that the NHS needed to put in a specialist team, familiar with the processes 
involved in making the necessary changes when hospitals were undergoing closure, 
because handling a merger and also running the hospitals on a day-to-day basis may 
provide a level of stress in the organisation sufficient to cause it to fail. 
iii) External relationships 
Many interviewees at senior management level (both internal and external), viewed 
the relationship between the Trust and other external stakeholders in the local health 
economy as poor. The Trust was seen as inward looking and insular. Some 
interviewees associated this behaviour with the presence of the old hierarchy in the 
organisation, saide to be obstructive and difficult to deal with, an issue they felt 
contributed to the failure of the Trust. As outlined above, the Trust was undergoing a 
huge process of change and, in such circumstances, might benefit from the 
establishing constructive relationships with organisations such as the SHA and the 
PCT. However, the interviewees highlighted that, in general, the Trust kept some 
organisations (particularly the SHA) at arm's length, thus depriving itself of external 
sources of help. 
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"I think they were very insular and I think they literally did not care 
what was happening outside of [name of Trust]. " (8: 17) 
"Our previous chief exec was very clear that kept Strategic Health 
Authority at arm's length. You can keep somebody at arms length but if 
you've got a problem I'd like to know who's going to help you sort it 
out. " (1: 43) 
Working relationship with the local PCT: 
It was reported by saff that there was not a close working relationship with the PCT at 
that time, but changes have since occurred and much better relationships exist now. 
For example, there were no regular meetings between the Trust and the PCT, the main 
commissioner. In mitigation, some staff maintained that the PCT was then a very 
young organisation, also struggling to develop and establish its own organisational 
structure and culture. Both organisations had learned about the commissioning 
relationship which was being developed and was evolving, so the PCT might not have 
been very helpful to the Trust during that process. 
Working relationship with the local SHA: 
The working relationship between the Trust and the SHA was not a close one, 
according to staff. Some interviewees had noted tensions between the SHA and the 
Trust during that time and that it was a `distant' relationship. Although the 
performance management system was becoming more important and the role of the 
Health Authority, and thereafter the SHA as a performance management agent, 
became prominent, the relationship was not constructive. One interviewee external to 
the Trust put forward the idea that an organisation should be under suspicion if its 
managers wanted to keep themselves at a distance from other organisations, and that 
such organisations should be closely monitored. 
"The Strategic Health Authority [... ] was never given the opportunity or 
allowed near the Trust and about that there was a barrier around this 
Trust. " (16: 19) 
"Before there was always a distant relationship [between the Trust and 
the SHA], they were not particularly close and afterwards because of 
the incident [waiting list irregularities] they had to become closer but 
that was because we had to sort out the problem. So it was distant, they 
never saw themselves as corporate players in the area [local health 
economy].... " (21: 37) 
Some saw this type of relationship, especially between the CEOs, as a factor that had 
an impact on how the Trust was assessed and supported by the CEOs of external 
organisations. One interviewee cited the following example of the relationship 
between the Trust and the SHA: 
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"I don't know but my take was well how was this Strategic Health 
Authority supporting the work that the team here were doing at the 
Trust so for example the Board, this Board got to know about the 
transfer of [name of the hospital] to the PCT, through a document that 
went on a website. We did not even know about that and given that they 
were and still are the staff of the acute Trust I just thought that was 
extremely unhelpful really quite shoddy and so it made me think well 
what sort of support are the exec team having higher up the chain when 
they're clearly dealing with some ground breaking work and some 
difficult issues. " (12: 29) 
iv) Lack of performance management system 
Most interviewees on the managerial side, insisted that there was no clear and 
effective performance management system within the Trust, and no appropriate, 
accurate and timely reporting of both financial and clinical matters. The appropriate 
attention to detail needed to diagnose and predict performance problems was not 
available. There was no performance management culture in the Trust and no serious 
attempt was made to rectify this. Lack of an effective internal performance 
management system was seen as contributing to the performance problems, as the 
Trust was not able to track fluctuations in the performance of individual units such as 
A&E, which allowed performance targets to drift. One interviewee also said that staff 
did not get any feedback on how they were doing- that "they were going in blind". It 
was felt that the previous management team did not quite understand how to develop 
a performance framework that changed clinical behaviour in a way that would support 
performance improvement and the attainment of key performance targets. 
"It was really around performance management I guess that had let us 
down. " (14: 66) 
`A huge amount of time wastage but there was no performance monitoring 
in 2002 that we were aware of, so there was nothing for us to actually and 
say this was really, really bad, we've got to improve it and we've got to 
stop wasting time. " (25: 156) 
"Well, the waiting list irregularities in my view would have been a 
reflection of the management culture of the Trust and the poor internal 
performance management controls. " 
V) Strategic issues 
According to external reports, in particular the CHI report, and the view of some 
interviewees, the Trust lacked strategies for clinical governance, performance 
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management, external relationships, human resources, nursing, and corporate 
strategies. Indeed it was described as a "strategy free zone organisation" by an 
interviewee. Indeed, there were no clear plans on how to respond in an appropriate 
and timely manner to changes in the health economy. This lack would seem to be a 
result ofpoor leadership, as one of the major tasks of effective leadership is the 
development of organisational strategies, as affirmed by the CEO of an external 
organisation. He added that strategy development was omitted by the previous 
management regime. A further participant argued that some of the policies and 
strategies that the Trust had formulated on paper, were not being implemented in 
practice. 
"It's one of the criticisms from all the external agencies and from our 
report that we [the Trust] had no organisational strategy. We were 
really criticized for being in the organisation with no strategy of any 
sort. " (1: 27) 
"We were missing a whole bunch of strategies. I mean, I suppose we 
were missing a whole organisation of strategies. At the time CHI came 
[.. ] we had no strategy. " [11: 83] 
One interviewee reported that in some areas, poor performance, was related to the 
lack of a clear strategy. For example, the lack of a plan for emergency care resulted in 
poor performance in A&E. He also thought that the relationship between managers 
and clinicians was reasonably good, but was rather `cosy' rather than challenging. 
Management had no clear policy as to what they wanted clinicians to achieve, or 
specific behaviour they wanted to see changed. 
5.3.3.2 Financial factors 
Poor financial control and management and the presence of a high cost structure were 
financial factors (as secondary causes of failure) interviewees saw as contributing to 
the Trust's decline in performance. 
Poor financial control and management: 
Lack of effective financial control was highlighted by the respondents, especially those 
at senior management level. The planned reduction of 20% in workload of the merged 
hospitals did not occur, nor was the Trust able to balance its annual financial budget 
in 2002. Complete funding was not provided to cover the merger of the two hospitals, 
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new development and early PFI bills. This weakness caused an approximate £7 
million deficit during the amalgamation of services and along with historical financial 
deficits caused serious difficulties for the Trust and resulted in CHI removing one star 
from their rating. One respondent indicated that there had been a lack of good 
financial discipline over the whole of a financial year. Poor communication between 
the finance department and operational general managers reportedly resulted in the 
finance department's inability obtain the financial balance required. One interviewee 
maintained that, from a financial perspective, the organisation had placed too much 
emphasis on the correctness of financial details, rather than the overall picture. 
Although people in the organisation might have knowledge of their allocated budgets, 
it was argued that there were no reliable control mechanisms for ensuring these were 
adhered to. There was also a tendency to commit to expenditure with no 
consideration for recovering costs. Indeed, it was thought that the whole organisation 
was unaware of the extent of the problem and might not be able to control its finances 
during a period of extensive change. There was an attitude across the organisation 
that overspend was allowed and staff need not own the Trust's financial problems. 
One of the interviewees said: 
"There was an acceptance that it was alright to be overspent here, we'll 
be okay because well be overspent, not to worry about it and also there 
was no real measure until we got our new finance director, of how big 
the problem was. " (16: 31) 
There were also problems concerning contracts with the PCTs where the Trust's level 
of delivery to the PCT was far in excess of what it had been contracted to undertake. 
Also, the Trust lacked rigour in following up and negotiating with PCTs when it could 
not continue to deliver this level of activity within funding provided. 
High cost structure: 
Three directors considered the high cost structure as an important factor in the 
Trust's financial problems. One interviewee gave excessive hours of work for junior 
doctors as an example: 
"Junior doctors' hours were totally out of control and we just looked at the 
money side of it, [... ] so basically every junior doctor was earning double 
what they should have been earning and there was no plan really in place 
to do anything about it. " (4: 81) 
Another example of the high cost structure and lack of financial control reported by 
two senior managers, was overspending on staffing costs, such as the high fees 
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charged by the bank agency for nursing, administrative and clerical staff. They felt 
there was no attempt to reduce the staffing costs through a revision in the skill mix in 
the organisation, particularly on the wards. 
As outlined earlier, the lack of experience in drafting the PFI contract with the private 
sector also created increased financial pressures and it was difficult for the Trust to 
constrain the costs of the PFI project, with several interviewees indicating that the PFI 
created a higher cost structure for the Trust. One of the managers reported that, if 
they were going to do it again, they would probably do it differently. Interviewees felt 
that there was no tight control on the internal process, and neither was there any 
proper internal control on the performance of the PFI partner. 
"Nobody quite understood what PFI meant, how the partnership was 
worked because they'd got rid of everything that we knew, like our 
portering system, our own domestic system, catering went out, everything 
went out of house and it had a huge impact really. " (25: 31) 
5.3.3.3 Cultural, factors 
A general idea was prevalent among the respondents that cultural issues contributed 
to the failure of the organisation. Most of the participants believed that the 
organisation had a very different organisational culture at the time they were 
performing poorly. 
A Culture of fear and blaming: 
As stated in relation to the leaders' behaviour, a culture of fear was prominent in the 
organisation and the divisional managers were under pressure to deliver the services 
by transferring stress down to their teams in order to `get the job done'. Inter- 
departmental teamwork was not seen to be working effectively, and in such a climate 
of fear, if staff found a problem they did not necessarily alert senior management 
because they were frightened of the consequences. It was reported that managers felt 
stressed and uncomfortable in meetings with the CEO. Most respondents, both on the 
clinical and managerial staff, felt that there was not an open culture in the Trust. It 
was stated that previous executives were trying to lay the blame for the problem on 
others, with the most prominent example being concealment of waiting list data. A 
senior manager accused a member of middle management of misrepresenting the 
data. Indeed, the previous managers consistently blamed other people for their 
mistakes and did not accept any responsibility for failing to complete the task 
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properly. 
"I think it was a culture of fear really and being scared to admit there was a 
problem. " (16: 43) 
`And [now] it is more of a working together kind of thing rather than in 
order to go and do something panic setting in and people not being able to 
deliver. Go back and there's further pressure and shouting and knowing 
that somebody has not delivered as opposed to having done so. " (5: 224) 
"There was quite a climate of fear really that if you found something that 
you did not necessarily alert senior management because you were scared 
and that's still quite a big factor really. There was lack of assurance within 
the Trust" (23: 23) 
"[Now it is] solution focused rather that blaming and the shaming which I 
think was how, maybe, you could have characterised the culture in the 
past. " (12: 45) 
A Culture of denial and hiding the problems: 
Denial of the problems rather than effecting remedial action on the part of senior 
management was reported by several interviewees. There was a culture stemming 
from the top of the hierarchy to conceal mistakes and damaging information, 
particularly waiting list data. As a result, people tried to misrepresent data to make it 
appear that targets were being met, when in fact the Trust could not deliver these 
targets. Staff, especially on the managerial side, were not comfortable when reporting 
something that did not go according to plan. 
"One lie leads to another lie I think [... ] someone thought it could be moved 
on and never be found out but in fact the problem just got bigger and 
bigger. " (16: 43) 
However, two of the interviewees did not agree that information was being hidden 
and the data falsified and they even believed that there were no serious complaints 
from the patients about the consequences of misrepresentation of the data. 
A no learning culture: 
The CHI report indicated a lack of effort in creating an active learning environment in 
which staff could speak openly about mistakes without fear of reprisal. The CHI 
report referred to creating a `just culture'. No clear system of individual accountability 
was in place when the problems occurred, and in general, within the organisational 
culture, there was no systematic attempt to encourage staff to learn from their 
mistakes. Although the CHI report emphasized that there was a good reporting 
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system in the Trust, some interviewees pointed out the inadequacy of the learning 
environment, saying many staff were not keen to report mistakes owing to the 
aforementioned climate of fear. 
"I think there was a bit of a blame culture, therefore people were not part 
of a learning organisation to make the change or did not feel the power to 
make the change. " (22: 89) 
Disconnection between the senior management team and staff: 
Some interviewees expressed the feeling that there was an evident `detachment' 
between the senior management team and the rest of the organisation. Two 
interviewees referred to an `us and them' culture that had caused a lack of trust, and 
expressed the view that the executive members of the Board, and particularly the 
CEO, were not visible. 
"If I was to be honest, I think it was very much `us and them'. You know 
you did not see the Board out on the wards. " (15: 19) 
`At that time it did seem to be I suppose the directors and to say, in the 
particular CEO there was a definite gap between them and the rest of the 
staff. " (5: 56) 
Conflict between staff following the merger of two hospitals: 
A mixture of two different organisational cultures, after merging the two hospitals was 
another issue that had a negative impact on the Trust. It was stated that there was in- 
house fighting because one hospital's staff thought they were better than the other (as 
detailed above), and such cultural issues created a lot of anxiety, which impacted 
negatively on the performance of the organisation as a whole. One interviewee likened 
the situation to the Berlin wall. 
"The ferst year was absolutely awful. The geography of the hospital 
such as where we are now is the old site of the hospital and in half a 
mile there is the new site and you might as well have put up the Berlin 
Wall across the corridor because the twain shall never meet. It took a 
lot of work to break down the barriers. " (25: 51) 
Interviewees maintained that two different kinds of service were provided in the Trust 
(tertiary care and the general services provided by all district hospitals), which one 
respondent said was like having two hospitals under one roof with different cultures. 
With respect to the provision of tertiary care, the Trust had a good national and 
international reputation and its consultants felt that they were separated from the rest 
of the hospital and clinically dominant over the general services. 
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"There was also quite an interesting kind of culture, it was almost like two 
hospitals under one roof here. There were the tertiary aspects of their 
business with the [name of centre] and [name of centre] and then there 
were the core services of their DGH function. " (26: 13) 
5.3.3.4 Organisational factors 
Lack of a robust information systems: 
The lack of a robust information system to enable staff to monitor performance was 
highlighted by the middle and new senior managers. The Trust had implemented a 
new information system that was not viewed as effective. In addition, the project 
manager, who had led discussions on the contracts with the suppliers for the new 
Information Technology system (IT system), and the director of IT, left the Trust. This 
left the Trust facing a serious lack of IT expertise. The previous management team did 
not consider it important to have an IT director to coordinate the IT system, so the 
Trust was not able to give a proper report of information for three to six months. One 
interviewee said: 
"Basically, at that time we'd have thought that it was an achievement if 
we could have reported what we had previously reported up until 
March 2002 but because of the new system. I suppose the reports and 
the way the system was used, etc, it meant that we had actually gone a 
step backwards by getting this new IT system, not only reporting wise 
but also operationally. I guess for example people in outpatients and 
people like that. It was taking them half an hour to do something that 
would have taken 5 minutes. " (5: 82) 
There was inadequate consultation or understanding of the IT contract implications 
and this caused several operational problems, such as difficulties in providing 
comprehensive patient information. Staff were exhausted and some of them left the 
organisation as it was so ineffective. Lack of adequate resources also resulted in 
insufficient investment in the IT system, which resulted in a poor performance 
measurement system. 
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Lack of a communication systems: 
Formal channels of communication were lacking. According to the CHI review, the 
lines of communication both upward and downward in the Trust were not working 
well. No formal information system on performance was in place. 
"From the doctor clinician standpoint we did not have enough 
communication opportunity for people. " (11: 135) 
One interviewee highlighted the fact that the flow of information throughout the 
organisation and the way it was represented internally and to external partners been 
both inadequate and inappropriate. 
"I think no wonder they've got problems because on the information 
that they have or the way that they use it or represent it it's not telling 
you anything and there's not enough detail going to the Board etc it's 
sort of filtered. " (37: 156) 
Lack of a corporate accountability systems: 
The issue accountability was problematic. Several interviewees explained that the 
organisation was run without clear lines of accountability and the CHAI report 
highlighted lack of clear processes for key risk issues such as clinical governance. One 
interviewee raised the fact that clinicians did not have a strong input into the 
corporate agenda. Although there was a relatively good relationship between 
managers and clinicians in some areas and they were seen as having a high level of 
commitment, they did not appear to be very committed to the performance 
improvement agenda. 
Methods of working: 
Some interviewees had a negative view of the method of working in the Trust, 
especially on the managerial side under the previous management team. Not enough 
people could make routine decisions because of the number of changes. This occupied 
much of the managers' time, leaving too few people to carry out all the operational 
work in the divisions. Confrontation between various departments was pointed out by 
some interviewees. 
External secondary causes of failure: 
Two interviewees, one a middle manager and as the other a matron, did not see the 
zero star situation solely as the fault of senior management. They perceived that the 
previous management regime did not focus on targets because there were not so many 
at that time and that the `target culture' was not as important as it later became. If 
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they were operating in the existing environment, they thought that the previous team 
might have behaved in much the same way as the current team. 
"I think the current exec team are more focused on the target and the 
achievement of the targets where some of the last exec team perhaps were 
not as focused on that. But I'm just trying to think whether there was a real 
difference or whether just the environment in which they all worked is 
different. Just, I don't know if the previous exec had been here now with the 
importance of focus on targets as there is externally would the culture have 
been the same? I suspect it probably would actually. " (9: 17) 
Primary causes of failure: 
Organisational introspection and organisational arrogance were perceived as two 
important factors having a negative impacton the organisational learning process, as a 
primary cause of failure. 
Organisational arrogance: 
A degree of arrogance within the hierarchy in the old, poorly performing Trust was 
reported, with interviewees feeling that senior management could not be challenged. 
They were perceived as believing they could ignore nationally set targets and had no 
need to change. They saw themselves as a teaching hospital with nationally and 
internationally renowned departments whose decisions would not be contested. This 
arrogant stance led to them failing to respond appropriately to the changes in the 
external environment, or doing what was expected of them. For example, it was 
widely accepted the Trust could overspend with impunity. Indeed, some respondents 
saw the lack of a culture of change to be a result of this attitude. According to the 
McKiernan model (2002), this kind of behaviour is classified as a primary cause of 
failure, putting the organisation in a situation that blocks the learning process. 
A respondent stated: 
"There was an arrogance here that we're a University Trust that we're 
very good about quality of care. It doesn't really matter what we do on 
target. " (16: 15) 
According to the McKiernan model (2002), this kind of behaviour is classified as a 




Organisational introspection (explained in section 3.8) occurred when the managers 
of the Trust, distracted by the reconfiguration of the hospital site, were unable to deal 
with external challenges. (The distraction issue was explained in previous section. ) 
5.3.4 Response of the staff to the results of star rating 
Most of the interviewees felt that the star rating was an unfair assessment of their 
performance, which did not represent a `rounded' or `balanced scorecard' for their 
organisation. They saw themselves as hard working, and mistakes on the managerial 
side caused the hospital to lose one its stars. 
"I think to be fair, the standards that we were measured against, as far 
as I'm concerned are not quite the standards you should be measured 
by. "(40: 91) 
The receipt of a zero-star rating was, in the staffs judgment, a very bad experience. 
They had not expected such a rating, because Dr Foster's data had shown quite good 
results. The staff believed the patients were happy being treated by the Trust. 
"I think that people although particularly the second time we'd got zero 
stars that the staff actually found it quite frustrating because at the 
same time there were other reports coming out, like the Dr Foster and I 
think there was another report that came out that actually rated the 
Trust quite highly. "(34: 15) 
"I think there was a degree of a sense of hopelessness amongst some of the 
junior members that were, you know, [saying] we're working as hard as 
we can and nothing can change and we can't make this better and that's a 
familiar scenario as you probably know in any acute trust that feels as 
though it's under pressure and not delivering on its performance 
framework. " (26: 19) 
Several staff reported that it was difficult to work for a zero-star organisation. They 
felt that the zero-star rating was inappropriate for the Trust and certainly did not 
reflect what they did on a day-to-day basis. 
"I think you feel quite disappointed really because it doesn't really reflect 
what you might be doing as a department and the fact that the Trust is 
judged on that as a level of performance. "(33: 19) 
`I think a lot of people did say I don't want to work in a no stars Trust. We 
are better than that. We deserve better than that. So I think there was a 
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sort of feeling of we are better than that. No way is the hospital down the 
road a3 stars rust and we are not. " (9: 108)) 
"The people in the frý ont line believed that they delivered good quality of 
care to patients and they were very demoralised and very upset about the 
fact that we were a zero star but it certainly did not feel like a zero star 
Trust. " (18: 6o) 
Several interviewees compared their performance with another Trust in a 
neighbouring area, which was given three stars, and did not feel its performance was 
better than their own. Several interviewees said they were shocked, particularly when 
the hospital was rated as poor performer for a second year. One of the interviewees 
argued that the previous management team were telling them that every thing was 
fine, and the receipt of a zero-star rating came as a bit of shock. 
"I think it probably impinged a little bit on us and thinking because one of 
the hospitals down the road got a three star rating and, you know, I think 
a lot of people said, 'well if we do a much better job than them why have 
they got three and we've got one? So, I suppose it had a negative impact on 
people how they felt a little bit in the morale sense. "(32: 23) 
"I think it was for individuals quite personally it was devastating. I think 
people felt quite let down, you know, [.. ], there'll always be excellence for 
which the star ratings aren't an appropriate measure. " (22: 85) 
The new senior management team were expecting a zero star rating in the second year 
because it was already too late to do anything, since the hospital had lost its stars in 
the first quarter of the year. One of the interviewees from outside the Trust, 
pinpointed that senior management accepted the reasons for as the zero starrating 
and did not think it unfair. Some of the senior managers expressed great 
disappointment and they were sad to have to tell the staff that, although they had 
worked very hard and clinical outcomes were good, the Trust was still rated as a poor 
performer. 
However, one of the new members of the Board did not see it as a totally bad 
outcome, explaining that the situation gave the executive team some real `fighting 
spirit' with which to face the problems and advise the staff of their predictions for the 
coming year. It was felt that the organisation was not going backwards and that it 
would be unacceptable to be a poor performer in the following year, so the Trust 
focused on changing in order to gain stars. 
"So I think we all had a bit of steely determination and I think we all felt, 
[... ] really felt that we were going to push for this organisation to make 
sure that we improved in the public perception. " (4: 71) 
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On the other hand, some staff, especially among clinicians and at the junior nursing 
level, were not concerned by the results of the rating, believing that they provided as 
high a quality of service as possible. They believed that the senior managers were very 
interested to the results of the star rating. A. few interviewees, particularly nurses, 
maintained that the star rating had not affected them. 
"I think a lot of our doctors were very disappointed, they probably felt very 
disillusioned with the management at the time, you know, about what was 
going on, why were we zero star because they felt that they were delivering 
good care and patients liked this Trust as well. " (14: 62) 
"I don't think that the people at clinical level really relate to stars from the 
sense of stars. It doesn't really matter to those of us who are giving the 
bedside patient care, it doesn't matter to the patient really who's receiving 
the care how many stars we've got, what they care about is that their needs 
are being met at that level and that's what most nurses care about as well. " 
(17: 33) 
Star rating system and performance targets 
Various issues were raised regarding the use of the star rating system to measure 
performance. An important issue pointed out by the respondents, was that clinical 
priorities differed from those considered in the star rating system. They maintained 
that the criteria selected for the star rating system would not necessarily those 
involved in the effective running of a hospital. More than half of the respondents 
perceived a conflict between the quality of service and attainment of national targets. 
They held that targets excused people from paying attention to things that were 
measured by the star rating, which encompassed only part of the whole picture of 
performance related issues. It was argued that this system was a poor, crude 
measurement of performance which did not cover clinical issues and some 
interviewees stated that the effort and money put into measuring performance did not 
represent value for money in terms of the improvements received by the patients. 
Some clinicians did not have a good perception of the targets and claimed that they 
were not motivated by them. Most of the nurses did not hold a positive view of the 
national targets. It was perceived that the targets, in particular A&E targets, put a 
high level of pressure on the system. As there was inadequate capacity owing to the 
high bed occupancy rate, hitting the A&E targets was one of the most important 
concerns for the Trust, and a conflict between the quality of the care and hitting the 4 
hours A&E target was mentioned by most of the interviewees. 
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"It's difficult to have any real belief in an assessment process that is 
really just looking at target achievement and of course as targets 
become more focused and more specific, coming frý om our current 
Government, then the target achievement by the Trust has become all 
encompassing and all powerful. Indeed, there seems to be little regard 
to other services or other issues where targets don't apply. " (42: 18) 
"I have a worry about the star ratings it is an attempt to assess an 
organisational activity and I think is politically driven rather than 
clinically driven. " (38: 31) 
"That was always a criticism from the clinicians to say that, you know, 
we've never seen these targets before. They're just given to us and we are 
meant to achieve them. " (5: 178) 
The clinical staff denied having been doing anything particularly different, although 
the external perception of the Trust had changed radically once the Trust received 
three stars. One interviewee noted that perception on the part of clinicians made the 
situation more difficult for managers when they needed to exert their influence in 
order to achieve targets. However, certain interviewees did not support this view, 
stating that the clinicians in the Trust were already engaged in the process of 
achieving targets. 
Two interviewees criticised the star rating system, because it compared all acute 
Trusts, irrespective of the different factors such as size, teaching status, socio- 
economic status of the population served by the Trust and that can potentially affect 
its performance. All Trusts were measured by the same scale, without considering 
variations in terms of local factors and contingencies. 
An important issue raised by some respondents, was that during the previous 
management period the extent of emphasis on performance targets was less than 
when the new management team arrived, because the star rating system was evolving. 
In addition, the performance management system at that time was not dealt with as 
systematically as it has been since. 
"There was money that was provided by the government and if you get 
money from the government to achieve targets then you go out and spend it 
as a manager because you need to achieve your targets because that's what 
you're told to do. It doesn't quite seem right as far as consultants are 
concerned. " (47: 15) 
It was reported by some interviewees that the population of the area did not pay 
serious attention to the results of the star rating and saw the hospital as a good place 
for treatment. 
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"I think the reality was that the general public who actually come here and 
use the services, I don't think a zero star rating would have meant 
anything to them greatly. It was the wider perception because I think as 
the general public come through the door, they were still getting good 
treatment. " (4: 73) 
Some interviewees referred to the level of pressure staff were undergoing owing to the 
national performance targets. One interviewee even maintained that some targets, 
such as the 4 hours A&E target, acted as a hindrance. 
"It's obviously worked and it's successful because we have gone frý om 0 to 3 
stars in a year but, you know, that's happened. What I'm saying though for 
somebody on the shop floor for those of us in clinical practice, I'm not sure 
how relevant that is to us and what difference it's made to us, apart from 
this constant pressure to achieve to meet targets or be on budget or 
whatever. I don't think it's been an enjoyable process the shall we say for 
the staff that are working at the coalface to achieve those targets. " (17: 174) 
An interesting point raised by an interviewee, was that staff at the lower levels did not 
feel a sense of ownership of the targets. Even, some staff reported that they did not 
know much about the performance targets and the only way that they perceived that 
the targets existed was the time when a target was breached and a directorate 
manager came to the ward to sort it out. Although, they emphasised that since last 
couple of years they know more about the targets. 
On the other hand, although respondents criticised the targets, they also supported 
some of their positive effects, with one interviewee believing that the incentives 
introduced by the star rating did benefit organisations but that the process was very 
costly. The system was referred to as a `new model' approach, for those who had been 
working in the NHS, which pushed the organisations to conform and raise their 
performance. The star rating was seen to be a strong trigger that caused a high level of 
focus on the development of a performance management regime and alignment of 
reporting systems. Indeed, the star rating programme made central government 
targets the highest priority for management and for manipulating resources to reach 
these targets and improve performance. Certain managers argued for the need for 
targets in order to facilitate changes and take the organisation forward. 
"But it's (targets) also pushed through improvement. I can see why they're 
also designed that way. " (12: 136) 
"So, I think targets are a complete nonsense, however you have to 
acknowledge they have improved efficiency, that people don't wait in 
casualty as long as they used to. So they've had a good effect but I think 
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that the quality of care is not as good as it used to be because of the 
targets. " (32: 1o7) 
5.4 Summary 
A range of symptoms of organisational decline was identified in the study including 
financial, behavioural, organisational and managerial. Both internal and external 
factors that had contributed to performance decline and failure were also reported. 
Internal factors were classified in four categories: i) manageria;, ii) financia; , iii) 
cultural; and iv) organisational. Change in the external environment (e. g. new 
policies) was also perceived as an external secondary cause of failure. A contextual 
factor (poor socioeconomic situation of the population served by the Trust) was also 
perceived as a factor that had contributed to performance decline. Two factors 
perceived as the primary cause of failure were organisational arrogance and 
organisational introspection. Clinical staff could not accept two successive zero star 
ratings, because they believed that it did not reflect the high level of quality of care 
that the Trust provided for its patients. 
In the next chapter the findings of the empirical study regarding the factors (both 
internal and external) that had initiated the processes of change within the 
organisations (triggers) are discussed. 
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Chapter 6: Empirical evidence on the triggers for 
change 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explored a rich source of qualitative evidence on the 
symptoms and causes of organisational failure in the Trust. The aim of this 
chapter is to present empirical evidence regarding the recognition of failure and 
triggers for change (both external and internal drivers) within the organisation. 
The stage theory, set out in section 2.9, is used as a conceptual framework within 
which the case study evidence is organised, reported and interpreted. 
6.2 Acceptance of failure 
The literature on turnaround processes in the private sector demonstrates that 
diagnoses and triggers for change (as outlined in part 2.8), can be attenuated or 
impeded by various stakeholders. Both internal and external stakeholders can 
fail to recognise that a problem exists, or may even conceal it in order to make 
the situation appear in a better light. Stakeholders also face different incentives 
and constraints in relation to their ability and willingness to accept and report 
failure. One of the key themes emerging from this study, was the positive effect 
of the new management team in rescuing the Trust and their ready acceptance 
that changes were required to remedy and turnaround the situation. 
In the case study, several problems (e. g. waiting list irregularities) had been 
concealed by previous management. The new team did not attempted to hide the 
existence of failure, but apologised publicly for the Trust's poor performance. 
One member of the board argued that it was not possible to choose to deny the 
problem, as there was clear evidence that there were serious failings within the 
organisation. 
"I think some of issues were inexcusable, really, in the public interest 
and also from the point of view of staff. Their organisation that they 
care a lot about was dragged through the press in a not very nice 
and pleasant way. " (4: 21) 
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Staff explained that, when the Trust recognised and accepted failure, all external 
stakeholders assessing the organisation were viewed in a more positive manner 
by the senior management team and there had been no confrontation between 
them. One interviewee from the Performance Development Team (PDT) noted 
that the response of the senior management team was to affirm that receiving a 
zero star was fair, as they knew why they were performing poorly as an 
organisation, and were focusing on strategies for improvement rather than 
looking for excuses. Indeed, there was a general consensus amongst interviewees 
that the new management team wanted to learn from past failure and focus 
attention on improving internal management processes and performance 
reporting arrangements. 
"So we set up a process about doing that both internally and 
externally which was about, yes the organisation has some failures, 
yes the organisation have learnt from what those failures are, this is 
what we have got to do to improve. " (4: 23) 
"Yeah, they recognised and they acknowledged, there was no denial 
so they did stand up and say, `we've got a problem here, we need to 
address it'. " (45: 49) 
The new management team had obviously identified the existence of problems 
and accepted responsibility more readily than the team previously in place. The 
new managers had been brought in from outside the organisation, so owed no 
allegiance to the previous management regime. Most had arrived at the 
organisation armed with some information about the performance problems of 
the Trust, although they had been unaware that waiting list data had been 
misrepresented. 
6.3 Triggers for change 
In section 2.8, it was noted that, in situations where performance levels are far 
below those considered acceptable, a triggering process is required to initiate 
change and recovery. This stage has been highlighted in the literature as a key 
phase in the turnaround process (Balgobin and Pandit, 2001), and both internal 
and/or external factors can trigger positive change (McKiernana, 2002; Grinyer 
et al., 1990). In stage theory, the decline phase is followed by triggers for change 
(Balgobin and Pandit, 2001; Mckiernan, 2002). In Chowdhury's stage model 
(2002), this phase is referred to as `response initiation'. The following section 
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presents evidence from the study concerning the initial diagnosis of failure 
within the Trust and internal organisational responses to the situation. 
6.3.1 Diagnosis process 
As outlined in previous sections, the Trust was awarded a lower star rating 
because it failed to meet central key performance targets: financial targets; 4 
hour A&E targets; and the misrepresentation of waiting list data. When the new 
CEO was appointed, the Trust had been awarded one star and problems relating 
to finance and the A&E waiting list were evident to the new CEO. However, the 
waiting list misrepresentation had not been made public at the time and, when it 
was revealed, the result was the Commission for Health Improvement removed 
yet another star. 
Identification of the misrepresentation of data occurred through the confluence 
of both internal and external factors. The 'Trust had been randomly selected for a 
`spot check' by the National Audit Office to determine the accuracy of its waiting 
list data. In the previous year, the `light touch' inspection by the Audit 
Commission Office had found no irregularities in this area. Although it was 
publicized that the Audit Commission had discovered the Trust's 
misrepresentation, the internal staff, who were aware of the existence of 
irregularities, played a key role in the speedy diagnosis of the problem and 
reported the irregularities to the new CEO two days before the Audit 
Commission commenced its investigative work. It was reported that they wanted 
to be open about the misrepresentation, as they had also informed the previous 
senior management team about the irregularities, but had been instructed by the 
senior management team not to make changes until the end of that financial 
year. The new CEO and his Deputy notified the Audit Commission of the 
likelihood that there was a problem, causing the Audit Commission to 
investigate the waiting list data in more depth. The staff in charge of collecting, 
processing and reporting the waiting list data presumed that the irregularities 
would be discovered by the Audit Commission group, although one of the 
interviewees reported that a senior auditor had said that they would not have 
been able to find the problem without inside information volunteered by the 
Trust. In addition, one of the new managers reported that she had become 
suspicious when she had found discrepancies in the waiting lists. A middle 
manager maintained that during the CHAI inspection, the Trust expressed 
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concerns about the identification of waiting list irregularities in 2002, although 
the CHAI investigation did not concentrate on waiting list information, and the 
quality of audit data was outside its remit. 
"The staff didn't know the detail of how the audit process had 
happened because basically how it was said at the time was that 
the auditors had found this. And they didn't find it. From day one 
that's how it was put in the newspapers etc. And the auditors, one 
senior auditor actually said to me that they wouldn't have been 
able to find it, which kind of surprised me. " (5: 114) 
The outcome of the Audit Commission enquiry was the publication of a 
comprehensive report, including 95 recommendations for the Trust's 
performance improvement. The new CEO identified the problem to the SHA, 
after the Audit Commission revealed the existence of misrepresentation, and 
requested further investigation. The SHA sent an expert team who provided a 
detailed account of waiting list irregularities within the Trust. In the staff s 
perception, both internal and external factors had contributed towards 
diagnosing the existence of the problem. 
6.3.2 Role of external factors in triggering change 
6.3.2.1 Investigation by external organisations 
There was a general view among those interviewed that several external factors 
had played an important role in stimulating remedial action within the Trust. 
Indeed, it was reported that the external report simplified the job of the new 
management team by identifying the key problems to address. Both internal and 
external interviewees saw the external inspection process as one of the most 
crucial factors in triggering changes, even though the investigative process was 
highly stressful for the staff, especially those who were directly involved. One 
interviewee likened the situation to a "review city". A number of investigation 
teams, each with a different focus across the organisation, reported that three 
external reports (the Audit Commission report, the SHA report, and CHAI 
report), had significantly influenced the response of the Trust. Some 
interviewees reported that the external investigation helped the Trust to look at 
things differently and fixed the attention of the new management team on the 
key performance issues which needed to be addressed. 
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"It was very much external people had come and had looked at the 
organisation. The original action plans were very much top down. 
This is what we've got to do, and I think it was born frý om the fact that 
we'd had external reviews. " (9: 92) 
"The external review had shown weaknesses in our system therefore 
there wasn't a choice about it, we had to improve it. So I think that 
was as much as was needed at the time. " (9: 68) 
It was noted that the CHAI report presented several recommendations for 
improving performance, although it conceded that the Trust had made positive 
attempts in some areas. The Trust, and in particular its governance Committee, 
dealt with each issue seriously, which resulted in the development of a plan with 
emphasis on meeting the desired outcomes. Most of the interviewees confirmed 
the positive effect of the CHAT report as guidance on performance improvement, 
though one did not view the CHAT report as a major driver of change in the 
organisation. 
"I think it [CHAI report] was a wake up call for the organisation and 
then there were rapid strives made around clinical governance 
around the CHAT action plan. " (12: 77) 
"The help to the Trust, I think certainly since the last CHAT report, a 
lot better guidance has come out of the centre in terms of supporting 
the executive team. " (6: 93) 
"People were glad when CHAT came in, although there was quite a lot 
of hard work, but I think the people were glad. It gave people an 
opportunity to say, `look we are more than just a hospital which has 
got a problem with a waiting list'. " (9: 80) 
The Strategic Health Authority (SHA) report focused on the quality of waiting 
list data and was perceived by the majority of the interviewees as a major driver 
for change. Some interviewees felt that the strong influence of the SHA exerted 
pressure on the Trust to quickly turnaround its poor performance and meet the 
Department of Health targets. In accordance with the role of the SHA as a 
performance management agent, the poorly performing Trusts in the area and 
especially the Trust under study, were asked to develop an action plan for 
improving their performance. This control strategy is discussed below. 
"We always felt that the Strategic Health Authority very much 
wanted to see [name of the Trust] its performance. " (4: 99) 
"There was quite a lot of close scrutiny from the Chief Executive and 
the Performance Director at the SHA. " (16: 46) 
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The role of the Audit Commission in triggering change and facilitating the 
development of the action plan, was highlighted by several interviewees. The 
Audit Commission's plan contained 95 points. The Trust management team 
focused their attention on these recommendations and it was stated that this 
plan played a key role in developing factors such as data quality arrangements. 
"I think really in terms of organisation, we didn't have policies and 
procedures in place, so they [The Audit Commission] came up with a 
number of recommendations around getting a policy together, 
making sure that responsibilities are highlighted. " (lo: 61) 
Although the Trust had to accept a review of its performance undertaken by 
several external organisations, a senior manager maintained that most of the 
executives were very willing to `open the doors' and let the external agencies 
scrutinise their working practices as they wanted prevent the situation recurring. 
On the other hand, certain interviewees believed that each external organisation 
investigating the Trust had provided its own action plan and that managers had 
been swamped by their number and scope. Although the Trust's managers 
agreed that these investigations had a positive influence in triggering change, 
they felt that providing documentation and attending numerous meetings, had 
been very time consuming. Some were of the opinion that more time could have 
been spent addressing performance problems rather than dealing with 
information requests from external organisations. 
"So, the Audit Commission came and did some work for us and they 
established that there were about 30 odd committees meeting on a 
very regular basis and when we looked at the number of man hours 
that that involved, there was quite a lot of time that was being 
involved and we didn't say it wasn't of value but we felt it could be put 
too much better use. " (27: 32) 
Although the Performance Development Team (PDT) of the Modernisation 
Agency had been involved in the performance improvement process, 
respondents did not consider them a trigger for change. This might have been 
the result of the sequence of investigations undertaken by different 
organisations, as the PDT came into the Trust after the performance 
improvement plan had already been developed. Because of the function of the 
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PDT, outlined in Chapter 3, they did not play an important part in either the 
diagnosis or triggering of activities in the Trust. 
6.3.2.2 Public announcement of the Trust's performance 
The public announcement of the low star rating, coupled with a negative media 
campaign, was also cited by staff as an external factor that had helped to trigger 
change. Some pointed out that to the Trust's wish to avoid losing their 
reputation had played an important role in starting the turnaround process. 
They also felt that the organisation did not have any choice but to turnaround 
the situation, having reached "rock bottom". Moreover, publicising the waiting 
list irregularities had had a direct effect on the star rating, and was perceived as 
a strong driver for change. 
'No star rating provided some benefits for the Trust as well, you 
know, they were able to use that as a lever to instigate other change 
which might have been more difficult if they'd been a comfier three 
star organisation and people can legitimately say, well do we need to 
change? " (45: 105) 
"In my view the most, the turning point [trigger] in all of this was the 
loss of all our stars. We'd gone from a2 star to a1 star to ao star 
trust in a very short period of time. For me that was the turning 
point. Obviously there was nowhere else you could go. You were right 
at rock bottom. That was really significant for the organisation I 
thought[ .. 
] because it was a shameful time. But that forced our 
attention on meeting, on absolutely meeting the key targets that were 
set for us. So, we started to change our game which was interesting, 
we started to play the game that people were expecting us to play. " 
(39: 34) 
"I think the biggest factors are your own desire to avoid adverse 
publicity and shame and the external scrutiny that you come under 
as an organisation both from the SHA, your primary care 
organisations but crucially the Department of Health. "(38: 63) 
One interviewee reported that receipt of a zero star rating had facilitated the 
process of change and served to reduce internal resistance, as staff became 
aware of the severity of the problem. Several staff (e. g. in the operating theatres 
and A&E Department), reported as initially seeing no necessity for change, 
began to accept that it was inevitable. This finding appears to support the stress- 
inertia theory put forward by Hoffman (1992). 
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`As a no star, it's obviously helpful because you can use that as an 
argument to apply the change. " (45: 105) 
6.3.3 Role of internal factors in triggering change 
A factor referred to by most interviewees as an internal trigger for change, was 
the introduction of the new management team. The new CEO his deputy were 
two key, proactive individuals in setting the turnaround in motion. However, it 
was emphasised by some interviewees that both the external factors (mentioned 
above), and the substitution of key managers as an internal factor, contributed 
to triggering remedial action. The new CEO was also reportedly asked by the 
SHA to remedy the situation over a period of six months, otherwise his 
organisation would come under threat of being franchised, which was a strategy 
used to replace the senior managers at that time, where they not successful in 
turning around performance. 
"We got a complete new executive team, I suppose that was the 
trigger. " (25: 77) 
According to Walshe et al. (2004), internal staff are frequently aware of 
problems that exist in an organisation, so diagnosis of failure is not totally 
unexpected. In this case study, several internal staff were clearly aware of the 
waiting list problems and when, on the entrance of new management, they got 
the opportunity to report the problem, it also became evident to others. 
However, as this outcome occurred parallel with an external audit, staff were 
generally of the opinion that the external auditors were responsible for 
identifying the problem. The findings of this study confirm the crucial role of 
internal staff in recognising failure and if they were able to speak freely about the 
problem within the organisation, further decline may had been prevented. 
The valuable role of a thorough external assessment, with the capacity for 
diagnosing problems and proposing solutions is demonstrated clearly in this 
case study. As was discussed above, if the auditors are no thorough in their 
dealings with data, as in the `light touch' programme, they may not be able to 
discover the problem. Inexperienced auditors may be another reason that the 
outcome of the audit process was less effective than required. 
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6.4 Discussion 
According to the stress-inertia theory (Huff et al., 1992) discussed in section 2.7, 
strategic change may occur by decreasing the resistance stemming from inertia 
or by increasing the stress levels originating from dissatisfaction with the status 
quo. Thus, change may arise when the levels of stress exceed the levels of 
resistance and inertia to change (Barker et al., 2001). Several internal and 
external factors were identified as contributing to heightening stress in the case 
study. The key internal factor was the replacement of senior management and 
the key external factors were investigations by outsiders agencies, receipt of a 
zero star rating, hostile local media coverage and support provided by the 
government to help turnaround failing organisations. 
The findings of the present study on triggering change align closely with the 
theory developed by Barker et al. (2001), derived from their empirical findings. 
The present study confirms that, although receipt of a zero star rating was an 
important factor in turning around the Trust, both the establishment of a new 
senior management team and external investigations and interventions were 
also required to affect the performance of the organisation. 
The findings of this present study reinforce those of recent research conducted 
in the NHS (Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Fulop et al., 2004) in relating to triggers 
for change. Although the role of external stakeholders, such as the SHA, was 
evident in facilitating change, the role of the external community of user groups, 
which Fulop et al. (2004) found to be an important trigger for change, was not 
evident in this study. 
Similarly, Mannion et al (2005) found that the star rating and a critical CHAI 
report, identifying serious problems not previously addressed by senior 
management, acted as triggers. However, opposition between managers at 
different levels relative to making important decisions, and conflict among 
different groups within the organisation, attempting to maintain their 
autonomy, were found by Jas and Skelcher (2004), to be important internal 
triggers for change. These factors seem that had not played important role in 
initiating change in this case study. 
The next chapter presents the development and implementation of the 
performance action plan implemented by the Trust. 
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Chapter 7: Study findings -implementing turnaround 
strategies in the Trust 
7.1 Introduction 
Diagnosis of performance failure and subsequent triggers for change were explored in 
the previous chapter. The aim of this chapter is to present the findings of the study in 
relation to the specific turnaround strategies used within the Trust and their impact 
on organisational functioning and performance. The stages theory, outlined in section 
2.9, is used as a conceptual framework against which to report and interpret the 
evidence gathered in the study. 
7.2 Turnaround strategies 
Within the stage approach (McKiernan's model), when organisational decline is 
diagnosed a limited range of turnaround interventions are likely to be used to remedy 
failure. McKiernan (2002) classifies these strategies as (i) retrenchment and (ii) 
recovery. As outlined earlier (part 2.10) three major turnaround strategies are 
identified in the for-profit sector literature including i) reorganisation (replacement), 
ii) retrenchment, and iii) repositioning (renewal). Against this framework, the 
following section explores the range and effectiveness of the different interventions to 
improve performance used within the Trust. 
7.2.1 Reorganisation strategies 
As outlined in section 2.9, reorganisation strategies include changes within the 
internal management of an organisation. The most common reorganisation strategy 
in the for-profit sector literature is the replacement of the CEO and/or other members 
of the senior management team. A range of reorganisation interventions were used in 
the Trust. 
7.2.1.1 Replacement of senior managers 
The replacement of the CEO and/or other senior managers, is one of the most 
frequently used turnaround interventions identified in the literature in both private 
and public sectors. In the case under study, the CEO, Chair and most of the senior 
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management team (the Deputy CEO and Director of Operations, Director of Finance, 
Director of HR, and Director of Nursing) were replaced by staff recruited from outside 
the organisation (external succession). All these changes happened over a period of 
five months, between August and December 20o2. The previous CEO and the Deputy 
CEO left the organisation to take up more senior positions within the NHS, although 
subsequently they were suspended from their current posts and held responsible for 
what had happened in their previous positions. The Director of Finance had 
previously retired, as the new CEO was not willing to work with him and the Chair of 
the Trust was replaced on the advice of the SHA. Two executive positions remained 
unoccupied for a relatively lengthy period. The Medical Director was the only member 
of the executive team who retained his position. Interviewees at all levels of the Trust 
identified a range of characteristics and behaviour of the new senior management 
team that they believed had been beneficial to the improvement processes. 
A cohesive Board with highly experienced executive members: 
Some interviewees emphasized that the new CEO recruited staff with considerable 
senior management team experience. Both internal and external interviewees 
reported that the new executive team was composed of appropriate personnel, who 
had sufficient experience to form a cohesive team with good working relationships 
and had played a key role in facilitating a successful turnaround in performance. Two 
had experience of working in organisations that had faced a similar crisis. They felt 
this experience helped them to recognise and understand the Trust's situation and to 
select the right strategies. One key senior manager in particular was perceived as 
having a strong operational background. Closer working relationships between the 
Finance Department and the Directorate of Operations and between the Medical 
Director and the Director of Human Resources were reported by both senior and 
middle managers as examples of improvements at board level. Interviewees described 
the new team as dynamic and highly focused, with a positive attitude towards 
achieving organisational change. One of the clinical staff expressed the view that the 
new management team communicated problems very clear. Some middle managers 
believed that changing the executive team was the biggest factor in helping the Trust 
to improve and one even insisted that the organisation would not have achieved its 
turnaround in performance without such a change in the senior management team. 
Interviewees from outside of the organisation (e. g. the SHA) also viewed the senior 
management team, particularly the Trust's CEO, as highly experienced and effective. 
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"That the Chief Executive did very well was actually because those he 
recruited as executives very well in terms of personality mix and we 
actually do get on well together, so there's no real in-fighting within the 
team, it's quite cohesive and I think that's actually helped support the 
organisation. " (4: 31) 
"The difference when the new people [senior executives] came along 
was that they had a high profile and I'm sure it wasn't like this in 2002 
(18: 273) 
"I think the thing that helped was a really close relationship in the 
Board in terms of the executive members of the Board because we all 
get on well together and know what each others problems are and I 
think, you know, I'd say the finance director and the director of 
operations have been at logger heads because they are potentially 
conflicting interests there, I don't think we would have got anywhere, 
so, the fact that we actually work together on problems rather than, 
you know - so I would say that it's a big help. " (46: 68) 
One interviewee stated that the new senior management team brought fresh ideas, 
was not linked to the problems of the past and had a positive and constructive 
approach to solving the Trust's problems. 
"It was helpful that it was a new management team, executive team in 
any case, so they were able to say, well distance themselves from the past 
in that sense. So that helped them position themselves to make afresh 
start and introduce new management methodologies for addressing the 
issues. " (45: 49) 
Visible and honest senior managers: 
There was consensus among interviewees that the new management team was much 
more visible, approachable, credible, honest and supportive than the previous team. 
Its members were open to discussion and debate about problems as well as being keen 
to communicate with clinicians and middle managers. On the other hand, only one 
interviewee, a nursing staff member at ward level, reported that the previous 
executive team were also visible. Two managers currently working with the new 
management team, and with experience of working with their predecessors, did not 
view the previous executive members of the Board as being dishonest and 
unapproachable. 
"I think this Board on the whole are more visible within the Trust. " (15: 19) 
"But being close to this team I find them all approachable and I find them 
all honest and truthful with me. " (39: 24) 
214 
Focus on performance targets: 
It was reported by most of the interviewees that the new management team, 
particularly the CEO and Deputy CEO, were very performance oriented and focused 
on the task of meeting central government performance targets. It was reported that it 
was not acceptable for them to hear that the targets were not being achieved. 
Divisional and directorate managers perceived clearly that if they sought to introduce 
new developments, they should first meet their performance targets. This message 
quickly filtered down to the lower levels of the organisation. The focus on targets by 
the Trust's senior management team was supported by the SHA, as achieving these 
targets was also the main objective of the SHA as the local performance management 
agent. 
"I think management focus upon, it's very goal orientated, very much 
focused on achievement and performance where I think that leadership 
is not as succinct as that and it's about how we do manage and how we 
do lead the people to get to that point where you might have common 
goals decided that are focused but at a higher level is more upon 
specifics. " (29: 23) 
"I think the new management team made it very clear what their top 
priorities were. They clarified it for everybody that hitting the targets 
and achieving financial balance were the main goals. That's what we're 
here to do and that's what we're going to do and they made sure that 
those were the priorities. " (39: 63) 
"The exe team were very clear that this is what we expect of you and, 
you know, there's no point coming knocking wanting something else if 
you're not delivering on that. So that became a clear message really. " 
(23: 115 
Focus on performance information and data by the senior management team: 
Most interviewees, particularly middle managers, believed that members of the senior 
management team(and in particular the Deputy CEO) were highly experienced in 
understanding and analysing performance. One senior manager emphasised that, 
without adequate focus on performance data the new management team had not been 
able to meet central government targets. On the other hand, an executive member of 
the Board argued that senior board level staff should not be involved in that degree of 
detail, but should be focusing more on strategic issues. 
"I [an executive director] think any NHS organisation now needs quite 
directional top team just because it is so variable and so changing and I 
think what I've realised in the past few years, you know, an executive 
team needs to know every detail and if you don't know every detail you 
get yourself into a lot of problems really and I think that's not just from 
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culture and disorganisation, I think it's a culture of the department at 
the moment. " (16: 171) 
Leadership style: 
The leadership style of the newly appointed senior management team, particularly the 
CEO and Deputy CEO, and especially in early stages of the turnaround process (in the 
first year following appointment of the new management team) was a directive, `top 
down' transactional leadership approach with strong performance management 
architecture and tight internal control. The main focus was on the achievement of 
centrally set performance targets and the role of the Deputy CEO in focusing on 
targets was emphasised highly by almost all interviewees. 
"My leadership [an executive member of the Board] was very 
directional, very determine as we were in a state of chaos. I was very 
clear to the divisional directors and the general managers really clear 
that this is what we've got to achieve, we cannot say no. I guess in the 
first year it was very detailed, it was very direct, very focused on the 
results, it was very on a mission, it was less about developing and 
empowering people" (16: 91) 
On the other hand, the Trust's senior management team aimed to encourage and 
facilitate a participative style of leadership within the Trust in order to harness the 
skills of staff and delegate power to lower managerial levels within their divisional and 
clinical directorates. The role of the Director of Human Resources in encouraging 
more participative leadership was reported as a key driver of change, although the 
Trust was still only in the initial stages of developing devolution. It was also 
emphasised that although directorate managers were encouraged to develop and run 
their own units, the executive managers continued to monitor performance. 
"I [an executive member of the Board] guess following year two and 
year three it's [leadership style] more about developing the team, more 
about developing the business units now, more about developing how 
they can monitor their own performance and more about self- 
development for some individuals. What we're doing now I guess is a 
lot more refined and it's about developing these divisions as business 
units getting them to run their objectives, getting them to manage their 
own performance, giving them the tools to do it and again that's 
transformational really because they're having to adapt to that model 
but we [executive members of the Trust] still kept our eyes on the results 
and still monitoring them from a distance" (16: 91) 
`I think there has been a style of leadership that has been to provide 
strategic leadership from the top and that has been coupled with an 
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approach grow staff and develop staff and empower staff and that is 
sort of developing further through the organisational development 
program hat the trust is rolling out, at the moment that you 
presumably are aware of. " (12: 43) 
The switch of leadership style from transactional to more participative was clearly 
emphasised by senior managers: 
"That you have a certain style of leadership that works within an 
organisation for a certain time period and it has been very much driven 
by the top at the top level and then it's about 4 years that you think 
about what is the style of leadership that is needed, you know, to 
further develop the organisation, so we're probably at a stage where 
we're ready for the brave new world or the next management style. " 
(14: 135) 
Although senior managers maintained that the Trust Board had a positive view of 
participative leadership and devolving authority to lower levels of the organisation so 
that they could run their system as a mini-business, when the Trust received three 
stars, there were differing points of view among the members of the Board about the 
feasibility and extent of delegation and the reduction in the degree of central control. 
Two executive members believed that a performance management culture had 
become embedded within the organisation, which would facilitate future delegation 
within the organisation. 
Role of non-executives: 
The importance of the role of non-executive members of the Board in bringing 
different and broader perspectives from outside the Trust and contributing to the 
strategic decision- making process was highlighted by both executives and non- 
executive members. A good working relationship between executives and non- 
executives was reported by the members of the Board. Two non-executives said they 
supported the new management team in conducting their business, but at the same 
time were willing to challenge executives about important issues. One executive 
member of the Board gave an example that underscored the challenging role of the 
non-executives, reporting that non-executives raised concerns and asked questions 
about the possible effects on the quality of patient care of the cost-cutting strategies 
(retrenchment) introduced by the executive members. Some non-executive members 
chaired key committees, such as the clinical governance assurance committee. 
Generally, the role of the non-executive team was viewed as being more effective 
within the new Board, which was working in a more constructive and challenging way 
than within the previous Board. 
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"I think they are very useful because they're the only people involved in 
hospital management system who are basically the public and therefore 
they can pick up on areas where the hospital because it's a management 
system is/has very much of a narrow perspective on what's going on. 
And they have a broader perspective because they're looking at it from 
an over all view and they're looking at it from outside. They also 
obviously because they are non exec directors of the trust Board they 
also have the interests of the trust at heart and of the hospital at heart 
but they have a different perspective. I think that's very important" 
(47: 31) 
In addition to the executive members, accounts confirmed that the Trust recruited 
managers with good managerial skills for important positions such as general 
managers for clinical divisions, particularly surgery, and that a higher level of 
payment was set up to attract experienced and highly motivated managers. For 
example, one of the new general managers was described a very bright, confident 
person who had brought fresh thinking to one of the divisions. Junior managers 
believed that the role of general managers needed to be acknowledged in the 
turnaround process. 
7.2.1.2 Development of Performance Improvement Plan (Action Plan) 
It was reported that the SHA requested that the Trust develop an action plan to 
address their serious performance issues within relatively a short period of time. One 
interviewee stated that it was of paramount importance, in the first year, to achieve 
the access targets because the SHA insisted that the Trust should achieve a 
turnaround situation within six months. The Trust developed a very detailed action 
plan, covering all aspects of performance within the organisation (e. g. financial 
recovery, waiting list issues, data quality, clinical governance, human resources and 
operational delivery), referred to as the Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), to 
demonstrate how improvements could be made in relation to the performance 
concerns raised in external reports (especially the Audit Commission report, the SHA 
report and the CHAT report). The Audit Commission had provided 95 
recommendations, following its `spot check' investigation, which the Trust considered 
to be one of the most helpful sources when developing the PIP. The recommendations 
presented in the SHA investigation report were another important factor.. The CHAT 
report was used when developing the PIP in relation to clinical governance issues. 
Managers noted that the SHA had not been closely involved in the development of the 
PIP, explaining that the SHA were willing to leave this job to the Trust in the belief 
that the Trust was aware what to include in the action plan. However, the Trust 
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managers knew that the action plan should be signed off by the SHA, and that it 
would not have been completed unless the Trust addressed all the performance issues 
the SHA had identified. One of the external interviewees reported that there was a 
kind of `panic' in the system as the Trust managers were not sure how they could best 
formulate and implement the action plan. So, the Trust used the format of the action 
plan of another zero star non-teaching Trust as a template for the development of its 
own action plan. Most interviewees insisted that it was a completely new plan and 
that there had not been a similar operational plan in the organisation before. Both 
internal and external interviewees emphasised the Trust's desire to `own' the action 
plan, and affirmed that its managers were very proactive in developing it. 
"There was enough detail in there [the performance action plan] to 
capture all the key areas of improvement that needed improvement 
basically, and captured everything that went towards the star rating 
system or the indicators in there, and covered I'd say, all the key 
departments within the hospital operationally and staff wise as well. " 
(5: 150) 
The Director of Operations and the Head of Modernisation were key to the 
development of the PIP, which covered major performance themes and was organised 
in 15 chapters. One of the interviewees likened the Director of Operations' office to 
"the engineer's room of the first PIP". A PCT representative also attended the 
development meetings, as suggested by the SHA. One interviewee reported that they 
viewed the role of the PCT representative as being to access the action plan from an 
external viewpoint and develop it in a way that was acceptable to the SHA. It was 
indicated that a key executive was assigned as a leader for each chapter, in order to 
assure ownership of the plan. Perceptions of middle managers were that the first draft 
of the action plan was very `top down'. 
"The original action plans were very much top down. This is what we've 
got to do. And I think it was born from the fact that we'd had external 
reviews. So it was very much external people had come and had looked 
at the organisation. There was a new executive team in that didn't 
know the history really of the organisation, and therefore I think they 
developed action plans and said that these are the things we have got to 
do as an organisation to improve our performance. So I think the early 
ones, as I remember were quite top down. " (9: 92) 
Several interviewees reported that the first draft of the plan was sent to relevant staff 
in different divisions and departments of the Trust, in order that they might provide 
their comments and develop their sections. It was reported that in cases of 
disagreement over the content, managers were mainly attempting to satisfy the 
requirements of the Director of Operations. Subsequently, all chapters were combined 
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into an overall plan, which senior managers maintained was a unique plan with 
ownership across the Trust. Some interviewees emphasised that they felt it was a good 
idea to pull all the chapters together rather than separate plans as they had had 
before. The last stage for the action plan, which had been approved by the SHA, was 
sent to the Department of Health for final approval. 
"Well when I first started we had various action plans on the go. 
Basically the overall structure had been identified through the executive 
team and then they were distilled down to divisional level. Each of the 
individual middle management, my level, then had to break down 
within their own directorates the sorts of targets that were needed to go 
in order to achieve the objectives. So there was a sensible cascade of 
things" (29: 76) 
Some interviewees reported that the action plan had strengthened the way that the 
Trust's managers worked within their management team. They insisted that it was not 
a plan which would `gather dust' on the shelves, but was intended to be aa `live' plan. 
A middle manager stated: "Now, I'm intimately acquainted with the Performance 
Improvement Plan". In the PIP, each table showed the area for improvement, the lead 
person responsible for delivering the improvement, the timescale, the action plan 
required and the progress that had been made. The line of accountability was very 
clear, which encouraged ownership of the problem with the implementation of the 
plan under the overall control of the Director of Operations. One interviewee 
emphasised that the PIP worked as an internal framework of management control 
that monitored performance along different dimensions. All units and departments 
were required to deliver the targets set out and assigned to them in the action plan, 
with managers being asked to work with other departments on implementation. 
However, individual responsibilities, relating to each chapter, were clear because one 
person was appointed to be accountable to the executive Board. An example of how 
the action plan was working in practice was provided by a Trust manager: 
"For example, the elective in-patient part of the performance 
improvement plan belongs to surgery, so the associated directors of 
surgery will work out with her team how that is going to be delivered 
because you can't be so dictatorial as to say, you will do X, Y and Z, it's 
dependent on local circumstances and how things change, so it's up to 
them to work it out themselves but they know that that is part of their 
responsibility. It's something that has got to be done anyway, you 
know, it makes sense that these are the things that need to be delivered 
within the organisation, so the divisions have to work out how it's best 
delivered. " (14: 48) 
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It was reported that the Trust used the action plan as a document both to 
communicate performance to the SHA and for internal monitoring. One interviewee 
noted that the SHA was interested in the plan as it was a tool with which to monitor 
performance and evaluate how much had been implemented. There was a consensus 
among senior and middle managers that the development of the action plan had 
helped the Trust to clarify what it was doing, which performance indicators were the 
subject of focus, and what turnaround processes it was trying to implement. 
"They (SHA) really just then kind of monitored that (action plan), I 
think they looked at it and said whether they were happy with it or not 
and then just monitored it and put timescales in, you know, you need to 
do this by then. " (20: 55) 
One interviewee perceived that the development of the PIP as a single document and 
its up-dating, reduced the risk that the SHA might wish to operationally manage the 
units and intervene directly in the running of the organisation. Any recommendations 
following the internal and external audits automatically went into the PIP. A general 
manager stated: 
"But what we tend to do is get a report or get a problem and then 
convert that into an action plan and then try and get the monitoring - 
doing the actions to be embedded within the operational part of the 
organisation and get the monitoring of that into the performance 
review part of the organisation. For example, we had a staff 
satisfaction survey which we've not performed as well as we thought 
we might and maybe we've taken our eye off the ball, I don't know, but 
we've now got an action plan for that and that's separate from all the 
other action plans. " (18: 265) 
Several interviewees indicated that a year after the development of the action plan, 
the general strategic direction of the organisation and the revised corporate objectives 
were able to be incorporated in the action plan because the organisation was more 
`settled'. It was reported that the PIP still exists and has been updated by the 
managers in order to ensure that each manager has his/her own chapter for reference. 
7.2.1.3 Focus on performance management 
A focus on performance management was a key strategy during the turnaround 
process. It was reported by all interviewees that, when the detailed action plan was 
developed, a robust and effective performance management system was set up by the 
new management team, particularly in relation to access targets and the monitoring 
and management of the performance of different operational units in the 
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organisation. Interviewees expressed a positive view that using a robust performance 
management system resulted in improvement of organisational performance and was 
key to the Trust's subsequent receipt of three stars. Interviewees also acknowledged 
that the regular attendance of the Director of Operations and CEO at the weekly and 
monthly meetings to report on performance was crucial in establishing good 
performance management processes. Some performance indicators were said to be 
monitored even on an hourly basis, such as the four hour A&E targets. 
"Performance management is really driven within the organisation from 
weekly meetings we have with the Chief Exec around management of the 
waiting list to performance review meetings. " (14: 29) 
"The Trust was already very focused on delivery and set up their own new 
internal performance management structures around reporting and 
analysis. " (37: 55) 
"Monthly performance monitoring for divisions around HR indicators, 
finance activity, quality issues and that helped us really I guess if anyone of 
the divisions if we became concerned about the performance either 
financially or operationally in one of those divisions then we had time to 
deal with it, so we would get some results through every 3 months, we 
were getting results through on a month by month basis and we were 
looking at a trend and could really react quite quickly if it was de-engaging 
from the path it was supposed to be. " (4: 87) 
As explained above, for each chapter of the PIP an individual was appointed to be 
accountable to the executive team. A senior manager was appointed as the Head of 
Performance. This represented a new post in the Trust, with a remit to ensure that the 
action plan was implemented, with relevant and timely data collected and presented 
in the monthly performance meeting. The performance reports were also presented to 
the Trust Board and were considered as a critical agenda item at Board meetings. 
Interviewees highlighted the fact that rewards within the organisation (such as 
performance related pay) were now based on meeting performance targets, especially 
in relation to the national performance measures. 
"I suppose the monitoring; the intense scrutiny that you come under is the 
big factor in turning the hospital around. It certainly focuses the mind. 
That's really very important. " (39: 63) 
`Again the key drivers for those targets, for example, your waiting times 
and emergency were coming down to weekly meetings and those weekly 
meetings had our Chief Exec, Director of Operations, plus divisional 
directors, plus the immediate directorate managers, those are what we 
called PTL meeting. So, on a weekly basis, you would be looking at 
scrutinising where you're going in terms of long waiting patients [lists], 
where you're going in terms of accident and emergency targets. "(24: 84) 
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Some senior managers reported that that they were now focusing not only on the 
`hard' indicators (e. g. the level of absence because of sickness, the number of 
complaints and thank you letters) but also on `softer' data and quality issues 
(qualitative information) particularly within individual divisions to track their 
performance such as quality of data, level of relationship with external organisations 
and level of awareness about what is happening inside and outside the organisation. 
"' Im developing a much softer performance indicators that look at SMA 
rates, the number of complaints, the number of thank you letters, you 
know, those kind of things which are much more around some of the 
quality issues, look at some of the essence of care standards and so you 
send out to a clinical team both this in terms of, can you do your 
Government targets, have you got good governance, are your staff being 
inducted, what is your sickness rate and then actually are you thinking 
about some of the softer issues around some nutrition for your patients 
etc. So we then will have kind of a much rounder performance 
framework" (23: 98) code 6.2 
7.2.1.4 Emphasis on Human Resources Management System 
In the literature, Human Resources Management (HRM) has been considered an 
important factor in influencing organisational performance and clinical outcomes 
(Arthur, 1994; d'Arcimoles, 1997; Delery and Doty, 1997; Hoque, 1999; MacDuffie, 
1995; Patterson et al., 1997; Terpstra and Rozell, 1993)" West et al. (2002) argue that 
the main aims of new style of human resources policies, referred to as progressive 
HRM as opposed to traditional HRM -'the use of jobs with low levels of skill variety 
and autonomy, and the minimization of expenditure on selection, training, 
development and compensation' - are to take advantage of the knowledge, abilities 
and extrinsic and intrinsic motivations of staff. The recruitment processes (e. g. 
scheduled interviews and psychometric tests), performance appraisal, inclusive 
education and training programmes, use of incentives, engagement in decision 
making, non-monetary benefits, team working and job enrichment are some examples 
of progressive human resources practices. The significant influence of human 
resources policies (particularly assessing the quality of the appraisal system) in the 
acute trusts, on the clinical outcomes (e. g. mortality rate) has been identified in the 
literature (West, 2002 cited in Mannion et al., 2005). 
There was a general consensus among interviewees, that the new management team 
considered HRM issues were to be an important strategic priority and that significant 
improvement and innovation had been achieved in this regard. It was felt that the 
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previous management team did not focus on HRM and human resources managers' 
attention was focused on personnel issues rather than effective people management. 
"Previously the focus has been on money and what we said was, hang on, 
you know, most of our money is spent on the cost of our staff, so let's make 
sure that we manage our staff properly and let's make sure that we use 
them effectively. " (27: 90) 
It was acknowledged by most interviewees (both clinical and non-clinical), that the 
new Director of Human Resources had a leading role in bringing strategic human 
resources issues to the attention of the Board (e. g. improving working lives, agenda 
for change, workforce modernisation, and organisational development) and that the 
HR strategies had been developed on the basis of the NHS plan. Participants 
emphasised that eight operational HR standing committees were responsible for 
implementing HR strategies within the Trust with progress reported to the HR 
strategy committee. A range of metrics, including a staff satisfaction survey, were also 
used as a tool to monitor the progress and implementation of HR strategies. In the 
organisation, improving `people' management was supported by staff and one of the 
ward managers commented: 
"We've got a new HR Manager who is very keen and she will offer her 
support and guidance in dealing with HR issues, she's very good with the 
PDPs and sickness and absence. The previous manager, she wouldn't 
contact you about it at all but this one is very, you know, what have you 
done about it? Do you want any help with it? she's very good. " (30: 138) 
There was a close working relationship between the HR Director and Medical 
Director, which it was felt resulted in the smooth implementation of the new 
consultant contract without the significant difficulties that other trusts had 
encountered. This was cited as an example of good joint working between managers 
and clinicians. The HR director was a member of the clinical governance assurance 
committee, which was an example of how the Trust viewed the importance of HR in 
mediating relations between managers and clinicians. Interviewees maintained that 
the HR directorate had a close working partnership with the Trade Unions, which was 
perceived as essential for implementing the `agenda for change'. In addition, the HR 
managers were said to work closely with each division to assist them manage their 
staff more effectively. 
"I think they've done a lot of hard work and with the new director, we 
didn't really have any direct links with HR unless there were problems 
within the workplace, whereas I think now that the culture has changed 
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because they've actually linked the HR manager with a different 
directorate or division. " (29: 107) 
The following strategies were used by the new managers to manage staff more 
effectively. 
Focus on Organisational Development: 
One of the most important policies regarding people management, reported by 
interviewees, was the introduction of the Organisation Development (OD) 
programme. This programme was perceived as a effective way of empowering 
frontline staff, delegating operational autonomy to divisions and clarifying roles and 
responsibilities lower down the organisational hierarchy. Managers reported that the 
OD programme was an attempt to sustain a positive culture of change throughout the 
organisation. It was noted that the Trust also used an external facilitator to service a 
management development programme designed for the CEO and executive Board, 
general managers, divisional managers and doctors taking on new managerial posts. 
"I think the executive team recognise that there has had to be a lot of hands 
on management from the very senior people and that's not ideal in an 
organisation of this size, so we've put together an OD programme starting 
initially with the divisional directors and general managers and that will 
roll out over a3 year period so that there will be development at different 
levels of the organisation to encourage team working and team 
development, so that people are aware of the expectations of them in their 
role and people are now taking more accountability. " (27: 96) 
Focus on education and training: 
The Trust was perceived as being proactive in developing the skills and competencies 
of staff through the provision of a range of opportunities for education, training and 
career development. Internal facilities were used (e. g. the Trust's Education Centre), 
as well as external sources of support in the NHS (local and national training 
programme). Interviewees explained that the Trust was good at supporting staff who 
were undertaking post-graduate training relevant to their job by providing time off 
work and contributing to the payment of course fees. However, it was also reported 
that some staff were unable to get time off to attend mandatory training sessions 
because of inadequate staffing levels, particularly at ward level. 
"I would say in defence of the Trust, again from a nursing perspective, 
there are lots of opportunities there both for in-house training and also 
higher education. " (29: 85) 
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"I mean, certainly, from a nurse practitioner point of view, there are 
people at all stages of development and within that some are very 
junior and some have been nurse practitioners for five years, so that's a 
continually rolling programme to educate people. " (33: 159) 
Emphasis was also placed on staff induction procedures that were used to introduce 
new entrants to the culture and ethos of the organisation. The induction meeting 
aimed to familiarise new staff with the `can do' mentality and to clarify what was 
expected of them. 
"'When new doctors come now they have a couple of days induction, so 
all of the information about the 4 hour targets is discussed and kind of 
reinforced at that induction, which again will help. " (33: 215) 
Improving working lives: 
One of the issues viewed as a HR priority by interviewees, particularly junior nursing 
staff, was the high level of attention the Trust paid to `improving working lives' and 
supporting `family friendly' initiatives. One interviewee explained that the HR 
managers tried hard to change traditional management thinking in the Trust by 
allowing staff to be more flexible in how they worked. Some interviewees placed a 
considerable emphasis on the importance of having flexible working arrangements. 
Two new senior managers indicated that the rate of sickness absence had been 
reduced, although not significantly, over a two year period. They explained that 
sickness absence was still high but they predicted that this could see further reduction 
with the implementation of new HR strategies. 
"The report gives us a glowing report on our flexible working 
interventions and we've really managed to turn that around and I 
guess in terms of staff being valued, that if staff had the confidence to 
actually come to the organisation and say, I have a problem, you know, 
I haue one or two ways of dealing with it. " (4: 121) 
`At ward level things have been implemented, really, I think which 
helped for instance in improving working lives you know for the staff 
which is good because it takes in a number of things, like regarding 
flexible retirement and improved training and development for 
nursing" (36: 19) 
HR managers reported that the Trust did not face any serious problems regarding the 
recruitment and retention of staff in most key areas. Also, the quantitative data 
(percentage of the staff that had left the Trust) did not show significant difficulties in 
terms of staff retention. However, some interviewees maintained that some staff had 
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left the Trust because of the pressure associated with the new performance 
management culture and increased onus on staff to meet performance targets. 
Staff appraisal: 
A focus on conducting personal development plans and staff appraisals, was viewed as 
a key task of the HR directorate. Such arrangements were perceived as a good way to 
communicate what senior managers expected of staff, as well as providing 
opportunity for the staff to talk with their managers about their personal development 
records. Staff at different levels also supported the fact that there were now better 
induction procedures and appraisal systems. 
"We've started to encourage the managers to actually to look at people 
management issues from a risk perspective, as well, because that seems 
to engage with making the divisions more effective. So what are the 
risks of our staff not having PDPs. Well the risks are that the staff don't 
know what's expected of them, they don't know what their objectives 
are, there are some other training and development issues around that, 
so are we actually preparing our staff to do the work that we want 
them to do? So we're saying to them to look at some of the risk aspects 
of that really and reducing risks. " (27: 213) 
Staff engagement: 
Staff involvement was frequently stated as an important policy for the HR directorate. 
The management development programme was centred on encouraging managers to 
involve and consult staff in the early stages of new developments and give them the 
opportunity to present new ideas and solutions. There was a perception that the 
environment was now more `open' and that staff could more easily communicate with 
Trust's managers. One of the staff representatives stated that staff now enjoyed a 
more open environment, with the ability to contribute to decision making: 
"It now seems the doors are open and you can influence, sometimes it 
doesn't make a bit of difference but at the moment you can definitely lodge 
your objections, point out problems that may not have been picked up and 
hopefully before the final decision is made, it'll be more agreeable to 
everybody and hopefully if that's the case, there'll be no real turmoil, they'll 
be no people getting upset and it should be better for the patient if the 
decisions that are made are the correct ones and not the wrong ones that 
have to be altered later on, once they're introduced. " (4o: 53) 
Staff support: 
It was stated that the staff were also members of some operational HR communities, 
for example there were three places in the employment policy review group, which 
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provides the opportunity for staff to raise their concerns relating to HR issues and 
give their suggestions. One of the HR managers explained what they were trying to 
do: 
"We say to our managers, some of the issues around ensuring that we 
support our staff effectively mean that their morale will be improved, 
they'll feel happier in the workplace they were less likely to leave and if 
we can offer them some training and development as well, then they'll 
develop their skills to enable them to do their job more effectively and 
for us to implement changes that we need to do. " (27: 82) 
According to the CHAI report the previous management team did not pay staff during 
periods of sickness, which caused tension within the Trust. Several interviewees 
believed that new management team resolved this problem and improved the HRM 
within the Trust. 
Celebrating success: 
To show that success is valued and to encourage staff to share good practice it was 
reported that a range of `award' ceremonies celebrating success, were held within the 
Trust. The HR director emphasised that they tried to recognise and acknowledge the 
attempts made by the staff towards improvement. 
Some interviewees reported that there was plenty of scope for development in HR 
policy. They believed that the culture of working across different departments and 
different disciplines could be improved. Some staff argued that the HR strategies were 
related to targets set by governments rather than serving to enhance areas of 
performance of concern to staff locally. 
7.2.1.5 Strategy Development 
As outlined in Chapter 5, the Trust appeared to have suffered from a lack of strategic 
direction and this weakness was highlighted within the CHAT report. One member of 
staff stated, "We were a strategy free zone organisation". Several participants 
indicated that the development of strategies had been addressed by the new 
management team. The governance strategy, estates strategy, human resources 
strategy and education and training strategy had been drafted for the first time. In 
addition, some existing strategies, such as Information Technology (IT), had been 
revised. It was reported that all the executive members of the Trust Board were 
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involved in revising or writing the new strategies. The CEO was responsible for 
developing a corporate strategy for the Trust. 
"So there was a sweep of strategies that developed from the whole team 
that everybody was involved in a lot of strategies were either recovered 
or written for the first time. "(11: 115) 
One clinical director highlighted the important role of the new management team in 
the development of strategies and providing general strategic direction for the 
organisation. It was believed by both clinical and non clinical interviewees that 
planning for different strategies would help the Trust to sustain its performance 
improvement. 
"The new management has brought in a degree of clarity as to its 
purpose, as to its strategy. It's shown far more clearly than the 
previous administration did, where it wishes to go and what its 
priorities are, that has in some ways strained relationships as well built 
them because in showing what strategy the management team is, then 
it raises the possibility and it has happened where people have 
fundamentally disagreed with the direction that they're taking. " (42: 14) 
7.2.1.6 Improving lines of communication within the organisation 
among staff 
An important issue, highlighted by staff at all levels (both clinical and non-clinical), 
was the emphasis of the new management team on upgrading communication 
practices within the organisation. It was apparent that the problems had been dealt 
with, and communication had become more evident both within and between 
departments. The interviewees indicated that this had helped improve relationships 
and build up a better understanding and support for staff, which they appreciated. 
Junior staff also viewed it as a good opportunity to learn what was going on inside the 
organisation. It was reported that the Trust communicated effectively with staff in 
order to show the importance of the national performance targets and to inform staff 
of why they were being asked to carry out particular roles and the consequences of 
their roles for the performance of their departments and the Trust. 
"There's a lot more communication that goes on. We have not only 
business meetings but we have nurse meetings and we have team 
meetings and it actually does get cascaded down. We have identified 
people that will go to team briefs and actually cascade that information 
down and people seem to want to know more information" (44: 83) 
"We have a vastly improved communication strategy, people actually 
know what's going on so it's so much easier for everybody to 
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understand and that was one of the really important things that we did 
was improve our communication. " (25: 81) 
"There is a huge flow of information now, which just wasn't there even 
four years ago. " (32: 43) 
"It is certainly an easier organisation [in which] to get communication 
going than it was, you can go and talk to people and they will respond, 
they will call you back, they actually will engage. " (42: 89) 
Participants reported that a range of different forms of communication were used to 
relay performance information to staff. These included: 
  Posting the minutes of Board meetings on the Trust's website. 
  Introducing an electronic `rumour Board' linked to the Trust's intranet. This 
allowed staff to ask senior managers questions. Answers were received within a 
few days. 
  Briefing of senior staff by a member of the Board to inform them what the Board 
had approved and what it intended to implement as new working processes and 
procedures. 
  The use of the Trust's intranet as a two way communication system. 
  Introduction of a team briefing process, at different stages, via e-mail. 
  Scheduling more 'walkabouts' by executive directors to make them more visible to 
`frontline staff. 
  Introduction of increased `face to face' meetings between the CEO and clinical 
directors. 
  Encouraging more `team to team' meetings between clinical departments to 
inform each other about what they were doing. 
  Introduction of staff news and bulletins, informing them of developments within 
the Trust and highlighting examples of departments with significantly improved 
performance. 
Although many stressed, that communication within the Trust had improved 
significantly, some interviewees reported there was still room for development in 
communication procedures. An executive member referred to the issue resulting from 
the high level of work pressure within some divisions because of the extent of the 
necessary changes. It was reported that the flow of information was not equal among 
the divisions and directorates. In some directorates it appears that staff were better 
informed than in others. Another member of the Board pointed out that divisional 
managers and directors may need to develop better and more appropriate 
communication skills in order to relay information and decisions more effectively 
within their units. Another senior manager suggested that the Trust was trying audit 
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team briefings in order to remove blockages in that process and she believed that 
there was still some work to do on communication strategies. For example, staff in 
hospital B felt that they were isolated and that they were not informed about key 
developments in hospital A, although the Trust was aware of this and was now 
addressing these problems. Three interviewees reported that it was difficult for staff at 
a lower organisational level to communicate with senior managers, though the Trust 
was trying to address this issue. One interviewee believed that senior managers did 
not pay enough attention to their staffs views. 
"I think it's got better and better since I've been here, I think the 
communication has actually got better. I think there are still areas 
where it's lacking but generally I think, as a whole, it's got better but I 
think it's probably got quite a long way to go. " (20: 243) 
One consultant reported that they appreciated the greater volume of information flow 
within the Trust, stating, "there is a huge flow of information now which just was not 
there even four years ago". However, he added that it was not clear whether the 
improvements were driven by improvement and investment in IT technology or 
driven by management. He also argued that communication between consultants was 
poor, as he believed that the consultants, especially the older ones, were not computer 
literate. With offices scattered in different buildings, they did not have too much 
opportunity to interact with each other. 
It was argued by some interviewees that, despite the proliferation of information from 
a variety of sources, some staff were still not willing to read the material. One of the 
ward managers said: 
"I mean there's team briefing but as I say, it's getting to it. Having time 
to read what's there, understanding what it means sometimes, what's 
on it because if it's all performance related people switch off because it 
doesn't relate to them on the ward. " (30: 190) 
Several nurses reported that they could not attend team briefings or even check the 
intranet, because of their very busy schedules, which appeared to limit the 
effectiveness of communication strategies. For this reason, they felt that there was not 
a major difference between current and previous communication, although they 
reported that they could download the minutes of meetings for later reading. 
"No I don't think there's terribly good communication coming down 
from the top to the ground level, I think it's even worse the other way 
round from bottom to top, I don't think that there are good 
communication systems. " (17: 154) 
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7.2.1.7 Internal reorganisation and restructuring 
Some major organisational restructuring and development of new units was planned 
and implemented, and was perceived by several interviewees (both clinical and non- 
clinical) as a key contributor to performance improvement. 
Three new directorates (Estates and Facilities, Human Resources and Information 
Technology) had been formed. The Board's composition had undergone a significant 
change and the directors of two of the newly formed directorates (Estates and 
facilities and Human Resources) became executive members of the Board. The senior 
managers believed that these changes showed the importance the CEO attached to the 
role of the new directorates in the process of performance improvement. 
A Performance Team was introduced as a part of the Directorate of Operations, which 
was perceived as playing a key role in the process of performance measurement and 
monitoring, by providing timely and appropriate performance information to the 
Board. 
Clinical divisions were also subject to a series of changes at managerial level. Both 
surgery divisions were given to the same general manager and it was stated that the 
these were now working as one division rather than two. The Board was planning to 
appoint a general manager for medicine and separate medicine from heart/lung 
divisions in order to have a more effective managerial process. Because of the 
importance of the A&E Department, the Board was planning to recruit a general 
manager for the A&E Department. In each clinical division, a Human Resources 
(HR) manager was appointed in an attempt to manage staff more effectively and to 
report on HR issues to the senior HR team. 
In the previous management system, only one unit was responsible for producing and 
reporting performance information and this was believed to be a key reason that the 
misrepresentation of performance data had continued for so long. According to the 
Audit Commission report, waiting list data management was separated from the 
information performance structure. The staff who are now responsible for producing 
waiting list data report the data to the Head of Modernisation, who is not connected 
to the information structure. A Data Quality Department was set up, giving managers 
appropriate access to the patient administration system. These changes were made in 
order to clarify lines of responsibility, provide more accurate data and minimise the 
likelihood of future misrepresentation. 
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"I mean the difference then and kind of now really is that I'm 
responsible for the operation and performance within surgery, so 
basically it's around achieving the waiting targets. But the waiting list 
clerks who actually, the junior members of staff, who actually put 
people on waiting lists, you know, work with the clinical team, they 
actually report outside of my managerial control to somebody else. So 
we've got an assurance body then who go in and validate, who check 
what we are doing what we say we are doing, that we're not - because 
sometimes, I think, I don't think it's malicious. "(23: 27) 
To mitigate the problems raised by the shortage of beds, a bed management team and 
a patient discharge unit were set up. Patients who were to be discharged over the next 
few hours were transferred to the discharge unit in order to provide more bed 
capacity. The hospital's bed management team was responsible for allocating patients 
to different wards to use all available capacity. However, some clinicians believed that 
the function of both teams was to meet performance targets and that it compromised 
the quality of patient care by discharging patients earlier than they should have been 
discharged or by allocating them to inappropriate wards. 
To address the serious clinical governance problems highlighted in the CHI report, a 
new Clinical Governance Manager was appointed and the Medical Director took on 
responsibility for clinical governance. In addition, a clinical governance assurance 
committee was set up to scrutinize clinical governance arrangements and a non- 
executive member of the Board chaired the committee. 
A senior manager stated that during the restructuring process, several managers with 
insufficient experience and skills were dismissed. 
7.2.2 Retrenchment 
The retrenchment strategy, as a generic turnaround strategy, was used within the 
Trust to stabilise its financial position, as the organisation had lost one of its `stars' 
because of the financial deficit. Most interviewees emphasised that the Trust had 
developed a tight financial recovery plan, in 2002, to control financial costs, provide 
cash flow and balance the financial status, which subsequently created a lot of 
pressure within the organisation. The key role of the Director of Finance in 
understanding the Trust's financial status and working collaboratively with the SHA 
to handle the financial situation was stressed by some interviewees. However, the 
Director of Finance maintained that the general managers were involved in the 
financial plan from the outset and that they had collaborated with the financial 
managers in their clinical divisions in order to contribute to the drafting of the budget 
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and cost pressure schedule. It is necessary to explain that the SHA gave the Trust a 
period of three years to solve the historical debt problem, and during that time the 
financial priority of the Trust was to achieve financial balance. 
Senior managers highlighted the fact that one of their attempts within the first few 
months of the turnaround process, was to make sure that staff understood the 
importance of financial issues and their impact on the quality of patient care. All the 
different parts of the Trust were asked to work on the budget in order to deliver the 
desired financial savings detailed in the financial recovery plan and it was stressed 
that all units and departments were clear about their contribution to savings. A close 
collaboration between operational and finance managers had been developed within 
each division when they were aiming to meet financial saving targets and this was said 
to be ongoing. It was reported that, if a unit was unable to meet its financial targets, 
its managers must explain to the CEO and Director of Finance why they had not done 
so and come up with strategies for remedying the situation. 
Two senior managers explained that, in the first instance, they focused on poor 
financial control in some departments within the Trust. As outlined in Chapter 5, the 
Trust suffered from the high cost of overpayment of junior doctors and heavy 
expenditure on staff banking agency fees, particularly for nurses, costs which were not 
well controlled. One executive stated that both these issues were targeted by the 
financial recovery plan and that about £1.5 million was saved by better management 
of the junior doctors' rota. It was stressed that a reduction in the staffing level, or a 
`vacancy freeze', was also used to reduce costs. A further example of a money saving 
strategy was the introduction of a group pharmacist whose aim was a 5% saving 
through the more cost effective purchasing of drugs. They were able to achieve their 
target. Units such as the heart and lung division, that were able to save money 
through more efficient purchasing of medical equipment and earning money by 
increasing work load and making contracts, were not subject to staff reductions as a 
cost cutting strategy. It is interesting that the Trust provided this opportunity for units 
which were able to earn more money. The Trust was successful in reaching financial 
balance within two years, which was to the result of accumulated cost saving across 
the Trust. 
"We [executive member of the Board] had a plan almost from day one 
really that once the executive team were here, we had a very, very clear 
plan which was about financial performance. We had to turn round the 
finances of the Trust" (4: 77) 
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"We have taken a lot of money out of the system over the past few years, 
now in my division Ive got budgets totalling £40 million pounds and 
over the last two years we've taken £2 million out, which I think is a 
pretty good performance. However, I've currently got a saving target 
of another 1.3 million. If you've been in f nancial recovery to the degree 
that we have in this organisation for as many years as we have then it 
all gets very difficult. "(18: 91) 
Several middle and junior managers pointed out that strict cost reduction had a 
deleterious effect on staff morale and harmed the quality of patient care. A clinical 
consultant believed that cutbacks in such areas as purchase of coffee, notepads, 
ballpoint pens and the use of the telephone cannot save a large amount of money, but 
do undermine morale. In addition, some interviewees reported that the PFI partners 
were not monitored in terms of financial issues as rigorously as the Trust's middle 
managers. 
"I know staff do feel very, very pressured, you know, we're constantly 
looking at saving money, we're constantly looking at making cut backs 
which leaves little room for developing people. " (44: 55) 
"We've got a PFI agreement, which is a quarter of a million pounds per 
annum overspent, so I'd like to get in there and have a look at it because 
I suspect that's not being managed with the same rigour as I manage 
my budgets, not because somebody is doing their job wrong it's just a 
very difficult thing to do. " (18: 325) 
To deal with the historical debt, the Finance Director noted that two options were 
being considered. The first was through the sale of assets at hospital B with which he 
was hoping to create a'one-off surplus which might help the Trust. Another option 
was to re-finance the whole PFI scheme. 
7.2.3 Repositioning 
As outlined in section 2.9, Repositioning (renewal) strategies are activities used to 
reorient the strategic direction of an organisation and revitalise its vision, with the 
aim of assuring long-term survival (Walsh, 2004; Boyne, 2004a). A range of 
repositioning strategies were used by the Trust when attempting to sustain long term 
performance improvement. 
7.2.3. E Improvement of external working relationship 
The UK Department of Health (2ooob) is placing increased emphasis on the notion 
that the NHS pursues a'whole economy' approach, assessing and rewarding 
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performance. The implication is that NHS organisations are required to create 
effective networks across all key organisations within the local health economy, with 
leaders expected to nurture good relationships and work collaboratively with the 
other health and social care leaders to achieve the desired performance improvements 
(Mannion et al., 2005). 
There was general consensus among the interviewees (both internal and external), 
that the new management team was indeed developing good working relationships 
and collaborating effectively with the key local organisations. In the local health 
economy the Trust senior managers stressed that the development of close working 
relationships between the Trust and other organisations, particularly the SHA and 
PCT, was a key priority because the Trust would benefit greatly from their support. 
"When the new Chief Executive and team arrived, the culture of the 
organisation changed markedly. It became much more positive, much 
more friendly externally. Before it was never particularly a friendly 
organisation and the new Chief Executive particularly adopted a 
position of establishing partnerships that never play as external, which 
he saw as necessary for the organisation's strategic future. " (21: 104) 
"I do think the success in your organisation is about your own network 
as well. I would actually say, for a successful organisation the leaders 
need to have a very wide network because they can help you in times of 
difficulty. You need to have really good relationships with your SHA 
and PCT because when you've got those good relationships they 
actually start batting for you.,, (16: 111 
Several staff explained that the Trust had a `wholesome' working relationship with the 
SHA, which enabled the SHA to receive more information on the Trust's performance 
related issues. When the Trust could not resolve its own problems it could seek 
additional support from the SHA. Indeed, they viewed the SHA as a support 
mechanism and affirmed that there were constructive meetings at different levels, 
between the SHA and the Trust. The SHA senior managers confirmed that the Trust 
was working collaboratively with them to address their performance problems. A 
member of the Performance Development Team (PDT) stressed the quality of the 
relationship between the SHA and the Trust. 
"I personally am very encouraged by [name of the Trust] approach 
because they let us [the SHA] know about things that are going to 
happen, not that we've always had a problem. I think as I've hinted 
they're [the Trust] much more open and honest and opportunities to 
engage are greater" (22: 29) 
'My impression [member of the PDT] was that the SHA had been 
supportive and the Trust was happy to work with them. Happy to work 
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with them because they knew if they were working with them the SHA 
isn't working against them or breathing against them. It's supportive. It 
was almost like a symbiotic relationship. " (37: 145) 
Most interviewees had a positive perception of the relationship between the new 
management team in the Trust and the PCT. It was emphasised that there are now 
regular team to team and Board to Board meetings, which had not happened 
previously. PCT managers also confirmed that the Trust had adopted a more open and 
inclusive attitude towards them and they viewed this as providing the opportunity to 
talk about joint priorities and strategic decisions, as well as for seeking solutions to 
thorny performance issues. The SHA viewed the relationship between the Trust and 
PCT as a good and close one -much better than that experienced under the Trust's 
previous management regime. 
"So we [PCT and the Trust] now have more of a partnership 
arrangement than we used to do, so it's gone from being a traditional 
performance management and contracting role into more of, you 
know, there are things we need to do together in order to deliver and 
make sure that people are seen in the best place at the right time 
because that's kind of key, really. " (8: 25) 
"There's been several instances when the medicines management 
committee has the PCT representatives on Board. So that when you're 
talking about prescribing the pharmacy budget you have your PCT 
representative who looks at it from the Primary Care Trust perspective 
and looks at purchasing of drugs both from primary and secondary 
care which makes it much easier. Because you can then; there's no point 
in having one set of rules for the Trust and then another set of rules for 
primary care. It's better to work together. And there's been lots of 
instances where things work well together. "(47.35) 
One member of staff, while conceding that relationship between the PCT and the 
Trust had become much better, maintained that the PCT still did not acknowledge 
some of their performance issues. An example was given by an interviewee of the GPs' 
referral rate to the Trust. This was set by the SHA and should not have increased, but 
the data showed a 12 per cent increase in referrals, which inevitably affected the 
Trust's performance and added to their performance difficulties. It was believed by 
some that the PCT did not view the Trust's problems as their problems. An 
interviewee reported that the Trust was inconsistent in the way in which it 
approached the PCT; the Trust viewed the PCT as a source of funding and backing, 
but does not deal with the PCT on several key issues. The interviewee believed that 
although it reflected a dynamic relationship, there was a power imbalance between 
the PCT, which was a small organisation, and the more powerful Trust, which was a 
large teaching hospital. 
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The Trust had developed good relationships with other hospitals. Several participants 
said that the new management team was willing to work with its neighbouring trusts 
in order to assist them to deliver services and develop specialist facilities. In like 
manner, the Trust received help from its neighbours, particularly in relation to 
developing a joint patient access policy. 
None of the interviewees at the ward level was sufficiently aware of the working 
relationship between the Trust and the SHA or the PCT to have a well informed 
opinion. However, matrons noted that the Trust should work more closely with the 
PCT and Social Services to resolve patients' problems and social care needs, when 
discharged from hospital. 
7.2.3.2 Cultural change 
Respondents highlighted the important issue of senior managers' attempts to change 
the culture of the organisation. Although several interviewees expressed doubt that 
the culture could be changed in a short time, as it had been embedded in the 
organisation for many years, they said that a set of values and behaviour had been 
agreed by the Board, particularly the executives, to try to nurture a different 
performance culture. Senior managers emphasised that they were still in the process 
of trying to change the organisational culture and that it would take a long time for a 
new ethos to become embedded within the organisation. 
Encouraging transparency and the development of an open and learning culture: 
Most interviewees stated that openness and transparency had been encouraged by 
senior managers and that staff were now much less fearful than they had previously 
been when reporting problems. Senior managers said they accepted the concept that 
staff were human and human beings actually made mistakes, so they had tried to 
move away from a disciplinarian approach with a `blame culture' to a culture that 
essentially looked at why the system led to mistakes and errors and how staff could 
learn from these. An important example, given by interviewees, related to the 
transparency of the waiting list data. Management enabled all staff engaged in it to be 
very clear about the process, to know that deception would not be tolerated, but that 
they could now report freely in the event of any mistake or problem. Indeed, a `whistle 
blowing' policy was introduced that helped the Trust to detect problems and any 
misrepresentation. 
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"There's a style of leadership now which is very open, fiddling will not be tolerated and I think there's openness among the top members of the Trust. " (10: 41) 
"One of the things that was very clear to me as a Director [name of 
position] was that I had an objective to develop an open and learning 
culture, which I think we've done in many respects. "(11: 77) 
Although the hospital was one of the first Trusts to establish a system of electronic 
instant reporting (as acknowledged in the CHAI report), it was noted that the number 
of incidents reported was not high, and that this might result from the presence of a 
`fear culture' promoted by the previous management team. The internal documents 
show a very significant increase in the number of incidents (about 4000% over three 
years) reported by the staff, following the cultural change encouraged by the new 
management team. Within the system, clinical and non-clinical risks are integrated. 
Staff from different groups and at different levels of seniority within the groups, 
report mistakes and problems, providing a possible indirect measure of how 
effectively the Trust is developing an open learning culture. One of the matrons 
emphasised that there were now more opportunities to talk with senior managers 
about any problems: 
"If something happened and I didn't feel that it was right, I could go to 
my chief nurse without any hesitation, I feel that we've got quite an 
open policy, I do think we've got quite an open approach really. " 
(57: 43) 
"' Im not afraid to raise an issue with them. No matter how difficult that 
issue is. I would say that of the CEO as well. " (39: 22) 
"I don't feel as though if anything goes wrong I'm not afraid of being 
blamed or being sacked, [... ], I don't feel threatened by making 
mistakes. " (17: 126) 
The participants expressed the opinion that a strong culture of risk management 
within the Trust had been developed over the last couple of years. One described how 
the SHA had been provided with honest and open reports of certain, enabling them to 
assist the Trust in dealing with these problems. Such an open and transparent culture 
also helped the Trust to gain the trust and support of the SHA. A member of the 
Performance Development Team reported that the Trust's managers were very candid 
and willing to provide the information required by PDT members. The Trust 
managers tried to tackle the different problems openly rather than declaring that they 
would deal them by not involving other organisations. 
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Encouragement of a'can do' culture: 
Several interviewees stated that a `can do' culture was encouraged by senior 
managers, who tried to support staff in carrying out their jobs. One of the external 
interviewees reported that the culture of the organisation was changing from a 'cannot 
do' culture to a `can do' culture and she added that it had become unacceptable within 
the Trust, for clinicians and managers to say they were not going to do a particular 
task. The external interviewees confirmed the presence of the `can do' culture and as 
one of them stated: 
"Chief Executive and his team which communicated and modelled for 
the rest of the people in the organisation that performance 
improvement was important and conveyed a belief I think, a belief that 
we can do this, we can be successful. " (45: 89) 
"There has definitely been a development in a growing of a" can do " 
culture, here, you know solution focused rather that blaming and 
shaming which I think was how, maybe, you could have characterised 
the culture in the past. " (12: 45) 
Development of performance management culture: 
It was reported that one of the most important cultural changes within the Trust was 
the development of the performance management culture among staff at all levels of 
the organisation. It was emphasised by some of the interviewees that staff (both 
clinical and non clinical) had more awareness of their own performance than before 
and were now trying to take ownership of their activities. One clinical director noted 
that, although clinicians did not recognise the zero star rating and believed the quality 
of care within the Trust to be good, they did acknowledge that things needed to be 
changed in order to gain a better star rating. In general, it was perceived that more 
awareness of performance had been created between different groups in the 
organisation. 
"I think, as a Trust, there was a huge culture shift probably over the last 
18 months in people actually taking ownership of this target [A &E 
target] and you know, the medical consultants appreciating that they 
had a part to play in achieving it. " (33: 71) 
The development of the performance management culture was perceived as an 
essential aspect of performance improvement. However, it was viewed as a short term 
strategy to meet the targets and not viewed as the key cultural change strategy that 
would probably maintain sustainable performance improvement. 
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Cultural change in ways of working: 
Several interviewees agreed that there was an attempt to change the culture in ways of 
working. They stated that the executive team offered helpful suggestions and possible 
ways of working, with the emphasis on working together rather than instructing staff 
to carry out a task that they actually would be unable to complete. Staff perceived that 
their contributions were valued. An interviewee argued that now there was a 
constructive methodology in place and advice was being given about how things 
should be carried out. The CHAI report also highlighted this issue and suggested that 
the organisation should create a more open culture with more effective ways of 
working together. Several interviewees, from senior and middle managerial levels, 
believed that staff were now being encouraged to work differently, in ways that helped 
each other and that made the team more effective. Senior managers reported that the 
implementation of the Organisational Development programme (detailed in previous 
sections) was an attempt to sustain a positive culture of change throughout the 
organisation. 
"It's a combination of change, certainly there's been a cultural change 
that is more about working to get the same ends, there's more working 
together, there's more partnership now. We appear to be less in conflict 
overall. " (40: 131) 
"So in terms of sustaining that culture change we've embarked upon a 
programme of organisational development which is really about 
empowering front line staff and empowering divisions and being very, 
very clear about roles and responsibilities. " (4: 39) 
One interviewee gave an example of the existence of a better working relationship 
between A&E and the clinical assessment unit, and believed that the 4 hours A&E 
targets are now perceived as a corporate issue rather than a departmental concern. 
One manager gave as an example, if a patient or relative complains, instead of staff 
pointing them to the complaints procedure, they would try to understand the problem 
and help resolve it. 
"Yes huge amount (conflict between A&E and other wards) but it is so 
much better now and I think it's because it just takes a long time for 
change to be accepted but yes, initially we weren't really working that 
closely with the medical assessment unit and they would call for 
patients 5 minutes before the 4 hours is up, which doesn't give you time 
to get porters, organise yourself. So we now have an excellent working 
relationship with them and we know as soon as they have a bed ready, 
that they will ring us. " (33: 187) 
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Alternatively, it was reported by interviewees that over the first two years of the 
turnaround process, the focus was a'top down' performance management system and 
implementation of a transactional style of leadership. The organisation had not been 
concentrating on empowering staff. Some interviewees, particularly those from lower 
levels working in clinical units, believed that the dominant culture that had developed 
within the organisation was in the main concerned with short term gains (targets). 
They believed that in this environment, where the targets were the main focus, staff 
seemed `frightened' of innovation. One interviewee noted that cultural change was the 
next step and that it was necessary to establish a performance focused organisation 
when trying to ensure sustained improvement. 
"I think a lot of culture issues still remain and were just starting on an 
organisation development programme with the divisions and the 
divisional directors to try and understand some of those issues and to 
try and help turn those around, so that we are very transactional in 
terms of [requiring staff] do as I say, as opposed to maybe being more 
transformational. " (23: 36) 
One of the middle managers believed that the organisation had difficulties in 
establishing its own identity when determining strategies to turnaround the situation. 
Because there were two different behavioural expectations, it meant that on one hand 
the organisation wanted to support staff and encourage organisational development, 
and on the other, being very target driven, it felt that targets could not be achieved 
without a very aggressive approach. The interviewee likened this to a case of 
`schizophrenia'. However, he added that in order to meet the targets and gain stars, it 
seemed that there was no option than to use an assertive approach and, after the 
targets were achieved, the maintenance approach could be slightly softer. Most 
interviewees favoured tight management control. 
"I think the organisation, over the full 2 years since I've been here has 
had difficulties in identifying which sort of organisation it really is and 
if you go into one meeting it will feel very positive and you go into the 
next meeting, it will feel very aggressive and difficult. " (24: 34) 
Cultural change takes time: 
All interviewees held the common view that any change of culture would take a long 
time to become embedded within the organisation. A senior manager emphasised that 
the Trust embarked upon a programme of organisational development with its main 
focus on empowering frontline staff, empowering divisions and clarifying the roles 
and responsibilities of staff. The aim was to devolve authority to staff at lower levels, 
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enabling them to develop their own services, in accordance with the performance 
improvement plan, and to learn to use it as a tool to run their departments as small 
businesses but still with responsibility for meeting targets. It was expected that staff 
would develop their own strategies and chair meetings on performance improvement. 
Three senior managers felt that it was time that staff from lower levels of the 
organisation, experienced more ownership of some of the issues about which the 
Trust was concerned. 
7.2.3.3 Extending services and modernisation 
When the Trust received its three star status, the senior managers were attempting to 
implement a range of strategies. These included extending services (e. g. particularly 
day case services) and modernisation to increase the probability of a sustained 
performance improvement and enhancement of service quality. Some of these 
strategies were planned in order to respond to the new market based policies (e. g. 
Payment by Result, patient choice). The strategies planned by the Trust were: 
The Modernisation Agency's io high impact changes: 
The members of the Board stated that they were aiming to align and remodel the 
detailed performance plan into one that focused on the Modernisation Agency's io 
high impact changes, which would re-focus the direction of the Trust. It was believed 
this could provide the Trust with a better basis for future development and respond to 
the Payment by Results funding regime. 
"I thought what we need to do is some kind of massive performance 
improvement programme across the organisation and make sure that 
the PIP is linked to our modernisation programme" (16: 71) 
Some middle managers reported that, despite the good ideas inherent in the 10 high 
impact changes (e. g. extending day case surgery), they would be very unlikely to 
achieve the aim of 75% of all operations being carried out as day surgery. The pockets 
of very high deprivation in the Trust's catchments area produce a high incidence of 
co-morbidity that would make it difficult for the Trust to reach this target. 
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Extending day case services: 
One strategy was to develop the day case services, enabling the Trust to be more 
efficient in competing with other Trusts and the private sector in the provision of 
clinical services. 
Extension of specialist services to other neighbourhood organisations: 
Three senior managers maintained that the Trust proposed to work with its 
neighbouring hospital, assisting in the delivery of services and likewise, working with 
neighbouring acute Trusts and PCTs developing specialist services for other units in 
the Trust's local area. 
7.3 Impact of external organisations in the turnaround process 
Most interviewees cited the role of a range of external organisations in initiating 
change, developing, implementing and monitoring the performance improvement 
plan. The role of external organisations in triggering change was explored in Chapter 
6. Both the positive and negative impacts of external organisations on the turnaround 
process, are presented in this section. 
These organisations were considered important resources, especially by new senior 
managers, in providing staff with a different perspective on the problems and helping 
the Trust to direct its focus and determine its priorities. The new management team 
were obliged to accept the external staff who came to the Trust's assistance, there 
being no alternative, certain members of the Board were emphatic that, should a 
similar situation occur in the future, they would invite these external organisations to 
come in, rather than wait for them to intervene. 
Despite the fact that almost all interviewees viewed external organisations as 
supportive, some senior managers and clinicians perceived that there had been too 
many external staff in the Trust at the same time carrying out investigations. This had 
caused problems for the Trust when trying to focus on the process of change. One 
member of the Board likened it to a `review city', and the executives felt that they were 
regularly required to deal with different groups, provide the necessary documentation 
and attend various meetings. Too much managerial time (on the part of both senior 
and middle managers) was being taken up with servicing external requirements. 
Senior managers believed that in some instances they had not been given adequate 
time to carry out their own work. The most prominent external organisations engaged 
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in this process were the Strategic Health Authority (SHA), the Audit Commission, the 
local PCT, the performance Development Team (PDT) of the previous Modernisation 
Agency, the Health Care Commission (CHAI) and the Department of Health. The role 
of each organisation is briefly as follows: 
i) Role of the SHA 
The SHA played an important role in triggering change by providing a report 
following their in-depth investigation. This had been requested by the new CEO when 
the waiting list irregularities became apparent. In the role they played as a 
performance management agent, the SHA followed a close monitoring and 
micromanagement of the process of implementation of the PIP through weekly 
meetings with some of the Trust's senior managers (executives and performance 
team) and the PCT representative during initial stages in the first year. One of the 
interviewees reported that the weekly meeting between the SHA and the Trust, was 
one of the strengths of the SHA, not only in terms of communication, but also in 
summarising the issues, reviewing performance problems and meeting requirements 
for dealing with the problems. A senior SHA manager stated that the data should be 
accessible for managers to review on a regular basis, which meant at least weekly, to 
monitor the performance; otherwise it was not thought to be beneficial. An 
information analysis team, based in the SHA, analysed the quantitative data 
forwarded by the Trust and produced a briefing report to aid in judging the level of 
performance. Subsequently, the SHA were said to have used this kind of meeting as a 
benchmark for other zero star trusts. One of its managers, described the SHA's role as 
providing challenge, clarity and coherence, ensuring that the Trust was focused on 
what it needed to do and managing situations where the Trust was under achieving. 
Several interviewees, senior managers and clinical directors, perceived the SHA as 
being very supportive, noting that at the time the SHA recognised that the new 
management team faced considerable challenges and needed support rather than 
disciplinary action. They added that, at that stage, the Trust needed a `hands on' 
approach to staffing, because there were not enough experienced staff in some areas 
to actually `cover the ground' and get the `work done'. The SHA sent some personnel 
who were based at the Trust for a week, to investigate and help the Trust with waiting 
list data, service redevelopment in the maternity unit and so forth. 
"I think the SHA have been quite supportive, not financially as such, but 
I think psychological support and giving support as opposed to the new 
team and making it clear they were maybe supporting the new team 
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and that I suppose gives you more credibility if you like in the 
organisation itself. So I think that was helpful. " (46: 68) 
"They (SHA) were, I think quite supportive around the trust 
management, around the trust leadership. They certainly weren't 
trying to organize change in leadership. They were supporting those 
leaders. I think they then sort of backed off from my perspective and let 
the trust get on with it. " (37: 141) 
"I think the Strategic Health Authority was offering expertise, advice in 
terms of understanding, say the waiting list profile. They offer 
analytical skills and that was at the time one of their strengths and I 
guess it's the sort of support that you can't turn down in that sense. " 
(45: 69) 
All the interviewees in clinical-managerial positions perceived the SHA as being 
supportive, although they believed that such close scrutiny was not always 
comfortable for the Trust's staff. Some managers did not completely support this 
belief, arguing that it was a difficult time for managers as they had to provide very 
detailed information for investigators and could not make decisions without first 
submitting them for checking. Managers reported that they needed to obtain SHA 
approval of everything they proposed to do, particularly in services development. 
They likened it to `having big brother looking over your shoulder all the time' and 
added that the SHA wanted to ensure that the Trust was doing things correctly. 
"The ability to make decisions on your own without checking them or 
being constantly asked for information at short notice, that was very 
wearing. It was like doing your job with like carrying somebody on 
your shoulders, they were stopping you from doing your job so it was 
kind of like a double life, which I guess I would have had less of that 
than my colleagues but I know [name of a director] when she was 
trying to sort out the problems with the waiting list and so on was 
constantly barraged with questions and checking of everything. " 
(11: 95) 
Two managers had a negative view of this kind of SHA role and described it as a 
hindrance, especially in the first stage. They believed that the SHA did not allow the 
Trust to use its potential and capability to turnaround the situation. One also noted 
that the managerial ability of both the SHA and PCT organisations was limited to 
achieving only short term targets. They felt this inhibited the organisation's progress 
as the SHA challenged anything that threatened the achievement of targets. The Trust 
did not welcome the SHA, feeling they were continually negative and always 
highlighted aspects of performance that had not been delivered. 
I think initially they were quite a hindrance because they didn't trust 
us to get on with it" (23: 52) 
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"So certainly the Strategic Health Authority was seen as a kind of pest 
really. I think they still see the Health Authority as a bit of a pest, [... J 
and as an external nuisance really. " (8: 111) 
A manager in the Directorate of Operations stated that they realised at the time that 
things would `get worse before they got better'. After a year in which the Trust showed 
improvement in its performance, the number of meetings between the SHA and the 
Trust and the pressure from the SHA were reduced. However, the SHA transferred 
responsibility for meetings to the local PCT and expected the PCT to manage the 
Trust's performance, as opposed to the previous arrangement where both the PCT and 
the Trust went directly to the SHA. The aim of the SHA in one-to-one visits, was 
reported to be an attempt to develop more capability among managers, as they began 
to look at their systems and processes. The SHA currently meets the PCTs twice a 
month to receive information on the Trust's performance. 
"We were like on weekly monitoring from the SHA. We had visits from 
the SHA as a regular occurrence, we were asked to do over and above 
what they were asking the organisation to do in terms of reporting 
monitoring and that's completely gone now. I mean they kind of leave 
us to it now. " (23: 40) 
"Well the monitoring was very close when the performance was poor 
but over time that monitoring has become substantially less" (18: 177) 
The SHA behaved as a performance management agent, exercising close monitoring 
in the first two years and supporting the Trust by sending `hands on' staff to help the 
Trust with key performance targets, such as waiting lists. Their objective was, 
nevertheless, to develop capability in the Trust rather than intervene directly. Their 
action prompted the Trust to focus its attention on targets and performance issues 
through regular weekly meetings. 
ii) Role of the Audit Commission 
The role of the Audit Commission was perceived as a strong trigger for change, and its 
recommendations, which were included in the report, played an important role in 
developing the action plan. Because of the nature of the Audit Commission Office, it 
did not have much impact on the implementation of the PIP, but it audited the Trust a 
year after the start of the implementation of the action plan, comparing its 
performance with that of the previous year. 
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iii) Role of the Performance Develop Team (PDT) 
Background: 
In the process of turnaround, the Trust was supported by a Performance Development 
Team (PDT) which was a part of the Modernisation Agency (MA). The precursors of 
the PDT were two different teams in the NHS Modernisation Agency (MA), namely 
the Clinical Governance Rapid Response Unit (RRU) and the Performance 
Improvement Team (PIT). These were merged to form the PDT. The PDT was 
working with all the zero star rated organisations, including primary care, acute, 
ambulance and mental health trusts to provide support and facilitate organisational 
turnaround. In 2002, the Modernisation Agency only assisted acute trusts to 
turnaround their poor performance (DoH, 2004; Harvey et al., 2005 ). 
Before explaining the role of the PDT in the Trust under study, the routine schedule 
followed by the PDT should be clarified. A cluster leader co-ordinated the work of the 
PDT in each of the geographical clusters and a client manager was responsible for 
organising the work in each individual zero star rated trust. Following the 
appointment of a client manager, s/he arranged the first engagement meetings with 
the Trust and other relevant organisations, in order to reach an agreement on the 
action plan using different interventions and development programmes to turnaround 
the organisation. The diagnostic process was an important part of these meetings and 
the capacity of the organisation was also taken into consideration. A formal 
contractual agreement was then drawn up between the PDT and the Trust, which 
encompassed the process involved in the implementation of the plan, and the time 
that the PDT was scheduled to withdraw from the organisation. Subsequently, client 
managers of the PDT and other staff from the Modernisation Agency became 
responsible for delivering the plan. The PDT categorised zero star rated organisations 
into groups reflecting high, medium and low levels of intervention required to 
improve their performance. Their level of acceptance of the PDT, and the nature and 
size of the problems they encountered, affected performance, so it was stressed that 
the PDT was dealing with each organisation individually, rather than applying a'one 
size fits all' solution (Harvey et al., 2005). 
Initial engagement meeting arranged by the PDT client manager: 
In this case, when the client manager of the PDT was assigned, he reported that he 
already knew the Trust's history and background, and he tried to engage with the 
Trust during the initial stage. A meeting Between the CEO and Deputy CEO of the 
248 
Trust, and the SHA and PCT representatives seemed to him an appropriate way of 
ascertaining the views of different relevant organisations regarding the Trust's 
situation and problems in the local health economy. However, he stressed that other 
strategies had been used to stimulate engagement with other organisations on the 
basis of their situations. The client manager reported that a' tailor-made' approach 
was pursued, responding to the special needs of the Trusts rather than a trying to 
effect a generic solution. 
"When you (client manager) go to work with an organisation you have 
to make sure that you're going to work with them in the way that's 
specific to them. So I wouldn't come to that trust saying well but this is 
what I normally do. I do this every time for every organisation. ' So I do 
the same thing all the time because the same things would not be 
necessarily what each organisation needs. " (37: 18) 
Role of the PDT in diagnosis and development of the action plan: 
In this instance, the PDT did not play an important role in problem diagnosis, because 
that had already been done by the Trust following external reports (as previously 
outlined), before the PDT team entered the organisation, and in addition, the Trust 
had already developed its action plan. The members of the PDT, felt the action plan to 
be sufficiently robust and they did not see the need for a more formal review of the 
plan. The PDT team focused on the implementation of the action plan and its effects. 
The PDT client manager maintained that there was an audit trail, which had reduced 
their need for monitoring and reporting. 
"They weren't in need of intensive support. They had a lot of work to do, 
but in terms of somebody describing what that was or diagnosing it, it 
wasn't that they weren't that bad. They've already done that. They were 
beyond that. " (37: 43) 
PDT members reported that the Trust's managers were very clear about what they 
wanted and needed to do and the Trust was viewed as a proactive organisation in 
developing an action plan. It was stated that the Trust's managers wished to own the 
action plan themselves so the PDT did not have to contribute to developing the PIP. 
The PDT client manager felt that the Trust could initiate its own turnaround process, 
so there was no need for external interventions to remedy the situation. That was also 
emphasised by some of the Trust's senior managers, one of whom said: 
"We were being very proactive so that the Modernisation Agency didn't 
need to come and bring its own team in, which isn't what we wanted 
because we felt we could turn things around ourselves. We didn't want 
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a team coming from outside, so we 
sure that things got turned around 
Function of the PDT: 
took the role on internally to make 
 (14: 74) 
The PDT client manager stated that senior managers of the Trust requested skilled, 
`hands on' staff to help the Trust, rather than the provision of training sessions. There 
were two different perspectives on the function of members of the PDT. Some were 
not viewed as very effective by several senior managers and clinicians within the 
Trust. They were seen as staff who did not have adequate expertise and skills, did not 
spend sufficient time within the Trust to understand the system, and they were 
thought to not to be `hands on' staff. One interviewee criticised staff who came in on a 
one-off basis and gave their views or opinions (one-off diagnostic) on how the Trust's 
staff should do their jobs. He believed that such a short `diagnostic' relationship rarely 
resulted in performance improvement and, even if it did, it would not be sustainable 
because behavioural change could not be embedded in such a short time. One 
interviewee argued that the PDT brought in nurses from the Modernisation Agency in 
order to facilitate change in A&E, but it seemed that the nurses were not helpful and 
the changes superficial. He added that neither nurses, nor the Trust, knew how to 
translate these suggestions into changed behaviour. For example, it was not clear 
whether to team up, do a ward round every day, or do proactive discharge planning. It 
was said that they presented general solutions in order to solve the problems without 
understanding what the problems were. This was not welcomed by the Trust, and 
some clinicians in particular responded in a less than positive way. 
"I think there were a number of performance improvement assessors 
and teams in but clearly they were not effective. Now, in my 
judgement, they were not effective either because the people that came 
here were not terribly effective or, more likely, I think there are flaws 
around that one- off hit and I think it's something to do with the 
continuing relationship which is both facilitating and challenging and I 
think you're more likely to combine facilitation and effective challenge 
with a continuing relationship. " (26: 124) 
"I think there were certain individuals [members of the PDT] who they 
felt came in and were supposed to do a job but maybe didn't have the 
skills or the understanding of the system before they could change it 
and didn't have the time to spend getting to know the system. So in 
some aspects they were welcomed but I think there were others where 
someone was supposed to come in and help but actually all they did 
was make the consultants angry or upset staff who were already upset, 
so I think the timing had to be right or the input had to be right and in 
some cases that wasn't the case. " (8: 127) 
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"We had an emergency care collaborative, we had an action arm, we had quite a few visits from the Modernisation Agency saying, what can 
we do to help you? But in actual fact, in terms of feeding them where 
you're up to, that consumed an awful lot of time, we didn't necessarily 
get the same benefit from them. " (23: 62) 
In contrast, one of the PDT members was perceived by both internal and 
external interviewees as an effective and supportive individual who focused on 
A&E and the discharge process. He was a consultant who had a medical 
background, was Deputy Medical Director in his own Trust at that time, and 
also had experience of working with other trusts as a member of the Winter 
Emergency Services Team, to help the trusts to achieve performance 
improvements in their emergency departments. Several participants reported 
that he was an enthusiastic and realistic individual who did not try to solve all 
the problems at once and spent an adequate amount of time (2 to 3 days a 
week) observing and gaining an understanding of how the services operated 
and listening to the staff, rather than just suggesting what they needed to do. 
The participants considered that that PDT member had relevant experience 
and skills and was the right person for the job. 
Some interviewees reported that certain clinical directors were not willing to 
collaborate with him, but he identified those clinicians who were keen to 
cooperate and had a sense of the importance of the star rating for the 
organisation, whether they had signed up to it or not. The external consultant 
clearly placed emphasis on the role of those clinicians and stated: "We focused 
really on those individuals". The external consultant was working in the Trust 
for i8 months and he believed that the continuity of that relationship helped 
him to collaborate more effectively with clinical directors, arguing that 
performance improvement was fundamentally about changing behaviour and 
attitudes and that it required a better working relationship. He felt that an 
organisation needed to have a sense of local ownership of the issues that 
needed to be changed, in order to sustain those changes once the external 
improvement team exited the organisation. 
The external consultant also explained that, during the first stage, he confronted the 
Trust's clinicians and managers about their own data, which demonstrated their 
problems, and then it was necessary to find ways to change behaviour without causing 
revolution in the ranks and unhappiness and tension. He reported that he tried to 
compare the function and behaviour of certain clinicians and their job descriptions 
and the resulting comparison revealed that they clinicians did not follow their job 
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descriptions, especially on ward rounds and when discharging patients. Rather than 
using a daily system for discharging patients, clinicians chose to use only two days per 
week. This system was perceived as a cause of bed blockage. The external consultant 
was reported to have raised the problem and tried to translate its recognition into 
changes in clinical behaviour. That would help eliminate the problem and provide a 
performance framework to sustain possible solutions. He argued that it was difficult 
to challenge the clinicians' belief system on a day-to-day, collegiate, on-going working 
relationship, because they wished to avoid conflict. He stressed that if the clinicians' 
belief systems were to be challenged it had to be on quite an evidential basis and 
should be carried out by an individual who knew how the clinicians behaved. He 
perceived himself as an individual who had those characteristics, and this was a 
significant help. He added that the clinicians in the Trust accepted him, as he was 
seen as a clinician who had made changes in his own organisation in terms of 
performance improvement. He saw his role as a challenging facilitator, encouraging 
people to implement change. In contrast, one of the Trust's consultants was negative 
about the discharge plan introduced by the external consultant, believing that it had 
affected the quality of care. 
"I can only presume that, firstly, they have found me helpful and, 
secondly, the style I use is challenging but doesn't create revolution, but 
I am quite forthright and capable of confronting difficult colleagues 
with very rigid mindsets and trying to explore ways in which they 
might be prepared to contribute, in a kind of corporate way, to improve 
the quality of care that patients receive. " (26: 116 
One of the A &E senior nurses stressed that the external consultant had an important 
role to play in helping the department to achieve the 4 hours target by presenting 
innovative ideas, engagement of staff and in particular clinicians, and encouraging 
staff ownership of the target. She stated: 
"When he (external consultant) started to look at how the Trust was 
going to achieve the 4 hour target because at that stage we were a long 
way off it, he was very good at pulling everybody together and 
involving everybody. You know, there was a lot of reluctance from a lot 
of people who didn't feel A&E 4 hour target was their problem at all and 
they didn't see how they needed to contribute to it. he was very 
innovative and had a lot of ideas [... ], he was very inclusive again and 
wanted people to participate" (33: 71) 
PDT exit from the Trust: 
The contract between the PDT and the Trust was for 6 months, in the 
first instance, 
but the PDT client manager realised that they did not need to renew the contract as 
252 
the Trust did not need further support. However, the Trust was willing to continue to 
collaborate with the external consultant on A&E issues and the discharge process. 
Some interviewees reported that the ultimate test of the external consultant's success 
was for the Trust to request he keep collaborating with it for longer than the period of 
the original contract. 
iv) Role of the PCT 
There were controversial views on the role of the PCT in the turnaround process. A 
senior manager of the PCT believed that it helped the Trust particularly through 
demand management within primary care. However, she added that there was a 
mixed relationship, because probably the PCT was seen by the Trust as `a bit of 
nuisance' but they needed the PCT, as they knew it could help them with matters such 
as the process of patient referral, booking targets and choice. A Trust manager also 
emphasised the important role of the PCT and how it affected the performance of the 
Trust and she said: 
"Obviously a lot of what we [the Trust managers] do is dependent on 
what happens in primary care, so they will be feeding things into it and 
there are joint responsibilities with primary care, it's dependent on 
what happens in primary care as well. " (14: 58) 
Some interviewees saw the two different roles of the PCT as including monitoring the 
performance of the hospital in order to make sure the that Trust was doing as it had 
said, and introducing changes were necessary in Primary Care and had an impact on 
the Trust's performance. For example, one of the problems confronting the Trust was 
the large number of patients attending A&E without referral, or that GPs referred to 
the Trust. It was argued that the PCT had different strategies for reducing referrals, 
such as providing greater and faster access to GPs and making the walk-in-centres 
more effective. Those were areas in which the Trust was reportedly willing to work 
with the PCT, because it left the Trust with more time to focus on real emergencies 
and specialised care. The Trust managers affirmed that there was a good working 
relationship with the PCT, and that an improved partnership had developed between 
the PCT and the Trust, which had gone from traditional performance management 
and a contracting role into a more collaborative arrangement. However, a trust senior 
manager stated that the PCT had not given sufficient consideration to the patient 
overload occurring in the Trust. 
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In contrast, certain Trust managers believed that, although the PCT was involved with 
the Trust, it was not particularly helpful because the PCT was fairly new organisation 
trying to become established and it could not help the Trust by reducing patients 
referral and facilitating the discharge of patients. For example, one reported that the 
PCT closed a walk-in centre to save money, without considering its affect on the 
hospital's A&E Department. In addition, a Trust manager did not have very positive 
view of the PCT's role as she felt they were setting unrealistic targets and expectations 
for surgery, from the governance point of view, when the new community hospital was 
opened at the old hospital (hospital B). She added that it seemed `they don't live in the 
same world as me". 
7.4 Unintended and dysfunctional consequences of turnaround 
interventions 
A range of unintended and adverse consequences of implementing turnaround 
interventions were believed to have had a negative effect on the organisation and on 
service delivery to patients. 
Pressure and stress perceived by staff due to high level of workload: Almost all 
interviewees stressed that staff had come under a high level of stress owing to the 
pressure of a high workload and continual change in order to achieve the performance 
targets. Staff reported that they were still under pressure to sustain the Trust's 
performance at a high level and to achieve the next target, which was obtaining 
Foundation status. Furthermore, they argued that the targets set by government and 
also by the Trust, were becoming more stringent and difficult to achieve. For 
example, it was reported that the Trust achieved the CNST Level 2 (The Clinical 
Negligence Scheme for Trusts), despite the fact that it was difficult to reach. The 
improvement was appreciated by the CEO but then the CEO expected achievement of 
CNST Level 3, which meant that there was constant pressure on staff to continuously 
improve their performance. The matter had caused serious concerns about staff 
morale, especially staff working in clinical areas such as A&E. Even staff at a junior 
level reported that they were not sure how moving from zero to three stars was 
relevant to them, or what difference it had made to them, apart from putting them 
under constant pressure to achieve targets. Staff were reported to have left the Trust 
due to this high level of pressure. 
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"The expectations will continue to grow and so all of the standards 
we've been measuring ourselves are going to get tighter and so how 
does an organisation continue to deliver against that background? 
Very, very difficult. " (22: 186) 
Some middle managers reported that several posts were not filled when the staff took 
maternity leave or were being seconded, as the Trust was working under a financial 
recovery plan and other staff needed to work harder to cover the gaps. Some middle 
and junior managers said that they were under enormous pressure from senior 
management to achieve their targets, and that it had caused a high level of stress for 
them, which they inevitably transferred to those working for them. The nursing staff 
also highlighted the high degree of pressure related to the retrenchment and cost 
control strategies (detailed in section 7.2.2. ). An executive member of the Board 
argued that it was a `pressurised' system within which the staff were dealing with an 
increasing number of patients who were very sick. Senior managers believed that a 
certain amount of pressure was inevitable when trying to turnaround poor 
performance, particularly in the first stages. On the other hand, middle managers 
believed that the level of pressure imposed upon staff below them at organisational 
level should be reasonable; otherwise they were not able to work properly. 
"There's consistently this hill after hill that you've got to try and climb 
over and I seriously don't think you can maintain that for much longer 
than a couple of years " (24: 118) 
A high daily workload causes staff to loose their protected learning time, which means 
that the processes of staff development and training are affected adversely. 
"You can't make people fill these things in, they are under enormous 
pressure in their day job and I think they also have probably not 
enough time; there's not enough protected learning time. "(7: 77) 
The results of staff satisfaction surveys did not show any significant difference in 
satisfaction between the time that the Trust was rated as zero star (2003) and later on 
three stars (2004), though in general both surveys presented satisfactory results. Two 
senior managers of the Trust said that these results might echo the notion that the 
staff were under pressure, but another executive member of the Board stated that the 
results of staff satisfaction survey did not show the real picture owing to difficulties in 
measuring such a complex issue. On the other hand, some interviewees, particularly 
senior managers, noted that staff were proud of their achievements and their attitude 
towards their organisation was positive in terms of developing and improving 
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services. They reported that the staff accepted the pressure because they thought that 
the Trust was moving in the right direction in relation to improving its performance. 
"But, you know, you are more confident to go out and say actually this 
is a great place and this is what we're doing. So I think it's been a real 
boost to people like winning the [name of award] performance award 
last year. " (12: 55) 
Several staff, especially those at junior level, reported that the Trust's senior 
management team rewarded the staff's attempt to assist in gaining three star status by 
giving them each a box of chocolates. They felt this compared unfavourably with 
another Trust in their area that had given its staff an extra day off when they had 
achieved three stars. He added that the staff perceived that they were not rewarded 
enough for the level of time and effort that they had shown, causing them to feel 
demoralised. 
Tunnel vision and impact on quality of patient care: 
Several interviewees, both clinical and non-clinical, highlighted that the focus of the 
Trust was on the measurable targets during turnaround, and a large amount of time 
was being spent on details of individual patients in order to move targets forward (e. g. 
waiting list targets). This left very little time to look at softer and more qualitative 
aspect of patient care. 
"There are many critics of the targets and I don't feel that I'm a critic or a 
fan. I think they've changed the way we work. I feel that they've been 
positive at making improvements towards the NHS plan. But I think 
there's been a price to pay for that and I think that in some cases the price 
to pay has been the quality of care that patients receive. The quality of 
care that patients receive and I'm not really a fan of that. I feel that's not 
good. " (39: 150) 
"But the clinical teams feel a number of issues are being sidelined and 
ignored because of this concentration of effort and time on target 
achievement. Now, target achievement as well as taking us frý om zero 
stars up to three, can't argue with that, but it's at what cost and I think 
that is where a number of clinical teams including myself have an issue. 
(42: 22) 
Now it seems very split, it seems very, very competitive, people seem 
quite frightened of any innovation, much more focused on the targets as 
opposed to the patients and sadly at times it seems that the patients get 
in the way of the targets, whereas it should be the targets are there for 
the patients but it actually seems now that patients get in the way of the 
targets really. " (20: 23) 
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For example, most `clinical' respondents (clinicians and staff working in the wards) 
highlighted two negative side effects of focusing on the 4 hour A&E target, relating to 
patient care. Firstly, the interviewees believed that, as the Trust's managers proposed 
not to breach the 4 hour A&E target, an attempt was made to try to find beds for 
patients waiting in the A&E Department, even if it meant sending them to an 
inappropriate ward and transferring them later. These patients were reported to have 
been admitted to wards that may not have been equipped to cope with their 
conditions and whose staff were likely to have insufficient skills and knowledge to 
understand them. Some interviewees stressed that, when staff were under a high level 
of pressure, needing to make decisions more quickly and work faster, the process of 
appropriate patient care may be adversely affected, increasing the probability of the 
occurrence of errors (e. g. risk of being given wrong medication and risks associated 
with moving patients). The staff at the ward level stressed that they were distracted by 
middle managers, particularly bed managers, trying to provide beds for those 
patients. It was reported that sometimes the ward staff did not allocate beds to 
elective patients in order to accommodate patients from the A&E Department. A 
consultant reported that this led to a non-productive workload and demoralisation of 
staff. 
"That can be a problem really because as I say, this is a cardiothoracic 
surgery ward and we find when we have empty beds, this is the big 
change you mean from a few years ago really, because of the targets in 
A&E the 4 hour wait and that type of thing, we find we get a lot of patients 
that aren't our own, such a variety of patients in fact at the moment. " 
(36: 98) 
"Wards continually feel they're being harassed and bullied into making 
decisions that clinically seem unsafe" (29: 41) 
Secondly, clinical staff reported that managers asked them to maintain a higher 
turnover of patients in order to free up beds for emergency admissions and also to 
meet the waiting list targets for surgery. The staff felt that the patients were being 
discharged sooner than they should be, and that that was not satisfactory as some of 
them came back to the Trust because their care had not been completed. 
"From time to time some people have been discharged too soon and that 
isn't good care. I'm sure they won't appreciate the fact that they've been 
discharged too early but we're doing it because if we don't do it we can't 
get the patient from A&E into a bed and it's a very dynamic system. " 
(39: 81) 
"I think probably again one of the biggest things that sticks in my mind 
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that became obvious this year really is the A&E4 hour target has had a 
real knock on effect on discharge and people being sent home before they 
feel they've got adequate support and then being re-admitted. " (20: 111) 
An interesting point, raised by a senior executive, concerned increasing the admission 
rate of patients who wished to come to the Trust after it had successfully shortened its 
waiting list and met its four hour A&E target. He reported that patients preferred to 
come into the Trust straight away for minor problems to be dealt with, rather than go 
to their GPs, because they had learnt that by doing so they were not going to have to 
wait for more than 4 hours for attention. It was perceived that the success of the Trust 
had an impact on its A&E workload, which increased demand for extra services in 
other units such as x-ray and clinical laboratory services. He reported that the senior 
executive team now took such issues into account when planning new developments. 
"We seem to be getting higher numbers of patients, as well, because they 
all know that they're going to be seen within the 4 hours, so sometimes it 
feels like, well go to A&E because we know well soon get sorted out 
within 4 hours, not 12 hours or a day like they used to be. " (35: 45) 
Some interviewees reported that the the government's emphasis on the importance of 
targets and monetary issues caused staff, and particularly doctors, to think more 
about the cost of services, the amount of money that they spent every year and its 
impact on the organisation. 
7.5 Facilitating factors 
A range of factors were perceived as key elements that facilitated the Trust's 
turnaround: 
Impact of receiving a zero star rating 
Several interviewees reported that the zero star rating achieved by the Trust and other 
negative external reports about its performance helped stimulate the processes of 
change and turnaround. Both senior and junior staff believed that the Trust should 
not have been rated as a zero star organisation, but that such a low rating did provide 
the staff with the incentive to improve the situation. One interviewee stated: 
"I think in some ways that external view actually did galvanize people 
internally. " (15: 55) 
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Impact of new management team 
Most interviewees, including those from external organisations, viewed the new 
management team as having a positive effect on the success of the turnaround 
process. Strong leadership, exhibited by the new management team, was highlighted 
and many had a very positive view of the composition and balance of the Board. 
"I think there is a very committed Director of Operations I think there 
were also some very good people in the team around that particular 
aspect of managing this organisation. " (26: 100) 
"I think strong leadership has really been the key to us moving frý om 0 to 3 
as far as the senior team go. " (27: 134) 
Communication improvement 
Interviewees at all organisational levels, believed that the communication within the 
organisation had improved and was a factor in helping the Trust to improve its 
performance. 
"The biggest factor in helping us improve was changing the executive team 
and communication those two things have definitely been a boon to us. " 
(25: 192) 
"So, the factors for me are just the amount of information we're now 
cascading to all areas. You know the waiting list clerks for instance, they 
know the rules, they know how long patients can wait, before they just 
used to book them in. "(44: 71) 
Role of the action plan in developing clear lines of accountability and 
ownership of performance issues 
Having created lines of clear accountability over the period of the turnaround process 
(explained in section 7.2.1.2), staff felt that ownership of the problems and 
responsibility for change were in place. In addition, a very clear reporting and 
measurement system had been defined for each issue and that was viewed as a 
facilitating factor. 
"You ve got to identify the people who are going to carry out the actions to 
the people that are permitted to the action that is theirs to do or be made to 
committed to do it in a performance way and then be carefully monitoring 
it. So individuals with dates that's to be completed by and you're to 
monitor it and make sure it's done. " (18: 269) 
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Focus on targets 
It was reported that there was no history of communicating the importance of key 
performance targets throughout the organisation and that 'cascading of information' 
helped the organisation to move forward. 
"So we were quite clear what we were doing, where our focus was, which indicators we were looking at, what the processes we're trying to address because otherwise you can try to do everything and you just fail again. " (23: 48) 
"The management keeping on top of them, because it's all to do with the 
targets really, that's why you get three stars, so it's keeping on top of that, 
I think that's definite. I wouldn't say communication, I'd say somebody at 
the top or the middle making sure that you reach the targets. " (31: 263) 
Focus on performance monitoring and management 
Several participants reported that the regular performance monitoring of divisions in 
relation to financial performance, HR indicators and quality issues, although it 
increased workload and pressure, helped the Trust to track fluctuations in the 
performance of the divisions and provided adequate time in which to sort out the 
problems. The senior management team, and particularly the Director of Operations, 
viewed information management as an important factor, in the provision of 
structured and timely data. Middle managers also stated that the data had become 
more accessible and accurate. It was reported that the Trust Board had been informed 
about the performance of the Trust in a very detailed performance report and that this 
kind of consistent information kept them aware of any trends and deviations. 
However, some staff, particularly middle and junior managers, suggested that such 
intense monitoring of performance may not be required in the long term. 
"I have to say, whilst I find it [tight performance management] 
discomforting, which I do, it nevertheless has achieved our turnaround, so 
was it right? And the answer is, well it probably was. " (18: 237) 
"I think looking at the 2 years that I have been here I was surprised at how 
far we were able to go with the very specific aggressive management 
individual patient level detail and forcing it the system, it didn't feel 
comfortable but it did actually achieve what it was intended to. "(24: 92) 
Organisational restructuring and internal working relationship 
Organisational restructuring (e. g. the change in several divisional and clinical 
directorates) and the development of new units and wards (e. g. discharge unit, CDU 
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unit) were viewed to facilitate the performance improvement process by helping to 
free up acute beds. 
Development of open culture 
Most interviewees argued that a significant factor in helping the Trust's performance 
improvement was the development of an open culture. It was reported that staff no 
longer `sat on' problems and that the performance concerns were being openly 
reported and discussed. Staff at different levels highlighted the fact that individuals 
were now willing to share more information and were more communicative with each 
other. 
Committed staff 
Senior managers reported that the commitment of staff helped to move the 
organisation forward. One expressed the opinion that the staff were working with the 
management team in a positive way rather than seeking to resist or undermine the 
required changes in working practices. It was also noted by senior managers that 
doctors and consultants working in the Trust were helpful and keen to support the 
management team during the process of change. This was regarded as a very positive 
factor that many senior managers had not experienced in their previous 
organisations. 
Development of better clinician-manager relationships 
It was reported that the Trust senior management team was keen to engage clinicians 
in decision making processes. An executive member of the Board noted that the most 
significant thing that the executive members of the Board did was gaining the 
confidence of the consulting body, and then being clear with them about the Trust's 
priorities. The new management team included key clinical consultants and 
encouraged them to get involved in contributing to the solution of problems. For 
example, clinicians were invited to be involved in the negotiation processes of 
developing targets for the local delivery plan, introduced by the Department of 
Health. They were given the opportunity to contribute and negotiate in the 
development of targets for policies (e. g. transfer of some activities from secondary to 
primary care). This was seen as a new process, as previously they had been given 
targets rather than taking part in developing them. A senior manager felt that the 
consulting body worked more flexibly in the change process because they saw that the 
new management team was concerned not only with financial issues, but also about 
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the quality of patient care. Even a senior manager from the SHA, believed that the 
incoming management team developed a new internal relationship, focusing 
principally on the relationship between managers and doctors. Several interviewees 
maintained that the younger consultants were more willing than older ones to align 
themselves with the targets and engage openly with the management team. 
"I think probably one of the most important things was getting some of the 
clinicians to become opinion leaders and champions of change. " (26: 104) 
"I think clinicians realised they couldn't work in their little boxes any more 
they had priorities and targets to meet. I think that managers realised the 
same and people started to work together more, be more open, you know, 
I'd say those were probably the main things. " (28: 147) 
A clinical director supported better clinician engagement from the senior 
management team and stated: 
"When you make a decision that is unpopular for Chief Exe and Chairman 
to invite you to the office to discuss it. So it makes me feel that I am being 
acknowledged, so I feel as though I'm a player in a good team and I hope 
that will grow and ideas like how to reorganise the hospital and the Chief 
Executive asked me how would you reorganise it and I said well you need 
accountability, you need theatres, it may not happen but at least I know 
I've made effort to give a clinicians view. So I think the fact that there is 
good dialogue, which is constructively critical. " (38: 37) 
Role of the external organisations 
Some interviewees stated that the external organisation had had a positive impact on 
the turnaround process. For instance, there were positive views about the latest CHAI 
report, which provided clear guidance for the executive team. As reported above, the 
guidance and documents from the government (e. g. the NHS Plan and lo high impact 
changes provided by the Modernisation Agency) helped to clarify the Trust's strategic 
direction. The role of the national audit programme in bringing staff together, 
increasing multidisciplinary working, and raising awareness of issues, was also seen 
as a facilitative factor by a few interviewees. Some regarded external medical 
consultants, recruited by the PDT, as helpful agents in recovering A&E targets. The 
role of the SHA was also significant in the turnaround process as it used a closer 
performance management system, which provided more support and improved 
working relationships. The SHA also effected changes at senior management level. 
However, some interviewees reported that these external reports (CHAI, the SHA 
report, and National Audit report), on their own, did not enable the Trust to achieve 
three star status. 
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Development of external relationships 
Some participants expressed the opinion that better relationships with external 
organisations at local and national level, and trying to work in partnership, ensured 
the Trust had more support, particularly in times of difficulty. One of the executives 
indicated that the development of a wide working network across other organisations 
played an important role in the success of the Trust. It was also emphasised that the 
Trust was willing to extend its working relationship with the local university, and 
particularly the medical school, to increase the extent and quality of the medical 
research conducted in the Trust. 
Focus on Human Resources Management 
Focus on human resources management was seen as a factor that contributed in 
performance improvement. Some interviewees, particularly junior staff, viewed it as a 
facilitating factor in legitimising training and allowing staff to attend training. 
Change in external environment 
More focus on performance measurement, improvements within the public sector and 
presenting more tools to assess performance and conduct audits were provided by 
central government, making more opportunity for the senior management of the 
Trust to use these tools in order to evaluate their performance improvement. 
"We just had more tools, you know, the Government had given us more 
tools and the Trust executive were using those tools and asking us 
questions and that was good and so that contributed really to the shift. " 
(28: 51) 
7.6 Hindrance factors 
i) Insufficient resources 
Financial issues: In the Trust, the size of the financial challenge, particularly the 
historical financial deficit, was perceived as a very significant barrier to progress 
because improvement in some areas (e. g. day case surgery services) needed financial 
investments which were not forthcoming. The financial issues were viewed as a 
significant barrier which had an impact on sustaining performance improvement. 
Some interviewees also reported that although the Trust had improved its operational 
performance, in some areas there was no financial rigour, so a more rigorous 
approach to the management of financial resources was necessary. 
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"The biggest obstacle to making really good sustained progress is money. " 
(39: 141) 
"Cost has been a very important and significant factor, money is always 
leading. It's a big driving force for being here and clinical services are 
very much affected by financial issues. In the last couple of years that 
seems to have got worse rather than better, even though we achieved o to 
3 stars in one year". (17: 15) 
"We're looking very actively both frý om an SHA point of view and a Trust 
point of view at improving day case surgery figures, but it needs to have 
money put into it. You can't just change services with the same facilities. 
with the same equipment, we have problems about. " (47: 59) 
Inadequate number of and increasing demand for beds: 
Several interviewees stressed that the bed requirement was always an important issue 
affecting the ability to meet key performance targets, relevant to the star rating. The 
bed occupancy of the Trust was very high (about 97%), leaving little slack in the 
system. Some interviewees reported that an increase in the number of patients 
attending the A&E Department (more demand) or were referred to the Trust, 
exacerbated the situation. 
Information Technology issues (IT issues): 
Some interviewees reported that, although attempts had been made to improve the IT 
system, the current system was not able to satisfy the needs of the different 
departments. The IT system was viewed, by some interviewees, as limiting 
performance improvement. For example, they reported that, if this new system could 
not generate appropriate and timely data with regard to the core business of the Trust, 
required by the "Payment by Result" policy introduced by central government, the 
hospital would face difficulties in generating sufficient funds. 
"We don't have IT, so all we're doing is a paper trail so we don't have the 
ability to be proactive; we are reactive to meet government or local 
pressures. " (38: 13) 
High workload and lack of time: 
Certain participants emphasised that staff were under enormous pressure owing to 
the high workload required to complete their daily tasks and meet the performance 
targets. As a result, they may have suffered from a lack of enthusiasm and a shortage 
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of time (particularly insufficient protected learning time). This may have affected 
sustained performance improvement. 
"They're [staff] already dealing with as much as they possibly can, so 
realistically you can't give them more and just expect them to do it. " 
(24: 102) 
"I don't think any hindrance (in terms of managerial and organisation 
factors) really other than probably time to do certain things, you know, 
there are things that I would want to introduce and develop within my 
role and it's just that I haven't got enough hours in the day. " (33: 199) 
"we [ward managers] have the team briefs that are done on a monthly 
basis but it's getting the time to go to meetings away from the ward, you 
know, when you're needed on the ward it's very difficult. I don't have any 
spare time especially when you're short staffed and it's a busy 
environment. " (30: 63) 
ii) Poor partnerships between the Trust and other relevant organisations: 
One of the barriers, an issue indicated by the Trust's managers, was the level of 
dependency of the hospital on external organisations for several areas of their 
performance. For example, an executive member of the Board reported that the 
Trust's discharge arrangements were very much dependent on the PCT and Social 
Services, and beyond the control of the Trust's managers. When they were not able to 
transfer patients, it caused bed blockage and delayed the patient flow. Two external 
interviewees pointed out although the Trust had developed its relationship with 
external organisations, it still suffered from insularity and external relationships 
should be better developed. 
iii) Impact of continuous change: 
The pace of continuous change was pointed out by both internal and external 
interviewees, as the main barrier to performance improvement, as it caused 
difficulties for staff in maintaining their motivation to improve matters. It was argued 
that the system needed a period of stability, although it was thought this would be 
difficult for the Trust. Constant change, for example, as a result of the Trust's 
proposed application for Foundation Trust status, would involve a great deal of effort 
and even more changes, not ideal conditions for stability. In addition, the `cut off 
point' used to assess targets are changing every year, which makes them harder for 
the organisations to plan to meet. 
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"People say lack of resources but I would guess management of change, 
battle fatigue, too much change at once. I would say battle fatigue more 
than resources, resources come second. " (16: 143) 
"So maintenance you can maintain what was the base line to get to 3 
stars, so it's not only maintain that but work even harder because the 
waiting list targets have gone down, 4 hour targets have gone up, so I 
think that has been one of the more stressful things because it's having to 
do even more. So there's been no period of almost like stability, it's just 
been work harder. " (14: 123) 
"The problem is that there is no sustainability because everything changes, 
so like A&E the target is different than it was last year so they sustained 
last years performance, try to improve to reach this years but I suppose 
there's only so far you can go before the system is as perfect as it can be 
but still can't deliver it and I think that's a problem in the NHS, we never 
sustain because what's the next thing, there's always continual 
improvement, so my frustration is my star rating indicators are never the 
same year after year, they change, you know, there's two drop off and 
another three come in or three drop off and you get two completely new 
ones that you didn't have any idea about and at least in a hospital I think 
they stay more or less the same but it's the measure that changes. " (8: 173) 
iv) PFI agreement issues: 
Some interviewees (both clinical and non-clinical) viewed the PFI agreement as 
an important factor that can affect performance improvement and the standard of 
services. They believed provision of service through the PFI scheme to be more 
expensive. Several interviewees reported that the whole PFI project was not well 
received by staff, as they believed it was not good value for money and that the 
PFI partner was only looking for profit. The Trust's managers were reported as 
having less expertise in writing detailed PFI agreements than the PFI managers. 
Consequently, some important issues had not been dealt with, and when things 
were put into practice, problems were caused in the routine work of the hospital. 
The PFI was seen by some of the Trust's managers, as being more complex in 
terms of setting up the concession agreement and monitoring arrangements. 
Some found it odd that the PFI partner was monitoring its own performance and 
reporting it to the Trust, which meant that the Trust usually received a perfect 
performance report from them. Invoices were sometimes sent to the Trust for 
work that the PFI partner perceived as extra work and that again increased the 
cost of the services provided by the PFI partner. Two participants argued that if 
they were to do it again it would be probably be done differently. 
"It's been absolutely cast-iron proved without any shadow of a doubt that 
PFI is more expensive and it's completely unjustifiable. But, operationally 
it's a disaster and financially it's a disaster [... ] they have just got one thing 
266 
on their minds and that's to maximise their profits. " (2: 66) 
"I think the PFI area is a problem because we can't control it, managers 
can't manage it, you have a third party doing your work and they're in it 
for profit, they're looking at what the agreement says, they're experts in 
handling contracts and agreements, whereas the people on the NHS side don't necessarily have these skills and the staff who implemented PFI, a lot 
of people who were involved at a high level have all gone, they've been 
replaced by other staff who are not familiar with what the content of the 
contract was, so we're not quite sure what services we can expect from the 
PFI partners and if you want anything else which is out with that contract, 
the Trust has to pay early and sometimes you can't even get it done. But 
there are restrictions that you can't bring outside contractors in for 
certain things because the PFI won the rights to provide that service. In 
fact we're [staff side] not even sure what agreements we have entered into 
with the private companies, so we feel we're being misled and deluded 
somewhat" (40: 135) 
v) High level of micro management: 
Several interviewees, particularly middle managers, stated that senior managers had 
used a high level of micro management when the Trust had been rated as a poor 
performing organisation and, even after it had gained three stars, micro management 
was still being exercised (although the middle managers stated that this had recently 
been reduced). They viewed this tightened managerial control as a source of 
increased stress and pressure, which interfered with effective operational 
management and sustaining performance improvement. Even an executive member 
of the Board accepted that they should not be involved in that level of detail, which 
distracted them from focusing on strategic issues. The divisional managers stated that 
they would like to have boards, within their divisions, in order to run things 
autonomously on the basis of an agreed system of reporting to the executives. 
"If you try to run at that sort of level of intensity for more than a couple of 
years, you're going to have operational difficulties. " (24: 110) 
"The executive team are there for a purpose, they're there to manage the 
Trust as an entity, not to micro manage each individual specialty and 
basically they should keep their hands off because it can be very disruptive 
to have a member of the executive team telling you how to do things. 
They're hindering us because we have to justify why every single decision 
is made and, you know, sometimes you make a decision that the executive 
team aren't going to like, but its for a reason. " (25: 178) 
On the other hand, several managers stated that they were aiming to put in place an 
organisational development programme to encourage more team working and 
delegate power to managers of clinical divisions. However, they believed that the 
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system still should be monitored carefully, and from a distance, to prevent any future 
drifts in organisational performance. 
"I think that probably the time is right now to delegate control to the 
operational teams to give them more autonomy and more lateral ability to 
be creative and to come up with new options for sustaining and achieving 
progress. I think that time is now. But I would do that with caution, in the 
sense that, yes, we've passed control on but we need to in parallel increase 
monitoring and accountability because those controls will become 
incompletely ineffective if we fail to drive accountability through that. 
Because the way the NHS works if we pass control to lots of people and 
then stop the monitoring then they will not get half [the work] done. You 71 
lose performance in my view anyway, because there'll be so many other 
different things being priorities that you'll lose control of it. So it's almost 
like for me that the transformation of the leadership is to be done in 
parallel. " (39: 53) 
vi) Policy change: 
The interviewees noted that the introduction of several new national policies such as 
`Patient Choice' and `Payment by Result' were likely to affect the performance of the 
Trust because of the increased competition within the NHS. It was reported by both 
internal and external interviewees that the changing policy context in which NHS 
organisations were now performing, might affect the performance improvement of 
the Trust over time. Interviewees placed strong emphasis on recent policies: `Patient 
Choice', `Payment By result (PBR)' and `Plurality of Provision' as factors likely to 
affect the performance of the Trust. It is necessary to explain briefly the above 
mentioned policies in order to clarify why the Trust's managers considered the impact 
of those policies on their performance. 
Payment by Result introduced a significant change in the financing of acute hospitals, 
reflecting the market oriented reform established by the Government for the NHS in 
England (Mannion and Street, 20o6). The aim of Payment by Results (PbR) is: 
" to provide a transparent, rules-based system for paying trusts. It will 
reward efficiency, support patient choice and diversity and encourage 
activity for sustainable waiting time reductions. Payment will be linked to 
activity and adjusted for casemix. Importantly, this system will ensure a 
fair and consistent basis for hospital funding rather than being reliant 
principally on historic budgets and the negotiating skills of individual 
managers. Under the reforms to NHS Financial Flows, instead of being 
commissioned through block agreements as previously, hospitals (and 
other providers) will be paid for the activity that they undertake; so 
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) will commission: 
the volume of activity required to deliver service priorities, adjusted for 
casemix (i. e. the mix of types of patients and/or treatment episodes) 
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from a plurality of providers on the basis of a standard national price 
tariff, adjustedfor regional variation in wages and other costs of service 
delivery. " (DoH, 2004) 
The PbR encourages health care providers to increase their activities, as by so doing, 
they can increase their revenue. The Government proposes to implement the PbR to 
pay for 9o per cent of inpatient, day case and outpatient activities (Mannion and 
Street, 2oo6). 
According to the Patient Choice reform, patients should be given more choices to 
decide about how, where and when they want to receive care from the NHS. This 
policy provides the opportunity for patients to choose from between four or five 
hospitals or clinics for elective procedures. The "choose and book" policy, which is a 
national choice scheme, enables patients to select a specialist in a hospital that they 
have chosen and book their outpatient appointments electronically using a booking 
service (DoH, 2005). As reported above, the national tariff is the basis for the 
calculation of the cost of services, so the NHS commissioners are not faced with a 
greater level of cost due to the introduction of patient choice. However, the NHS 
providers are likely to be at financial risk because it is difficult to predict their income, 
which means they may not be able to meet their financial targets or provide sufficient 
income to complete their service development plans (Plumridge, 2005). 
Plurality of Providers places emphasis on a "mixed economy" of public and private 
sector healthcare provision (Plumridge, 2005). The Department of Health has tried to 
encourage the NHS to make contracts with the existing UK independent sector 
(private and voluntary sectors) in a more planned way, in order to use their spare 
capacity (DoH, 2004). 
Some interviewees argued that health services management is going to be more 
complex in five years time, because the environment is likely be more volatile and 
unpredictable owing to the government's introduction and implementation of market 
based reform. NHS organisations, as a consequence, may face financial instability and 
uncertainty. More competition between healthcare providers, particularly with the 
private sector, was predicted by the interviewees and they noted that organisational 
failure might come to the fore over the next few years because not every current NHS 
CEO and team of directors will make the transition from where they are now to where 
they need to be in five years time. As a result, the need for the development of teams 
of staff who are experienced in turning around crisis situations seemed a necessary 
provision for the future. They believe, there will be associated costs and unintended 
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political consequences for the government of the time, as governments will implicitly 
accept that such a team is needed because more failure will occur. 
"I (an executive member of the Board] think with choice and with the 
independent sector coming on-line this year, again you're not quite sure 
where your organisation is going because 20% of activity could maybe 
moved down to it, so I guess they'll still be an element of focus of what 
direction are we going in" (21: 171) 
"That is a massive risk for us now with Payment by Results because we 
cannot expand into dusty unused dilapidated wards if we decide we can 
do things and earn money we simply cannot do that on this site, we've 
no way to 90. " (2: 42) 
As a consequence of the introduction of these policies, there was a consensus among 
interviewees, particularly managers, that the Trust should focus on improving 
efficiency and develop their activities especially in terms of day case surgery, so that it 
could compete with the other providers, particularly the private sector. It was 
reported that a private sector provider had invested significantly in the day case 
activities in the local area and that they were able to choose particular patients for 
activities it prefers to carry out rather than admitting patients with all kinds of needs, 
especially complicated cases. This situation was also noted by the interviewees as a 
reason for competition being more difficult for the Trust. 
"The other things around are what do our other health care partners 
provide and then the competition from the private sector and there's a 
push around doing day care surgery now, we don't do enough day care 
surgery. So that's one of the areas that we need to improve, so if we do 
improve that, what impact does that have on the rest of the 
organisation? " (27: 195) 
"You need to focus into those areas that can take the Trust forward into 
the future into the Payment By Results regime that we're going into and 
we need to focus on those areas like day surgery, improving the 
efficiency and literally high impact areas where minimum intervention 
can make maximum effort and that's an affect and literally drive those 
through to middle management. " (6: 83) 
"These days of PbR, Payment By Results, everybody is acutely aware 
that if we don't perform against contract then we don't revenue. We 
don't get revenue then we can't do what we want to do, we can't develop 
service. So our service development and our establishment of service 
are all dependent on the revenue. If we're seen to be not achieving and 
we don't achieve then we can't develop because we don't have the 
revenue to back that up, " (25: 41) 
On the other hand, some managers reported that the PbR systems would increase 
involvement and engagement of clinicians and managers in meeting targets, as both 
know that income will be generated by increasing activity. 
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"The whole income aspect is now becoming just as key really and it's 
essential that the clinicians are signed up to that [the PBR] and are fully 
aware of, OK they may be meeting their access targets however they 
may not be getting the income for some other reason and it's a matter 
of making sure they're all tied in together really. So I can definitely 
vouch for the involvement and engagement issues. " (5: 182) 
The Human Resources Managers of the Trust raised an important issue concerning 
the impact of PbR on the staff and staffing levels. They believed that if the Trust was 
not able to increase its activities and if a proportion of its activities were transferred to 
other providers, the Trust might not need the number of staff currently in its employ. 
In addition, private sector providers may also offer a better working environment and 
remuneration than the Trust, causing staff to leave the Trust. 
"So those are the sorts of things, not just around how these units are 
going to be staffed and the implications of that, it's also really what 
affects it has on our services and our provision of service and whether 
or not we will have the demand to need the number of staff that we've 
currently got because if somebody else is treating half of our patients, 
we don't need as many staff. So, [... ] we don't know for sure, so all of 
these things are going to effect us, so what does that mean for our 
service and then what does that mean for our staff, so we've started to 
look at that. " (27: 190) 
"That is a massive risk for us now with Payment by Results because we 
cannot expand into dusty unused dilapidated wards if we decide we can 
do things and earn money we simply cannot do that on this site, we've 
no way to go. " (2: 42) 
"I think it will be interesting to see what [name] does and also I think 
with choice and with the independent sector coming on-line this year, 
again you're not quite sure where your organisation is going because 
20% of activity could maybe moved down to it, so I guess they'll still be 
an element of focus of what direction are we going in. "(16: 171) 
vii) Resistance to change: 
Some interviewees reported that although there was greater clarity and understanding 
of performance targets and the level of clinical engagement was reasonable in the 
Trust, there were still some health professionals, in particular older consultants, who 
were resistant to change (e. g. reconfigurations in clinical departments) and showed 
little interest in meeting performance targets. It was reported that there was still some 
conflict between clinicians and the management team. In addition, staff, especially 
nurses who had been working in their posts for a long time, were unwilling to 
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consider new ways of working. Resistance to change was viewed as a key hindrance 
factor, delaying performance improvement. 
"There was obviously a lot of resistance. In fact some of the changes, for 
example we take urology, as I mentioned as an example. Urology has a 
network between [name of hospital] and between the [name of 
hospital]. But some of the consultants still work at [name of place] in 
the community hospital. And they didn't want to move from [hospital 
B]. Now actually to run a service on 3 separate sites is from a 
managerial point of view, a nonsense. A total nonsense. It should be on 
one site, it should be; and there have been problems but the consultants 
don't want to know. " (47.55) 
"there was quite a strong nimby culture amongst the medical staff here, 
you know, this wasn't quite my problem, you know, I [external 
consultant] do my bit and it's all fine and I can't see what I can do to 
help and again that's quite a common theme when you are trying to 
stimulate performance improvement, people don't actually think it's 
their performance that needs to improve. " (26: 28) 
viii) Lack of corporate identity: 
Some interviewees, mostly middle managers from both clinical and non-clinical sides, 
believed that no corporate identity existed among different divisional directorates. It 
was reported that although middle managers were trying to avoid developing a silent 
mentality, circumstances made it difficult to take a wider view of matters. 
"I think we all work a bit fragmented. Although we have team 
meetings, we all seem to be doing different things, we could work 
together more, communicate more and make sure that each other 
knows what they're doing and it's a uniform approach really. " (31: 167) 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter presented the findings of the study in relation to the specific turnaround 
strategies used within the Trust and their impact on organisational functioning and 
performance. It was revealed that all three major turnaround strategies 
(reorganisation, retrenchment and repositioning - '3 Rs') were being used by the 
Trust. 
A range of reorganisation interventions were used in the Trust. The replacement of 
the CEO and other senior managers was perceived by the interviewees as most 
important intervention that contributed to facilitating a successful turnaround 
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process. The new senior managers were viewed as appropriate managers, who had 
sufficient experience to form a cohesive and effective senior management team. A 
detailed action plan was developed by senior management team within the 
organisation, covering all aspect of performance in order to demonstrate how 
improvement could be made in relation to the performance problems raised by 
different external organisations (e. g. the Audit Commission). The leadership style of 
the new management team, particularly in early stages of turnaround process was a 
directive, `top down' transactional approach with a focus on building a robust and 
effective performance management system. This system was perceived as a key factor 
in improvement of organisational performance. Focus on Human Resources 
Management, strategy development, improving lines of communication within the 
organisation, internal reorganisation and restructuring were the most important 
reorganisation strategies used by the Trust. 
The retrenchment strategy, as a generic turnaround strategy, was used within the 
Trust to tackle its financial problems. A detailed financial recovery plan was used to 
control financial costs (e. g. using a series of cost cutting interventions), provide cash 
flow and balance the Trust's financial status. The strategy was perceived as successful 
as the Trust was able to balance its financial books, however several staff argued that 
strict cost cutting had a deleterious effect on staff morale and harmed the quality of 
patient care. 
A range of repositioning strategies was used by the Trust, when attempting to sustain 
long term performance improvement. The focus of reorganisation strategies were on 
the improvement of external working relationship, cultural change in terms of 
development of an open and learning culture, and extending services and 
modernisation in order to respond to the new market based policies (e. g. Payment by 
Result). 
This Chapter also presented impact of external organisations (e. g. the PDT and the 
SHA) in the turnaround process. The Trust showed many characteristics of a'self 
initiating' organisation which was able to initiate the turnaround process by itself. It 
was reported that the Trust was given the support and encouragement by both, the 
SHA and the PDT, for a self-managed turnaround and a regular monitoring was used 
by the SHA to evaluate performance improvement ('relational approach'). 
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At the end of Chapter, a range of factors that were perceived as key elements that 
facilitated or hindered the Trust's turnaround was presented. 
The next Chapter (Chapter 8) presents discussion and interpretation of the findings 
of this study in the context of relevant literature on organisational failure and 
turnaround processes. 
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Chapter 8 Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
As outlined previously, the aims of this study were threefold to: i) better understand 
the causes, consequences and responses to organisational failure and the 
effectiveness turnaround processes in health care settings, ii) place the findings of the 
empirical study in the context of the wider literature on organisational failure and 
turnaround, and iii) draw lessons from both the literature review and empirical phase 
of study for the development of health policy, and management and the focus of 
future research. 
The previous three chapters presented rich qualitative evidence pertaining to the 
symptoms and causes of organisational failure, triggers for change, and turnaround 
strategies used by the Trust and their impact on the Trust's performance and its staff. 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss and interpret the findings of the study in the 
context of wider literature on organisational failure and turnaround processes, 
presented in Chapter 2 (for-profit sector literature) and Chapter 3 (public sector 
literature), using stage theory as set out by McKiernan (2002). The findings of this 
study largely reinforce the results of the existing research studies in this area, but also 
raise some new issues and questions for further investigation. The lessons for the 
development of health policy and recommendations for further research are 
presented in the next chapter (Chapter 9). 
8.2 Organisational failure 
A range of symptoms, internal and external secondary causes of failure and primary 
cause of failure were identified. In line with the stages of McKiernan's model, 
symptoms and causes of failure explored in this study are discussed below. 
8.2.1 Symptoms of failure 
As outlined above, McKiernan differentiates between symptoms (the initial 
observable indicators of a problem in an organisation) and the causes of failure, 
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although these concepts are inter-related. As in McKiernan's classification of 
symptoms of failure, four different types of markers of failure (financial, physical, 
managerial and behavioural) were identified, in this case study. It should be borne in 
mind that the official perception of failure signalled by the star rating (zero star) was 
the most evident marker of failure. 
Inability of the Trust to balance its annual financial situation and the legacy of a large 
financial deficit were important markers of poor performance which resulted in the 
Trust losing a star in the national performance rating over two successive years. 
These markers were also found to be the most important symptom in the majority of 
studies in the for-profit sector. In addition, Fulop et al. (2004) and Protopsaltis et al. 
(2002) found that these were the most common markers observed in their study of 
acute Trusts. Fulop et al. (2004) relate these markers to poor managerial leadership, 
which was also, highlighted by several interviewees in this case study. However, 
studies conducted in state schools in the UK did not report these markers as being of 
importance (Harris and Chapman, 2002; Wilmott, 1999; Harris et al., 2003). 
Four different physical symptoms were reported by interviewees, including: inability 
to hit core targets, poor public and press image, poor working relationships with 
external stakeholders and a high turnover of senior managers. These findings are 
supported by other studies in the health sector (e. g. Fulop et al., 2004; Protopsaltis et 
al., 2002). It is important to note that poor external relationships should be treated 
as an important symptom because in the current context of the NHS, collaboration 
and partnership working across the whole local health economy is a key requirement 
of all NHS organisations. The Trust did not display two important physical symptoms 
(a high level of staff turnover and recruitment problems) identified in the literature 
from the for-profit sector (McKiernan, 202) and public sector (Fulop et al., 2004; 
Gray, 2000; Mannion et al., 2005; Eitel, 2002). Mannion et al. (2005) argue that 
ghettoisation is one of the potential unintended consequences of the star rating 
system which means that low performing Trusts may find it difficult to recruit and 
retain high quality staff. However, in this case study, despite some managers leaving 
the Trust, and attributed to the autocratic leadership style of the CEO, the 
organisation was still perceived by staff (especially clinicians) as a good place to work 
and Human Resources data did not show significant problems with regard to these 
issues. It can be argued that the perception of staff about their willingness to work in 
an organisation may not necessarily be affected, at least in the short term, by the level 
of their organisations' overall performance. 
276 
Employee distrust (particularly among staff who collected and reported waiting list 
data), internal conflict, and centralised decision making were perceived as key 
managerial symptoms of failure. The first two markers were also commonly reported 
in previous studies in the public sector (e. g. Fulop et al., 2004; Turner and 
Whiteman, 2005; Eitel, 2004; Wilmott, 1999). However, centralised decision making 
was seldom reported as being a problematic symptom and in only two studies (Fulop 
et al., 2004; Eitel, 2004) was it explicitly reported. One possible explanation for this 
is that some studies may have categorised this factor as a managerial cause of failure 
rather than a symptom. 
Behavioural symptoms, identified in this study (low staff morale, ignoring and hiding 
problems, and blaming others for problems), were one of the most commonly 
perceived symptoms of failure by interviewees. These findings are congruent with the 
findings of previous research in terms of behavioural symptoms in both the for-profit 
and the public sector (e. g. Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Fulop et at, 2004; 
Protopsaltis, 2002; McKiernan, 2002; Slatter, 1984). A common behavioural 
symptom reported by almost all studies conducted in the public sector, was low staff 
morale. Low staff morale was due to several factors, including problems associated 
with an ineffective IT system, difficulties around merging of two hospitals and a 
general lack of support from the previous senior management team during a period 
of intensive organisational disruption (due to the scale and pace of organisational 
change and also changes in the senior management team). 
Senior managers of the Trust, similarly, showed all the `ignorance phases', `blaming 
others' and `information disguise', which McKiernan (2002) refers to as commonly 
observed behaviour of senior managers in poorly performing organisations in the for- 
profit sector. The Trust's senior managers had concealed and manipulated the actual 
performance of the Trust through purposeful manipulation of the waiting list data 
and had reported that the waiting lists were shorter than they actually were. In 
addition, when the problem became evident to both internal and external 
stakeholders, several senior managers had tried to abrogate their responsibilities and, 
instead, had blamed others. These patterns of behaviour are consistent with the four 
stage model developed by Slatter (1984), to explain crisis development. He claims 
that crisis is developed through four stages: crisis denial, hidden crisis, organisational 
disintegration and organisational collapse. Although, in this case, organisational 
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collapse did not mean a threat to the existence of the Trust, but receiving a zero star 
rating was perceived by most as a clear sign of organisational failure. 
Fulop et al., (2004) categorise symptoms of failure into `multiple' clusters rather than 
`singular' events in their nine poorly performing English acute Trusts (detailed in 
section 3.6). Two main clusters were identified. They argued that zero star rated 
trusts usually represent cluster type 1 (such organisations are characterised as insular 
`fortress' exhibiting poor media image, poor external relationships, low staff morale, 
high turnover and recruitment problems) and that organisations `at risk' of failure 
more commonly exhibit cluster type 2 (inability to implement core targets and 
presence of financial problems). This case study represents both clusters i and 2, 
except for, as explained above, high turnover and recruitment problems. 
Therefore, the findings of this case study appear to support proposition i (a range 
of markers and symptoms of failure of the Trust, under study, will be shown to be 
similar to those identified in the literature review). Although, there were some small 
differences in the sub-categories of symptoms found in this study and previous 
research, which might be related to the specific characteristics of the organisation. 
8.2.2 Secondary causes of failure 
A range of secondary internal and external causes of failure was explored in this 
study. McKiernan (2002) categorises all secondary causes of failure, identified in the 
for-profit sector, into three groups: i) financial, ii) `demand' (external environment) 
and iii) managerial. In this study, the internal causes of failure have been classified 
into four key categories including: i) managerial, ii) financial, iii) cultural, and iv) 
organisational. 
Along similar lines to Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004), the findings of this study reveal 
that the combination of both internal management (voluntaristic perspective) and 
external factors (deterministic perspective) contribute to failure, although, the 
interviewees placed more emphasis on internal rather than external factors. Mellahi 
and Wilkinson (2004: 34) argue that, `any attempt to explain organisational failure 
will not be complete unless the interplay between contextual forces and 
organisational dynamics is taken into account'. This study supports the results of 
previous studies, emphasising the role of both internal and external factors in 
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contributing to organisational failure, although different categorisations are used to 
classify internal causes of failure (e. g. Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Fulop et al., 
2004; Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Andrews et al., 2006). 
8.2.2.1 Managerial factors 
The Trust's performance problems, perceived by the majority of interviewees, closely 
associated with the behaviour of the previous CEO and senior management team. 
i) Poor leadership 
Poor leadership was viewed as an important internal secondary cause of failure. The 
leadership style of the CEO was perceived as very autocratic. Centralised decision 
making, insufficient attention to the external environment and performance targets, 
bullying behaviour, unwillingness to devolve decision making to middle managers, 
poor flow of information in the organisation, and a lack of managerial capability and 
capacity managerial traits that had been associated with the CEO and senior 
management team. Staff believed that ineffective leadership affected negatively the 
performance of the organisation. Similarly, a lack of good managerial leadership was 
one of the most common factors reported in previous studies in the public sector. 
Protopsaltis et al. (2002) found that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of poorly 
performing NHS acute trusts were a key contributor to the performance problem. 
Lack of leadership, unwillingness to make decisions, reluctance to distribute power 
(delegation), working in isolation from managers in other organisations, and the 
inability to challenge internal vested interests were found to be key managerial 
problems. Andrews et al. (2006) also found a significant relationship between poor 
managerial leadership and the likelihood of failure in local government settings. 
Turner et al. (2004) report that poor managerial leadership was found in poorly 
performing local authorities. Joyce (2004) highlighted the importance of both 
managerial and political leadership as important factors in preventing continuing 
failure. The importance of political leadership was rated more highly than managerial 
leadership because of the power of politicians, who can approve or veto decisions 
made by managers (Andrews et al., 20o6). They also argued that good political and 
managerial leaders were unlikely to be attracted by poorly performing organisations, 
creating a vicious circle, where poor leadership resulted in poor performance. 
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ii) Distraction 
Another factor, perceived by interviewees that contributed to performance decline of 
the Trust was the distraction of the senior management team away from the day-to- 
day management of the organisation due to having to complete large projects 
(merging of two hospitals and the PFI project). Indeed, it was widely believed that the 
senior management team had taken their `eyes off ball' concerning key access targets. 
This finding is supported by the finding of previous research in the NHS (Protopsaltis 
et al., 2002). Likewise, McKiernan (2002) argues that too much focus on a major 
development plan, in for-profit sector, is viewed as one of the contributors to 
organisational failure. 
iii) Lack of performance management systems 
Lack of a robust performance management system within the Trust was identified as 
an important factor contributing to the Trust's performance decline. There were no 
feedback cycles in existence through which to report how different parts of the 
organisation were operating. That was attributed to the inability of senior managers 
to develop an effective and responsive performance management framework. 
Thompson (2002) argues that performance measurement and control system are 
necessary for service providers in order to enable them to know how the systems are 
performing and which targets are achieved. Andrews et al. (2006) argue that there is 
insufficient empirical evidence regarding the relationship between failure and the 
performance management system. However, they showed a significant relationship 
between poor performance management and organisational failure in English local 
government. They argue that the development and use of a robust performance 
management system require clear, unambiguous and realistic goal setting agenda for 
an organisation. Mannion et al. (2005) state that low performing hospital Trusts in 
their sample did not view the establishment of a performance management system as 
an important priority. Similarly Fulop et al. (2004) and Protopsaltis (2002) showed 
that poor performing acute Trusts suffered from the lack of a robust performance 
management arrangements. The lack of a performance system or the incomplete 
implementation of such a system were also shown to be contributors to the failure of 
public organisations, in a report provided by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
(2004). 
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In addition, insufficient attention to the national performance targets, a slow 
response to targets, and lack of a general communication about their importance 
throughout the organisation by senior managers, were also perceived as managerial 
factors that had contributed to performance problems. Mannion et al. (2005) found 
that hitting national targets was not a high managerial priority for low performing 
hospital Trusts and not hitting performance targets was treated as a taboo by high 
performing trusts. Similarly, Kelly (2004) argue that successful organisations in the 
for-profit sector (e. g. Lloyds TSB) had a clear focus on their core business, but 
unsuccessful organisations are likely to focus on ambiguous targets which do not 
provide a route for performance improvement. The Audit Commission (2002) argue 
that both the development of performance management systems and clearly defined 
objectives of the organisation, which are well communicated throughout the 
organisation, are two key requirements, for an organisation wishing to meet 
performance targets, set at local or national level. These issues are also congruent 
with the findings of previous studies (e. g. Fulop et al., 2004; Protopsaltis et al., 2002; 
Turner and Whiteman, 2005). 
iv) Lack of strategy 
The Trust suffered from the lack of central strategy and poor strategic planning in 
several areas which was perceived as a factor that had a negative effect on the 
performance of the Trust. No clear central direction had been set by senior managers 
for several key areas including human resources, clinical governance and external 
relationships. According to Kotter (1990), poor leadership was viewed as the main 
reason of this matter because the main function of a leader is to set a direction and 
provide a clear vision. A meta analysis conducted by Miller and cardinal (1994) shows 
a positive relationship between planning and performance of firms in the for-profit 
sector. Similarly, a positive impact of planning on the performance in the public 
sector has been shown by Boyne et al. (2003) and Hendrick (2003). 
iv) Poor relationships with external stakeholders 
Poor working relationships between the Trust and external stakeholders \vere 
perceived by the interviewees as prominent contributor to failure. Indeed, the Trust 
was viewed as an inward looking and insular organisation that had not benefited 
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from the support of external organisations such as the SHA during the rapid process 
of change. However, the quality of relationships with users of services was not 
identified explicitly by interviewees. Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) argue that poor 
relation with external stakeholders is viewed in the theories of failure as a factor that 
leads to organisational decline. For example, Mellahi et al. (2002) report that the 
failure of Mark & Spencer was related to the inattention of its senior managers to the 
information provided by customer surveys and over confidence in their own 
experience and long established market position. A reactive engagement with the 
local health economy by poorly performing trusts was reported by Mannion et al. 
(2005). However, Andrews et al. (2006) did not find a statistically significant 
association between the quality of external relationships and the performance of local 
authorities. Only the development of a relationship with the private sector was 
considered to be an external relationship in their study and relationships with other 
public and governmental organisations had not been included in their assessment. 
There is insufficient evidence about the impact of greater focus on user preferences 
on the likelihood of failure or success of organisations for a robust conclusion to be 
drawn. Within the current NHS context, which highlights Patient Public 
Involvement, the impact of such relationships on the performance of trusts, 
particularly foundation Trusts should be a focus of future research. 
8.2.2.2 Financial factors 
Several interviewees attributed the financial problems of the Trust to poor financial 
management and control and the presence of an inbuilt high cost structure. For two 
successive years, CHI had removed one star from the Trust's performance ratings due 
to the inability of the Trust to meet its financial target. There was little awareness of 
financial issues throughout the organisation. In addition, increased financial pressure 
was experienced by the Trust due to the lack of experience in drafting the PFI 
contract with the private contractor. This study reinforces the findings of previous 
research conducted in the health sector (Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Fulop et al., 2004; 
Audit Commission, 2006). Fulop et al. (2004) found that a high cost structure, poor 
financial control and financial instability, and overspends in key clinical directorates 
as examples of financial factors that had contributed in organisational 
failure in acute 
Trusts. An Audit Commission report (20o6) argued that financial failure of the NHS 
organisations can not be separated from wider organisational 
failure. The report 
attributes the origin of the financial problems to ineffective management and weak or 
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inadequate board leadership. In addition, the board's eye being `off the ball' was 
reported as another factor contributing to financial problems. These finding are 
reinforced by the finding of this study as interviewees related financial problems to 
the lack of good financial discipline established by senior managers. In addition, the 
board of the Trust was perceived as not a highly effective team that was not able to 
challenge decision made by the CEO and senior executives. 
Similarly, several studies in the for-profit sector draw similar conclusions about the 
impact of financial factors on performance decline and organisational failure 
(McKiernan, 2002). 
8.2.2.3 Cultural factors 
As explained in section 5.3.3.3, a range of cultural issues (a culture of fear and 
blaming, a culture of denial and hiding problems, a lack of performance culture, 
cultural issues following the merger of two hospitals) perceived by the interviewees, 
led the organisation towards performance decline. Most of these cultural issues were 
attributed to the behaviour of the CEO and senior management team. This accords 
with in accordance with Schein's (1985) assertion that `the unique and essential 
function of leadership is the manipulation of culture'. 
It was argued that a culture of `fear' and `blame' was prominent in the organisation. 
In addition, the presence of culture of `denial' and `hiding' of problems exercised by 
senior managers (e. g. hiding and manipulating waiting list) was also reported by 
interviewees. In such an organisational environment problems are not likely to be 
reported by staff and learning from the mistakes are blocked. This promotes a vicious 
circle, which means that increased reluctance from staff to report problems. The 
presence of blame culture as secondary cause of failure is also represented by Fulop 
et al. (2004) and Eitel (2004). 
In addition, a range of problems resulted from the merger of two organisations with 
very different cultures. Due to the cultural differences between the two hospitals, 
conflict between the staff of two hospitals occurred, which resulted in increased 
anxiety and stress that had a negative impact on the performance of the organisation. 
Similarly, the negative and unintended consequences of hospitals merger on the 
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delivery of the services due to the cultural differences have been reported by Fulop et 
al. (2002). 
Similarly, a lack of `performance culture' was attributed to organisational failure in 
previous studies conducted in the public sector (Turner and Whiteman, 2005; 
Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Mannion et al., 2005; Joyce, 2004, Andrews et al., 2006). 
8.2.2.4 Organisational factors 
A range of organisational factors including lack of robust information system, poor 
communication system, lack of corporate accountability system and method of 
working were found as contributors to the organisational failure. The Trust was not 
able to monitor its performance properly due to the lack of a robust information 
system. The Trust suffered from a poor communication system which had impeded 
flow of information within the Trust and was viewed as an important barrier to the 
performance improvement. Some interviewees highlighted the presence of 
inappropriate method of working and internal conflict within the trust under the 
previous management regime. Similarly, previous research shows tense employee 
relationships and internal conflicts as factors that contributed to the failure (Fulop et 
al., 2004; Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Eitel, 2004; Harris and Chapman, 2002). It 
was highlighted that the Trust was suffering from the lack of corporate identity and 
some kinds of separation was reported between departments within the Trusts, which 
is consistent with the findings of other studies indicating the presence of poor 
corporate structure in their sample (Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Eitel, 2004; 
Protopsaltis et al., 2002). However, Andrews et al. (2006) did not show the 
relationship between organisational failure and internal relationships. It was noted 
that the study measured joint working and cross cutting working in order to evaluate 
internal relationships, though these two factors are only one form of internal 
relationship and did not present significant correlation with failure. The other 
elements of internal relationship, which may show a relationship to failure, were not 
included in this study. 
8.2.2.5 External secondary causes of failure 
Several interviewees placed emphasis on the impact of structural and policy changes 
within the NHS as factors that had contributed to the Trust's performance decline. 
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They added that the pace of change was too quick and it was difficult for the 
organisations to deal with them. This finding support findings of the previous 
research (Fulop et al., 2004; Protopsaltis et al., 2002). Fulop et al., (2004) argue that 
structural and policy changes occurred during 1999-2001 within the NHS context, 
such as introduction of the Performance Assessment Framework, were viewed as 
contributors to failure of some NHS organisations because their managers had 
reported that it was difficult to both transform their roles and also respond properly 
to the new expectations of partner organisations. Turner and Whiteman (2005) also 
argue that policy changes and introduction of the CPA had contributed to 
performance problems experienced by some local governments. 
Therefore, the findings of this case study appear to support proposition 2 (A range 
of secondary external and internal factors, which also contributed to failure, will be 
identified). 
8.2.3 Primary cause of failure 
According to McKiernan (2002), dysfunction in relation to the organisational 
learning process is viewed as the primary and main cause of organisational failure. 
Over confidence, lack of experience, complacency and rigid thinking are reasons that 
disrupt organisational learning processes (McKiernan, 2002). Two different reasons, 
organisational introspection and organisational arrogance, were perceived as factors 
that had impeded the Trust's learning process. It was reported that a sense of 
arrogance existed among the previous senior management team, as they believed that 
it was a teaching hospital with an excellent history of working in clinical areas and 
that the decisions made by them were correct and could not be contested. This 
arrogance led them to ignore difficulties or to respond inappropriately to changes in 
the external environment. Indeed, the lack of a culture of change and blockage in the 
learning process was attributed to this arrogant stance. The theory of the `curse of 
success' (detailed in section 2.6.4.3), is based on the notion that previous success may 
breed overconfidence and arrogance among managers. As a consequence, those 
managers may maintain their previous operating assumptions related to the 
dominant ideas associated with success in the past (Jas and Sckelcher, 2004). This 
attitude may result in ignorance about the changes in the external environment or 
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inattention to signs of performance problems and performance decline (Mellahi et 
al., 2002). 
The findings of this case study in relation to the primary cause of failure reinforce the 
findings of previous research (Fulop et al., 2004; Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Eitel, 
2004). Fulop et al. (2004) found four reasons for organisational learning process 
being impeded in acute trusts, including organisational introspection, organisational 
arrogance, organisational trauma and organisational myopia. In addition, Turner and 
Whiteman (2005) found similar reasons to those found in this case study. Finally, 
Eitel (2004) argues that the lack of double loop learning, explained in section 3.8, 
was the main cause of organisational failure in a US regional governmental office. 
Therefore, the findings of this case study appear to support proposition 3 (the 
primary causes of failure as the main source of organisational decline, will be 
identified. 
8.3 Triggers for change 
As outlined above, a range of factors are required to trigger the turnaround process 
when organisations are not able to perform at an acceptable level. Within the context 
of stress-inertia theory (Huff et al., 1992) discussed in section 2.8, strategic change 
may occur by decreasing the resistance stemming from inertia or by increasing the 
stress levels originating from dissatisfaction with the status quo. Thus, change may 
arise when the levels of stress exceed the levels of resistance and inertia to change 
(Barker et al., 2001). Similar to the findings of the other studies (e. g. Grinyer et al., 
1990; Fulop et al., 2004; Turner et al., 2004; McKiernan, 2002), several internal and 
external factors were identified as contributing to heightening stress in the case 
study. The key internal factor was the replacement of the senior management, which 
is consistent with the literature from the for-profit sector which suggests that the 
most important factor in initiating change is the replacement of the top team (Slatter, 
1984; Bibeault, 1982; Schendel and Paton, 1976; Grinyer et al., 1990). The key 
external factors were investigations by outsider agencies, a zero star rating, hostile 
local media coverage and support provided by the government to help turnaround 
failing organisations. 
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The findings of the present study on triggering change align closely with the theory 
developed by Barker et al. (2001), which posits that performance decline is not in 
itself a strong enough stress to initiate change and that the presence of internal 
factors (e. g. change in senior management) and/or external interventions seems 
necessary. The present study confirms that, although receipt of a zero star rating was 
an important factor in turning around the Trust, both the establishment of a new 
senior management team and external investigations and interventions were also 
required to affect the performance of the organisation. The findings of other studies 
in relation to the role of external investigation is an important factor in the diagnosis 
of problems and for triggering change (Jas, 2004; Eitel, 2004; Wilmott, 1999; Fulop 
et al., 2004), and it was strongly supported by this study. 
The findings of the present study reinforce those of recent studies conducted in the 
NHS (Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Fuiop et al., 2004) relating to triggers for change. 
Although the role of external stakeholders, such as the SHA in raising its concerns in 
relation to the Trust's performance, was evident in facilitating change, the role of the 
external community of user groups, which Fulop et al. (2004) found to be an 
important trigger for change, was not clearly evident in this study. 
Similarly, Mannion et al. (2005) found that a low star rating and a critical CHAI 
report, acted as triggers. However, opposition between managers in relation to 
making key decisions, and conflict among different professional groups within the 
organisation, attempting to maintain their autonomy, were found by Jas and 
Sketcher (2004), to be important internal triggers for change. However, these factors 
had not played important role in initiating change in this case study. 
Therefore the findings of this study appear to support the proposition 4 (A range of 
internal and external factors, which triggered the process of change, will be 
identified). 
8.4 Turnaround interventions 
Analysis of the turnaround interventions in terms of the `3Rs' Strategies (Boyne, 
2004a) reveals that all three interventions (reorganisation, retrenchment and 
repositioning) were used simultaneously by the Trust and were widely perceived as 
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successful in aiding the recovery of the organisation. However, most of the 
interventions were focused on reorganisation strategies. Retrenchment strategies 
(tight financial control) also played an important role in performance improvement, 
at least during the first two years following the arrival of new senior managers. The 
findings of this study show that the use of the '3 Rs' strategies, derived from the for 
profit sector, is feasible in the public sector, and is likely to lead to turnaround, 
although the implementation and duration of the use of these strategies may need to 
be adopted. Turner and Whiteman (2005) argue that the level of cognition, capability 
and capacity of an organisation (detailed in section 3.12.1) when beginning the 
turnaround process, can affect the effectiveness of interventions. Evidence in the 
public sector, shows that the most commonly used `3Rs' strategies is reorganisation. 
In addition, it was demonstrated that the findings of this study regarding the success 
of the turnaround interventions, accords with the evidence for-profit organisations. 
It was perceived that the Trust selected these strategies on the basis of the diagnosis 
of the causes of failure, as set out in the external reports. Pearce and Robins (1993) 
argue that strategies that do not focus on the causes of failure may not achieve the 
desired results or that only short-term successes are accomplished. The Trust was 
compelled, by the SHA, to develop an action plan and to turnaround the organisation 
in a short period of time (six months). The literature, from the for-profit sector, also 
places emphasis on the importance of developing a timely action plan (Hambrick, 
1985). Similarly, Boyne (2004b) argues that highly visible public organisations are 
likely to be under pressure to produce a recovery plan quickly. This means that the 
organisations, in critical situations, are not given sufficient time to analyse the 
situation. Organisations, that are not highly visible and/or are not a under high level 
of political pressure, are often afforded more time to plan their strategy. It should be 
emphasised that more comprehensive investigation is required to examine the extent 
and impact of the use of these interventions in turning around failing organisations 
in the public sector. 
8.4.1 Retrenchment 
As explained in section 7.2.2, one of the most important strategies, selected by the 
Trust's senior managers to turnaround financial failure, was the use of a 
retrenchment strategy. The focus of the retrenchment strategy was on cost cutting 
rather than asset reduction. Tight financial control, aiming to balance the annual 
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financial budget and deal with the historical financial deficit, was planned using a 
series of cost cutting interventions, such as reduction in staffing (lower use of 
banking agency staff), tight control of junior doctor's rotas, further control of 
purchasing and use of medical and administrative stuff. The strategy was perceived 
as successful because the Trust was able to balance its financial books for two 
successive years, although historical financial issues had not been addressed. 
Involvement of operational managers in helping to draft of the financial action plan 
and the close working relationship between operational managers and financial 
managers, and clear communication with staff throughout the organisation regarding 
the importance of the financial plan, were perceived as important factors that 
resulted in successful financial turnaround. 
The findings of this study are compatible with the empirical evidence in the for-profit 
sector that supports retrenchment as an effective turnaround strategy (McKiernan, 
2002; Boyne, 2004a; Pajunen, 2005). The Trust, under study, was not efficient, and 
Boyne and Meier (2005) and Robins and Pears (1992) argue that, when high cost or 
low efficiency are the causes of problems, which are internal to an organisation, then 
a retrenchment strategy is likely to lead the organisation toward recovery. The 
existing evidence on the turnaround process in the public sector, particularly in 
school settings, shows that cost reduction is a less frequently used strategy. However, 
in several studies conducted in the public sector, retrenchment was reported as a 
strategy selected by managers (e. g. Fulop et al., 2004; Protopsaltis, 2002; Turner and 
Whiteman, 2005; Boyne and Meier, 20005; Eitel, 2004). Fulop et al. (2004) showed 
that, in most of their samples, acute trusts were successful in meeting the financial 
targets by employing a financial action plan. Boyne and Meier (2005) argue that 
more emphasis on cost cutting and increasing efficiency, by the superintendents of 
the public schools in their sample, was unlikely to result in performance 
improvement. They question the effectiveness of the retrenchment strategy in turning 
around of organisations. In the for-profit sector, although some studies did not find a 
positive relationship between retrenchment and performance improvement, no study 
reported a negative relationship. Therefore, further study is needed to examine the 
effectiveness of the retrenchment within the public sector. 
However, tight financial control had a deleterious impact on Trust staff and caused a 
lowering of staff morale and, in some cases, a resistance to financial control, 
particularly by clinical staff. Likewise, some commentators argue that although the 
retrenchment strategy is viewed as an effective instrument in stabilising the 
289 
organisation, too much financial control may reduce staff morale and increase staff 
resistance to change (Sutton et al., 1986; Hardy, 1987; McKiernan, 2002). 
To tackle the historical financial deficit, the sale of assets at hospital B and 
refinancing the whole PFI scheme were two strategies that the Trust's managers were 
proposing to use. It is important to note that, when the Trust was unable to tackle the 
financial historical deficit using cost cutting strategies, then asset reduction (selling 
land and/or equipment) was viewed by them as another alternative. This supports 
the idea presented by Hofer (1988) and Robins and Pearce (1992) that when the first 
response (cost cutting) is applied to financial problems but does not result in 
recovery, asset reduction should supplement it. 
In addition, a focus on core performance targets was cited by interviewees as a factor 
that helped the Trust to improve its performance. Similarly, other studies, conducted 
in the public sector, show the effectiveness of this intervention, at least in the short 
term, in meeting performance targets (e. g. Fulop et al., 2004; Protopsaltis, 2002; 
Turner and Whiteman, Boyne, 2006). 
8.4.2 Reorganisation 
A range of `reorganisation' strategies (replacement of senior managers, a focus on 
performance management) was used by the Trust to turnaround the organisation, 
which corresponds with the evidence from both the for-profit (e. g. McKiernan, 2002) 
and public sectors (e. g. Fulop et al., 2004; Turner et al., 2004; Gray, 2000; 
Protopsaltis et al., 2002; Boyne, 2006). 
The most important and effective reorganisation intervention, perceived by the 
interviewees, was the replacement of the CEO and senior management team. This is 
consistent with the literature, suggesting that the most common turnaround 
intervention is the replacement of the CEO and/or members of the senior 
management team (Walshe et al., 2004; Boyne, 20o6). Although different impacts of 
succession on organisational performance are identified in the literature (Mellahi and 
Wilkinson, 2004), Barker et al (2001) view top management team replacement as a 
crucial requirement for a successful turnaround in the for profit sector. Similarly, 
Virany et al. (1992) show the positive impact of succession on the performance and 
survival of an organisation, particularly in turbulent environments. Dailey and 
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Schwenk, 1998) also show that replacement of senior management team had stronger 
performance effects than replacing only the chief executive. These reflect an 
assumption that failure is influenced by poor leadership. The majority of interviewees 
related performance improvement to key individuals (senior managers, particularly 
Deputy CEO). Harvey et al. (2005a), similarly, argue that performance improvement 
in some organisations is determined by specific individuals, such as the CEO or a 
director. In this case study, senior managers also placed an emphasis on establishing 
a performance culture throughout the organisation. However, it is important to note 
that embedding and maintaining an appropriate organisational improvement culture 
in an organisation takes considerable time and effort. 
Therefore, the findings of this empirical study appear to support Proposition 6 
(Although a range of turnaround interventions are used within the Trust, 
reorganisation strategies will be the most important deployed) 
The `Upper Echelon' theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) explains the relationship 
between the characteristics of the senior management team of the organisation and 
organisational outcomes (e. g. organisational performance). All the new senior 
managers came from outside the organisation (external succession), which means 
that they were not linked to the previous managerial team and the organisation's 
performance problems. The literature suggests that when an organisation proposes to 
turnaround poor performance, new senior managers introduced from inside the 
organisation are more likely to recover the organisation because they know more 
about the performance difficulties of the organisation, particularly when a speedy 
response is needed (McKiernan, 2002). However, other researchers argue that new 
managers introduced from outside the organisation are not linked to the previous 
management team and to the existing culture of the organisation and its performance 
problems, and for that reason, they are more likely than outsiders to be able to 
turnaround the situation as they can bring fresh ideas and a constructive approach 
towards performance improvement (McKiernan, 2002). Similarly, Helmich (1974) 
shows that outsider successors are likely to be more successful than those internal to 
the organisation. However, the differences between `insider' and `outsider' 
succession has not been scrutinised in the public sector. In this case, although, 
external succession occurred, the reports provided by the external organisations 
facilitated identification and diagnosis of the performance problems. Therefore, the 
organisation benefited from the presence of new managers with different 
perspectives, who became immediately aware of problems. 
291 
In addition, several interviewees highlighted that the new CEO placed a great deal of 
emphasis on recruiting staff with considerable senior management team experience. 
Both internal and external interviewees reported that the new executive team was 
composed of appropriate personnel, who had sufficient experience to form a cohesive 
team with good working relationships and had played a key role in facilitating a 
successful turnaround in performance. This is consistent with findings of the 
previous research highlighting the important role of experienced and capable senior 
mangers in the process of turnaround (Joyce, 2004; Fulop et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, Zimmerman (1989) highlights the important role of the functional 
background of senior managers on organisational performance. Mellahi and 
Wilkinson (2004) also emphasise that a cohesive and homogenous group is likely to 
make decisions more quickly in a crisis situation, when timely decisions are crucial. 
Therefore, the findings of this case study appear to support proposition 7 (In the 
process of replacement strategy, the appointment of an appropriate managerial team, 
with sufficient skills and capabilities, is an important factor in initiating turnaround 
interventions). 
A directive, `top down' transactional leadership style, was exhibited by the newly 
appointed senior management team, particularly during the first year following their 
appointment, and a strong performance management system and tightened 
managerial controls were also introduced. Although, the long-term aim of the senior 
management team was to nurture a more participative and democratic leadership 
style and to empower middle and lower level managers, more mechanistic (directive) 
leadership was perceived as a factor that enabled the focus to be on the achievement 
of centrally set performance targets in the early stages of the turnaround processes. 
The findings of the literature review indicate that a varied range of leadership styles 
have been used by senior managers during the process of turnaround, relevant to 
each stage of the turnaround cycle. The findings of this study are compatible with the 
findings of Mannion et al (2005) who note that high performing trusts (three stars) in 
their sample exhibited a top down `command and control' style of leadership. They 
report that a long tradition of strong directional leadership from the centre, along 
with setting clear performance objectives for the organisation and establishing a 
robust performance management system which had a close monitoring system were 
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features of these organisations. A high level of commitment to continuously 
improving the measured performance was shown by the CEO of these organisations. 
Fulop et al. (2004) state that new mangers exhibited a range of leadership styles from 
participative, facilitative and risk taking to more mechanistic approaches based on 
the hierarchical principles had been deployed. A broad range of leadership styles 
from directive leadership to participative, people oriented and dispersed leadership, 
was shown by the head teachers in the school setting. Although more emphasis was 
placed on using a people-oriented leadership approach (Harris et al, 2003; Harris 
and Chapman, 2002; Gray, 2000), Harris and Chapman (2002) argue that directive 
leadership was likely to be needed during the initial stage of the turnaround process. 
For example, they state that head teachers demonstrated more autocratic leadership 
styles during the pre inspection phase made by the OFSTED. On the other hand a 
more supportive leadership style was displayed during the inspection phase. 
Therefore, the findings of this empirical study appear to support Proposition to 
(The Trust's managers will use more mechanistic (directive) leadership during the 
first phase of the turnaround process). 
8.5 Role of external organisation in the process of 
turnaround 
In this study the role of a range of external organisations (the Audit Commission, 
CHAI, the SHA, and the PDT), were perceived by interviewees, as a crucial factor in 
initiating change an turnaround process. The role of the Audit Commission, CHAI 
and the SHA in diagnosing and triggering change was discussed above. Theses 
organisations were viewed by the new management team as important resources in 
helping the Trust to improve its performance. 
The role of the PDT in diagnosis of the performance problems and development of an 
action plan was less important because the Trust had already developed its own 
action plan, following external reports, prior to the PDT involved with the 
organisation. The Trust was seen by the PDT client manager as a proactive 
organisation that was very clear about its priorities and its senior managers knew 
what they wanted to achieve. 
According to Meyer and Zucker (1989), who classify organisations into two groups in 
terms of other ability to initiate the turnaround process (self initiating organisation 
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and permanent failing organisations) [detailed in section 2.11], the Trust could be 
categorised as a self-initiating organisation. Jas and Skelcher (2004) compare the 
characteristics of these two organisations (see Table 2.3) and according to their 
comparison, the Trust under study showed the characteristic of a self initiating 
organisation. The Trust's senior managers were able to start and move forward the 
turnaround process by themselves and in addition there was changing the culture 
presenting very low level of `threat rigidity effect' in a way that the flow of 
information was encouraged and different methods of communication and 
distribution of information throughout the organisation were used. The new 
management team had required authority to initiate change by themselves, although 
they wished to receive extra help in terms of `hands on' support in some area such as 
waiting list management and dealing with A&E4 hour targets and the process of 
discharge of patients. 
As detailed in section 2.11, Jas and Skelcher (2004) use principal-agent theory to 
explain the effect of different types of turnaround interventions, depending on the 
relationship between the principal (intervening body) and the agent (organisation 
which requires intervention). Three alternative types of intervention (episodic, 
relational /mutual, and mandated) [see Table 2.4] were categorised by them. The 
relationship between principal (intervening bodies such as the SHA and the PDT) 
and the agent (the Trust) could be categorised as a relational approach, which means 
that the Trust was given the support and encouragement for a self-managed 
turnaround and a regular monitoring was used by the SHA to assess the process of 
performance improvement. It was noted that the SHA was not willing to use direct 
intervention (mandated approach) in order to motivate the Trust to conduct the 
process by itself and also to reduce the financial cost and political risk. Because, as 
Jas and Skelcher (2004) argue, the mandated approach causes a high level of 
financial cost and political risk to the principal if it can not turnaround the situation. 
In addition, the senior managers of the Trust were willing to conduct turnaround 
process by themselves. It is important to note that a good relationship between the 
trust and the SHA had a positive impact on the progress of relational approach, 
which is consistent with the findings of Harvey et al. (2005a). Likewise, Turner and 
Whiteman (2005) showed that the use of a relational approach reduced the level of 
resistance by authorities against ODPM involvement. Similarly, Harvey et al. (2005a) 
argue that the PDT embraced a relational approach, in their sample, due to its 
philosophy and partnership working style which actually encouraged self-managed 
turnaround. This study revealed that self initiating organisations such as the Trust 
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under study do not necessarily require a huge degree of external support (particularly 
in terms of the presence of an in-house performance support team). The Trust was 
viewed by the PDT client manager as an organisation that had required a low level of 
interventions. 
This study showed that the SHA played an important role in turning around the 
organisation as it was able to provide an appropriate balance between its two 
different roles at the same time firstly as the performance management agent and 
secondly as supporting agents. Harvey et al. (2005a) highlight this issue as an 
important role of the SHA in the turnaround process. 
This study reinforces the findings of the study conducted by Harvey et al. (2005a) in 
relation to the function of the PDT and its relationship with poorly performing NHS 
organisations. This study revealed that the timing a PDT enter an organisation is 
important in terms of diagnosis and development of an action plan because the PDT 
arrived in the Trust when the Trust managers had already developed their plan. 
This study also revealed that the use of inexperienced staff in the PDT or the presence 
of staff that did not spend sufficient time inside the organisation to understand the 
problems did not result in effective outcome. On the other hand, this study found that 
the presence of experienced consultants in the PDT who spent a long time observing 
and gaining an understanding of the problems and dealing with staff rather than just 
suggesting what they needed to do, was perceived very to be effective by the Trust's 
staff. It seems that the type of relationship between members of the external 
performance supporting team and the staff of the organisation, particularly 
clinicians, is likely to be affected by the type of profession, duration of contact 
between these staff, quality of relationship between them and extent of acceptance by 
clinicians. Burke et al. (1994) similarly argue that the characteristic of mentor and 
mentee and the quality of relationship between them are important factors that 
influence the mentor relationship outcomes. Turner and Whiteman (2005) also 
suggest that the level of experiences and skills of political mentors were perceived as 
important factors to assist poorly performing local government authorities in 
reducing resistance to change and developing positive attitude to continuous 
performance improvement. 
Therefore, the findings of this case study appear to support proposition 5 
(Organisations, able to `self turnaround, do not necessarily require a huge degree of 
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external support, particularly in terms of the presence of an in-house performance 
support team. 
8.6 Effect of external and contextual factors on organisational 
failure and turnaround processes 
The findings of this study suggest that the characteristics of users of public services 
(e. g. socio-economic status, ethnic diversity) can affect the extent of local need for 
services, which may affect the performance of the organisation. A high level of 
healthcare need was reported in this study as a large population of very poor people 
lived in the area covered by the Trust. This resulted in there being a higher number of 
patients seeking the Trust's services and patients from populations, on average need 
to stay in hospital for a longer period, both of which could affect the capacity of the 
organisation, and its performance (e. g. meeting the 4 hour A&E target). One of the 
factors, perceived by the interviewees that had contributed to difficulties in meeting 
performance targets and in turning around the situation, was the very high level of 
need generated by the poor socio-economic characteristics of users of the services. 
Although the impact of contextual factors on organisational failure has not been 
investigated in the health sector, this study reinforces the findings of previous studies 
conducted in other public sectors (local government and schools) on the impact of 
contextual factors and the characteristics of the consumers of services on 
organisational failure (Wilmott, 1999; Andrews et al., 2006; Gray, 2000; Harris et al., 
2003; Turner and Whiteman, 2005). 
Andrews et al. (20o6) showed that the diverse service needs (higher ethnic diversity) 
and poverty had contributed to the failure of 120 UK upper tier local authorities 
measured by the CPA score. Similarly, Turner and Whiteman (2005) claimed that the 
possibility of failure of English local authorities was higher in the areas that had 
populations which needed a variety of services. Three studies (Gray, 2000; Wilmott, 
1999; Harris et al., 2003), conducted in the English education sector, showed that the 
poorly performing schools in their samples were located in areas with a high level of 
poverty and deprivation. It may be concluded that a high level of poverty and 
deprivation are likely to negatively affect the performance of public organisation. 
However, Andrews et al. (2006) did not show a significant statistical relationship 
between social class and failure in UK local government. 
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It seems that, in some situations, the performance of the organisations is related to 
factors that are beyond their control. Therefore, to assess the performance of the 
public organisations, the impact of contextual factors (particularly socio-economic 
circumstances), on the performance of the organisations, should be taken into 
account. 
8.7 unintended consequences of turnaround interventions 
A range of unintended consequences of implementing turnaround interventions was 
found in this study. A majority of interviewees referred to the high level stress related 
to the pressure of achieving the performance targets. Consequently, it resulted in 
lowering staff morale. In addition, it had affected negatively the learning time for 
staff as they did not have time to attend development and training programmes. The 
interviewees also perceived that too much focus on measurable targets had a negative 
impact on the quality of patient care. Mannion et al. (2005) refer to this as `tunnel 
vision'. This finding is supported by another study (Mannion et al., 2005), conducted 
within NHS context. However, the trust studied, did not represent serious problems 
in terms of recruitment and retaining high quality staff (Ghettoisation) that 
Mannion et al. (2005) found in their study. It is necessary to note that staff at lower 
levels, although were under pressure, did not report bullying under the new 
management regime. 
Similarly, unintended consequences were reported in local government setting. 
Turner and Whiteman (2005) argue that achieving a better CPA score had been the 
key priority for some local authorities. Two negative consequences were explored: 
first, the local authorities were reluctant to criticise the government (Compliance); 
and second, local authorities focused on meeting centrally, set targets (heavily 
oriented to the CPA score possibly incompatible with the requirements of their local 
communities. 
Therefore, the findings of this case study appear to support proposition 8 (A range 
of unintended consequences and barriers related to implementing turnaround 
interventions, within the Trust, will be apparent). 
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8.8 Applicability of `stage theory' in the public health sector 
The use of exercise of analytical generalisation (Yin, 2003) requires a consideration 
of the phenomena that are expected to happen in relation to organisational failure 
and turnaround, based on the theory derived from the for-profit sector, and a 
comparison of empirical findings with theoretical expectations to evaluate whether 
they confirm or reject the theory. The case study supports the turnaround stages 
framework (McKiernan's model) developed in the for-profit sector and confirm 
applicability of this framework to the public sector. However, there are some minor 
differences in the nature of the different stages. For example, the action plan 
developed by the Trust had to be approved by the SHA and following that by the 
Department of Health before it could be implemented. It also suggests that senior 
managers working in public service organisations do not have as much authority as 
senior managers in for-profit sector. The need for external approval for the outline of 
the action plan needs to be considered in McKiernan's model when it is applied to the 
public sector. Table 8.1 summarises the match between the categories of the 
turnaround stages framework and the data gathered in the case study. 
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Table 8.1 The match between the categories of the turnaround stages 
framework and the case data 












Multiple, interrelated cause 
J 
Primary causes 
Dysfunction in organisational learning V 
Triggers stage 
Internal triggers (new top management) 
External (external intervention) 
Diagnostic stage 
Diagnosis process and development of action plan 
V 
Retrenchment 




Priority given to growth (performance improvement) I/ 
Therefore, the findings of this case study appear to support proposition 9 (the 
`stage' model theory, developed in the for-profit sector, is applicable in the public 
sector, particularly the health sector). 
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8.9 Limitation of the study 
There are several limitations to this study. As outlined in section 4.3.1.3, case study 
research is subject to a number of limitations and the following should be borne in 
mind. 
First, according to Murphy et al. (1998) the merits and limitations of qualitative study 
constrain the findings of research (validity and reliability). One area of concern is the 
issue of generalisation. The generic limitations of qualitative methods do not allow 
for direct generalisation of the findings to other settings. However, as explained in 
section 4.3.1.3, the aim of the case study method is not statistical generalisation but 
analytical generalisation, i. e., the testing of theory (Yin, 2003). Therefore, due to the 
lack of sampling logic, it is not necessary to consider whether the findings apply to 
other settings. Nonetheless, the reader may feel tempted to extrapolate findings to 
other settings, in which case make it would be necessary to enter some caveats in 
place before attempting such generalisation. 
Second, the research is conducted by a single student, in which all the processes of 
data collection and analysis have been carried out by one researcher, may increase 
the likelihood of subjectivity in the findings (researcher bias) [Mays and Pope, 19951. 
With regard to issues of validity and reliability (Section 4.7), different strategies were 
used to minimise the likelihood of bias. The findings of this study were presented at 
two seminars and advisory meetings and the feedback received was used in 
reconsidering the analysis process. The verbatim quotations from interviewees were 
also presented in order to support the validity of the findings and show the link 
between interpretation and original data. However, the possibility of bias remains. 
A third limitation is respondent bias. It should be borne in mind that interviewees did 
not necessarily have to disclose their true perceptions in their answers. In fact, their 
answers might have been strategic, highlighting an issue for their own benefit and 
minimising or hiding other aspects, as well as giving answers that were more likely to 
please the interviewer. An attempt was made to mitigate such respondent bias by 
using triangulation strategies, explained in section 4.5.2 in detail. 
Another limitation is lack of control. The case selected for this empirical study was a 
unique case and its situation justifies its selection and the subsequent, investigation 
using an in-depth qualitative case study. However, in terms of the aetiology and 
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causation of performance problems and turnaround process (establishment of cause 
and effect), it may not be possible to present definite cause and effect evidence about 
the case under study. For example, the effectiveness of different selected turnaround 
strategies cannot be conclusively proved because there was no comparison between 
this case as an organisation that recovered, and other similar organisations that 
continued to fail. The latter might use similar strategies but they were not able to 
improve their performance. On the other hand, it was difficult to find a case, directly 
comparable to this in terms of important background criteria, such as teaching 
status, experience of merging, and the size of the hospital. In addition, due to lack of 
resources (time and money), it was not possible to investigate another case as much 
depth as the organisation used in this study. The researcher chose to investigate a 
case in greater depth rather than deciding to include additional cases. Selection of 
this unique case helped to maximise the amount of information about the 
organisational failure and turnaround process and it provided the opportunity to 
achieve deeper insights into the processes under study. In addition, Bonns (2001) 
argues that the studies of the turnarounds can be viewed controlled experiments in 
that they compare decline and success in a particular organisation, with the essential 
difference being is leadership. 
The other limitations of the case study approach set out in section 4.3.1.3, should also 
be borne in mind in regard to interpreting the findings of this study. 
The next Chapter (Chapter 9) presents the lessons for the development of health 
policy and recommendations for further research. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This study aims to contribute to a wider understanding of organisational failure and 
turnaround processes in health care organisations. Its findings are broadly 
comparable with other research findings and theories in this area of research. Thus, 
this study reinforces the limited evidence already available and adds new insights to 
this applied area. Nevertheless, much more still needs to be learnt about the 
organisational dynamics underpinning performance decline and turnaround, 
particularly how organisations are able to better diagnose performance failure, halt 
organisational decline, and sustain continuous performance improvement over the 
long term. In the NHS these issues will be brought into sharper focus as market 
mechanisms are increasingly applied to the finance and management of NHS trusts. 
Based on the findings of the empirical case study and review of the theoretical and 
evidence base, the following lessons and policy implications are drawn for policy 
makers, regulators and health care organisations wishing to turnaround their 
performance. 
g. Policy implications and lessons for turnaround 
" Tracking an organisation's performance and early diagnosis of 
performance problems 
Comprehensive diagnostic mechanisms and tools need to be developed by policy 
makers and regulatory agencies to track trends in the performance of organisations 
over time and provide early warnings of potential performance failure. This will allow 
the focusing of external interventions and remedial action. A range of soft intelligence 
(qualitative data) and hard information (quantitative data such as core performance 
indicators) is available to facilitate early diagnosis of problems. It is also important to 
observe the continued progress of more successful organisations so that lessons can 
be learned and shared across the NHS. 
Over the past five years the performance of NHS organisations has been assessed 
by a 
`star' rating system. Since 2005-2006, however, the Healthcare Commission 
has used 
a new system, the `annual health check', which aims to produce a more 
`balanced 
scorecard' of quality and performance using a four-point scale ranging 
from 
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"excellent", "good", "fair" or "weak". Trusts are now rated on two major dimensions: 
`quality of services' and `use of resources'. To assess the quality of services, a range of 
areas that matter to patients are assessed using three measures including: meeting 
`core standards' of care (covering safety, clinical and cost effectiveness, governance, 
patient focus, accessible and responsive care, the care environment and amenities, 
and public health), meeting targets set by governments (both existing and new 
national targets), and reviewing of specific services or topics (e. g. tobacco control, 
management of admissions and diagnostics services). This new system should 
improve on the problems araised with the star rating, but nevertheless require careful 
monitoring and evaluation to guide the development of policy. The introduction of 
new market based and competitive policies in the NHS (e. g. Payment by Results and 
patient choice) the number of failing health care organisations is likely to increase in 
the future. As the environment is likely to be more volatile and unpredictable, the 
NHS organisations, may face financial instability, uncertainty and service difficulties. 
Therefore, these issues again highlight that the organisations need to track their 
performance more carefully and the necessity for the existence of turnaround teams 
consisting of experienced staff in financial and operational fields became more 
evident. 
So more focus on identification of poorly performing organisations and assisting them 
to turnaround the situation appears to be an increasingly important issue. NHS 
organisations should track their performance using both hard and soft data. The 
range and type of hard and soft data may vary between different types of 
organisations. Harvey et al. (2005) draw out some examples of hard and soft 
intelligence, which could form the basis of monitoring and assessment: 
Hard information includes performance indicators in the following areas: the 
achievement of key performance targets; the maintenance of financial balance; 
complaints (the level of complaints, seriousness of reported complaints and the level 
of satisfactory resolution of complaints); medical incidents (the level and severity of 
patient safety incidents); the findings and conclusions of audit studies and external 
reviews (e. g. Healthcare Commission, staff and patient surveys, national audit 
programmes, and Audit Commission investigation); the level of staff turnover; and 
the severity of recruitment and retention problems. 
Soft information (qualitative and informal intelligence) that may be gathered 
includes: the level of staff morale; the level of the accuracy and availability of the data 
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relating to organisational performance; the use of available data by the organisation; 
the organisation's level of awareness of what is happening both internally and 
externally; the level of distraction caused by major projects being undertaken within 
the organisation (e. g. PFI, mergers, major restructuring); the quality of the 
organisation's response to the signs of decline; the quality of relationships with 
external organisations (e. g. the SHA, commissioners and other stakeholders); the 
quality of relationships between managers and clinicians; and the relationship 
between the organisation and local media 
" Diagnosis of problems 
This study has shown that diagnosis of the cause of performance problems within the 
Trust, undertaken by its managers and by external organisations, facilitated the 
selection of appropriate programmes and strategies to address and turnaround the 
poor performance. To increase the success of turnaround interventions, the 
underlying factors (both internal and external), contributing to performance decline 
should be identified and an appropriate action plan developed on the basis of the 
correct identification of these factors. Policy makers need to develop better bespoke 
tools to aid the early diagnosis of organisational failure and decline. 
" Turnaround requires investment in resources and skills 
The findings of this study and a review the relevant literature, indicate that although 
the replacement of the senior management team appears to be a requirement 
for performance improvement in poorly performing organisations, any incoming 
managers need to process broad blend of core managerial skills, as well as ready 
access to financial resources and external assistance (e. g. use of mentors or 
consultants). This issue is more important when organisations seek to sustain over the 
long term their hard won performance improvement. It should be borne in mind that, 
although the number of failing organisations is small percentage in the NHS, those 
that are under-performing affect service delivery across the local health economy and 
absorb a greater proportion of resources. 
" Turnaround takes time 
Remedying a crisis situation takes an extended period of time, and policy makers, 
external agencies and regulators need to allow sufficient time to assess the 
effectiveness of turnaround strategies and interventions. External stakeholders must 
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have realistic expectations, although it remains a fact of life that for political reasons, 
performance improvement is often sought within a very short period of time. 
" Leadership skills 
As this study and the literature review have revealed, competent leadership is a crucial 
factor in the success of the turnaround process. The NHS suffers from a lack of 
talented managers who are able to assist organisations in crisis situations (Ham, 
2005), and policy makers should employ mechanisms to develop appropriate 
leadership capabilities in senior management. It is vital that senior managers have 
both management and leadership capabilities and skills. 
" Development of an `open' culture 
This study, as well as the literature review, illustrated that in organisations with a `fear 
culture', staff are not willing to raise concerns regarding performance problems or 
report mistakes because of the risk of being blamed or `scapegoated' by senior 
managers. Alternatively, it was shown that the development of a more transparent 
and open culture helped the Trust to improve its performance. This kind of culture 
provides opportunities for staff to disclose performance difficulties (e. g. constructive 
discussion during meetings) and report mistakes which occur in the workplace, and is 
likely to lead to the development of a learning environment within the organisation. 
Development of an open, `no blame' culture by the organisations' managers is 
recommended, as this may help to sustain their organisational performance and 
prevent the occurrence of similar difficulties in future. 
" Secure engagement of clinical staff 
This study showed that involving clinical staff in the decision making process and 
management of the Trust appeared to help improve the organisation's performance. 
Policy makers should encourage organisations to engage the interest of their clinical 
staff, particularly clinical consultants and by so doing, to decrease the risk of 
resistance to change and provide more commitment and ownership of problems 
among clinical health professionals. One way of addressing this issue would be to 
integrate into external performance assessment systems measure of the quality of 
clinical staff engagement with the `corporate vision'. 
" Work with external stakeholders 
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This study, and the findings of the literature review, have shown that it is important 
for acute trusts to develop and enhance their relationships with external stakeholders 
within the local health economy in order to avoid performance decline and sustain 
performance improvement. Doing so may bring more support for the organisation 
from external stakeholders, and also expand working partnerships and mutual 
collaboration with these organisations. Hospital managers should be encouraged, 
perhaps by use of incentives, to proactively develop their working relationships with 
other organisations in the local health economy. Moreover, increased community and 
user perspectives should be sought by acute trusts during the turnaround process, to 
try to ensure that their requirements are met and that change does not adversely 
affect their interests. 
" Development and improvement of recruitment policies 
Because of the importance of the role of senior managers, particularly CEOs, in the 
process of organisational turnaround, it is crucial when a replacement intervention is 
planned, for an organisation to recruit to key posts, appropriate managers with 
relevant core managerial skills and capabilities. In a poorly performing organisation, 
replacement of incumbent managers with inappropriate managers is unlikely to result 
in a successful turnaround, although even replacement with appropriate people does 
not necessarily guarantee success. 
" Focus on performance management system 
This study and literature review showed that the lack of a robust and effective 
performance management system contributed to performance decline within the 
Trust. A greater focus on the development and implementation of a performance 
management system helped the organisation to turnaround the crisis situation, at 
least in terms of short term performance improvement. Such a performance 
management system would help provide ownership of performance issues and 
develop a clear line of accountability. The policy makers should invest more in the 
development of an effective performance management system, by investing in and 
developing good information systems, which provides timely and accurate data 
relating to key aspects of organisational performance. 
" Internal award systems 
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As this study has shown, the staff were not satisfied with the rewards they received 
when the Trust was rated as three stars, in comparison with those awarded by another 
Trust situated in their neighbourhood. They felt that that their efforts had not been 
sufficiently appreciated and this affected their morale. Appropriate reward systems 
need to be developed to motivate staff and show that senior managers value and 
appreciate their efforts in turning around under performance. 
" Avoiding duplication in deploying inspection and support mechanisms 
In order to avoid duplication, confusion and waste of resources, only a limited 
number of inspectors, auditors and external assessors should be sent to a failing 
organisation at any one time. As this study has shown, the Trust's managers perceived 
that the presence of a large number of investigators was sometimes an impediment to 
virtuous performance improvement. 
" Contextual factors should be taken into account 
This study indicated that the Trust's performance had been affected by the low socio- 
economic background of patients and the resulting high workload was beyond the 
control of the Trust's managers. The impact on an organisation's performance of 
contextual factors (e. g. deprivation), which are beyond the control of the 
organisations' management team, should be considered by central government when 
offering rewards or impose sanctions on organisations. It is recommended that the 
national performance measurement system takes into account the impact of 
contextual factors on organisational performance. 
" Tailor-made approaches 
Since the causes of performance decline, the local context, and the level of capability, 
capacity and cognition (explained in Chapter 3) are unique to each organisation, so a 
series of generic and `one size fits all' turnaround prescriptions is unlikely to result in 
performance improvement for all types of organisations. A tailor-made approach, 
which uses a range of specific tools tailored to local circumstances and contingencies, 
is required when attempting to increase the chance of successful turnaround. For 
example, the use of interim managers may not be appropriate in an attempt to 
turnaround poor performance. 
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" Enhancing quality of external audit 
This study has shown that, when less than rigorous audit was carried out by external 
auditors they were unable to discover data misrepresentation within the organisation, 
thus allowing Trust to continue this malpractice. Therefore, a more robust and 
comprehensive auditing system is required to ensure the quality and accuracy of data 
presented by different organisations at local and national level. Heavy penalties could 
also be applied to deter such behaviour at the local level. 
" Use of experienced staff in external performance improvement teams 
The use of an experienced external consultant helped the Trust to diagnose and solve 
several key performance problems. Policy makers are advised to develop mechanisms 
which enable the use of such experienced people when dealing with poorly performing 
organisations. Indeed, the development of performance improvement teams 
(turnaround teams) with experienced staff who are able to work with organisations 
(but not in the capacity of inspectors) seems useful in the future as the number of 
failing organisations is likely to increase under the financial pressures and recent 
policy changes in the NHS. 
" Diagnosis and mitigating the impact of dysfunctional consequences of 
interventions during the turnaround process 
This study and the literature review showed that focusing mainly on performance 
targets set by central government during the turnaround process distracted managers 
from considering issues that were not subject to the performance measurement 
system (e. g. quality of services) and might hinder performance improvement over the 
medium or longer term. Therefore it is recommended that policy makers develop 
mechanisms to monitor and mitigate such dysfunctional consequences. More 
involvement of service users is recommended to ascertain their views, which may 
thereby disclose performance weakness. 
9.2 Research implication 
Based on the findings of the empirical case study and literature review, further 
research is recommended in the public sector particularly in NHS organisations: 
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" Longitudinal studies are required to track the performance of organisations 
following implementation of turnaround interventions and to record which 
performance improvements become embedded and are sustained over the long 
term. Thus longer-term performance fluctuations could be investigated, so that 
dynamic the issues affecting sustainable performance improvement can be better 
identified and targeted. It should be borne in mind that longitudinal approaches 
also have limitations. For example, to carry out longitudinal work, the research 
team needs allocate a more significant amount of time and effort. 
" Organisational failure and turnaround are complex, multifaceted and dynamic 
processes, so multi-method (both quantitative and qualitative) and multi- 
disciplinary research is suggested when exploring this complexity in the natural 
setting. It is recommended that studies be conducted to compare both successful 
and unsuccessful attempts at turnaround. 
" As the literature review showed, theoretical frameworks have generally not 
underpinned in studies conducted in this area, so research underpinned by sound 
theoretical frameworks is required in order to provide better guidance for policy 
makers. 
" According to McKiernan's model, symptoms, secondary, and primary causes of 
failure are interdependent. When trying to gain a better understanding of the 
nature of organisational failure, further research is recommended in order to 
scrutinise the relationships between markers and causes of failure and to identify 
links to turnaround interventions within the public sector. In addition, the complex 
interplay between the various secondary causes of failure should be further 
explored. 
" More comparative studies are recommended across health systems and between 
other public services to identify similarities and differences in relation to 
organisational failure and the turnaround processes among public organisations. 
As there is limited evidence of the impact of contextual factors, which are beyond 
the managerial control, on the process of organisational failure and the turnaround 
process in the public sector, particularly the health sector, further research is 
recommended to evaluate the impact of these factors (e. g. socioeconomic 
factors, 
size of the organisation) on the level of failure or success of public service 
organisations, especially in the health sector. Moreover, examination of 
how the 
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management strategies can mitigate the negative impact of these factors is 
recommended. 
" Further research, particularly using a longitudinal approach, is needed to examine 
the role and effectiveness of external supporting agents in the process of 
turnaround and to explore the interaction between the key change agent roles and 
the organisations' managers during the period of turnaround. It is also helpful to 
explore the impact of the levels of expertise, skill and the style used by the 
members of the external supporting agencies when approaching the organisation, 
on the outcome of the turnaround interventions they suggest. This kind of research 
may reveal how long and how closely the external agents need to work with poorly 
performing organisations. This empirical research showed that the Trust's senior 
managers were willing to retain contact with a member of the external supporting 
agency for a long period of time, so it may be useful to explore why and how 
willingly the organisations in the health sector, and other public sectors, keep their 
contact with external agencies. 
9 As the literature review revealed, permanently failing organisations are unable to 
initiate the turnaround process by themselves and external intervention and 
support is necessary to initiate the process of change. More research is needed to 
explore how government agencies need to react to permanently failing 
organisations, the kinds of intervention likely to be effective, and the length of time 
such interventions may be needed. 
" As this study and literature review highlighted, `self regulating' organisations are 
able to initiate turnaround interventions by themselves without receiving direct 
intervention from outside, and need less external support and resources than 
`permanently failing' organisations, although the former may absorb scarce 
resources. As a consequence, further research is required to develop tools to 
distinguish between those organisations that are self regulating and those that are 
permanently failing. This would provide the opportunity for external supportive 
organisations to focus their support and extra resources to those organisations 
unable to initiate turnaround by themselves. 
" Owing to the political context within which public service organisations operate 
and the continuous change in the policy landscape, research is required to examine 
the impact of external environmental change, such as governmental policy reforms 
on performance of NHS organisations (e. g. Payment by Result, Patient 
Choice, new 
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financial scheme for organisations and practice based commission) and on the 
process of failure and turnaround, over time. 
" The role of leadership in the turnaround process is vital and further research is 
recommended to explore the impact of the role of the CEO and senior management 
team and their leadership style on the effectiveness of the turnaround process and 
sustaining performance improvement. This may reveal the type of leadership style 
likely to be effective during different stages of the turnaround, particularly when 
leaders seek to sustain performance improvement. The leadership style could be 
evaluated using comparative studies between and within successful and 
unsuccessful organisations, in terms of the turnaround process. 
" There is limited evidence to show whether insider or outsider succession is more 
effective in the public sector, and further research is recommended to investigate 
this issue more broadly. As the review showed, in some circumstances interim 
managers were appointed during the turnaround process, so more research is 
needed to evaluate their roles and how they are perceived by other managers at 
different levels of the organisational hierarchy. Moreover, it is helpful to explore 
the solutions to the conflicts that might have happened between different 
stakeholders and interim managers. 
" More research is required to explore the impact of user involvement and 
consultation on the decisions made by the organisations and how those decisions 
may contribute to organisational performance, failure and turnaround processes. 
The prescription of a series of generic and `one size fits all' turnaround 
interventions is unlikely to result in performance improvement for all types of 
organisations, so further research is needed to show the kinds of turnaround 
strategies (reorganisation, retrenchment and repositioning) that are more effective 
and under what circumstances in the public sector. 
" As found by this research and the literature review, turnaround interventions and 
efforts to attain targets caused a range of unintended consequences (e. g. tunnel 
vision and distortions of clinical priorities; bullying, intimidation, stress and 
anxiety; erosion of public Trust and reduced staff morale). Further research is 
needed to evaluate how these unintended consequences of turnaround 
interventions, particularly the increased level of stress and anxiety among staff, 
affect performance improvement in the long term. 
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" Further research is recommended to explore the types of intervention strategies 
central government agencies and the local SHA should attempt with high 
performing organisations when they start to show a downward trend in 
performance. 
" An interesting point is that the Trust gave permission to the researcher to conduct 
his research when the performance of the Trust had improved and the pressure and 
stress on the Trust had decreased. The Trust was not willing to allow research to be 
carried out when it was under investigation by a range of teams from various 
organisations. So, they refused to give permission for research to be done by a team 
who were conducting a large project on the turnaround process in different 
organisations. Refusing access may be related to the lack of time that the managers 
had at that crucial stage or some managers may have viewed the research team as 
other investigators or as an unwanted distraction or hindrance factor. Therefore, it 
seems that organisations are more likely to grant permission for research to take 
place when they have been successful in turning around situations than when they 
are still involved in crisis situations. This is an issue which needs to be factored into 
the design of future research in this area. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 3.1 Search strategy in HMIC (via Ovid) 
1 fail$. mp. 
2. declin$. mp. 
3. cris$. mp. 
4. recover$. mp. 
5. renew$. mp. 
6. rejuvenat$. mp. 
7. success$. mp. 
8.1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 
9. exp organisations/ 
10. exp ADMINISTRATION/ 
11. organi? ation$. mp. 
12. exp performance/ 
13.9or1oor11or12 
14.13 and 8 
15. (Organi? ation$ adj6 mortality). mp. 
16. (Organi? ation$ adj6 exit). mp. 
17. (Organi? ation$ adj6 death). mp. 
18. retrenchment$. mp. 
19. turnaround. mp. 
20. turn$ around. mp. 
21.15 or 16 or 17 or 18 or 19 or 20 
22.21 or 14 
23. exp HEALTH CARE/ 
24. healthcare. mp. 
25. hospital $. mp. 
26. exp NHS TRUSTS/ or exp HEALTH TRUSTS/ or exp PRIMARY CARE 
TRUSTS/ or exp COMMUNITY TRUSTS/ or exp TRUSTS/ or exp TEACHING 
PRIMARY CARE TRUSTS/ or exp CARE TRUSTS/ or exp INTEGRATED 
SERVICES TRUSTS/ or exp ACUTE HOSPITAL TRUSTS/ or exp SOCIAL 
WELFARE TRUSTS/ or exp MENTAL HEALTH TRUSTS/ 
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27. trust$. mp. 
28. exp HOSPITAL CARE/ 
29. secondary care. mp. 
30. exp PRIMARY CARE/ 
31.23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 
32.22 and 31 
The search strategies for other databases were modified from this search 
strategy. 
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Appendix 3.3 Quality Appraisal of Qualitative Studies 
1 Question 
" Did the paper address a clear research question and if so, what was it? 
2 Design 
" What was the study design and was this appropriate to the research question? 
" In particular, was a qualitative approach suitable and was the right design used? 
3 Context 
" What was the context of the study? 
" Was the context of the study adequately well described that the findings can be related to 
other settings? 
4 Sampling 
" Did the study include sufficient cases/settings/observations so that conceptual rather than 
statistical generalisations could be made? 
5 Data collection 
" Was the data collection process systematic, thorough, auditable and appropriate to the 
research question? 
" Were attempts made to identify and explore disconfirming cases? 
6 Data analysis 
" Were data analysed systematically and rigorously? 
" Did the analysis take account of all observations? 
" Were sufficient data given to present evident relationship between evidence and 
interpretation? 
" How were disconfirming observations dealt with? 
7 Results 
" What were the main results and were those clearly stated? 
" Were there any unintended consequences and, if so, what were they? 
8 Conclusions 
" Did the authors draw a clear link between data and explanation (theory)? 
" If not, what were the limitations of their theoretical analysis? 
9 Reflexivity 
" Were the authors' positions and roles clearly explained and the resulting biases 
considered? 
" Were the authors' preconceptions and ideology adequately set aside? 
io Ethics 
" Are there any ethical reservations about the study? 
ii Transferability 
" To what extent are the findings transferable? 
12 Worth/relevance 
" Was the research worth doing at all, and has it contributed usefully to existing 
understanding? 
Source: Adapted from Mays and Pope, 2000 
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Appendix 3.4 Quality appraisal of questionnaire based survey 
studies 
i Research question and design 
" Was there a clear research question, and was this important and sensible? 
" Was a questionnaire the most appropriate research design for this question? 
2 Sampling 
" What was the sampling frame and was it sufficiently large and representative? 
" Did all participants in the sample understand what was required of them, and did they 
attribute the same meaning to the terms in the questionnaire? 
3 Instrument 
" What claims for reliability and validity have been made, and are these justified? 
" Did the questions cover all relevant aspects of the problem in a non-threatening and non- 
directive way? 
" Were open-ended (qualitative) and closed-ended (quantitative) questions used 
appropriately? 
" Was a pilot version administered to participants representative of those in the sampling 
frame, and the instrument modified accordingly? 
4 Response 
" What was the response rate and have non-responders been accounted for? 
5 Coding and analysis 
" Was the analysis appropriate (e. g. statistical analysis for quantitative answers, qualitative 
analysis for open-ended questions) and were the correct techniques used? 
" Were adequate measures in place to maintain accuracy of data? 
6 Presentation of results 
" Have all relevant results ('significant' and `non-significant') been reported? 
" Is there any evidence of `data dredging' (i. e. analyses that were not `hypothesis driven')? 
Source: Boynton and Greenhalgh (2004) 
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Appendix 3.5 Detailed summary of the methods and findings of 
the studies included in the comprehensive review 
ID number 
1 
Turning around failing hospital 
Title 




NHS Confederation Report 
Aims and To explore causes and patterns of failure among failing NHS 
Objectives acute trusts. In addition to explore responses to impending 
and actual failure, type of turnaround strategies and their 
impact on different stakeholders (e. g. patients, staff, public) 
Type of NHS acute trusts, UK 
organization and 
setting 
Case study method using interview technique and focus group 10 Design with managers 
Previous and new mangers in 4 failing acute trusts and 5 
Participants trusts at different stages of turnaround; interview with key 
external stakeholders (e. g. related PCTs, Regional Offices) 
Outcome Perspectives of hospital managers (clinical and non-clinical) 
measures and external stakeholders (e. g. PCT, Regional offices) 
regarding performance improvement in acute hospital trusts 
Number of interviewees had not been reported. Sample size 
The data was collected over few months through interview Data collection: and focus group Source & Period 
It was not clearly reported but it seems that the thematic Data analysis analysis method has been used 
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Results Markers (symptoms) of failure were: poor performance on 
core targets; financial deficit, poor public image; poor 
working relationships with local media and external 
stakeholders; and low staff morale. 
The study has explored five main reasons that cause failure 
among studied trust including (i) poor leadership (a failure of 
leadership, unwillingness to delegate, failure to challenge 
internal vested interest, being isolated from colleagues in 
other organisations, reluctant to make decision, too 
comfortable board), (ii) Poor operational management; (iii) 
strategic and external problems; (iv) Problems with internal 
culture and lack of clinical engagement; v) Distraction by 
major projects (eyes off ball). 
The study has recognised that replacement of senior 
managers occurred in all the five turnaround cases. In all of 
them, the CEO had been changed. In two of the Chair of the 
trust and in three of them, the entire or most of the members 
of the trust board had been replaced. 
Triggers for change were replacement of senior managers, 
inspection or intervention introduced by external 
organisations and low performance level. 
The study has explored different turnaround strategies that 
had been adopted by the trusts, including: i) Internal 
reorganisation (more structured management teams, 
reconfiguration of posts and responsibilities); ii) Improving 
operational performance; iii) Focus on human resources; iv) 
Financial analysis and control v) Attempts to change 
organisational culture (introduction of `can do' culture 
through promoting transparency, clarity of process, goal 
setting and aspiration for meeting performance targets); vi) 
Development of relations with external stakeholders. 
The five trusts under study represented some impacts of 
turnaround strategies on patient care: more focus on clinical 
governance; more transparent with patient complaints and 
risk assessment and stress on reduction of waiting lists. 
All the cases has reported positive impact of turnaround 
strategies on the trust's public image and working relation 
with external stakeholders. 
Some clinician had shown resistance against some changes in 
the management of clinical practice introduced by new 
managers. 
In general the impact of turnaround strategies were positive 
on the staff but in some cases staff had shown some extent of 
resistance to the new managers' plan because they felt more 
workload pressure and stress derived from these plans. 
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Result of turnaround: three out five trust presented 
performance improvement in terms of changes in star rating 
and two of them received lower performance rating over a 
year. 
Limitation and The study has recruited star rating (2001-2002) to evaluate 
strength the effectiveness of the turnaround strategies adopted by 
these organisations. However, It seems that it was early (only 
about a year after introducing turnaround strategies) for the 
researchers to conclude the effectiveness of adopted 
strategies for sustained performance improvement. More 
longitudinal studies are needed. 
Research The study revealed that more longitudinal research in the 
implications health sector is needed to evaluate the process of 
organisational failure and the effectiveness of turnaround 
processes. 
Policy 
The study highlighted that policy makers need to develop a 
implications comprehensive 
diagnosis system using different markers to 
detect the problems at the early stages to prevent entire 
failure of the orgainsations. In addition The authors warned 
that although replacement of management is necessary but it 
is insufficient. They note that managers replacement may not 
be the best approach when problems are related to the 
external or strategic factors. More emphasis on the 
communication across the organisation and changing 
management and involving staff were addressed. Time should 
be given to the organisations to improve performance 
(realistic expectation). 
More longitudinal studies are needed to show the Comments effectiveness of turnaround strategies that can gaurantee 





ID number 2 
Title Turnaround in Health Care Providers 
Author Fulop, N., Scheibl, F., Edwards, N. 
Year 2004 
Country UK 
Source Report, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
Aims and To improve the understanding of management change Objectives (franchising) leading to turnaround as a policy intervention 
for addressing `failure' in NHS hospitals. The study 
specifically sought: to identify markers for failure beyond the 
NHS star rating, to identify different interventions used to 
turnaround failing organisations, to identify which interventions are successful and in which context, to explore both intended and unintended consequences of turnaround 
strategies, and to draw lessons for the NHS on how `failure' 
might be prevented in the future. 
Type of Poorly performing English acute Trusts - according to the star 
organization and rating system (zero star trusts or trusts that were at risk of 
setting becoming zero star and were subject to intervention by the 
Modernisation Agency) or on the basis of the perceived 
`failure' identified through replacement of senior managers 
prior to the introduction of star rating - that had experienced 
replacement of senior manager(s) as a turnaround 
intervention. 
Design Multiple case study 
Participants internal and external stakeholders at nine NHS Hospital 
Trusts 
Outcome Perception of interviewees regarding the organisational 
measures failure and turnaround process, views of patients on the basis 
of national patient surveys, and performance rating on the 
basis of star rating system. 
Sample size Nine Poorly performing English acute Trusts 
Data collection: Three types of data: semi-structure face-to-face interview 
Source & Period with io6 internal and external stakeholders at nine NHS 
hospital Trusts over two years, data from a sample of local 
media reports from the web, and finally data from national 
patient survey programme and the NHS performance rating. 
Data analysis Interview data was analysed using Atlas-ti software, data 
collected from media was analysed manually and additional 
analysis completed using Atlas-ti. 
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Results Symptoms, secondary and primary causes of failure were 
identified. Three main clusters consisted of markers 
(symptoms) including: inability to hit core targets and 
financial problems; distraction by the major development 
(merger with another trust and/or PFI) ('eyes off the ball'); 
and organisation was as insular `fortress' exhibiting poor 
external relationships, low staff morale, poor media image, 
high turnover and recruitment problems. Secondary 
causes: secondary internal causes include financial (financial 
mismanagement, high cost structure such as agency staff and 
drugs, overspend in key clinical directorates, duplicating 
services across two or more sites), managerial (lack of 
engagement of clinicians, lack of systems, process and 
procedures (lack of data management system, operational 
mismanagement, lack of leadership, no response to external 
challenges from managers, lack of planning vision or 
strategy), and organisational issues (instability within the 
organisation triggered by poor industrial relations and major 
incidents). Secondary external causes were major policy 
changes in the NHS (e. g. introduction of Performance 
Assessment Framework) and increased competition as 
services relocated to PCT and mental health trusts). Primary 
cause was an inability to learn and adapt due to the 
organisational introspection (management took on the stance 
of a closed system and were unable to deal with external 
challenges), organisational arrogance (no need for change of 
attitude of managers due to the previous success), 
organisational trauma (removal of CEO following high profile 
negative media coverage and clinical investigations), and 
organisational myopia (presence of a complacent 
management team who lacked the ability to scan the 
environment resulting in a conservative and risk/change 
averse organisation). 
Triggers for change: triggers for change came from 
managers internal to the organisation (chair contacting DoH 
or Regional Office to raise concern, new managers took the 
CHI report as a trigger to support his/her radical action) and 
the concerns of external stakeholders highlighted in the local 
or national media. 
Turnaround interventions: Different interventions were 
used by the managers to impact on a range of organisational 
issues including management structure, finance, human 
resources, organisational culture, external relationships, 
systems and protocol, strategic vision and operational 
performance. A range of different leadership styles from 
participative, facilitative and risk taking to more mechanistic 
approaches based on hierarchical principals were employed. 
The turnaround process was planned to be run over a period 
of three years: first six months (strategy: focus f consultation 
on strategy; organisational culture: increasing visibility of 
top team, use of `quick wins'; Management: re-organisation 
management structure to improve clinical engagement, 
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reduction of number of clinical directorates, create and fill 
new posts for key directorates; Finanace: increase financial 
control; HRM: communication strategies to gain staff 
commitment toward national targets; External 
relationship: better media relationships, better working 
relationship with external stakeholders; systems process 
and policies: data management; operational 
performance: prioritise operational performance targets); 
between to o 12 months, strategy: development of strategic 
vision using bold slogans; organisational culture: more focus was to complete new buildings/PFI to demonstrate 
management ability and commitment; Management: re- 
organisation of middle management and leadership 
programme; HRM: develop staff training and staff reward 
system; External relationship: improvement of external 
relations, development of PALS, set up clinical networks; 
systems process and policies: modernise procedures. 
The aim of the manager over the third phase was to 
implement organisational learning programmes, decision 
making, celebrating success, create clinical networks 
encourage ownership of the strategic vision throughout the 
organisation. 
Impact of turnaround interventions: Five trusts showed 
consistent improvement in their performance assessed by the 
`star rating' system over the study period which means that 
these organisations were `self regulating' organisations', 
however four organisation presented either stagnation or a 
decline in performance. Two out of four cases could be 
classified as `permanently failing' organisations'. 
Various constraints on turnaround and organisations' access 
to the resources required for the turnaround can explain 
difference among these organisations. 
Constraints on turnaround: Some factors constrained the 
turnaround interventions including: cultural diversity 
(competing sub-cultures), complexity (multie-layer nature of 
hospitals), lack of leadership and external influences (impact 
of government policy and pressure about public image). 
Resistance from the clinical body and middle managers 
created resentment and was due to the cultural diversity and 
complexity. 
Resources required for turnaround: The success of the 
managers to turnaround was contingent upon them to the 
having certain core skills (developing change agenda, ability 
to communicate and provide clear vision, ability to grasp 
detail required to deliver core targets, and having strategic 
perspective) and access to financial, temporal (time and 






Policy implication Identifying `at risk' organisations by the organisations 
charged with inspecting, managing and improving 
performance such as SHA and the Healthcare Commission 
using both soft and hard indicators; providing required 
financial, temporal, and external resources (money, time, 
stability); development of sustainable improvement takes 
time (5 years); diagnosis of the problem is needed before to 
plan any turnaround programmes; development of an open 
attitude which accepts responsibility for the organisation's 
difficulties; establishment of clear leadership; encouraging 
involvement of clinical staff; developing work with external 
stakeholders; having an appropriate recruitment policy to 
have the appropriate people at right posts at top level; 
negotiating access to financial resources; using internal 
reward system; using external support system (e. g. from MA). 
Comments Some factors were taken into account for both symptoms and 
causes of failure such as lack of leadership, financial 
mismanagement. That may cause some confusion. 
Other details `Failure' and `decline' have been used. 
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ID number 3 
Title Investigating `Turnaround' in NHS organisations supported 
by the Performance Development Team (PDT) of the 
Modernisation Agency 
Author Harvey, G., Hyde, P., Walshe, K. 
Year 2005 
Country UK 
Source Centre for Public Policy and Management, Manchester 
Business School, University of Manchester 
Aims and To examine the role of the Performance Development Team 
Objectives (PDT), a part of the Modernisation Agency, as an external 
intervention agent in promoting and facilitating turnaround 
of the zero star rated NHS organisations; To evaluate the 
experience of the trusts concerned and the impact of PDT 
interventions on their performance; to increase 
understanding of effective turnaround strategies and their 
situational appropriateness (when and how to use which 
interventions). 
Type of NHS organisations from the 2003 cohort of zero-star trusts 
organization and (an SHA, an acute trust, a mental health trust, a PCT and an 
setting ambulance trust), selected NHS organisations from the 2002 
cohort of zero star trusts, UK. 
Design Formative evaluation design, supported by the principles of 
`realistic evaluation'. Case study method using interview and 
review of documents. 
Participants Five cases study sites chosen from the 2003 zero-star trusts 
(interview with 38 people from the trusts' senior mangers, 
PDT staff working with the trust and related Strategic Health 
Authorities) and zero star rated trusts in 2002 (interview 
with 14 senior managers and related strategic health 
authority). 
Outcome Perspectives of organisations' managers and external 
measures stakeholders (e. g SHA) and members of the PDT team 
regarding performance improvement in selected NHS 
organisations 
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Sample size 52 interviewees (38 interviewees from the 2003 cohort of 
zero-star trusts and 14 interviewees from the 2002 cohort of 
zero-star trusts). 
Data collection: Three main data sources using interview method and review 
Source & Period of documents. (i) The total cohort of 2003 zero-star trusts 
(documentary review); (ii) Five cases study sites chosen from 
the 2003 zero-star trusts (review of documents and interview 
with 38 people from the trust's senior managers, PDT staff 
working with the trust and related Strategic Health 
Authorities); (iii) Number of zero star rated trusts in 2002 
(interview with 14 senior managers and related Strategic 
Health Authority). 
Data analysis It was not clearly reported but it seems that they have used 
the thematic analysis method. 
Results i) Nature and content of PDT interventions: 
The main aim of the PDT was to help trusts to obtain long- 
term and sustained performance improvement (through 
changing organisational culture and development of whole 
system working) rather short term success. The role of the 
PDT was consistent with the `relational approach' of Jas and 
Skelcher's principal-agent framework (Jas and Skelchere, 
2004) rather than episodic or mandated approaches. The 
Results PDT focuses on main causes of failure (secondary and 
(continued) primary) rather than concentrating on the symptoms of the 
failure. However, this aim was in contrast with the initial will 
of some trusts and their external stakeholders in particular 
the SHA which seeks quick performance improvement 
(through hitting essential targets) and gaining one or more 
star in the next round of ratings. Only one year contract 
between PDT and failing organisations raises a debate about 
how the PDT can assure sustained performance 
improvement for a long-time because Fulop et al (2004) 
argue that literature shows such changes take more than five 
years to achieve. 
ii) Impact of PDT intervention: 
The focus of the PDT activities was on the retrenchment and 
renewal interventions because the PDT did not have the 
authority to replace key managers (replacement 
intervention). Although the initial purpose of PDT was to 
apply flexible and responsive interventions according to the 
needs and situation of each organisation (tailor-made 
approach), the strategies that they have used for 
organisations were not so diverse. Some organisations 
declared that this limited the breadth of available 
interventions. In general, most of the organisations studied 
presented a positive feedback on the function of the PDT such 
as it providing required skills and experiences to apply 
change, external confirmation for initiating changes; 
facilitating development of external network; giving advice as 
a critical friend; assisting with concentration of efforts across 
the Organisation. Most of the PDTs (86%) delivered their 
347 
agreed commitment on time. There was an improvement in 
star rating of 8o% of the zero star organisations studied. 
However, attribution of such improvements in terms of star 
rating to the activity of the PDT, which is as one factor among 
several factors, is difficult. Some organisation alleged that 
they (especially new managers) could turnaround situation 
without help from the PDT and in some situation they even 
asserted that the PDT was as an interfering factor in process 
of changes. 
iii) Facilitating factors in achieving successful 
turnaround supported by an external agent( the 
PDT): 
Authors address some factors that enhance the effectiveness 
of the PDT functions and achieving success such as role of 
client manager of the PDT which was affected by the level of 
maturity, background and experience of the client manager; how the organisation is willing and ready to accept the PDT 
help; the clearness of the role and the quality of the 
relationship between the PDT, trust, and other related 
organisations such as Strategic Health Authority (SHA); the 
type of approach adopted by the PDT and its flexibility, along 
with establishing realistic expectations and managing them. 
vi) Impeding factors in progressing the turnaround 
process: 
Some factors have been judged as hindering factors in the 
progress of turnaround processes: insufficient required 
resources (especially financial); inadequacy of the PDT skills 
and experience in some areas (e. g. financial problems); poor 
relationship between the trust and external organisations 
such as SHA; shortage of time that the PDT works with the 
Trust. The Trust also perceived that a huge level of pressure 
and stress on a zero-star organisation inhibited the 
organisation from moving forward. 
Limitation and 
strength 
Research (i) Development of methods to differentiate self-regulating 
implications organisation from permanently failing organisations 
(ii) Conducting more longitudinal research to evaluate the 
turnaround process supported by the external agents over 
longer time 
(iii) Evaluation of the effect of changes in the external 
environment on the organisational failure and turnaround 
process in the health sector (e. g. effect of governmental policy 
on the NHS organisations). 
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Policy Need for external agency, such as PDT, with adequate skills 
implications and expertise to produce tailor-made work plans; focus for 
external interventions needs to be on organisations that are 
not able/or willing to initiate turnaround and these 
organisations need longer term support; resources needed for 
turnaround should be considered. 
Comments 
Other details Ethical issues had been considered 
Quality issues Good 
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ID number 4 
Title Learning from the experience of recovery: the turnaround of 
poorly performing local authorities 
Author Turner, D and Whiteman, P 
Year 2005 
Country UK 
Source Local Government Studies 
Aims and To track the process of turnaround and seek to identify the key 
Objectives theories of turnaround adopted and implemented in a sample of 
15 English local authorities that were categorised as poor 
performers. In particular, this study aims to answer the following 
questions: 
Why do some councils perform in such a way that they are 
labelled as poor performers? 
What approaches are used in recovery (or turnaround) work, in 
what situation, and why? 
What is the impact of turnaround strategies on levels of 
performance? 
Type of English poorly performing local authorities 
organization 
and setting 
Design Three year longitudinal study using case study methodology 
within the grounded theory approach. A realistic evaluation 
methodology was adopted using context-mechanism-outcomes 
(CMOs) which sought to identify the Context for poor 
performance-Mechanisms for recovery- Outcome for local 
authority performance. 
Participants The key stakeholders of selected local authorities (managers, 
staff, politicians and external advisors) and key actors at national 
level (who were involved in development and implementation of 
the Government's policy towards turnaround in local authorities. 
Outcome - The results of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
measures (CPA) over three years to measure the performance of the local 
authorities. 
- Perceptions of key stakeholders regarding performance 
improvement among poor performing local authorities. 
- Staff attitude measured through survey 
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Sample size 15 English Poorly performing local authorities 
Data Each of the 15 organisations provided a range of qualitative and 
collection: quantitative data collected through a series of interviews with key 
Source & stakeholders and analysis of documentary evidence. In addition 
Period two round of surveys measured the staff attitude at two stages 
(first year and third year) 
Data analysis Five out of 15 local authorities acted as core cases that the 
theories for turnaround were developed and the rest of the cases 
(1o cases) were used to examine and refine the result which 
derived from the core cases. 
Results Context (causes) of failure: The common contexts which 
contributed to the poor performance and service failure were: 
political context (poor political leadership (8 organisations); 
stagnant political environment (old style politics or inert); 
volatile political environment (frequent changes in control, poor 
inter-party relations and internal political dispute); parochial 
politicians with lack of strategic focus; complex decision making 
at the senior management level)- Organisational context 
(inertia- living on past achievements reputation; inertia- 
political/managerial conflict (fear amongst managers driven by 
political intimidation); poor performance management; 
departmentalism and lacking corporate structures; weakness in 
relationships with the changing external environments)- 
Managerial context (silo management; lacked leadership 
skills; lacking corporate vision; lacking managerial skills and 
capacity)- Cultural context (unaware of need to turnaround; 
insular-arrogant; no performance culture; willing to turnaround 
but lacking focus on achieving it or lack of political support due 
to new rules and political context or lack of management 
capacity; resistant to turnaround due to lacking 
management/political will)- External Context (lack of 
engagement with the needs of community or with local authority; 
mismanaged priorities and selection of services; problems of 
diverse population reflected in demands on services, poverty and 
deprivation; resisted external pressure (e. g. not taking on board 
modernization and change). 
In six of the case studies, the need for turnaround had been 
denied at least for some periods by different people in the 
organisation. 
Triggers for change: 
Some factors were perceived as triggers for changes including: 
the departure or the replacement of the CEO or the council leader 
and the CPA process itself are two important factors. The public 
announcement of the CPA score was as a trigger. Seven out of 10 
authorities stated that CPA process had influenced turnaround. 
However, two authorities believed that the CPA had no effect on 
the turnaround (these trusts lacked an achievement culture) and 
one case defined the role of the CPA as a delaying factor in the 
turnaround process. 
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Turnaround strategies: Relatively similar approaches were 
used to turnaround the organisation: Replacement of managers 
(CEO or senior management team) and/or politicians (6o% and 
go % respectively); use of political mentor in steering politicians 
(9o%); focus on introducing new corporate management working 
(60%); the use of interim managers appointed by government 
following the departure of permanent senior managers and 
directors; help in directing councils by government officials 
particularly by Lead Officials; Overseeing the recovery plan by 
the Government Monitoring Boards; and government funding. 
Strategies to turnaround local authorities were divided into those 
enforced by the government and those adopted by the 
organisations themselves. The range of activities open to the 
government was from use of legal powers (intervention- ) to 
supervision and guidance (engagement- motivation and support 
of organisation to turnaround but leaving the main responsibility 
for owning this process with the authority itself). The 
`engagement' strategy was the first choice for the government as 
the modus operandi that effectively ensured co-operation and 
coalition. However, in one case a direct intervention was used by 
a minister because the local authority was reluctant to cooperate 
with engagement. 
Outcomes: Six organisations showed good progress and they 
presented a forward-looking, turnaround-oriented plan initiated 
by a (new) dynamic leadership at both managerial and political 
levels. The ODPM reduced engagement or even disengaged with 
those organisations, however, it continued this policy for other 
local authorities. Three organisation did not improve their CPA 
score which fit with the `permanently failing organisations'. 
Limitation and The generalisability to other public sectors has not been 
strength discussed 
Research To test the propositions and findings of this study in cross 
implications institutional and cross-national studies to better understand the 
contributory impact of governance arrangement, scale of 
organisation, regulatory environment and nature of service 
responsibilities on performance profiles, and specifically decline 
and turnaround. 
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Policy The strategies for public services improvement should consider 
implications the location of an organisation on its performance profile. More 
quantitative longitudinal studies to test and refine the model 
presented for both self-initiating and permanently failing 
organisations are needed. 
Comments 
Other details The theoretical model used for this study was Context (context 
for poor performance- causes) -Mechanism (mechanisms for 
recovery) -Outcomes (performance) (CMOs). 
Quality issues Good 
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ID number 5 
Title Performance Failure in the Public Sector: misfortune or 
mismanagement? 
Author Andrews, R., Boyne, G., Enticott, G. 
Year 2006 
Country UK 
Source Public Management Review 
Aims and To develop and test a model of the impact of both misfortune 
Objectives (bad circumstances faced by some public organisations, 
which are beyond the control of the organisation) and 
mismanagement of the performance of the public 
organisations. 
Type of Upper-tier Local Authorities, England, UK 
organization and 
setting 
Design Electronic questionnaire survey 
Participants Officers and politicians from English Local Authorities 
Outcome Measurement of performance using CPA score published in 
measures 2002. 
Measure of misfortune using five measures: population of the 
area as measure of size; two dimensions of diversity of service 
needs: ethnicity (using a calculated index) and social class; 
prosperity of local residents by using two proxies for the 
capacity of local citizens to co-produce services: number of 
single parent households (%) and the percentage change in 
the population between 1991 to 2001. 
Measure of mismanagement using seven measures: 
performance management (2 questions: management 
information system at corporate and service level); having 
clear priorities (single question); internal partnership (2 
questions: joint working and cross cutting working); link with 
users (three questions: the importance of users' needs, the 
importance of users' demands and the involvement of 
external stakeholders in strategy making); external 
partnership (single question); managerial leadership (single 
question); and political leadership (single question). 
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Sample size An electronic questionnaire was sent to 386 authorities for 
completion by 4184 officers and politicians working in 
English local authorities at corporate and service level 
(education, social support, benefit and leisure, environment, 
housing and libraries) 
Data collection: The data were collected using an electronic questionnaire 
Source & Period survey sent via e-mail and a range of secondary data sources. 
Data analysis 8i% of authorities replied (314/386) and 56 % the was 
response rate at individual level (2355/4184). However, 
statistical analysis using descriptive and regression analysis 
was conducted in only 120 local authorities with 1257 
informants because the CPA results for 2002 are available for 
only 120 of the authorities that replied to the survey. A single 
factor was constructed for some measures that consisted of 
more than one question using principal component analysis 
and Cronbach's alpha was calculated to assess the reliability 
of the factor. 
Results Around 55% of the variation in the relative success and 
failure of different local authorities was collectively explained 
by the twelve misfortune and mismanagement variables. The 
results showed that among misfortune variables the diverse 
service needs (supported by higher ethnic diversity (T= - 
3.779, p<o. o1) and poverty (supported by number of lone- 
parents household (T= - 3.267, p<o. oi) and population 
change (T= 6.522, p<o. ol) contribute to the organisational 
failure. This means that organisations with ethnically diverse 
population or higher levels of poverty (more lone-parents 
household or declining population) are more likely to be 
classified as poor performers. The size of the local authorities 
and financial resources directly available to the local 
authorities had no significant impact on performance. 
There was significant association between three out of seven 
mismanagement variables (performance management (T= 
2.602, p<o. o5), managerial leadership (T= 3.527, p<o. oi) 
and political leadership (T= 2.881, p<o. oi)) and performance 
of the local authorities. However, clarity of priorities, internal 
relationship, link with users and external relationships did 
impact on the performance of the local not show significant 
authorities. 
It was shown that English local authorities are more likely to 
fail if they have poor performance management systems and 
poor political and managerial leadership, as internal 
characteristics. Those authorities are also more likely to be 
vulnerable to failure if they face diverse services needs and 
have economically deprived populations. 
Limitation and Strength: The measurement of the mismanagement measures 
strength was conducted i8 months before releasing the CPA results, so 




i) Some questions about some management measures were 
not very clear and the terms `managerial leadership' and 
`political leadership' may not have been clear to th e 
respondents. 
ii) A limitation of the study is that the cross-cutting and flexible working relations are only one form of internal 
relationship was included in this study and other elements of 
the internal relationship may show relationship with failure. 
iii) Development of relationship by only the private sector is 
considered as an external relationship and relationship with 
other public and governmental organisations has not been 
considered. 
iv) More qualitative research is needed to explore 
management problems that may be specific to county 
councils which might be different from the local authorities. 
Research Andrews et al (2006) did not find relationship between 
implications clarity of priorities and performance of the local authorities. 
They found link between service and corporate objectives. It 
might be concluded when the service priorities are very close 
and perhaps artificially tied in corporate priorities, they are 
distorted. However, further research is suggested by the 
authors to test this hypothesis. 
Further research was suggested to explore the influence of the 
user consultation on service decisions and how those 
decisions may contribute to the organisational performance 
and failure. 
Policy i) The policy makers should notice that some circumstances 
implications (e. g. socioeconomic factors) beyond the control of managers 
may result in poor performance of public organisations and 
so a more sophisticated performance measurement regime 
should be designed to take into account theses external 
factors. 
ii) More investment in development of leaders and 
performance management system is recommended. 
Comments 
Other details Failure and decline have been used. 
Performance measured by the CPA was carried out in 2002 
which classified organisations into five categories (poor, 
weak, fair, good, and excellent). 
Quality issues 
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ID number 6 
Title The dynamics of chronic failure: A longitudinal study 
Author Eitel, D. F. 
Year 2004 
Country USA 
Source Public Money and Management 
Aims and To scrutinize why the repeated improvement strategies failed 
Objectives to turnaround a regional government office which was seen as 
underperforming for more than 25 years (chronic failure). To 
identify why such an organisation with an intelligent and 
committed workforce who provide infrastructure services 
suffered such negative results. 
Type of A regional office of a national agency in a major metropolitan 
organization and city, USA 
setting 





Data collection: Review of a range of archival and documentary sources 
Source & Period (internal and external) and also tracking the changes by the 
researcher as he had worked as both internal and external 
consultant to the organisation 
Data analysis 
Results Symptoms of failure: Under-performing on targets 
(approximately 200 indicators assessed quarterly), loss of 
reputation from national office point of view; bad press 
image; employee distrust, internal conflict between managers 
and employees and good staff leaving, low staff morale 
Cause of sustained failure: 
Different unsuccessful turnaround attempts (downsizing) was 
reported over 25 years (1976,1982 actions in response to 
national office directive; 1988 to 1992 decisions on reducing 
staff levels made only by top managers without input from 
staff which resulted in scepticism and distrust between 
managers and staff and encouraged resistance against the 
redundancy plan among staff) 
It was a `siloed organisation' (each department followed its 
own functioning and decision making pathways with 
counterparts in the national office) and the highly 
bureaucratic. The management style was command and 
control without a risk taking culture. Appointment of 
inappropriate leaders (poor leadership) who were often on 
their journey to retirement and used a command and control 
mang ement style. Their focus was on local politics rather 
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than national directives and decision made by them were 
made independently from the national office (representing 
poor corporate citizenship) which resulted in receiving weak 
support from the national office. 
Lacked corporate vision, lack of good external relationships, 
lack of communication and staff involvement in the decision 
making process, lack of involvement with national office the 
long-term failure in this domain caused the regional office to 
be closed by the national office. 
The trust between managers and employee was lost due to 
the repeated downsizing despite a vocal trade union. A 
culture of failure resulted due to the sustained poor 
performance. However, the `freelance' and flexible approach 
of the organisation pleased local clients. Eventually, however, 
and in spite of the clients' vocal support, the allegiances of the 
clients were shifted to the other offices to maintain their 
programmes when they became aware of the extent of the 
problems faced by the regional office. It resulted in financial 
decline due to the shifting of the fund to other offices in the 
merger bid, which and it enabled the merging process. 
Managers blamed others for the failure of change initiatives 
and they did not take into account their part in the failure. 
Turnaround interventions: Reduction of staffing level 
and refocusing the organisation's efforts were used 
repeatedly. The former interventions were not successful in 
the first two rounds of turnaround due to local political 
pressure and the resistance of unions to changes in working 
conditions and loss of staff positions. The reduction in 
staffing level policy suffered from the lack of a clear plan and 
it was not apparent which people would leave the 
organisation. As some staff rapidly left the organisation and 
were not replaced, this attrition was used to encourage staff 
to leave. However, a heavy workload and the need to learn 
new duties were other factors perceived by the remaining 
staff which led to more people leaving. In 1994 when the 
government proposed to close two regional offices due to 
financial issues, this organisation was as one of the main ones 
selected. As a result the duties of the local organisation were 
given to other offices and finally a merger was enacted. 
Triggers and Constraints of turnaround activities: 
Triggering: role of national office in seeking changes, 
Constraints: External pressure (local political activity, 
resistance of unions) 
Internal factors: Serious resistance by staff against 
changes 
Outcome of turnaround: The organisation did not 
survive, so it was merged with another organisation and the 






Policy Organisational turnaround is a messy activity and managers 
implications may perceive working in this environment to be as 
unpleasant. The role of the national office in the appointment 
of not a very rigorous and appropriate leader and insufficient 
attention to the results of staff survey were important in 
contributions to the failure. Using the reduction of staffing 
levels as a turnaround strategy meant that the staff knew they 
would lose their jobs. Although the problems faced by the 
organisation seemed to be obvious to those outside the 
situation, for managers trapped inside the situation, the 
difficulties were immense. 
Comments The organisation was categorised as having a high level of 
persistence and low performance (permanently failing 
organisation). According to the cognition approach to failure 
(Anheire and Moulton, 1999), the organisation did not learn 
from its mistakes and used only single loop learning 
(Stead and Smallman, 1999). Both the organisation and its 
staff suffered from the lack of double loop learning when 
facing organisation's problems. 




ID number 7 
Title The role of leadership in the Turnaround olocal authority 
Author Joyce, P 
Year 2004 
Country UK 
Source Public Money and Management 
Aims and To examine managerial leadership behaviour (a Chief 
Objectives Executive's experience) during a successful turnaround in a 
public services organisation. 
Type of Newham Council. 
organization and 
setting 
Design Case study 





Data collection: Data collected using an interview with the Chief Executive of 
Source & Period a local authority in 2003 and contemporary documents 
produced by the local authority during the late 199os. The 
interview was tape-recorded and transcribed. 
Data analysis The interview data was analysed using software for analysing 
qualitative data. The analysis was organised around the idea 
that `management' and `leadership' behaviour are different. 
Results The study shows that the effective CEO needs to present both 
characteristics of leaders (e. g. work through strategic vision 
and ability to organise this thinking into activities that can be 
undertaken, communication and empowerment) and 
managers (e. g. need to pay attention to operational details 
and to the context that the organisation working; have the 
ability to take staff into uncomfortable areas particularly in 
the performance management system; invest time in 
planning and control). Attention to detail was an important 
factor shown by the CEO when working to turnaround the 
organisation. The CEO and management team were visible. 
The CEO learnt about how the organisation was doing 
through visits and careful listening. On the basis of this 
knowledge she formulated a vision. Support from local 
politicians and external stakeholders was viewed as a very 
important factor in supporting top manager team's decisions. 
Strategy development, performance management and focus 
on human resources management and organisational 
development were three major strategies followed by the 
CEO. These strategies were viewed as a set of activities that 
all needed to be done. Also, the CEO challenged the resistance 
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of some managers to new vision through argument and 
persuasion. The CEO presented a significant level of energy 
and resilience when developing performance management 
though the process was uncomfortable for staff. A 
considerable level of emotional energy was invested in 
dealing with the resistance against the process of change. 
Limitations and Data was not collected from people external to the 




Policy Effective leaders should also be capable managers. They need 
implications to create strategic vision and also pay attention to planning 
and control (performance management). Therefore, a clear 
contrast between management and leadership, is defined in 
the literature break down and the CEO is viewed as a mixture 
of Kotter's manager and leader. Effective leader need to know 
their organisations and related details. The leaders should 
deal with resistance and conflict due to the presence of 
disagreement among different stakeholders. 
Comments The study only focused on the behaviour of a CEO during the 
turnaround period. 
Other details Success in turnaround was assessed using a basket of 
performance indicators from the Audit Commission (moving 
from 31st to third out of 33 London boroughs during three 
years (1996 - 1999) and also on the basis of the increase in 
the level of willingness of people to live in the area 
Quality issues 
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ID number 8 
Raising attainment in schools in former coalfield area Title 




Country London (DfES) 
Source 
Aims and To explore the strategies used for raising and sustaining 
Objectives attainment of English schools over 5 years 
Type of English schools (primary and secondary schools) in former 
organization and coalfield 
setting 
Multiple in-depth case studies Design 
Head teachers, senior and middle managers, teachers, non- Participants teaching staff and group of pupils of the selected schools. 
Outcome Improvement of performance measured by change in the 
measures GCSE score (A to C) 
8 English schools (2 primary and 6 secondary) Sample size 
Semi-structured interviews with participants, review of 
Data collection: inspection data and contextual data (socioeconomic data) 
Source & Period were also collected 
Not reported clearly 
Data analysis 
Results Symptoms of low performance: Presence of low 
expectation culture 
Role of external factor on the performance of the schools: 
All schools accept that the disadvantages faced by the pupils 
who attend their schools inevitably affects their performance. 
Additional resources and support through external 
interventions or projects; changes in the social mix of the 
pupil population and having a specialist status designated to 
the school were found to be positive external factors. 
Role of internal factors in improving performance: 
The role of leadership of the head teacher was found to be 
important and the prevailing leadership style was distributed 
leadership (especially for secondary school) and Heads' 
Leadership values and visions were primarily moral 
(dedicated to pupil and staff welfare) and reflected core 
personal values such as honesty and fairness; setting high 
expectations for pupils and staff through diary speech, 
award ceremonies, celebratory events and award schemes; 
Generating positive relationship (both internal workin 
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relationships and development of relationships with 
community and external stakeholders); Focus on teaching 
and learning; focus on professional development 
through mentoring, coaching, and peer review (half of the 
schools set up new peer review systems); focus on targets; 
Use of learning mentors; Performance tracking and 
Use of data (about pupil performance, their progress and 
potential) to inform decision making; and finally 
sustaining of the performance was on the basis of building 
capacity through empowering, involving and developing 
teachers to deliver high quality teaching and through 











ID number 9 
Effective leadership in schools facing challenging Title circumstances 




Country London (DfES) 
Source 
Aims and To explore leadership processes and approaches in ten 
Objectives schools facing challenging circumstances that have shown 
gradual performance improvement. 
Type of English schools (schools were selected on the basis of the 
organization and trend in their performance; Those schools in which 25%, or 
setting less, of their pupils achieved five or more grades A* to C at 
GCSE in both 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 were faced with 
challenging circumstances and also those schools In which 
over 35% of their pupil receive free school meals (indicating 
low socio-economic status) even if above 25% of their pupils 
achieved five or more grades A* to C at GCSE. 
Multiple case study. Design 
head teachers, middle managers, and classroom teachers of Participants the selected schools. 
Outcome Change in pupil achievement measured by the GCSE scores. 
measures 
lo English schools in a range of socio-economic and cultural Sample size situations (inner-city, rural and mixed catchments areas) that 
have shown gradual performance improvement and head 
teachers with different characteristics (gender, time in post, 
and previous experience). 
Collection through face-to-face semi-structured interview 
Data collection: with head teachers, and focus group with middle managers, Source & Period and classroom teachers; review of contextual performance 
data (e. g. raw GCSE data and league table data), inspection 
data (e. g. OFSTED reports), and data from school 
management conditions rating survey (to provide an insight 
to the school culture). 
Data analysis Thematic analysis method 
Results Symptoms of failure: bad physical appearance of schools, 
poor relationship within school among staff, pupils and 
parents; presence culture of low expectation and mistrust; 
insufficient professional confidence and capability; poor 
external support; inadequate external relationship; 
It was revealed that these schools need leaders who have a 
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broad range of leadership approaches underpinned by a core 
set of personal and professional values and a strong moral 
purpose. A broad range of leadership styles was presented by 
the head teachers with regard to the circumstances; however, 
there was a greater emphasis upon the leadership approaches 
that were people-oriented, transformational and 
empowering. A more autocratic leadership style (e. g. focus on 
policy implementation and consistent standards of teaching) 
was addressed by the head teachers during the pre-inspection 
phase (e. g. OFSTED inspection) but they show a more 
supportive leadership style during the inspection phase. The leaders led through enhancing organizational capacity by the 
generation of individual capacity through staff 
empowerment, involvement and ownership; encouraging 
collaboration and the investing in the quality of relationships 
and raising commitment within the school. 
Eight different strategies (short-term tactical approach and long-term strategies) have been applied by the head teachers 
to improve school performance: improving the physical 
appearance of the schools (e. g. painting of walls) a 
symbolic action to show that the school is starting changing; 
development of internal relationship within school 
between staff and pupils and parents (e. g. developing team 
working and collaboration, organizing social events, 
arranging staff-student committees); Provide clear vision 
(clear vision around some core values such as honesty, 
fairness and equality, promoting respect for individuals; 
caring for the well-being and whole development of students 
and staffs) high expectation (clear strategy in cultural 
change through setting high expectation levels); focus on 
consistent professional development (e. g. through 
mentoring, coaching, visiting other schools, in-service 
training, and a peer support scheme to maintain staff moral 
and motivation); focus on teaching and learning (pupil 
mentoring and tracking; monitoring the teachers' 
performance quality; providing learning opportunity for both 
children and teachers; encouraging discussion about teaching 
quality among staff); applying distributed leadership; 
development of external relationship (engagement of 
community and involvement of parents in school life); 
Creating an information-rich environment to 
encourage change (development of a robust internal 
evaluation process to collect and analyze data from different 
sources) 
These schools received external support (e. g. OFSTED, LEA) 
which through development of external networks facilitated 
the generation of ideas, professional development and 
dissemination of good practice. 
The study placed emphasis on the dispersed leadership and 
distribution of power, which means that leadership can be 
practised at different levels in school (teachers as leaders) 
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Limitation and The authors have not reported whether those leaders were as 
strength new head teachers or not. There is not any information about 
the differences among these cases. 
Research Further studies were suggested to highlight exactly how 
implications leaders generate and sustain school improvement. It was 
recommended that there should be an exploration of which 




No specific failure or turnaround theoretical framework was Comments used. The leadership theories were used to explain head 
teachers' behaviours. 
While firm, directive leadership may be required at the outset Other details of turning around a school in difficulty, it would appear that a 
more democratic form of leadership is needed as the school 







Structure, agency and school effectiveness: researching a ' ` ' . school failing 
Author Wilmott, R 
Year 1999 
Country UK 
Source Educational Studies 
Aims and To scrutinize the ways in which a Local Education Authority 
Objectives (LEA) advisor team (as an external turnaround agent) has 
responded to the needs of a 'failing' school delineated by the 
OFSTED auditors and how the school mediated such LEA 
strategies. 
Type of English school 
organization and 
setting 
Single qualitative case study Design 
Participants 
Outcome Use of OFSTED report to evaluate the school performance 
measures improvement 
Staff of the selected staff Sample size 
Data was collected using both participant observations 
Data collection: almost immediately after the inspection by LEA advisors, and Source & Period interviews with staff about their experiences of the LEA 
inspection. 
Not clearly stated Data analysis 
Results Contextual environment: the catchments area has mainly 
local authority housing and 'high levels of economic and 
social deprivation. 
Symptoms of failure: The OFSTED report in June 1996 
highlighted the problems of the school including poor 
achievement of targets (the school was at the bottom of the 
`league table' in its area); poor management, confrontation 
among staff, inappropriate match between managerial 
responsibilities of staff and their expertise, lack of staff 
development and support, poor monitoring of performance 
such as insufficient monitoring of both the teaching and the 
progress of individual pupils. Although the school was funded 
generously, the pupil achievements were not satisfactory (not 
value for money). 
Turnaroundrocess: Development of an action plan was 
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carried out following the OFSTED report under the 
supervision of the LEA advisory team and the 
implementation of the action plan was evaluated by three 
LEA advisors over three days in a OFSTED style inspection in 
June 1997" 
After the inspection by the LEA advisors, the head teacher 
decided to take early retirement and one of the senior 
members of staff has been appointed as temporary head. The 
new head teacher used the following strategies: 1) 
Reorganised staff meetings to reduce the high level of 
confrontation among staff. However, that did not result in a 
positive outcome, 2) Focusing on SATs as the most important 
target 
School effectiveness evaluation by the LEA advisors 
(as agent): The only real focus was on measurable outcomes 
and lesson attention being paid to the planning with less 
focus on the reality of the socioeconomic backgrounds of the 
pupils which can affect their achievements. They rejected the 
idea that social reality is differentiated and structured and 
thus deals only with constant conjunctions of observable 
events. 
Lack of communication, constructive discussion and feedback 
between advisors and staff caused disbelief and anger among 
staff. Staff reported that the assessment was not enough in- 
depth. 
Role of external environment constraints: 
Environmental constraints such as the level of deprivation 
should be taken into account when the outcome of the 
turnaround process is considered. 
Limitation and One of the principal limitations of this case-study is, of 
strength course, the lack of interview data from the LEA advisors. It 
would be useful to have data on other 'failing' schools in the 
process of receiving LEA advice. 
There was not any report about the how the school developed 
and implemented the turnaround strategies, the relationships 
between schools and the LEA during the implementation of 




Environmental constraints such as the level of the 
Policy deprivation should be taken in to account when the outcome implications 
of the turnaround process is considered. 
Comments 
Failure was defined on the basis of the Office for Standards in Other details Education (OFSTED) report. The key indicators of the 
school's OFSTED report centred around the SATs attainment, 
attendance, and exclusion and teaching quality, all of which 
were subject to numerical tabulation. 
Quality issues 
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ID number ii 
Title Not with a bang, but a whimper 
Author Meier, K. J., Bohte, J. 
Year 2003 
Country USA 
Source Administration and Society 
Aims and To examine the process of failure, defined as micro failure 
Objectives (pattern of suboptimal performance for a periods of time, in 
public schools in Texas). In particular the study aims to 
explore why some school districts consistently present poor 
performance with regard to three key indicators. To test four 
hypotheses that examine the impact of constraints on 
organisational performance. The hypotheses suggest that 
greater task diversity, inadequate resources, more 
bureaucracy, and the failure of incentives would all 
result in more micro-failures. 
Type of iooo public school districts in Texas 
organization and 
setting 
Design Quantitative survey 
Participants 
Outcome 
measures Measure of task diversity through using both average 
district performance score on standardised 
achievement tests, measured at i. and 2 year time 
lags and client diversity through measuring of the 
percentage of African American, Hispanic and low 
income students per district. 
Measure of resources through measure of instructional 
expenditure per pupil and average class size. 
Measure of bureaucracy: number of central bureaucrats 
per ioo student and number of - campus bureaucrats per 
loo students. 
Measure of incentives (adequate salaries) through 
measuring of teacher turnover and the district's budget 
surplus as a percentage of total spending. 
School districts can fail their children in three ways: 
absenteeism (measured through the percentage of students 
who are absent from school on any given day), classes failure 
[retention] (measured through the sum of the percentage of 
students retained in each of the eight grades) , and 
dropouts 
(comparing the number of juniors in year 1 with the number 
of seniors in year 2 and adjusting for overall the growth in 
enrolment. 
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Sample size loon public school districts 
Data collection: Data is available for 4 years from 1995 to 1998 and pooled 
Source & Period data resulted in a total of 4172 cases. 
Data analysis Pooled time series analysis to analyse the factors, which 
contributed to organisational micro-failure covering the years 
1995-1998. The analysis has been conducted at the 
organisational level (school district). 
Results The rate of absenteeism (mean 4.1% with SD i. o); retention 
with the mean 15.4% and SD 16.1 (skewed positively); 
dropout with mean 25.2% and SD 34.4. 
The regression analysis showed that of the four hypotheses, 
only task diversity/goal conflicts are positively correlated 
with micro-failure measures (absenteeism, retention and 
dropout) Ill out of 15 measures] and only one of its 
relationship was significant negative. The resources 
measure showed very mixed findings. Class size is always 
significant in the correct direction. Resources committed to 
classroom instruction, however, are unrelated to absenteeism 
and retentions. and positively linked to dropouts. Perhaps the 
weak relationship with instructional resources reflect 
variations in costs of educational inputs and, thus, the 
relationship are spurious. The competitive disadvantage 
variables may also be picking up these mixed resources 
relationships. In two cases, surplus funds are associated with 
fewer organizational failures. Teacher turnover never matters 
in the predicted direction. The bureaucracy relationships 
are generally inconsistent with the ideal stereotypical model 
of public organization. It is suggested that the bureaucracy is 
a reaction to problems not a cause of them. An increase in 
bureaucracy was generally not associated with greater 
organizational failures. 
Organisations that experienced high dropout rate also 
experience greater absenteeism and greater retention which 
means that dropout could actually be the start of the next set 
of micro-failures. 
It is suggested that the public organisation micro-failure in 
the long run might be associated with macro-failure of 
governance. 
Limitations and Strength: The diversity of the schools in Texas gives more 
strengths confidence that the findings are not the result of a limited set 
of organisations. 
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This article explored the nature of organization micro- 
failures, the inability to produce valued outputs. Because 
micro-failures are likely to occur more frequently than macro- 
failures in the public sector, only by focusing on micro- 
failures can sufficient cases be generated for systematic 
analysis. 
Research More systematic examination of micro-failure in public 
implications organisations was suggested. 
Policy Policies will be less likely to fail if an organization can deal 
implications with a relatively homogeneous set of problems. Although the 
political process is unlikely to recognize this principle, it 
might accept the corollary that organizations facing diverse 
tasks need to be given additional support in other areas. This 
might not be resources, as the above findings suggest, but 
might be greater autonomy or the ability to deal with cases in 
heterogeneous ways. 
Comments Although the schools are not typical public organisations, 
they are common ones and the largest employer of public 
servants in Texas, so the findings of the study are likely to 
have some generalisability. 
Other details The emphasis of the study was not on macro failure (the 
collapse and demise of the organisation). The focus of the 
study was to examine the failure to produce the outputs 
sought by politicians (micro failure - consistent patterns of 
poor organisational performance for extended periods of 
time). 
Quality issues Good 
372 
ID number 12 
Title Good luck, good management and organisational turnaround 
in the public sector 




Aims and To test a new model of turnaround that evaluate the impact of 
Objectives both a range of turnaround strategies chosen by managers 
and good luck which refers to the change in the external 
circumstances beyond the managerial control of the success 
of turnaround processes. 
Type of Texas school districts. A good place to examine because the 
organization and organisations were from a single industry within a singe state 
setting which were under the same rules and regulations, directly 
comparable organisations, school district are the most 
common public sector in the USA, superintendents have 
substantial discretion in playing a role in improving 
performance through retrenchment, reorganisation and 
repositioning. 
Design 
Participants 15o Texas school districts that were performing in the lowest 
quartile on the primary assessment criterion scale in 1995 
Outcome Evaluation of failure and turnaround was on the basis of the 
measures Texas assessment of academic skills (TAAS), assessing the 
function of students (retrospectively) from 1995 to 2002. 
Organisational environment: Munificence (change in 
financial resources) and environmental hostility (the socio- 
economic characteristics of school children which make it 
easier or more difficult to teach them) measured by the 
proportion of minority (black and Hispanic) and low income 
students (good luck is defined as the lower proportion of 
minority and low income students). 
Three measures of retrenchment: Using a survey of 
school superintendents as the most powerful stakeholders in 
the planning and implementing strategies: the level of 
priority of lowering cost/increasing efficiency by 
superintendents, the extent of focus on the exam results 
(TAAS), and the percentage of the superintendents' time 
spent on internal management. 
Three measure of repositioning: Through a survey of 
superintendents: extent to which superintendents are seeking 
change; seeking private funding; initiation of contact and 
interaction with external stakeholders. 
Three measures of reorganisation: New superintendent 
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insider, new superintendent outsider, changes in staff 
allocated to teaching (core staff), and changes in teacher 
experience as the marker of quality of core staff. 
Control variables: The size of the schools measured by the 
number of pupils enrolled in 1995; tenure measured by the 
number of years that the superintendents have spent in the 
current school districts; and the extent of failure. 
Sample size Not mentioned but 50% response in 2000 and 6o% response 
in 2002 which was in total 6oo useable responses. 
Data collection: The data on organizational strategies and context are derived 
Source & Period partly from secondary sources and partly from surveys of 
school superintendents in Texas in 2000 and 2002 (mailed 
survey with three follow ups) 
Data analysis Multivariate analysis of 141 out of 150 school districts (no 
difference between respondent and non-responding districts). 
Results The statistical evidence supports our argument that 
turnaround is associated with good luck as well as good 
management. Performance improvement was greatest in 
districts with the worst baseline performance and the impact 
of superintendents is non-linear. The size of school had a 
negative correlation but only significant at. ol level. Increase 
in munificence and decrease in hostility are likely to lead to 
better performance. The extent of turnaround is also 
significantly influenced by all three types of managerial 
strategies but not always in the direction predicted by prior 
theory and empirical evidence. Two of the three retrenchment 
variables, which focus on core business and time spent on 
internal management, have no significant effect on 
performance change. Schools that placed emphasis on 
lowering costs and increasing efficiency were substantially 
less likely to produce better results. In contrast to the private 
sector, this form of retrenchment appears to be a route to 
further failure rather than rapid recovery. 
The results ofa strategy of repositioning are broadly 
consistent with hypothesis 3. Two of the three repositioning 
variables are positively related to the extent of turnaround: 
superintendents who seek change, and who initiate 
interactions with a wide range of stakeholders, are more likely 
to lead their districts towards performance improvement. The 
third element of repositioning, the emphasis on acquiring 
private funding, has no significant impact on recovery from 
failure. Taken together, the results for retrenchment and 
repositioning suggest that `financial' turnaround strategies 
(cutting costs and seeking revenues) are not effective in 
school districts. 
A strategy of internal reorganization has a significant positive 
effect on performance improvement. School districts that 
replace their superintendent with an insider are more likely 
to achieve turnaround, but the appointment of an outsider is 
insignificantly different from persevering with the 
superintendent who led the district to failure. 
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Districts that raise the proportion of their staff who are 
teachers, and recruit more experienced teachers, have 
significantly better prospects of recovering from failure. Thus 
the results for reorganization are consistent with the 
proposition that turnaround is associated not only with top 
management change but also with a human resource strategy 
that pays particular attention to core staff. 
Limitations and As a set of poor performing schools was selected, the data did 
strengths not meet the standards of Gaussian distributions. Such 
extreme cases in the data distribution are likely to create 
situations where a single point or set of points exerts undue 
influence on the results, thus rendering the regression 
estimates unstable. To avoid this problem, the model was 
estimated with robust regression techniques that rely on an 
iterative process of downweighting extreme cases but 
converge to OLS estimates when data meet the assumptions 
of OLS regression. The specific technique was Andrews (1974: 
523) sine approach which is "resistant to gross deviations of a 
small number of points and relatively efficient over a broad 
range of distributions". 
Although we included luck in our analysis of turnaround in 
Texas School districts, our operationalisation of this concept 
is incomplete. First, our measures of the task environment 
covered munificence and hostility, but we did not have data 
on changes in the complexity of the conditions confronted by 
school superintendents. Second, our analysis focused on the 
technical but not the institutional environment of turnaournd 
(for example changes in support from external stakeholders 
and shifts in judgements concerning the legitimacy of 
different responses to failure). Subsequent studies of 
turnaround should seek to extend our analysis of good luck by 







Other details Prior work on turnaround has suggested that the impact of 
managerial strategies may be contingent on the severity of 
performance problems and the extent of environmental 
munificence. Cost-cutting may work if an organization is 
facing only moderate decline, but a radical repositioning 
strategy is required if decline is severe (Hambrick and 
Schechter, 1983; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). Similarly, 
retrenchment is necessary in an environment of low 
munificence, whereas a strategy of repositioning is more 
feasible when munificence is high (Dawley et al; 2002; 
Thietart, 1988). The validity of these arguments was tested 
through interaction terms that captured the combined effects 
of managerial strategies, performance problems and 
environmental munificence. None of these extra variables, 
however, produced a significant improvement in the 
explanatory power of our turnaround model. 
Furthermore, measures of all three generic have been 
included turnaround strategies in the same statistical model. 
Prior research has typically examined only one or two 
strategic responses to poor performance. For example, 
retrenchment alone is examined by Chowdhury and Lang 
(1994), Morrow et al, (2004) and O'Neill (1986); and 
reorganization is omitted from the turnaround models in 
Bruton and Wan (1994), Dawley et al, (2002), Evans and 
Green (2000), Hambrick and Schechter (1983) and Robbins 
and Pearce (1992). 
Quality issues Good 
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ID number 13 
Title What's different about public and non-profit turnaround? 
Author Paton, R., Mordaunt, J. 
Year 2004 
Country UK 
Source Public Money and Management 
Aims and To explore the process of turnaround in different public and 
Objectives non-for profit sectors 
Type of Four organisations including three different public 
organization and organisations (a local authority, a health care trust, a school) 
setting and a non-for profit organisation (a large disability charity, 
Ablecare) 
Design Multiple case study method 
Participants A person who led the turnaround in the local authority, Chief 
Executive of the health care trust, an academic who was also a 
member of the governing body for a period of time for the 
school, and Chief Executive of Ablecare 
Outcome 
measures 
Sample size Four senior managers of above mentioned organisations 
Data collection: Interviews with above mentioned participants. For both the 
Source & Period health care trust and Ablecare, documents and internal data 
were also gathered. 
Data analysis Was not reported 
Results Symptoms of the failure 
local authority: Poor appreciation of services by the clients, 
few services with good quality, divided organization marked 
by factionalism. 
Health care trust: Serious financial deficit, low morale 
level, significant clinical weaknesses, a substantial net export 
of the patients to the surrounding hospitals (inadequate 
competition), those weaknesses caused the trust to be merged 
with another trust. 
Merged school in deprived area: poor financial balance, 
school was rated as `special measure' (unable to provide 
acceptable standard of education) by OFSTED, poor 
behaviour in over half the classes, poor progress in Key Stage 
i, poor quality teaching in almost half the classes and lessons, 
unsatisfactory provision for the under fives, failure to fully 
implement the National Curriculum. 
Causes of failure 
Local authority: Poor internal organization and operations, 
in-fighting and power-broking. 
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Merged school in deprived area: lack of leadership and 
strategic direction by the head teacher, inappropriate 
development plan and lack of clarity in the school priorities. 
Acceptance of failure 
Local authority: The need for the changes has been 
accepted by the some senior staff but there was not 
agreement on the nature of the change. 
Triggers for changes 
Local authority: the triggers for change were internal 
(replacement of senior managers) 
Merged school in deprived area: The local education 
authority appointed an experienced mentor (the head teacher 
of another middle school) to help the school to provide an 
action plan (external trigger). 
Turnaround strategies 
Local authority: The newly appointed CEO adopted two 
main strategies including replacement of the senior 
management team during the first year (half of the new team 
members were women) and an attempt to bring about 
cultural change was made with considerable self-awareness. 
Other strategies were client-centred focus, more 
communication within the organization and changing the 
silos management and empowerment of people were the key 
aspects of change. 
Health care trust: The newly appointed CEO 
(Reorganisation) adopted a plan which involved renewing the 
senior team and changing how it worked; determination in 
tackling difficult issues (removing the suspended clinician, 
cutting staffing levels or altering staff positions to reduce 
costs - Retrenchment); initiatives with a definite symbolic 
dimension (building car parks; introducing a (mobile) state- 
of-the-art MRI facility; more clinical involvement in the series 
of review of services; later, introducing the Trust's own 
`Academy'; and giving much more attention to external 
marketing ('playing the NHS system') and reputation 
building. Creating clinical networking and partnership with 
the surrounding hospital (Repositioning). 
Merged school in deprived area: Appointment of an 
acting headteacher, The acting head teacher left the school 
after two terms and another temporary head teacher led the 
school for two terms before the substantive head teacher was 
appointed. During the acting head's period of office, recovery 
activity was attempted twice but attention was focused on 
more minor building improvement (improvement of financial 
management, changes in staffing). But in terms of shared 
ideas and values, the staff and head teacher found it difficult 
to sustain morale, cope with stress, and to recruit new staff. 
Outcome of turnaround 
Local authority: Considerable success in terms of service 
delivery and in terms of internal processes and relationships, 
the cultural change had been largely achieved and it had 
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become a happy working environment. It was rated as 
excellent on its CPA 
Health care trust: Successful turnarounds, 5 years after 
appointment of the new CEO no financial deficit, 
reorganizations of major services, expansions of key staff 
grades, reversal in patient outflow (the trust was now a net 
importer rather exporter) and it was the least-cost acute 
centre in the county, considerable institutional recognition 
and professional recognition. the health care trust continued 
to perform reasonably well, but for a raft of reasons merged 
with another trust 
Merged school in deprived area: appointment of a acting 
head teacher. The acting head teacher left the school after two 
terms and another temporary head teacher led the school for 
two terms before the substantive head teacher was appointed. 
During the acting head's period of office, recovery activity was 
attempted twice but attention was focused on further minor 
building improvement (improvement of financial 
management, changes in staffing). But in terms shared ideas 
and valued, the staff and head teacher found it difficult to 
sustain morale, cope with stress, and to recruit new staff. The 
school was removed from `special measure' and achieved 





Policy Owing to the political environment of public service 
implications organisations, politicians and funders seek a `quick win' 
following turnaround. That may constrain the time that an 
organisation needs to achieve proper changes related to 
recovery. 
Comments 
Other details Turnaround is referred to as substantial and rapid 
performance improvement sufficient to restablish business 
viability in the face of actual or impending failure. 
Theoretical framework: A two stages model 
(Argyowasamy, 1995) was used to explain the turnaround 
strategies used in this study. 
Quality issues Good 
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Annex4.1 Invitation letter for the Trust to take part in the study 
THE NIVER. SITYI 
Department of Health 
Sciences 
HYMS Building- second floor 
University of York 
Heslington, York YO10 5DD 
Tel: 01904 321916 
Fax: 01904 321920 
Email: hr122Qyork. ac. uk 




Turnaround and Organisational Performance Improvement in NHS 
Hospital Trusts 
I am a PhD student under the supervision of Dr Russell Mannion at the Centre for 
Health Economics, University of York. I have recently received ethics committee 
approval to undertake an empirical study exploring turnaround and performance 
improvement processes in your organisation. As part of this study I need to interview 
staff at various levels of the hierarchy in the Trust. 
Given your role as Chief Executive I believe you would bring a valuable perspective to 
this topic and wondered whether you would be willing to be interviewed for the 
study. The interview would last no longer than 6o minutes and would be arranged for 
a time convenient to your self. Enclosed are relevant background details for your 
information. 
I will contact your secretary in a couple of weeks time to see if you are willing to be 
interviewed for the study and if so to arrange an interview. 
I do hope that you are interested in taking part in the project and look forward to 
meeting you. If you require additional information about the study please do not 
hesitate to contact me. 
Yours Sincerely 
Dr Hamid Ravaghi 
PhD Research Student 
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Annex 4.2 Participant information sheet 
THE UNIVERSITY O71C 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET (version 2) 12.03.2005 
This research is being conducted to study "Turnaround processes and 
performance improvement in an acute hospital Trust". You are invited to 
participate in this study outlined below. Thank you for taking the time to read this 
information. 
What is the aim of the research? 
The aim of the research is: To identify the key themes in the processes of 
performance improvement in a zero `star' acute hospital Trust and to provide 
empirical evidence to support wider understanding of organizational failure and 
turnaround in health care organizations. 
Who is carrying out the research? 
The study is being conducted by Dr Hamid Ravaghi, a PhD student, and will form the 
basis for the PhD degree at the University of York under the supervision of Dr Russell 
Mannion, Senior Research Fellow at Centre for Health Economics (CHE). The 
researcher has previous experience of organizational studies in health care. 
Who should take part? 
A range of participants will be invited to take part in the study, including: 
- Members of the senior management team and a number of other key staff working 
in South Manchester University Hospital Trust (SMUH) since at least 2001. 
- Staff at different levels and professionals from external organizations related to the 
performance or regulation of South Manchester University hospital (SMUH). 
Is participation voluntary? 
Yes, Participation is voluntary. You are free to withdraw from the research at any 
time without giving a reason and without any detriment to yourself. 
What does taking part involve? 
If you decide to take part in the research, you will be interviewed. The semi- 
structured interview will take a maximum of i hour and a half and, with your 
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permission, will be audiotaped. After transcribing of the tape, transcriptions will be 
sent to you in order to verify their accuracy. 
What is the likely benefit to me? 
Although there is no direct benefit to you for participating in this study, it is expected 
that the findings will be of value to your organisation and the wider NHS in 
understanding the processes and mechanisms for `turnaround' in under performing 
organizations. 
What is the possible risk or inconvenience to me? 
There are no risks attached to this study. Your interview scripts will be kept 
confidential; available only to the researcher. The only tangible cost to the participant 
will be the inconvenience derived from the time required to attend for interview. 
What will happen to the information you provide? 
Interview tapes will be transcribed by the principal researcher. Interview tapes and 
transcriptions will be locked in a safe place. All the information collected during the 
course of the study will be viewed by the researcher, and his supervisor if requested, 
and remain strictly confidential. 
This information will be used to write up a PhD dissertation, as well as articles for 
journals. However, the names of the people who have taken part in the research or 
any other information that could identify them will not appear in the thesis or in 
other articles written after the project is completed. 
All who take part in the research will be sent a summary of the final report. 
When the study is completed, all the information will be kept in locked filing cabinets 
in a storeroom of the Department of Health Sciences of University of York for 5 years 
and will then be destroyed. 
What is the next step? 
If you decide to participate in this study, Please sign the attached consent 
form and 
return by the pre-paid envelop enclosed or e-mail your willingness to participate and 
the consent form will be signed on the day of interview. Please choose 
from the stated 
dates below the most convenient for you. The consent form will not be used to 
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identify you. It will be filed separately from all the other information. You can keep 
this sheet for reference. 
Further information: 
If you have any questions about this study, you can contact the principal researcher, 
Dr Hamid Ravaghi, Department of Health Sciences, University of York on 01904 
321916 or e-mail hr122@york. ac. uk 
Dr Hamid Ravaghi 
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Appendix 4.3 Interview Topic guide 
A. Employment background 
Al. Can you tell me a bit about yourself and your experience of working in the 
NHS? For example how long have you been working in the NHS? Who for? 
A2. How long have you been with this organization and in which positions/jobs? 
B. Organisational background and performance of the Acute Trust 
Bi. Tell me what you know about the history of the hospital's performance 
B2. Have there been any concerns regarding the performance of the hospital? 
When? What? 
B3. Tell me about the general performance problems in the hospital and external 
awareness. 
B4. Tell me about the factors that in your opinion have caused or contributed in 
specific problems in the performance of the Trust. 
C. Triggers for changes 
Ci. When and how did the hospital become aware of the problems? 
C2. Were there any external agencies involved? Who? What did they do? 
C3. How did the hospital react to the external reports about the problems? 
C4. Were there any factors that particularly helped or hindered the recognition 
of the hospital's need to adopt a recovery process? 
D. Turnaround process 
Di. Was there any recovery plan? How did the recovery plan get developed? 
D2. Who was involved in developing it? 
D3. Was it based on a previous performance plan? 
D4. What interventions have been adopted to deal with the problems? short and 
long term interventions? 
D5. How did these interventions work? Who and how did lead the 
implementation of the recovery plan? What was Leadership style during the 
turnaround process? 
D6. What was the role of external organisations (e. g. SHA, PCT, and MA) in 
development of action plan and during the turnaround processes? What were the 
advantage and disadvantage of their involvement? Could they conduct things 
better? What is your Suggestions in regard their roles for future? 
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E. Impact of Turnaround interventions 
Ei. What were the results of the turnaround interventions? Do you think the 
performance has been improved? How performance improvement has been 
measured and monitored? Has improvement gone according to recovery plan? 
E2. What were the unintended consequences of these interventions? Is there any 
conflicts between targets? 
E3. What factors do you think helped or hindered achieve those results? 
E. 4 Do you think that performance improvement will be sustained in the future? 
Why? How? 
At the end, Would you like to add anything that has not been pointed out already? 
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Annex 4.4 Consent form 
THE UNIVERSITYOýýOik 
Department of Health Sciences 
HYMS Building- second floor 
University of York 
Heslington, York YO10 5DD 
Tel: 01904 321916 
Fax: 01904 321920 
Consent form 
Email: hri22@york. ac. uk 
Please sign the form showing your consent to all of the following. 
"I am willing to be interviewed about the turnaround processes and performance 
improvement in an acute hospital Trust. 
"I understand that the interview will be audiotaped. 
"I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any time without 
giving a reason. 
"I understand that only the researcher (Hamid Ravaghi) and his supervisor have 
access to the information collected during the study. 
"1 am aware that the information collected during the interview will be used to write 
up a report on the project, as well as articles for journals. 
91 understand that information collected during the course of the research project 
will be treated as confidential. This means that my name, or any other information 
that could identify me, will not be included in anything written as a result of the 
research. 
"I understand that when this research is completed the information obtained will be 
retained in locked filing cabinets at storeroom of the Department of Health 
Sciences of University of York for 5 years and then will be destroyed. 
Interviewee's signature Date 
Interviewer's signature Date 
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Appendix 4.5 research Ethics Approval Letter 
Local Research Ethics Committee 
17 March 2005 
Dr Hamid Ravaghi 
Room 213 second floor 
HYMS Building 
Department of Health Sciences 
University of York 
Heslington 
York YO10 5DD 
Dear Dr Ravaghi 
Full title of study: Turnaround processes in NHS Acute hospital Trusts 
REC reference number: 05/Q1401/11 
Thank you for your letter of 14 March 2005, responding to the Committee's 
request for further information on the above research and submitting revised 
documentation. 
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the 
Vice-Chair. 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion 
for the above research on the basis described in the application form, protocol 
and supporting documentation as revised. 
The favourable opinion applies to the research sites listed on the attached form. 
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Conditions of approval 
The favourable opinion is given provided that you comply with the 
conditions set out in the attached document. You are advised to study the conditions carefully. 
Approved documents 
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is 
as follows: 
Document Type: Version: Dated: Received: 
Application 1 20/01 2005 24/01/2005 
Investigator CV CV for Dr 
Hamid Ravaghi 
25/12/2004 24/01/2005 
Investigator CV CV for Russell 
Mannion 
24/01/2005 
Protocol 1 lo o6/2004 24/01/2005 
Covering Letter 2 14/03/2005 14 03 2005 
Letter from Sponsor - 19/01/2005 24/01/2005 
Interview Schedules/Topic 
Guides 
1 20/10/2004 24/01/2005 
Participant Information Sheet 2 12/03 2005 14/03/200,5 
Participant Consent Form 1 20 12/2004 24 0l 2005 
Response to Request for 
Further Information 
1 14/03/2005 14/03/2005 
Management approval 
The study should not commence at any NHS site until the local 
Principal Investigator has obtained final management approval from 
the R&D Department for the relevant NHS care organisation. 
Membership of the Committee 
The members of the Ethics Committee who were present at the meeting 
are listed on the attached sheet. 
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Notification of other bodies 
The Committee Administrator will notify the research sponsor and the R&D 
Departments for the NHS care organisations that the study has a favourable 
ethical opinion. 
Statement of compliance 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance 
Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and 
complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research 
Ethics Committees in the UK. 
I 05/Q1401/il Please quote this number on all correspondence 




Enclosures: Standard approval conditions 
Site approval form (SF1) 
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Appendix 4.6 Research Governance Approval Letter 
South Manchester University Hospitals 
Research & Development Directorate NHS Trust 
Ground Floor, Education & Research Centre, Wythenshawe Hospital 
Tel: 0161 291 5777/5770, Fax: 5771 
Email: Ihine(aifs1 
, with. man. ac. uk 
Ref: AM/LH/ProjApp/ApprvOO86 (2005M0001) 
18 March 2005 
Dr Hamid Ravaghi 
Room 213, HYMS Building 
Department of Health Sciences 
University of York 
Heslington 
York YO10 5DD 
Dear Dr Ravaghi 
Re: Turnaround processes in NHS Acute hospital Trusts 
R&D Ref: 2005MG001 






Tel: 0161 998 7070 
Thank you for providing us with a copy of the letter confirming ethical approval for the above study. 
This research project has now been given R&D Management Approval. 
We are required by the Department of Health to report research carried out within this Trust to the 
National Research Register (NRR). This is carried out on a quarterly basis, and is published on 
the Internet. The details for this project are shown on the attached summary. If you have any 
changes to make, or you do not wish these details to appear on the NRR, please reply to Laura 
Hine, R&D Information Officer, at the address shown above. 
Please note it is a requirement of the approval given by the Trust that the research project is being 
conducted in line with the guidance given within the Research Governance Framework as issued by 
the DoH: (http: //www. doh. qov. uk/research/rd3/nhsrandd/researchqoverance/qov/home. htm) 
Alternatively from the R&D website http: //www. smuht. man. ac. uk/rd/, click on the governance link. 
May I also draw to your attention the need to comply with both the Health & Safety at Work Act and 
the Data Protection Act. 
Thank you for your assistance. If you require any further information please do not hesitate to 
contact us on the above numbers. 
Yours sincerely 
4- 
Dr Andrew Maines 







INS 1". S"fUH Iv 1"I: ß rý. r 
Chairman - Jeff Wilner Chief Executive - Peter Morris 
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